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Abstract 
This work considers the moral obligations agents have in relation to global 
poverty.  Utilising a practical ethics approach, it aims to provide an account of 
obligation that is explicitly political.  It proposes that moral decency requires 
agents to be concerned with the justice of the social structures to which they 
contribute.  Unjust social structures are treated as the aggregative effect of many 
human actions and institutions. The thesis argues that poverty indicates injustice 
in these structures.  It proposes that those who make on-going contributions to 
these structures have an obligation to make reasonable efforts to prevent 
injustice in them.  It explains that these efforts are required as a necessary 
precaution to avoid contributing to essentially aggregative harm. 
The interconnectedness of global economies means that actions and practices in 
one state can have a dramatic effect on the conditions faced by residents of 
another state. Currently a significant portion of the world’s population lives in 
social conditions where they are vulnerable to serious deprivation and 
domination.  The thesis argues that the combined effect of these facts and the 
norm elucidated above is that agents around the world have an obligation to work 
together to prevent the continuance of this situation.  It argues that each 
individual has an obligation to make efforts to form a collective to prevent 
structural injustice as a precaution against contributing to structural injustice. 
The original contribution of this thesis is to propose that there are precautionary 
duties in relation to global poverty. These duties require agents to work together 
with others through political action to alter the structures that give rise to global 
poverty. The aim of this thesis is to establish this obligation, define its meaning, 
and defend it against various challenges.  
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Preface 
At the end of a project of this length it is inevitable to be disappointed to some 
extent with what you have produced. Wishing for more time or space to cover all 
the interesting questions that have emerged during the project is no doubt 
inevitable. However, it’s good to have to finish a piece of work because it gives 
one the chance to offer a proper snap shot of one’s thinking at a particular time 
that can be given to someone else to read. 
I believe that there are some important things that need to be said in the debate 
concerning poverty and obligation. In this thesis I hope to have made some 
significant points and worked through the reasoning behind some common 
convictions in the global justice movement. In this way I hope to have contributed 
to the literature. The inspiration for this thesis was the conviction that there is 
something terribly wrong with how the problem of poverty and obligation is 
currently understood. I hope to have produced a thesis that challenges this 
understanding. 
This is a work of political philosophy. It approaches the subject matter in the 
Socratic tradition. This tradition is described by Raymond Geuss as one that asks: 
“You there, think about what you are saying and doing… don’t contradict 
yourself… act on the results of these reflections” (Geuss, 2010, p. 31). I have 
written this thesis in the confidence that an approach that starts from everyday 
judgements, understandings and practices and proceeds to reason them through 
systematically and carefully has much to offer the realm of moral and political 
questions. 
Writing this thesis has been a sort of torturous joy. It has been frustrating and 
isolating at times and adjusting to the practice of spending large portions of my 
time reading and writing alone has been a difficult process. I have been lucky 
enough to study in a department in which there have been plenty of 
opportunities to interact with other theorists, discuss political questions and offer 
mutual support. This has made the process of learning how to research and write 
considerably easier. 
I feel blessed to have had the opportunity to dedicate four years to pursuing a set 
of questions that deeply interest me. I believe the subject matter of this thesis to 
be both interesting and important and getting to work on it has been a privilege. 
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In an age where very few people have the opportunity to pursue work that they 
find valuable and interesting I feel incredibly lucky to have had this experience. 
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Introduction: Global Poverty, Injustice and Obligation to 
take Political Action 
This thesis is an investigation of the moral obligations agents from affluent 
countries have in relation to global poverty; it considers the obligations that 
follow from the gross inequality in prospects and conditions of people around the 
world. Global inequality is dramatic: the income of the quintile with the highest 
annual incomes is 80% of all income, whereas the poorest quintile’s income is just 
1% of total income (Ortiz & Cummins, 2011, p. 19).1 Furthermore, those at the 
poor end of this inequality suffer terrible living conditions. 50,000 people die 
every day of hunger or hunger related causes (Pogge, 2008, p. 3).  These people 
die due to a lack of access to resources which are essential to sustain their lives 
and maintain their health.2 Both the extent of the global poverty and the 
extremity of global inequality imply that current social relations are radically 
unjust. The relative and absolute position of the poorest people is serious enough 
to attract widespread agreement that some sort of action is morally required.3 
The poverty and inequality is so extreme that those with radically different 
theories of the requirements of social justice can agree that the current global 
distribution of resources and opportunities is unjust, provided they agree that 
demands of social justice apply globally. 
In addition, a weaker bargaining position at international trade talks also prevents 
many poorer states from growing wealthier quicker. Global trade agreements are 
negotiated on grounds of mutual benefit and the agreements tend to reflect the 
power relations between the contracting parties. As a result they tend to benefit 
                                                          
1
 If the distribution of wealth is considered, inequality is even higher: the wealthiest 10% 
of the global population possess 85% of the total wealth whereas the poorer 50% owns 
less than 1% (Davies, et al., 2008, p. 7). The Gini coefficient for wealth globally is predicted 
to be 89.2, much higher than wealth Gini coefficients for France Germany and the UK. It is 
even more than notoriously unequal societies like Brazil or the USA (ILO, 2008) and 
(Davies, et al., 2008) in (Ortiz & Cummins, 2011). The global Gini coefficient for income is 
thought to be between 0.630 and 0.686 (in the 1990s) much higher than nation income 
Gini coefficients for Brazil and the USA and double that of France (27.8) and Germany 
(31.1) (ILO, 2008) (Sudhir & Segal, 2008). The Gini coefficient is a commonly used measure 
of inequality. A Gini of 0 represents perfect equality and a Gini of 1 indicates that one 
person has all the thing being measured. 
2
 In the UK there are deaths every year as a result of fuel poverty. These individuals die 
because they cannot afford to heat their homes sufficiently to survive the winter. These 
deaths suggest that a portion of the UK population is vulnerable to significant deprivation. 
3
 Almost all philosophical discussion of the question suggests that there are some moral 
obligations to take poverty alleviating action. Disagreement surrounds how much action 
must be taken and whether it is owed as a duty of justice or humanity. 
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poorer parties minimally whilst providing greater benefits to affluent parties. As a 
result they tend to increase inter-state inequality even if they succeed in lessening 
the absolute poverty of citizens of poorer states.4  In these conditions global inter-
personal inequality is likely to increase and extreme poverty is likely to be reduced 
at an extremely slow pace (if at all). Thomas Pogge has presented evidence that 
supports this conjecture. He compares growth in GNI per capita of the poorest 
states containing a total 10% of the global population with the growth in GNI per 
capita of the richest states that together contain 10% of the global population. 
The richer countries have enjoyed growth of 15.7-22.7 times that of the poorer 
countries. Both sets of countries are increasing their GNI. However the growth in 
the GNI of the rich countries is on average 20 times that of the poor states and 
these countries start with a much larger GNI than the poorer countries. If this 
trend continues, then inter-state inequality will continue to increase rather than 
decrease or stagnate (Pogge, 2010, p. 96). 
The extent of avoidable poverty and increasing inequality rightly attracts moral 
concern. The seriousness of the situation and the belief that practical reasoning 
can help to elucidate what agents must do in response to it motivate this inquiry. 
The facts concerning global poverty and inequality provoke some members of 
affluent welfare capitalist societies to question the morality of doing nothing to 
alleviate this poverty. This can be seen in the existence of people who commit to 
donate substantial portions of their income to charitable organisations that seek 
to alleviate extreme deprivation (Giving What We Can, 2012). The same facts also 
provoke individuals around the world to question the justice of the national and 
global institutions that at best fail to prevent this poverty and inequality and at 
worst perpetuate it. This can be seen in the existence of social justice movements 
that protests against current trends in globalization. This movement has been 
visible in protests against the World Trade Organisation (WTO) since the Seattle 
                                                          
4
 Absolute poverty will not be decreased as a state’s GNI per capita increases unless some 
of that growth goes to the poorer members of the society. The lack of welfare provisions, 
low taxation and low wages for the poorest in poorer states suggest that very little of this 
growth will result in increasing income or resources for the poorest members of society. 
Studies of intra-state inequality suggest that in many states the bottom-decile’s relative 
share of GNI is very small. This means that their portion of the benefits of growth is likely 
to be very small indeed. As a result growth in a poor state is unlikely to result in a radical 
decrease in poverty (Pogge, 2010, pp. 97-100). For example growth in GNI of 236% in 
China the poorest decile’s income increased only 75% (Pogge, 2010, p. 100). It is also 
important to bear in mind that an increase in inequality even in the face of an 
improvement in income can lead to domination and losing out on positional goods. This 
can increase poverty all things considered. 
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WTO talks in 1999 (Smith, 2001).5 The conviction that there is something unjust 
about both current levels of poverty and inequality worldwide and the political 
institutions that permit it offer a starting point for practical reasoning. This thesis 
aims to explore reasons that can support this conviction and will produce a moral 
argument in support of radical political action. 
The stark contrast between the conditions and prospects of the comfortably off 
citizens of affluent societies and the extreme poverty faced by much of the global 
population has led moral philosophers and political theorists in affluent states to 
question the justice of current conditions and consider what moral obligations 
agents have in the light of this radical difference in prospects and outcomes. 
These questions have been the subject of widespread philosophical debate since 
Peter Singer’s 1972 article on famine and affluence (Singer, 1972).  
In this article, in a style characteristic of the Practical Ethics movement, Singer 
attempts to persuade people to alter their behaviour through reasoned argument 
(Jamieson, 1999). In the hopes of provoking social change, Singer reasons from 
widely held premises to radical moral demands. In this thesis I aim to emulate 
Singer’s method by arguing from widely accepted moral premises to radical 
conclusions about the moral demands that fall upon individuals living in affluent 
states.6  However, unlike Singer, I aim to develop an account that is explicitly 
political. In this thesis an account is developed which analyses the social and 
political context in which poverty emerges and considers the possibility of using 
either collective action or institutional change to permanently prevent poverty.  
In the decades following Singer’s ground breaking paper an extensive literature on 
the topic of global justice has emerged.7 This literature considers what demands 
of justice apply globally and what global institutions must be established or 
                                                          
5
 The World Trade Organisation is a global organisation that establishes trade rules at a 
global or near-global level. Its stated purpose is to liberalize trade (World Trade 
Organisation, 2013). 
6
 These widely shared premises may be particular to the populations of western European 
states. These people are the primarily addressees of this argument. If they recognise a 
commitment to these premises, I argue that they must also be committed to taking radical 
political action to address global poverty through structural changes to the global 
economic system. However, it is my hope that these premises can be supported by all 
those committed to living in a way that is justifiable to others. Thus I hope that the 
reasoning put forward in this thesis can apply universally. This dual purpose will be 
discussed in the method section of this chapter. 
7
 Some examples of this literature include (O'Neill, 1986) (Shue, 1996) (Nielsen, 2003) 
(Nagel, 2005) (Caney, 2005) (Miller, 2007) (Pogge, 2008) (Hayden, 2010) (Miller, 2010) 
(Valentini, 2011) (Young, 2011) and (Gilabert, 2012).  
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reformed to comply with these demands. Some of this literature also considers 
the moral obligations that fall on citizens of affluent states. It is my aim to add to 
this literature by building on the work of Iris Young (Young, 2011) to combine a 
structural understanding of global poverty with an account of precautionary 
obligations to take political action. 
Morality is often regarded as demanding that agents treat each other decently in 
their direct relations. In this thesis it is argued that moral decency requires that 
agents must also be concerned with the justice of the social arrangements that 
they help to reproduce and maintain. This thesis suggests that extreme poverty 
and inequality indicates injustice in social arrangements. It argues that obligations 
with regards to social justice are not limited to positive obligations to support or 
promote just states of affairs and support just institutional arrangements.8 
My account treats social conditions as the aggregative result of many human 
actions, practices and institutions. It suggests that when these social conditions 
are radically unjust those agents who make on-going contributions to those 
conditions have an obligation to make reasonable efforts to prevent future 
injustice. I explain that these efforts are required as a necessary precaution in 
order to avoid contributing to morally significant essentially aggregative harm. 9 
The interconnectedness of global economies and the fact that actions and 
practices of citizens in one country can have a dramatic effect on the conditions 
faced by others means that at present agents in affluent countries contribute to 
social conditions in poorer countries. A large portion of the world’s population 
currently consists of people who occupy inferior social positions. These people are 
extremely vulnerable to serious deprivation and domination. This thesis argues 
that the facts about global inequality and interconnectedness in combination with 
the norm elucidated above lead to the conclusion that agents in all countries have 
an obligation to work towards permanently altering these arrangements. 
In this introductory chapter the motivation behind the thesis is explained and the 
question of why it is necessary to re-examine the relationship between injustice 
                                                          
8
 Such obligations are discussed in the work of John Rawls, Henry Shue and Simon Caney 
(Rawls, 1999) (Shue, 1996) (Caney, 2005). 
9
 In this work I do not tackle the important question of whether those who contributed to 
past social injustice are liable to compensate those who suffered as a result. This is an 
interesting question that has been discussed at length in the literature (Miller, 2007) 
(Pasternak, 2011) (Jubb, 2012). 
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and moral obligation is explored. Then some further applications of the obligation 
proposed here are outlined and the question of why our assumptions need to be 
interrogated and revised is discussed. Finally, I will explain the method I will be 
using to establish and justify my normative conclusions.  
Motivation 
Reforming Moral Obligations for an Interconnected World 
Samuel Scheffler has argued that common understandings of morality are very 
good at making normative assessments when it comes to one-on-one 
interactions. It is fairly easy to assess what is required of agents in these scenarios 
because consequences can be easily attributed to particular agent’s choices. 
However, Scheffler suggests that our normative accounts and moral intuitions 
often break down when it comes to the effects our actions have in combination 
with the actions of others (Scheffler 2001, 39). Scheffler notes that modern life 
does not just consist of individual actions and consequences that can be 
attributed to a sole individual. He notes that people’s lives “are structured to an 
unprecedented degree by large, impersonal institutions and bureaucracies” 
(Scheffler 2001, 40). These institutions have “profound effects on the lives of 
people worldwide, and serve to link the fates of people in different parts of the 
world in multiple ways.”  
Scheffler recognises that agents tend not to take seriously the idea that they can 
be at fault for contributing to an unjust situation when that situation is the result 
of thousands of similar actions (Scheffler, 2001, p. 39). Derek Parfit identifies that 
this is a mistake in his discussion of the fact that very small contributions to a 
good or bad situation should matter (Parfit 1986, 67-86). Parfit also recognises 
that a very small chance of making the difference between a good and a bad 
outcome can also matter when the difference between the two outcomes is 
significant (Parfit 1986, 73-74). Scheffler also draws attention to another problem, 
the fact that individual agents acting unilaterally have very little power to 
influence the outcomes which emanate from the institutions in which they 
participate (Scheffler 2001, 43). He also notes that agents who contribute to 
outcomes through participating in institutions very rarely intend to produce these 
outcomes (Scheffler 2001, 44).  
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Scheffler’s assessment suggests that we must consider what obligations follow 
from the social order agents live under and reproduce. I believe that the reality 
Scheffler describes requires us to consider our indirect responsibilities in addition 
to our direct responsibilities. A specific analysis of the obligations agents have as a 
result of the social arrangements they live under and contribute to is required 
because the features of agents’ relationships with social arrangements, identified 
by Scheffler and Parfit, mean that regular moral analysis designed to deal with 
interactional cases fails to make sense of the situation.  As Iris Young recognises in 
her recent account of responsibility for justice, we must consider our relations 
with institutions, both as participators who help shape them and as agents who 
relate to the social structures that result from that institutional order as an 
objective reality (Young 2011, 55).  
Scheffler suggest that the issues he identifies are a particular problem for modern 
times; that both mass society and globalisation are modern developments with 
which our moral understandings have failed to keep up (Scheffler 2001, 39). 
However, Young identifies the neglect of analysis of responsibility for what she 
calls ‘structural injustice’ as due to the recent shift in political discourse to an 
emphasis on personal responsibility and a false belief that individual responsibility 
and social responsibility are mutually exclusive (Young 2011, 3-4). 
Perhaps the neglect of responsibility for institutional orders or the social 
structures they lead to runs deeper than the recent emphasis on personal 
responsibility. In the field of liberal political philosophy there has traditionally 
been an emphasis on negative liberty and private freedom over political action 
and ‘the liberty of the ancients’, as Hannah Arendt laments in her work on the 
political sphere and mass society (Arendt 1958). Liberal political philosophy 
traditionally prioritises the problem of ensuring state power is only used justly and 
legitimately over considering the political rights and responsibilities agents have 
with respect to justice.  
The publication of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice led to a shift in liberal political 
philosophy. This is because it addressed the justice of the institutional order 
within a society rather than the legitimacy of state action (Rawls, 1971). In 
concentrating on the institutional order as a whole Rawls differs from more 
libertarian standpoints by considering state omissions as of equal importance to 
state actions (Pogge, 1989). My contention is that Rawls’ normative assessment of 
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the institutional order requires a complementary assessment of political duties for 
ensuring justice in that order. If the purpose of an assessment of justice is to bring 
about a more just world, it follows that there is no point in assessing the justice of 
anything without charging some agent with responsibility for ensuring that it 
becomes just. 
Political Engagement 
In this thesis I argue that there are obligations that fall on all people which require 
that they take an interest in the social structures to which they contribute.  This 
analysis suggests that political engagement is not an optional lifestyle choice but 
an obligation owed to others. In liberal political philosophy there has traditionally 
been an emphasis on the individual and individual responsibility. This has often 
been accompanied by a rejection of the concept of the community and collective 
responsibility. This is because such understandings could lead to the domination 
of individuals by society and legitimise abhorrent practices like collective 
punishment. However, this rejection of collective responsibility has been 
accompanied by the rejection of civic duties and social responsibility. There has 
thus been little concern for the result of the amalgamation of the actions of many 
distinct actors.  
The only political duty regularly discussed in liberal political philosophy concerns 
whether there is an obligation to obey the law. This suggests agents are only 
responsible for their own direct actions and are free to avoid engaging in political 
activity. Political philosophies like civic humanism based on participation in 
politics and direct democracy have been rejected by most liberals as forms of 
perfectionism which enforce a particular lifestyle choice or theory of the good on 
all of society (Lovett, 2013).  Furthermore, modern Republicans have 
concentrated on liberty as non-domination rather than liberty as self-rule (Pettit, 
1996). The communitarian backlash against liberal political philosophy has 
predominantly concentrated on the privatisation of social and cultural life 
inherent in liberalisms limiting the role of the state (Sandel 1998) (Taylor 1985). 
However, communitarians have noted that political life has also effectively been 
privatised. Political participation has been reduced by liberals to a lifestyle choice 
or private conception of the good that must not be enforced on others. However 
it could be that political participation is instrumentally important to ensuring 
justice and taking part in such action could be something that is owed to others. 
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John Rawls and Henry Shue are exceptions to this general neglect to consider 
obligations to be politically engaged. Rawls recognises a natural duty to support 
and comply with just institutions (Rawls, 1999, p. 99). The obligation Rawls 
identifies is a positive duty to support and obey existing institutions. Henry Shue 
develops an account of the obligations agents have in relation to the frustration of 
basic socio-economic rights. His account recognises that the fulfilment of a human 
right attracts a duty to protect that right that falls on others as well as a duty not 
to deprive others of their rights and a duty to assist those who have had their 
rights violated. His account calls on agents to protect human rights from violation 
by individuals, companies or institutions by developing just governing institutions 
(Shue, 1996, pp. 17, 45-65). This is a positive duty to protect others from harm. 
Thus Shue and Rawls both identify positive duties to support or establish justice 
ensuring institutions. In contrast this thesis will attempt to derive obligations to 
establish and maintain such institutions from the negative duty to avoid harming 
others.10  
The dominance of market economics and its acceptance by a wide range of 
political thinkers could explain the neglect of discussions concerning obligations to 
participate politically. In a market based system the main means of shaping the 
institutional order to suit the tastes and values of citizens is through their exiting 
those organisations which fail to reflect their interests or values. Living under such 
a model often leads to the unconscious neglect of the possibility of voicing 
concern or campaigning for change rather than expressing displeasure through 
exit.  
As Albert Hirschman elucidates in Exit Voice and Loyalty, agents who disapprove 
of an institution can either exit the institution or voice that objection (Hirschman 
1970). In moral analysis negative duties to avoid harming others often demand 
agents exit collectives or institutions which are harmful to others. I propose that, 
in some situations where harm is the result of a collective practice or the 
amalgamation of actions, what may be morally required is not exit but voice. It is 
my contention that in moral philosophy the possibility of an obligation to voice 
opposition has been largely overlooked. When an institution does harm to others 
it seems obvious that those participating in it have a duty to exit. However, in 
many such circumstances exit is both extremely costly and less effective at 
                                                          
10
 Although Shue’s account does identify negative duties not to frustrate the rights of 
others he does not develop this duty to include obligations to establish institutions. 
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promoting the good than voicing an objection and trying to establish collective 
change.11 
Often a morally significant bad situation is the predictable result of on-going social 
practices, trends in human action, and the concrete results of past action. There 
are a diverse range of cases in which no individual factor or action can be 
identified as the sole, or even most relevant, cause. These examples range from 
environmental problems such as human-accelerated climate change to economic 
problems, such as the prevalence of poverty wages in manufacturing worldwide, 
to social problems such as the unreasonable grooming standards expected of 
women in many cultures. Those who contribute to these social problems do not 
intend the outcomes of climate change, poverty, or gender oppression, 
respectively. Furthermore, in some cases contributors are unable to avoid 
contributing and in others such action comes with substantial personal and social 
cost. Worse still, those who contribute often regard avoiding such contributions 
as futile because such a change in behaviour would have no significant effect on 
the social problem in question.  
In the modern world a number of serious global problems have become apparent. 
Often these problems are the cumulative result of the contributions of billions of 
people residing in a variety of states and different regions of the world. There are 
various global environmental problems. There are also significant problems within 
the global economy and concerning access to that economy. Widespread poverty 
and extreme inequality indicate such problems. The analysis here suggests that 
those who contribute to these problems have obligations to work with others to 
establish collective solutions to these problems: that they must establish a 
collective system of regulation and adjustment that allows them to prevent the 
essentially aggregative harm from emerging. I argue that negative duties to avoid 
harming others require this in addition to obligations to promote the common 
good and the rational demands of prudence. 
                                                          
11
 The denial of voice as a means to fulfilling an obligation to avoid harm is particularly 
problematic because ties of loyalty and practical circumstances can leave some agents 
unable or unwilling to exit in spite of disapproval. Furthermore, not all agents have equal 
ability to set up alternative practices and organisations, in which case exit may not be an 
option for them. Additionally, agents are often tied to organisations by cultural 
commitment or loyalty. Some agents may even lack the means to maintain themselves 
and their happiness outside of a particular organisation. For these reasons, it is vital that 
voice remains an option. 
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However, the obstacles standing in the way of the establishment of just and 
legitimate solutions to these problems are immense. Coordination across 
continents is difficult. Furthermore, the majority of the world’s population are too 
consumed with the daily struggles of poverty to work on these problems.12 
However, many individuals in affluent countries like those of Western Europe 
have the necessary time, resources and political environment to make progress 
on these issues possible. Yet, a significant portion of the populations of these 
affluent countries is uncooperative and averse to taking political action.13 Despite 
these difficulties it is my hope that the analysis here can be helpfully applied to 
some of these problems. The seriousness of these problems should be sufficient 
to outweigh these difficulties and give reason to justify an obligation to work 
towards finding just and legitimate solutions to these problems. 
Method 
Practical Ethics 
It is widely accepted that there are certain standards we should live up to in our 
relations with others. In this thesis I adopt a model of moral reasoning associated 
with practical ethics; this method involves reasoning from widely held moral 
principles and intuitions to make radical demands. Utilising this method, Peter 
Singer and Thomas Pogge argue from intuitively plausible and well-established 
moral principles to extremely demanding conclusions. They use well-established 
duties along with factual premises to show that certain actions are morally 
required in current circumstances. Singer reasons from a moral obligation to 
rescue others in danger to an obligation to give away a large portion of one’s 
income to Aid Agencies (Singer, 2009). Thomas Pogge argues from obligations to 
avoid harming others to a demand to take political action or donate to Aid 
Agencies or take part in political action (Pogge, 2008). Both the duty not to harm 
others and the duty to rescue others are moral obligations that demand agents 
alter their behaviour and actions out of consideration for others.14 I share Pogge’s 
                                                          
12
 There are some political developments that suggest that the peoples of many countries 
are prepared to take political action to oppose injustice (National Staff, 2011) (BBC, 2013) 
(Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, 2013). 
13
 Some recent political developments suggest that a significant sector of some European 
countries are not averse to taking such action and thus that the situation is not as 
hopeless as it may appear (Robinson, 2011) (BBC, 2013). 
14
 I use the term consideration in order to capture both concern for the welfare or 
wellbeing of others and respect for the autonomy or dignity of others. The term 
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aim of connecting normative standards in global socio-economic arrangements to 
the obligations of ordinary people. Thus I aim to examine the complex 
relationship between individuals and the institutional orders which they interact 
within and reproduce. 
Peter Singer did much to develop the ‘Practical Ethics’ approach to moral 
philosophy. This approach seeks to connect moral philosophy to issues of public 
concern. It is based on the belief that the rigour and clarity of philosophical 
reasoning could contribute productively to these debates. In Animal Liberation, 
Singer articulated the beliefs and justifications behind the growing movement of 
people refusing to eat animal products. Singer used ordinary language and well 
accepted premises to reach his conclusions and challenge current practices. His 
aim was to communicate directly with meat eaters and convince them using 
moral reasoning to alter their practice on the basis that it contradicted the moral 
convictions they already endorsed. This project appears to have been successful in 
persuading some people to alter their behaviour.15 Dale Jamieson has claimed 
that the book was influential in turning a small number of animal welfare 
organisations in to a vibrant social movement (Jamieson, 1999, p. 5). Singer sees 
moral and political theory as offering a route to reform and to revolutionising 
practice (Jamieson, 1999, p. 6). In this respect he follows the example of fellow 
utilitarians Bentham and Mill. 
Thomas Pogge aims to contribute to a similar project. His work aims to seek out 
and remove serious faults in our current practices that may be going ignored. This 
explains why he seeks to base his arguments on widespread consensus rather 
than on his own reasoned convictions. Thus he focuses on negative duties in order 
to keep his arguments ‘widely acceptable’ (Pogge, 2010, p. 28). Pogge wishes to 
persuade those who only accept negative duties that they have obligations to the 
global poor and thus he relies only on premises that they can accept.  
In his approach, Singer aims to change the world one person at a time; to change 
social policy through persuading enough individuals to alter their behaviour 
                                                                                                                                                   
‘consideration’ avoids committing moral judgements to being about either respect or care 
and thereby allows for a plural approach. Considering others can in some cases require 
showing respect and in other cases acting on the basis of concern for their well-being. 
Which approach is required is a matter of dispute. However, it is plausible that both can 
be morally required. 
15
 I have met people who have never studied philosophy who have adopted vegetarianism 
as a result of reading the book. 
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(Jamieson, 1999, p. 7). This approach is limited in that it seeks to get individuals to 
alter their behaviour unilaterally rather than to establish collective or institutional 
change. To overcome this limitation my account will consider the possibility that 
there are individual obligations to take part in collective action and/or to establish 
institutional change. The account will consider obligations to work with others to 
alter institutions, rather than simply convincing people to change their private 
personal action. 
There is a potential problem with starting from those obligations, norms or 
intuitions on which there is widespread consensus. It is likely that these starting 
points will be influenced by society in several ways that may make them 
problematic. Firstly there may be bias in favour of those groups who are currently 
dominant in society. As Brian Barry points out, current ideas are likely to be 
influenced by those who are currently powerful. Thus current understandings of 
obligation in patriarchal societies are likely to be bias in favour of the interests of 
men (Barry, 1996, p. 10).  Barry is right to be concerned that public norms and 
understandings of duties are likely to be influenced by the distribution of power 
within society. He argues that those in positions of power are likely to have a 
greater ability to influence public norms and expectations. As a result these norms 
are likely to reflect the interests and perspectives of these power holders. Thus he 
suggests that current judgements or existing consensuses on question of social 
justice should be used only selectively and if they fit with a wider moral theory 
(Barry, 1991, p. 10). He also suggests that in more equal societies these 
judgements are more likely to accurately reflect the requirements of justice. This 
is because he understands justice to be that which would be agreed to by well-
informed people in a situation of equal power who are motivated to live by norms 
that none of them can reasonably reject. 
Barry’s concern draws attention to the fact that arguments in political theory 
must question intuitions and assessments of fairness and justice. Feminists have 
for many years argued that the intuitions of women in a patriarchal society may 
be biased and support the dominance of men. For example, Iris Young has argued 
that unconscious stereotyping leads people to associate particular groups with 
particular characteristics and ideas. This can result in changes in treatment that 
are insulting or undermine the ability of those stereotyped to be taken seriously 
or judged fairly (Young, 1990, pp. 122-155). These unconscious associations could 
also affect moral judgements and intuitions. Thus it is vital to be aware of these 
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tendencies and to question judgements and intuitions for biases. Similarly it is 
vital to look out for a bias towards oneself and one’s own society or class in 
utilising moral intuitions. Research suggests that people have a tendency to treat 
their own group more favourably than an out-group (Harris & Abbink, 2012, p. 2). 
Singer thinks that relying on what people generally think we should do is a bad 
way to establish what should be done (Jamieson, 1999, p. 6). Popular views and 
understandings of moral obligations are likely to be influenced by the way society 
is currently organised. Furthermore, people are likely to have a tendency to 
favour their own interests or the interests of their group in making moral 
judgements. In conducting moral and political analysis it is vital to be aware of 
these tendencies and to be particularly suspicious of norms or interpretations that 
favour the more powerful. In my approach I will try to take on board these 
worries and insights.16  
One of the limitations of Singer’s examination of poverty and obligation is that it 
appears to reflect a bias in favour of affluent individuals and powerful states. In 
considering only unilateral action Singer fails to consider revolutionary activity 
that threatens current power structures. Private donation or international aid 
payments do not disrupt the current global economic system. Thus it does not 
upset the dominance and affluence that current elites enjoy. It does not threaten 
their power or wealth. In contrast global economic change would threaten the 
current global order and undermine the global elite’s ability to determine the 
course of globalisation and would no doubt prevent them from reaping such a 
large proportion of the benefits of global trade. In contrast my account will 
consider the possibility of using political action to prevent poverty rather than 
offering money to alleviate poverty. 
Furthermore, in treating poverty as an unfortunate state of affairs requiring aid, 
rather than examining the causes of poverty, Singer reflects a picture that 
probably suits the interests of the powerful. In doing so Singer avoids relying on 
controversial premises about the causes of poverty. However, by refusing to 
consider the causes of poverty Singer lets those who cause the problem off the 
hook. It is likely that global elites are at least partially responsible for on-going 
                                                          
16
 Realist thinker Raymond Geuss suggests that we must also investigate the genealogy of 
norms and understandings in order to reveal their biases. Geuss suggests that we can 
discredit ideas and intuitions by demonstrating their dependence on the continued 
existence of particular configurations of power (Geuss, 2008, p. 52). 
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poverty. If this is true, in ignoring the causes of poverty Singer reflects their 
interests. In this investigation the causes of poverty will be considered.  
The above discussion shows that there is a balance to be struck between starting 
from widely shared normative premises and questioning current understandings 
in order to make moral progress. It also shows that in reasoning from widely 
shared normative assumptions it is important to consider whether those 
assumptions support the interests of the powerful. It also suggests that in 
choosing which facts to rely on in normative analysis it is important to be careful 
to avoid making choices that favour your own interests or those of the powerful. 
Moral Reasoning 
In this thesis I argue from plausible and widely held moral convictions to a 
demand to take radical political action. In doing so I seek to show the large 
number of individuals who rightly recognise that we all have these basic moral 
duties, that these duties require that they take part in political action that aims to 
address global economic injustice.  
The aim of my account is not to provide an argument that applies only to those 
who share a particular set of commitments. I argue from premises that are widely 
understood to be demands that can reasonably be made of all people. I am 
committed to the view that there are such universally applicable moral norms. 
Thus, the conclusions reached in this thesis are supposed to apply universally 
rather than just to those who share a particular commitment.  
Thus, in this account I appeal to the idea that there are moral obligations and 
moral reasons that apply to all people. I will now say a bit about what I mean by 
moral obligations and reasons. I will briefly discuss the justification behind making 
universal moral demands. However, I will not develop a full defence of universal 
moral obligations here. Nor will a detailed framework for identifying these 
demands be outlined and justified. Such projects are beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Instead, I will discuss what is meant by a moral obligation or a moral 
reason in this thesis. An account of what moral obligations are and how they can 
be identified will be sketched. An account of how moral reasoning will be 
conducted in this thesis will also be outlined. However, the reasoning utilised in 
this thesis is not dependent on the particular account outlined here. If the sketch 
of what moral norms and reasons are, and how they can be identified, turns out 
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to be invalid this will not undermine the account of obligation made in this thesis. 
This is because the account only relies on the validity of some account of moral 
obligations and moral reasoning. 
R. M. Hare understood that moral norms prescribe action (Hare, 1983, p. 1). The 
practice of citing moral obligations is a case of asserting that agents should do or 
refrain from doing something. Thus morality prescribes certain acts and 
proscribes others. It gives practical guidance concerning what should and should 
not be done. However, recognising moral statements as prescribing or proscribing 
tells us nothing about the grounds on which the prescription or proscription is 
being demanded. There are many different grounds on which it can be argued 
that someone should do something. In this account I rely on the idea that there is 
a distinctive sort of moral proscriptions and prescriptions. These demands apply 
to all agents and are demanded out of consideration for others. 
Jürgen Habermas has argued that moral reasoning must be distinguished from 
two other sorts of practical reasoning (Habermas, 2001, pp. 1-19) (Forst, 2012, pp. 
62-78). In this account I follow Habermas and Rainer Forst in adopting this three-
way division of different sorts of reasoning. Pragmatic practical reasoning argues 
that an agent should perform some action because it will fulfil their aims or 
further their interests. Pragmatic reasoning starts from an agent’s aims or desires. 
It reasons from these desires to recommendations as to what an agent should do 
(Habermas, 2001, p. 3).  Thus it offers hypothetical imperatives that apply to 
agents only if they have particular aims. Peter Singer distinguishes prudential frm 
moral and ethical reasoning. He explains that giving prudential reasons to justify 
an actioon does not count as providing a normative argument (Singer, 1999, p. 
10). Prudential justifications of action show that they are in an agent’s interests. 
Thus such reasoning can rationally persuade an individual to act (or not act) in a 
particular way. However, to an outsider it can only explain an individual’s action. 
It does not justify to an outsider why they should not object to the action in 
question.17 This is because such reasoning does not show that the action in 
question meets moral standards. 
Habermas and Forst distinguish ethical standards from moral standards. In this 
account, ethical standards are understood as being based on a particular value 
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 This is something that Rainer Forst identifies in The Right to Justification (Forst, 2012, p. 
15).  
27 
 
system or way of understanding the world. This value system or comprehensive 
world view may be held only by a particular agent themselves or it may be shared 
locally or by a particular sub-culture within the community. Ethical reasoning 
argues that an individual should take a certain courses of action because it is in 
accordance with a particular understanding of the good life or is required by the 
values and the aims that an individual endorses on reflection.18 The distinction 
between the moral and the ethical somewhat follows the distinction between 
justice and a particular conception of the good life in Rawls’s earlier work (Rawls, 
1971) or the distinction between a comprehensive moral doctrine and a political 
conception in Rawls’s later work (Rawls, 1996). It is similar in that Habermas uses 
these two categories of reasoning in order to differentiate between norms and 
reasons that apply universally and norms and reasoning that only apply to those 
who share a particular values scheme or conception of the good life. 
Moral reasoning applies when an agent’s choices affect the interests of others. 
Where there are conflicts of interests moral reasons can arbitrate a solution that 
both parties have reason to accept. The role of moral standards is to regulate such 
conflicts in an impartial manner (Habermas, 2001, p. 5). Almost all human actions 
and choice affect the interests of others. Thus moral reasons can regulate most 
action. 
Ethical demands arise from an individual or community’s deep commitments and 
standards to prescribe or proscribe certain actions. Ethics offers what Bernard 
Williams calls internal reasons: it offers reasons based on a particular motivational 
set (Williams, 1981). When agents share a set of community values or a religious 
outlook they can engage in shared ethical reasoning. This reasoning may proscribe 
or prescribe certain behaviour to members of that community because they share 
a deep commitment to certain norms, aims and desires. In contrast moral 
                                                          
18
 Habermas suggests that ethical reasoning is about what is required by an agent’s strong 
preferences that are integral to their identity. He suggests that ethical reasoning involves 
identifying one’s ideals but also properly understanding one’s self. It involves considering 
what one endorses on reflection (Habermas, 2001, pp. 4-5). This talk about deep 
commitments and identity echoes, to a certain extent, Christine Korsgaard’s discussion of 
the sources of normativity. Korsgaard suggests that ethical commitments are those values 
that individuals endorse after deep reflection (Korsgaard, 1996, pp. 49-90). Korsgaard also 
suggests that these values are binding because to violate these commitments would be to 
in some sense lose one’s identity (Korsgaard, 1996). According to the analysis here 
Korsgaard’s provides an explanation of the binding nature of ethical norms rather than the 
demands of inter-subjective morality. Korsgaard’s analysis suggests all persons will share 
some commitments because of their moral identity. Thus there are some universal ethical 
demands. 
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reasoning is not based on a particular set of desires, aims or commitments. It is a 
set of demands that apply to all agents no matter what the content of an agent’s 
aims or desires may be. It is a system of requirements that does not rely on any 
particular understanding of the world, value system or ethical commitments. It is 
based on the idea that persons unconditionally owe one another a basic form of 
respect and justification for their actions (Forst, 2012, p. 63). Separating morality 
from ethics is important because morality can be universal in scope whereas 
ethics is dependent on non-universal doctrines and world views. In this thesis I 
aim to draw on moral reason and obligations that apply universally and do not 
rely on a particular comprehensive world view or set of ethical commitments. 
Thus I hope to identify obligations and reasons that apply universally. 
Morality, unlike prudential reasoning, is not about reasoning from particular aims 
to particular actions. Instead it is about giving reasons to others to justify the 
permissibility of one’s actions. Thus it does not rely for its applicability on an 
agents own motivational set. The basic moral insight that this relies on is that a 
certain courses of action are permitted, mandated or forbidden out of 
consideration for others. Moral obligations place limits on all agent’s actions. They 
involve consideration of whether one’s plans can be justified to others as 
sufficiently considerate. What distinguishes a moral argument from a pragmatic 
or ethical argument is that the action must be justified to others as sufficiently 
considerate.  Both the duty not to harm others and the duty to rescue others are 
moral obligations that demand that agents alter their behaviour and actions out 
of consideration for the wellbeing of others. The practice of citing moral 
obligations involves asserting what an agent should do or refrain from doing out 
of consideration for others.  
The distinction between pragmatic, ethical and moral reasoning is intuitively 
plausible. When morally educating children, attention is often drawn to the 
victims of their impermissible acts and we ask them to consider the feelings and 
interests of others.  When we criticise the behaviour of others on moral grounds 
we are not accusing others of being foolish and failing to consider their long term 
interests. Rather, we are accusing them of neglecting to properly consider the 
interests, feelings or desires of others. Consequently failing to fulfil a moral 
obligation is of appropriate concern to outsiders in a way that failing to do the 
most prudent thing, or what is consistent with one’s own value scheme, are not.   
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The norms I deal with in this account aim to apply to all persons rather than to a 
distinct sector of society. Therefore the arguments used to establish these norms 
must not be based on an assumed commitment to a particular idea of the good 
life or some controversial value system. Thus they cannot be ethical arguments 
based on shared commitments and values that are specific to a particular 
community. Instead the reasons given must be in some wider sense ‘shareable’.  I 
will argue that compliance with these obligations is required out of minimum 
consideration for others. What I am looking for are shareable public reasons. 
What I aim to do is to contribute to public moral debate in the way Peter Singer 
aims to do in his arguments about vegetarianism and poverty. By engaging with 
widely held principles, entering into public debate and trying to persuade people 
to change their action there is a potential danger that what will be established is 
an ethical rather than a moral argument because my argument will rely on the 
intuitions of a particular public or a particular community. There is a worry that 
the widely shared premises, on which my account relies, may be convictions 
particular to the populations of Western European states rather than convictions 
held widely by the global population. I am aware of this risk and will try to ensure 
the widely held convictions I rely upon are morally defensible. However, 
defending these convictions as true is out-with the scope of this thesis. 
Contractualism 
My own understanding of moral reasoning is broadly contractualist: I am 
committed to the view that moral reasons and obligations can be determined by 
considering what would be freely agreed upon by all those committed to living 
within a set of constraints determining considerate treatment of others that are 
justifiable to all others equally so committed. In this thesis I will utilise the 
contractualist idea that moral obligation must be limited by what can be 
reasonably rejected. However the conclusions of this thesis do not rely on the 
validity of contractualism as a meta-ethical theory. 
In everyday life agents are often called upon to justify the way they treat others. 
Those affected by an action can demand justification for the action and its effect 
upon them. Moral argument follows when agents disagree about whether a 
certain sort of treatment is justifiable. These arguments concern whether 
legitimate demands of consideration for others have been transgressed. 
Contractualism has used this basic insight to offer a way to understand what 
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moral duties are about as well as to offer a theory of how to determine moral 
duties. The idea is to consider whether or not a certain sort of treatment of others 
is justifiable to those others. If it is not justifiable, then it is not morally 
permissible. Contractualism aims to mirror the reality of moral discourse in the 
real world. Using contractualism some progress has been made in issues of 
morality. Contractualism asks whether a certain sort of treatment can be justified 
to others committed to living by shared norms (concerning treatment of others) 
equally agreeable to all. In this section I will briefly discuss contractualism as a 
basis for moral argumentation and the universal applicability of moral obligation. 
The purpose of this exercise is to give an explanation of how moral reasoning 
could function universally and how primary moral obligations could be justified. 
Different contractualists offer different explanations for why moral reasons are 
binding. Scanlon argues that we recognise that we have good reason to regulate 
our behaviour out of consideration for others (Scanlon, 2000). Forst suggests that 
the ‘context of morality’ demands of persons that they give reasons for their 
actions that every moral person will respect, even in cases where those concerned 
do not share a further ethical or political context (Forst, 2007, p.32). 
Contractualism suggests that a good argument for a norm shows that there is 
good reason to believe that all those who are affected by it should accept it over 
any other norm governing this area of their lives (given that they are and 
committed to living by mutually acknowledged shared norms). Contractualism 
suggests that moral argument is a matter of proposing and challenging norms 
through discussing whether they are justifiable to all those committed to living by 
shared norms. 
Most people agree that we should regulate our behaviour, in some ways and to 
some extent, out of consideration for others. Furthermore, most people engage in 
the practice of justifying their choices to others. This suggests that public morality 
is of a contractualist kind. There are not many people who refuse to justify their 
behaviour to relevant others or who believe they need not be considerate of 
others. In this thesis I will adopt a broadly contractualist approach to obligations 
and reasons. It will be assumed that agents have a moral obligation if and only if 
the obligation cannot be reasonably rejected by those committed to living by 
shared norms mutually justifiable to all people equally so committed. 
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Structure 
The first part of the thesis discusses the existing literature on poverty and 
obligation.  It begins by examining Peter Singer’s account of poverty and moral 
obligation.  Some of the deficiencies of this approach are explored.  It is proposed 
that a political account of poverty and obligation could supplement Singer’s 
approach.  Next various accounts of cosmopolitanism and obligation are 
discussed.  It is argued that a structural account of global justice and obligation 
could help to advance the global justice debate. 
Part two of this thesis develops a new account of poverty and obligation.  It begins 
by establishing that social structure can be the subject of accounts of social 
justice.  It then proceeds to suggest that poverty and inequality indicate injustice 
in this structure and argues that solving this injustice requires global coordination.  
Next the question of what obligations agents have in relation to structural 
injustice is explored.  It is argued that structural injustice is a form of essentially 
aggregative harm.  An account of the obligations agents have in relation to 
essentially aggregative harm is then outlined.  It is argued that positive and 
negative obligations require agents to make efforts to form a collective and take 
action to prevent the continuance of structural injustice.  The negative obligations 
agents have with regards to structural injustice are then identified as 
precautionary duties.  The final chapter of part 2 explores the various forms 
collective action to prevent structural injustice could take.    In it various ways in 
which collectives can prevent structural injustice through overtly political action 
are discussed. This chapter also discussed the limits reasonableness and 
legitimacy place on demands to take political action. 
The third part of the thesis defends the account of poverty and obligation 
developed in part 2 from some significant objections.  The first chapter considers 
whether the obligation can apply in circumstances where apathy is widespread.  
Then, in the second chapter, the obligation to make efforts to form a collective to 
prevent structural injustice is defended from two inconsequentialist objections.  
This chapter considers whether agents who make small contributions to over-
determined outcomes can be considered contributors to those outcomes.  It then 
proceeds to examine the difficult question of whether one can be obliged to make 
efforts to prevent structural injustice if those efforts are extremely unlikely to 
make any difference.   
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The conclusion of the thesis recaps the arguments made in parts one two and 
three, identifies the contribution the thesis makes to the literature and proposes 
future directions of inquiry. 
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Part 1: Poverty and Obligation 
The first part of this thesis will survey the existing literature on poverty and moral 
obligation; critically evaluate existing approaches to poverty and obligation; and 
explain why an additional account of poverty and moral obligation is desirable. 
Over the course of this part, I argue that many theorists have made important 
contributions to our understanding of obligations to address global poverty. I 
argue that there are multiple obligations which apply to those living in affluent 
states in relation to the pervasiveness and extremity of current global poverty. In 
surveying aspects of the existing literature on poverty and moral obligation I aim 
to highlight critiques of existing accounts which suggest they do not fully 
understand the nature of the problem. I use these deficiencies to argue that not 
all of the obligations relevant to global poverty have been established in the 
existing literature. I use plausible critiques of existing accounts of obligations to 
outline the sort of account which is needed to supplement existing 
understandings of poverty and obligation. With these goals in mind, I concentrate 
on those authors whose understandings of poverty and obligation are valuable 
yet whose approaches neglect the features of poverty on which my own account 
is based. I begin by considering Peter Singer’s 1972 account of poverty and moral 
obligation.  
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Chapter 1: Singer’s Humanitarianism and the Need for a 
Political Approach 
The starting point of my investigation is the problem of widespread extreme 
poverty. The term ‘poverty’ primarily means serious deprivation in terms of the 
external requirements that are considered essential for a minimally decent a 
human life. Poverty is seen as particularly morally significant because it suggests a 
state in which one’s ability to live a decent life is undermined through external 
factors (usually a lack of external goods). There is much debate over what 
constitutes being in poverty, but there is widespread agreement that those who 
lack secure access to food, clean water, shelter and basic medical care are 
considered to be in extreme poverty. These goods are generally thought to be 
essential to maintaining one’s life and therefore must be essential for living a 
decent life.  
As discussed in the Introduction, 50,000 people die every day of hunger or hunger 
related causes. In fact poverty related deaths constitute one third of all human 
deaths (Pogge, 2008, p. 2). These people have died due to a lack of access to 
resources considered basic. People living in poverty often lack access to the 
resources which are essential to sustain their lives and maintain their health.  
Many individuals live in a situation where they cannot afford to fulfil the basic 
needs of their families adequately and should therefore be counted as living in 
extreme poverty. Thomas Pogge extensively details the plight of the income poor 
who lack items widely considered to be necessities (Pogge, 2008, p. 3). He asserts 
that currently 830 million people in the world are chronically undernourished, 
1,130 million lack access to safe drinking water, 2,600 million lack access to basic 
sanitation, 1,000 million lack access to adequate shelter, 2,000 million lack access 
to essential drugs and 1,600 million lack access to electricity.  
Furthermore many more individuals are vulnerable and insecure in their basic 
necessities. Sometimes poverty can be experienced not as actually lacking 
essential goods and services but as vulnerability to being deprived of them. When 
considering the extent of the vulnerability and precariousness of many people’s 
lives it is useful to consider the fact that 25% of the global population live on 
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fewer resources per day than can be purchased with $1.25 in the US. Furthermore 
80% live on less than $10 a day (Chen & Ravallion, 2008).19  
These figures may appear to suggest that the problem is hopeless and that the 
extent of poverty is so great that there are not enough resources or productive 
potential for all individuals to be freed from poverty. However, facts about global 
inequality suggest that the productivity (or lack of) of the global population is no 
barrier to reducing poverty. The richest 20% of the world population consume 
76.6% of total private consumption and the richest 2% of households in the world 
own more than half of global household wealth. The richest 10% of households 
own 85% of household wealth and the poorest 50% of world households own less 
than 1 % of global wealth (Davies, et al., 2007). These facts concerning global 
inequality are shocking because they suggest that the current levels of extreme 
poverty are not a result of there being insufficient goods and services to prevent 
poverty. However, they also offer independent reason to suppose there is 
injustice in the world distribution of goods and ownership rights. Intuitively such 
extreme inequality in resources and wealth is morally abhorrent in part because it 
indicates extreme inequality in life chances from birth for which there is no 
obvious justification. 
Low income is not the only measure that indicates poverty. There can be 
vulnerability to deprivation in terms of health, education, opportunities and 
access to social and political life which are not best identified by simply measuring 
income. In some countries low income is supplemented by rights to certain 
services free of charge (or at subsidised rates) like healthcare, education, national 
insurance and care in old age. Such rights can prevent deprivation in certain 
respects and therefore alleviate poverty without raising incomes directly. The 
presence or absence of such legal entitlements and whether they are accessible to 
those with low incomes can have an important effect on whether a low income 
family suffers from the deprivation characteristic of poverty. Conversely an 
income which is high by global standards can be accompanied by deprivation in 
some circumstances. For example, when vital goods are in limited supply within a 
local market those with relatively low income can be denied access and therefore 
experience deprivation. Furthermore, when it comes to participating in social and 
political life incomes that are low relative to other community members can result 
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 This is not to suggest that poverty should be defined in terms of income. It is simply to 
give a rough indication of the extent and seriousness of the problem of poverty.  
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in exclusion and being denied important opportunities to participate. These 
deprivations are a significant aspect of poverty that merits concern.  
These facts mean that a decrease in poverty measured in terms of income may 
not provide a decrease in overall deprivation. If income for poor families 
increased above $1.25 a day per person but users’ fees are introduced for health 
and education services a family’s overall level of deprivation may increase despite 
the fact their income has increased. Such a family may have become more 
vulnerable and their life expectancy may drop considerably. Furthermore, if this 
increase takes place amid a rise in inequality in the region, the family may find 
themselves excluded from political and social life to a greater extent than 
previously. 
The concept of ‘the poor’ also can be used to indicate those in a lowly social 
position: an underclass excluded from interaction with others as equals. This 
exclusion usually results from lacking the means to participate in central parts of 
social life. These facts suggest that in societies where participation in social 
political and cultural life requires more expensive goods or services, those on 
lower incomes are more likely to be living in poverty because they are deprived of 
the goods required to access social life (an essential part of a decent life). 
Furthermore, as previously discussed, where others have much larger incomes, 
those on low incomes are more likely to be out-priced in competing to acquiring 
essential goods and therefore are more likely to be deprived of essential goods.  
Poverty also suggests a pitiable position in which people are vulnerable to 
exploitation and abuse by others who take advantage of their abject neediness. 
The deprivation of essentials, characteristic of poverty, in addition to being an evil 
in itself also makes agents vulnerable to agreeing to abusive or degrading 
treatment by others in order to maintain their existence (by securing essential 
goods). Even if inhumane treatment is not actually meted out, the relationship 
between the poor and the affluent can often be one in which the poor submit to 
the rule of the affluent in order to secure essential goods. These issues indicate 
ways in which the poor experience greater domination than other sectors of the 
population. Exploitation, abuse, being treated in a degrading manner and being 
under the power of others are all forms of domination. Vulnerability to 
domination is a form of poverty. Some individuals should be considered poor even 
if they can secure access to essential resources through employment. When 
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individual is entirely dependent on a single employer and does not have legally 
enforced rights to decent working conditions and wages nor access to financial 
support if they are made redundant they should still be considered poor even if 
they have secure access to sufficient resources through employment. This is 
because such an individual is dominated: they are in a position of weakness and 
dependence where they are vulnerable to exploitation or degrading treatment. 
An extreme example of this sort of domination is revealed by the extent to which 
it has become the norm for women in areas of Kenya to exchange sexual activity 
for factory work in export processing zones (Irin: Humanitarian News and Analysis, 
2008).  
In circumstances where those who are dependent on employment to secure 
essential goods have effectively enforced worker’s rights they are protected from 
this sort of domination. Laws that prevent exploitation and abuse and guarantee 
access to collective bargaining can prevent domination. 
Furthermore, societies that contain a range of possible employers and 
unemployment support offer conditions where those without productive assets 
are less vulnerable to domination by employers. Where workers are protected 
from domination in these ways they may be less poor even if they do not have 
higher incomes. However, in circumstances where these features are absent, 
those who can only secure essential resources through employment should be 
considered poor because they are dominated by others.20 
What the understandings of poverty discussed above have in common is that 
those who are poor are vulnerable to deprivation and domination and that this 
vulnerability to deprivation and domination is part of what makes poverty morally 
significant. This is in keeping with Iris Young’s suggestion that poverty indicates a 
social position in which individuals are significantly more vulnerable to 
deprivation and domination than others (Young, 2011). Extreme poverty indicates 
a social position in which individuals are in serious risk of being deprived of the 
basic means to a life considered minimally decent. 
The facts about poverty intuitively suggest to most people that some moral duty is 
currently going unfulfilled. Widespread and extreme suffering is often thought to 
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 Philip Pettit has plausibly argued that domination of one group by another is morally 
significant regardless of whether it leads to abuse or exploitation. Pettit argues that the 
mere fact that an agent could be interfered with arbitrarily by another indicated that they 
are dominated (Pettit, 1996) (Pettit, 2006). 
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mandate action from all decent people (other things being equal). This is a widely 
held belief reflected in public support for anti-poverty campaigns like ‘Make 
Poverty History’ (Make Poverty History, 2005). In light of the horrendousness of 
poverty and the intuition that suffering makes moral demands, the first thing 
usually considered is whether extreme poverty places a legitimate demand for aid 
on those with an ability to alleviate suffering. Such a duty is suggested by Singer in 
his famous paper, “Famine, Affluence and Morality”. In this section I discuss the 
merits of Singer’s approach and outline the ways in which my account aims to 
improve on his (Singer, 1972). 
Singer’s paper calls on all reasonably well off citizens to donate large portions of 
their income to international aid agencies in response to a famine in Bengal 
(Singer, 1972). He argues that if we pass a child drowning in a pond and we can 
rescue that child by wading in, we have a moral duty to rescue that child even if 
doing so will dirty our clothes. Singer explains that if we fail to perform the rescue 
then we are morally culpable and can rightly be condemned. Singer expects the 
reader to share his intuition that the rescue is a mandatory duty and not just a 
morally praiseworthy act. Thus Singer demonstrates that we do sometimes accept 
that we have strong obligations to act in certain circumstances and that we are 
morally culpable in such circumstances if we fail to act. He explains that common 
understandings of what is unacceptable behaviour include unacceptable 
omissions as well as unacceptable actions. From this Singer suggests there is a 
general moral rule that demands we rescue others in certain circumstances. He 
formulates two possible principles on which the moral duty to rescue may be 
based, one principle being more arduous than the other. His first principle is “if it 
is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby 
sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it. 
By ‘without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance’ I mean without 
causing anything else comparably bad to happen, or doing something that is 
wrong in itself, or failing to promote some moral good, comparable in significance 
to the bad thing that we can prevent.” (Singer, 1972, p. 231). Singer’s alternative 
and less demanding principle is: “If it is in our power to prevent something very 
bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant, we 
ought, morally, to do it.” (Singer, 1972, p. 231) Getting ones clothes muddy, not 
going out for dinner or forgoing a new pair of stilettoes is considered morally 
insignificant, whereas (presumably) losing a limb, risking death, betraying a friend 
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or maiming an innocent bystander are considered morally significant. Singer 
endorses the stronger principle. However, he argues that even the weaker 
principle requires a radical change in people’s current practices. 
Singer concludes that if we accept the principle of aid (even in its weaker form) 
then we must also accept that donation to charity, in certain circumstances, is 
morally required rather than supererogatory (morally praiseworthy but not 
morally required). In a situation where it is the case that people are dying and 
suffering great deprivation from famine whilst others go to the movies, and 
international aid agencies can direct monetary donations into assistance, then 
extensive donation is morally required and those who fail to fulfil it are to be 
condemned. Singer argues that current circumstances have led to a situation 
where extensive donation to the poor is a mandatory duty. He is not claiming that 
the moral rules are different (to what we suppose them to be) but that our 
common sense analysis of what they require in current circumstances is in need of 
reform. He is saying that the principles that our common sense morality endorses 
are not compatible with common sense understandings of the particular actions 
that are required by them in current circumstances. We accept that there is a duty 
of rescue but we fail to see that we are therefore obliged to donate to anti-
poverty charities. Everyday moral thinking in the 1970s (as for the most part 
today) assumed that extensive charitable giving was supererogatory rather than 
mandatory. This, Singer argues is a mistake; circumstances at the time when 
properly understood meant that donations to aid agencies had become 
obligatory. Singer’s article attempts to reform everyday moral thinking concerning 
what individuals are obliged to do, in the light of a more accurate understanding 
of current circumstances. This is an important and laudable goal of much moral 
and political analysis. 
Singer argues that the stronger principle requires that we all donate our income 
until we reach the level of those to whom we are giving or at least until we begin 
to undergo serious levels of suffering. The weaker principle requires we forgo 
spending on non-necessities and therefore spend our discretionary income 
entirely on aid. By discretionary income I mean the portion of an individual’s 
incomes that is not required in order to pay for the necessities. Therefore, on 
some interpretations of Singer’s principle, we may never again purchase a book, 
go to the cinema, eat out or go to the theatre without violating a moral rule. 
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Overdemandingness 
Singer’s argument results in some rather hefty duties of aid. Accepting either of 
Singer’s principles requires that no individual may spend income on non-
necessities others (assuming this spending on non-necessities is not of moral 
significance) whilst there is on-going deprivation of necessities for. According to 
this theory, buying a book, an opera ticket or enjoying a glass of wine is morally 
unacceptable behaviour in current circumstances akin to failing to wade in and 
rescue the drowning child. A duty the fulfilment of which requires that we never 
buy a book, go on holiday, wear clothing that is better than adequate or go out to 
dinner requires that affluent individuals alter their lives dramatically and adopt a 
comparatively barren existence of work and necessities. In fact, Singer’s stronger 
principle could mean that individuals must avoid unnecessary time off work 
because by indulging in spare time doing as they please, they fail to earn money 
that could be used to save lives.  
The overdemandingness objection states that if a duty requires such extreme 
sacrifice it cannot really be a duty. Singer’s stronger principle requires that until 
survival is secured we ought not to work towards any other moral or ethical value 
(assuming it is the case that preserving life is much more important than other 
valuable activities). Singer’s weaker principle suggests that money can only be 
spent on things that are of moral significance. It is not clear what should count 
under this criterion.  
One way of understanding the strength of the overdemandingness objection 
comes from Tim Scanlon. Scanlon suggests that when determining what moral 
duties agents have we must consider what we can reasonably demand of each 
other. Rephrased in Scanlonian language the overdemandingness objection states 
that demanding such extensive giving cannot be justified because the affluent 
would be reasonable in rejecting this duty. Whether this objection is fair depends 
on whether the duty in question is intolerably intrusive. To determine this Scanlon 
suggests that we must consider whether the duty should be considered an 
unreasonable burden from a general perspective. This Scanlon concludes is a 
matter of judgement (Scanlon, 2000, pp. 23-26). 
Since the publication of Singer’s article much criticism of it has focused on the 
demandingness of the duty Singer proposes. It seems that many people share the 
intuition that duties of aid cannot demand the significant worsening of one’s’ life 
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over time. Singer’s example involves a single case, yet it results in a principle of 
helping in all circumstances. Richard W Miller argues that instead of considering 
each case in isolation we should consider what a reasonable policy of aid is over a 
life time (Miller, 2010, pp. 9-31). Singer is right to state that dirtying ones clothes 
is insignificant in the case of the drowning child. However, Miller argues that in 
determining which moral principles apply to us, and what they require of us, we 
must consider the effect of the adoption of those principles over a lifetime rather 
than the effect of fulfilling such a principle on a singular occasion. Miller argues 
that giving all one’s discretionary income to Oxfam does have a significant effect 
on the quality of one’s life. Such a duty asks individuals to give up too much for 
the good of others, Miller argues, as it prevents them from fulfilling their own life 
plans and participating in activities that give their lives value and meaning. There 
is much support for the view that we cannot owe this much to others. In short 
Miller argues that Singer’s proposed duty cannot be correct because it is overly 
demanding (Miller, 2010).  
As an alternative to Singer’s assesment, Richard Miller proposes a different 
solution to the problem of poverty, namely, ‘the principle of sympathy’ (Miller, 
2010, pp. 9-31). This principle requires that individuals adopt a level of charitable 
giving for the alleviation of suffering which is as demanding as it can possibly be 
without significantly worsening their lives. This proposal manages to balance the 
demand for aid with the demand to live one’s own life and not be overly 
constrained by one’s duty to aid others. Under such a principle one would be 
expected to rescue a child from drowning in a pond. This is because adopting the 
policy of rescuing those in immediate peril through taking physical action, in a 
society where such occurrences are rare, will not significantly worsen one’s life. 
This principle analyses what can be reasonably expected of an individual over a 
life time instead of considering what can reasonably be expected at a particular 
instant or in a particular case considered in isolation. Miller’s proposal is straight 
forward and alters Singer’s principle by taking the criticism head on. If a duty over 
a life time is overly demanding it cannot be morally required. Singer’s mistake, 
according to Miller, was to consider only what can reasonably be required in an 
incident considered in isolation. However, the fact is that we must commit to 
principles that we can reasonably be expected to comply with over a life time and 
not just in a particular instant.  
42 
 
Singer’s weaker principle acknowledges that we can only be expected to assist 
others when doing so does not require the sacrifice of something of moral 
significance. Rescuing a child from a pond or donating a month of discretionary 
income to aid flood victims does not involve a sacrifice of anything of moral 
significance. Therefore Singer concludes they are obligatory acts. However, giving 
away every month’s income or devoting one’s life to monitoring a treacherous 
pond does require the sacrifice of things of considerable moral significance. Since 
moral principles require action over a life time then the reasonableness of the 
demands they make on an individual must be considered over a lifetime. Miller 
thus seems to have come up with a sound principle which overcomes the 
overdemandingness problem. Individuals are obliged to adopt a policy of 
assistance to others which is as stringent as possible without significantly 
worsening their own lives in the long run.  
However, Miller’s principle is vulnerable to reasonable rejection by those 
currently suffering from poverty. It is likely the inequality worldwide is great 
enough to justify demanding that some significantly worsen their lives in the short 
(and possibly the long) term. It is likely that asking this of some people can be 
justified because their lives are so much better than those of others. The extreme 
need of some for a better life could justify demanding others give up arbitrary 
advantages even if that sacrifice will significantly worsen their lives. That is, the 
level of demandingness that we can reasonably ask of others on which Miller’s 
account depends could be disputed. The urgency of need experienced by those 
who require assistance could have a bearing on the level of demandingness their 
need can place on others. Thus it could plausibly be argued that Miller’s principle 
(as he interprets it)requires too little. Despite this problem Miller’s commitment 
to considering what principle of giving over a lifetime is reasonable is an advance 
on Singer’s analysis. Considering whether a principle can be justified requires 
considering its long term effect rather than just considering incidents on a case by 
case basis. 
In response to the problem of over-demandingness Liam B Murphy also argues 
that Singer has wrongly specified the precise nature of our duty of rescue 
(Murphy, 2000, pp. 5-7). He claims that to be fair such a duty must have a clause 
that states what we are obliged to do in terms of rescue cannot be increased just 
because others fail to fulfil what is required of them. His point is that if 10,000 
people have discretionary income at roughly the same level as me, and can easily 
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donate, I am required only to donate my share of the required funds to prevent 
the famine even if in current circumstances others are failing to donate and I 
could donate more and thereby save more lives. Murphy’s claim is that I am not 
required to donate more than my fair share and that I cannot be criticised if I fail 
to donate more, although greater donation would be morally praiseworthy. 
Murphy’s solution seems at first attractive – it produces a realisable and 
reasonable obligation (doing our fair share) and a good criterion for moral censure 
(failing to do our share). It also prevents some morally conscientious people 
having to take up the slack resulting from others’ non-compliance and does not 
demand (in current circumstances) that compliers suffer relative poverty in 
comparison to their peers as a result of those very same peers neglecting their 
duties. It seems unfair to censure those who give only 10% of their income to 
charity for not also supplying the 10% their neighbour has failed to give. However, 
it does not seem unreasonable to expect an agent to do something more than 
simply pay their share and shrug their shoulders when others fail to contribute. 
Surely the fact that others are neglecting such essential moral duties, and leaving 
others to suffer, must place a demand on us to do something? Furthermore, 
Murphy’s solution is unintuitive in that from Murphy’s principle it follows that if I 
see a group of eight toddlers fall into a pond and start to submerge and there are 
eight able-bodied healthy individuals in the vicinity, each of whom could rescue a 
child, I am required to rescue just one toddler even if the others make clear they 
will not rescue any. I am morally culpable and blameworthy if I fail to save any 
toddlers but not if I wade in and pull one out but do not return repeatedly to the 
water to drag out the others. This is not an intuitively acceptable position to hold. 
It seems strange that I am morally required to save one but not all of the children 
when I can in fact do so without sacrificing anything of equivalent moral 
significance.  
Additional Obligations 
One problem with Liam Murphy’s and Richard Miller’s solutions to the over-
demandingness objection is that they allow individuals to leave others suffering 
from extreme poverty when they could help them. In current circumstances of 
partial non-compliance, these solutions leave many citizens of the global south 
suffering from extreme poverty. If we believe that ensuring that these individuals 
do not live in extreme poverty is critically important and of great moral concern, 
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then we cannot accept a solution that leaves them in poverty. An analysis of 
duties to the global poor, which will in real and non-ideal circumstances of partial 
non-compliance leave many in poverty, is not an acceptable solution. If we believe 
that everyone has a right to live a life free from poverty, then we cannot accept 
this solution because it allows the widespread violation of this right to continue. 
Whilst Singer’s duty is prohibitively demanding, both Miller’s and Murphy’s 
principles are intuitively unacceptable as a response to the problem of poverty. It 
is unintuitive to believe that the plight of those suffering does not require that 
that suffering be entirely alleviated if sufficient resources exist to make this 
possible. 
It seems we have a choice between a duty of aid which is overly-demanding or a 
moral analysis that claims there is no moral criticism to be made when basic 
socio-economic rights are unfulfilled despite the fact that sufficient resources for 
their fulfilment exist. It appears that intuitively plausible assessments of the 
efforts that can be reasonably demanded of the affluent do not correlate with 
intuitively plausible assessments of the rights of poorer people. It is my 
contention that this problem can only be solved by considering duties other than 
those of aid.  
Perhaps the reason that the duty of aid appears so arduous in current 
circumstances is because some other important duties are being neglected. 
Perhaps it is not (or atleast not only) that the poor require us to aid or to rescue 
them. Perhaps their predicament should instead lead us to consider whether we 
have obligations of a different kind that are currently going unmet. Singer is right 
to assert that poverty presents a moral problem: it is a case in which fundamental 
rights are going unmet. However, there may be obligations other than rescue 
which apply in current circumstances.21 
I believe that Singer, Murphy and Richard Miller are right to suggest that our duty 
of aid requires that we assist those in poverty. However, I believe that aid is not 
the only duty demanded in current circumstances with respect to poverty. If there 
are other duties relevant to poverty alleviation, it may be the case that if these 
duties are fulfilled our duties of aid will be considerably less burdensome. This 
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 Henry Shue in his analysis of obligations to fulfil human rights to subsistence suggests 
that there is an obligation to design governing institutions that secure such a right (Shue, 
1996, p. 62). He explains that creating such institutions would make a duty to assist those 
who do not have such a right satisfied less burdensome (Shue, 1996, p. 63). 
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could defuse the dilemma of having to choose between a counter-intuitive over-
demanding duty of aid and an equally counter-intuitive assessment of duties 
which leaves some to suffer.  
The insight that there are likely to be duties, relevant to the problem of global 
poverty, other than aid is one that has been recognised by other theorists, some 
of whom have developed accounts of these duties. Richard Miller recognises this 
fact in his pursuit of other duties with regards to poverty alleviation in his 
‘Globalizing Justice’ (Miller, 2010). Thomas Pogge also recognises this fact in his 
account of a negative duty that if fulfilled could do significant work towards 
eliminating poverty (Pogge, 2008). Henry Shue has developed a tripartite account 
of obligations in regard to human rights including the right to subsistence (Shue, 
1996). 
 
Critiques of the Aid Based Approach 
This thesis will consider obligations other than those of aid that demand agents 
take action to prevent or alleviate global poverty. If these obligations are fulfilled 
then the dilemma between overly demanding duties of aid and unfulfilled 
subsistence rights will be defused. In order to investigate the obligations agents 
have in relation to poverty the deficiencies of the aid based approach will be 
investigated. The aim of this investigation is to use these deficiencies to develop 
an alternative account of poverty and the obligations agents have in relation to 
poverty. 
The aid based approach to poverty and moral obligation is direct and intuitively 
appealing. It is based on undisputable brute facts about current levels of poverty 
and the ability of those with larger incomes to address this problem. By appealing 
to a duty of assistance, the aid based approach avoids disputes concerning the 
nature and causes of poverty. However, many theorists since Singer have argued 
that the facts about the nature of poverty and the causes of poverty should be 
considered in determining obligations to lessen or prevent continuing poverty. In 
this section I lay out three important criticisms of an aid based approach to 
obligations to alleviate poverty. These critiques all suggest that theorists 
identifying obligations to avert poverty should take in to account the nature of the 
poverty problem. 
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Poverty as an On-going and Predictable Threat to Welfare 
Singer’s article treats poverty as a random and tragic occurrence that requires 
immediate assistance. He therefore appeals to a duty of rescue in order to 
address the tragedy. Andrew Kuper in his critique of Singer emphasises that 
considering only individual unilateral action is a mistake. He argues that we need 
complex and co-ordinated action to overcome poverty (Kuper, 2002). It could be 
that duties to take part in complex coordinated action exist. If these duties were 
to be fulfilled, then obligations of rescue would be less demanding. In this section 
I will consider whether there are obligations to take part in collective action to 
prevent poverty. I will argue that in circumstances where an incident of 
‘something very bad’ as Singer puts it is both a regular and predictable the action 
that would be most effective in preventing and alleviating the ‘very bad’ is ex-ante 
collective action to establish a permanent solution to the problem.22 I will suggest 
that individual unilateral rescue is more suited to circumstances which are rare 
and unpredictable; when something unusual occurs or when the means for 
addressing a regular problem fail. 
Directly assisting those living in poverty by donating cash or resources is one way 
to address poverty. Duties of rescue require individuals to assist those who are 
currently in difficulty. However, when a serious problem is on-going, widespread 
and predictable it may be better to work on preventing the problem or 
establishing a system for dealing with it (or so I will argue). In the modern world 
poverty is both common and predictable and thus requires the establishment of a 
system of prevention. 
An ex-post duty of rescue is the only appropriate duty to consider in the case of a 
child drowning in a pond because such incidents are both rare and unpredictable 
and because the child is already in the pond (that is, the situation is urgent and 
unexplained).23 In the case of a pond drowning; it makes sense for us to expect 
anyone able to perform a rescue to do so. A duty to rescue those who happen to 
be in the pond when one is passing by minimises deaths and is not overly-
demanding. Unlike pond drownings, poverty is neither rare nor unpredictable; it is 
endemic and systematic. It is widespread, common and predictable. This means 
an ex-post duty of rescue is not the appropriate response to poverty. Ex-ante 
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 Ex-ante action is action that takes place before an incident occurs, whereas ex-post 
action occurs after the incident in question. 
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collective action is more effective at addressing regular and predictable causes of 
suffering. This is because such action is both less demanding (at least long term) 
and more successful at addressing regular and predictable threats to well-being, 
relative to ad-hoc ex-post rescues. 
Poverty is less like a freak incident like a child drowning in a pond and more like 
an on-going threat to human welfare. To see why a duty of aid is inappropriate for 
dealing with on-going and predictable threats to welfare consider the following 
example. At a large public swimming lake one is not expected to rescue toddlers 
on a regular basis. Getting into trouble in the water is a regular and predictable 
occurrence at a place used for public swimming. Hence, a system of swimming 
regulations that minimise the possibility of such trouble is instituted and a 
lifeguard is employed to enforce these regulations, keep an eye out for potential 
problems, and to conduct rescues. If instead members of the public at the lake 
were expected to rescue others who got in to difficulty the results would be sub-
optimal. The result would be more deaths and the norm would require the sort of 
constant vigilance from lake users that would prevent people enjoying the lake. 
Whereas if a lifeguard system has been instigated, each lake user only has a duty 
to rescue a drowning co-user in the rare circumstance that the lifeguard system 
somehow fails. An obligation to rescue other lake swimmers (in the absence of a 
lifeguard) would be a sub-optimal way to preserve lives and would be overly 
demanding on swimmers.  
This insight does not mean that in the absence of the lifeguard system we have no 
obligations with regard to those who get in to difficulties. Nor does it mean that 
we have an obligation only to rescue our fair share of the drowning. This policy, 
although less demanding, would leave even more swimmers to drown and is 
therefore unacceptable. A life-guard system is the best means for preventing 
drowning because it is most efficient and least demanding. Because the risk of 
drowning is a regular and predictable threat in a swimming lake a unilateral ex-
post duty of rescue is inappropriate. Those who know that drowning is a threat 
have a duty to act ex-ante to minimise that threat.24 Both duties of rescue and 
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 Henry Shue argues that there is a basic right to subsistence. He argues that in response 
to this right agents have three sorts of duties. One sort of duty requires they establish and 
maintain institutions to prevent the violation of this right. He argues that when they fail in 
this duty individuals have an obligation to aid those who suffer from deprivation. The 
swimming lake example shows why there is a duty to secure a means to subsistence to 
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duties to establish and maintain systems that avert regular and predictable 
threats are humanitarian positive duties owed to others out of consideration for 
their well-being. 
What the swimming lake example shows is that there is a problem with 
considering the problem of poverty from the perspective of unilateral individual 
duties to act directly. In the swimming lake case - as in the poverty case - it is 
impossible to explain the most efficient and least costly means to minimise the 
risk of drowning in terms of individual unilateral action.  
Leif Wenar claims that in circumstances where we identify that action is required 
in order to avert a threat, on grounds of morality, the party that is held morally 
and legally responsible for averting that threat is whichever party can do so at 
least cost (Wenar, 2003). In the swimming lake example the party that is both 
most successful at alleviating the threat of drowning and also the party that can 
do so at least cost is the group as a whole. In assessing who has what duties and 
responsibilities with respect to poverty it is important to consider the possibility 
of collective responsibility and duties to act in concert. If we do not consider such 
possibilities we may overlook the best solution to some pressing moral problems.  
Tracy Isaacs in ‘Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts’ discusses how 
considering collective action can allow us to identify possibilities which otherwise 
remain invisible (Isaacs, 2011, p. 36). Collectives can produce effects and perform 
actions which go beyond what a group of uncoordinated individuals can achieve.  
We need to consider seriously the possibility that the group in the swimming lake 
must minimise drowning and that they have a duty to ensure institutions that 
minimise the risk of drowning. Wenar claims that having power increases 
responsibilities. If Wenar is correct then a group may have greater responsibilities 
than isolated individuals because the group could work together and therefore 
have the power to do much more than the sum of their individual powers. In the 
swimming lake example, the group can agree on a way of dividing up individual 
duties and responsibilities in order to achieve their collective duty and fulfil their 
collective responsibility. 
                                                                                                                                                   
everyone rather than simply a duty to aid those who lack secure access to subsistence 
(Shue, 1996, pp. 55-63). 
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However, those using the swimming lake are not an organised collective. Thus 
there is no collective actor who is obliged to organise and maintain a lifeguard 
system. However, it could be that the aggregate of individuals who use the lake 
each have an obligation to form a collective and organise a lifeguarding system. 
Virginia Held has argued that in certain circumstances aggregates can share an 
obligation to work together to avert serious threats or to form a collective that 
can avert a serious threat (Held, 1970). In the swimming lake example the 
aggregate has such an obligation.25  
Once a lifeguard system has been established at a public lake, there will be an 
individual duty to rescue a victim of drowning in the rare and exceptional case 
where the lifeguard system fails. A duty of rescue is a duty which applies to 
random and unpreventable problems. More systematic and predictable 
occurrences attract a different sort of duty that cannot be fulfilled through 
individual acts of rescue and cannot be effectively characterised in terms of 
individual unilateral ex-post duties. Applying a unilateral, individual, ex-post duty 
of rescue, in such circumstances, results in a system of duties that is overly-
demanding and fails to address the problem effectively. It could be that instead 
what individuals are obliged to do is form a collective to work together to 
neutralise the predictable threat. Modern global poverty is predictable and 
common and thus a duty of rescue is inadequate and inappropriate for its 
alleviation. 26 Thus, in this thesis is concerned with obligations to take collective 
ex-ante action to prevent poverty. 
Poverty as a Lack of Entitlement 
Another deficiency with Singer’s approach is that it does not characterise poverty 
as a social and political problem. In order to avoid relying on controversial and 
disputed premises concerning the nature and causes of poverty, Singer creates an 
account of obligation that only relies on the existence of suffering and the ability 
to alleviate it. However, the facts concerning the nature and causes of poverty are 
relevant to the question of what duties are owed to the poor.  
                                                          
25
 I will discuss this possibility at length in chapter 5. 
26
 Perhaps a duty of rescue and a duty to create systems which address common and 
predictable difficulties and suffering are both part of a more general duty of humanity. 
Brian Barry suggests that extreme poverty in foreign countries rightly attracts duties of 
humanity which he believes can legitimately be enforced through coercion (Barry B. , 
1982). Duties of humanity are usually concerned with the welfare of others rather than 
respect for the autonomy of others. Duties of humanity reflect a disposition of concern for 
the wellbeing of others. This possibility will be further developed in chapter 5. 
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As Amartya Sen points out in Poverty and Famines: an Essay on Entitlement and 
Deprivation, extreme poverty is not necessarily a matter of there not being 
enough resources to go round but is always the result of a lack of entitlement to 
resources (Sen, 1981, p. 1). Sen suggested that famines occur when large sectors 
of the population lack legal entitlement to food. His analysis showed that famines 
are not usually the result of an absolute lack of food. In fact in many cases there is 
plenty of food (Sen, 1981, pp. 52-86). He explained that starvation and 
malnutrition indicate a lack of entitlement to resources and services rather than 
an overall lack of availability of resources and services. Thus he established that 
poverty is not always a question of what exists but is always a question of what an 
individual can legally command (Sen, 1981, pp. 1-7). 
Sen explained that ownership relations are one kind of entitlement relations. It is 
necessary to understand the entitlement relation in which famine takes place. 
This is worth bearing in mind: a society in which transferable bequeath-able 
property rights rigidly govern who has access to goods, services and assets is just 
one possible system of entitlements of all those which could be enforced. The 
rights to property, resources and services a state enforces govern entitlement. 
Giving any individual a legally enforced right to a piece of property entails a legally 
enforced obligation on all other individuals not to interfere with their property 
without permission (Sen, 1981, pp. 1-7).  
Sen explains that in a modern capitalist economy an individual’s poverty level 
depends on several factors. They include: the exchange value of the individual’s 
labour and how many hours of it there are individuals or companies or individuals 
willing to buy. It also includes what they can earn through selling the assets they 
are entitled to, what they can produce with their own labour power, and the 
assets which they can buy and manage as well as any social security payments, 
benefits or services they are entitled to and the costs of the goods and services 
they need and/or desire.  
For the system of entitlement to be based solely on rigid property rights, trade, 
gifts and bequeathment is in fact quite rare. For example in the UK a system of 
bequeathable property rights is supplemented by a system of taxation and legal 
entitlement to education, healthcare, old age pension, maternity leave, sick pay 
and job seekers allowance in times of unemployment. This shows that the legal 
arrangements within a country and the economic conditions an individual finds 
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themselves in have a huge effect on that individual’s choices and their legal 
entitlements. Ignoring the relationship between poverty and social institutions or 
human action is to ‘reify’ the social: to treat it as the result of natural laws which 
cannot be otherwise. This is a mistake because human organisation unlike natural 
forces can alter over time and can be changed through conscientious action. 
Sen’s account of famine emphasises that entitlements is part of a political system 
regulating the production and consumption of goods. A lack of entitlement is part 
of a social system, constituted by human practices, which could be otherwise. 
Entitlement is governed by a set of institutions which are enforced and 
maintained by the on-going actions of agents. 
Singer may be right that there are duties of rescue that demand that affluent 
agents help the poor either by trying to prevent future poverty or by sending 
donations to the current poor. However, the fact that poverty is about 
entitlement suggests that it is a social and political problem. This thesis will be 
consider whether characterising poverty in this way leads us to identify duties 
other than rescue that apply to the affluent. It is very important when dealing 
with the issue of global poverty that we treat it as a social and political problem. 
Sen’s analysis suggests that poverty is a form of injustice rather than simply an 
unfortunate state of affairs that can be alleviated through charitable assistance. 
Poverty and Political Solutions 
The importance of injustice and politics is also highlighted in Andrew Kuper’s 
criticisms of Singer. Kuper claims that Singer has a naive and non-political 
approach to the issue of poverty relief (Kuper, 2002). Kuper argues that giving to 
charity is not necessarily the best reaction to the reality of periodic famine and 
constant malnutrition for a large section of the global population. Kuper claims 
that effective poverty relief requires extensive cooperation with others and the 
reform or creation of agencies to deal with the problem (Kuper, 2002, p. 112). 
Kuper implies that what is needed is political action. Political action can be 
legitimated through a popular vote and therefore made accountable to the 
populace in a way that charities and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) are 
not. He suggests that if we are to determine how best (in terms of effectiveness 
and legitimacy) to act in response to global poverty we need a more sophisticated 
approach than that offered by the proponents of simple aid. Such an approach 
involves:  
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“a political economy that charts the causal dynamics of the global economy and 
indicates the extent to which these could be controlled; a theory of justice that 
supplies a metric for evaluating goals and derives a set of principles with which to 
approach the problems of development; and a political sociology that 
encompasses and distinguishes the respective roles of individuals and various 
institutions in advancing these moral ends” (Kuper, 2002, p. 114). 
Kuper’s analysis suggests that aid is unlikely to be the action which best addresses 
poverty. His insight is that institutional change is required in order to rescue 
people most effectively from poverty. Kuper argues that preventing poverty in the 
future requires us to consider promoting global justice and making institutional 
change. He suggests that an account of global justice can provide the goals and 
aims of any action aimed at preventing poverty. Kuper is thus asserting that 
ongoing and extensive poverty is a concern of justice.  
Kuper is right that we need economics, sociology and a theory of global justice in 
order to determine what to do to address global poverty. However, we also need 
a moral theory which tells us who is obliged to take the actions recommended by 
economics, sociology and global justice theory. For those of us engaged in the task 
of identifying obligations to address global poverty, Kuper’s critique suggests that 
there may be obligations to engage in political action in order to achieve global 
justice. Many people are in a situation where they are able to assist those living in 
poverty and Kuper’s analysis suggests that the most effective action may be co-
ordination and institutional change. 
Both Kuper and Singer have important points to make on the issue of moral 
obligation and global poverty. The strength of Singer’s account comes from the 
fact that he manages to connect far away suffering to the actions and decisions of 
his readership. Singer directly appeals to individuals, claiming they have a moral 
duty to respond and are blameworthy if they fail to fulfil that duty. The advantage 
of such a strategy is that it requires specific action from specific people who are in 
a position to take that action and to whom appeal can be made. In contrast, the 
strength of Kuper’s analysis is that he grasps that poverty is a systematic issue 
that requires in-depth analysis and thoughtful consideration.  
Kuper recognises that it is a problem that can most effectively be addressed by 
the governmental powers that regulate entitlement and enforce law. He also sees 
that any action that is taken must be understood within the context of the global 
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economy and that an understanding of how this works and how it can be 
controlled and manipulated is essential to the issue of resource allocation, 
entitlement and availability. Kuper, like Sen, grasps that poverty is related to the 
legal attribution of entitlements. He acknowledges that poverty is a political issue 
and thus that questions of accountability, democracy and self-determination are 
thus relevant.  
Kuper points out some of the problems with utilising charities or NGOs to address 
poverty. These institutions are inappropriate agents of justice for a number of 
reasons. Many of these reasons have to do with the fact that these institutions 
lack the power to address poverty. Firstly, these institutions lack the power to 
regulate economic activity and implement development strategy. Nor, as is 
highlighted by Kuper, can they improve growth or impose redistribution (Kuper, 
2002, p. 114). This makes it difficult for them to systematically alter peoples social 
situations and dramatically alter poverty levels. Secondly, the funding of NGOs 
and charities is insecure (Kuper, 2002, p. 114). This means that they cannot 
guarantee that the improved circumstances they provide will continue. Thus 
NGOs and charities may be able to provide temporary assistance but they cannot 
secure a better social position in which people are no longer vulnerable to 
deprivation and domination.  
Worse still, charities and NGOs could become dominating themselves. If poor 
people are dependent on these institutions for their wellbeing they will be 
extremely vulnerable to the whims of these institutions and the personnel who 
run them. Such dependency will mean that they are vulnerable to arbitrary 
interference, exploitation or bullying from these institutions. If charities or NGOs 
supply basic resources and opportunities for poor people there is a risk that the 
poor will be dominated by these institutions. For example if the poor can only 
secure education for their children by regularly attending church and obeying the 
dictates of Christian authorities they will have little option but to comply. If poor 
people reliant on pleasing independent organisations in order to secure basic 
necessities this will undermine their autonomy and the social basis of their self-
respect. Such a scenario is neither fair nor just. Unless, NGOs and charities are 
made accountable or their powers to attach conditions to support are limited they 
will have the ability to exercise arbitrary power over others in a way that is 
morally problematic. The lack of accountability and illegitimacy of these make 
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them inappropriate agents of justice. Kuper recognises this flaw (Kuper, 2002, p. 
114). 
All of which suggests that tackling global poverty justly, legitimately and 
effectively requires a strategy other than widespread donation to charity. It 
suggests that contra-Singer some sort of political solutions is required in order to 
effectively solve the problems of extreme poverty and global inequality. 
Conclusions 
The deficiencies in Singer’s approach can partly be explained by the fact that his 
article was written in response to an immediate crisis (the 1971 famine in East 
Bengal). Singer did not include in his article a detailed analysis of the problem of 
poverty, its causes, or the possible ways in which it can be prevented, reduced or 
alleviated. Singer’s article directly addressed individuals in rich nations at the time 
of an immediate crisis in which he believed their donations could make a 
difference. He gave as clear a case as he could and attempted to appeal to as 
many people as possible whatever their moral beliefs or understanding of the 
nature and causes of poverty. This was the strength of his article: it contained a 
simple argument capable of attracting mass appeal. The weakness of his article 
was that it contained no analysis of the causes of the problem of poverty in 
general and no analysis of the possible means for its reduction. If the famine had 
been an isolated incident then Singer’s approach would have been sufficient. 
However, when the famine is viewed as part of a wider systematic problem of 
poverty and vulnerability his article is inadequate. An analysis of the causes of the 
famine may have led Singer to adopt a controversial stance which could not be so 
widely embraced and therefore perhaps it was wise of Singer to avoid such an 
analysis given his aim of addressing a particular crisis. Furthermore, a detailed 
analysis of how to prevent future famines would not have helped those who were 
dying at the time from this particular famine. Any long term plan for political and 
cultural change would not produce the instant relief which was urgently required. 
However, the famine that inspired Singer’s article was not an isolated incident. 
There have been many famines since and as I have mentioned, there are a 
number of serious on-going and often recurrent problems of global poverty and 
injustice including food insecurity and insanitary living conditions. Singer has - 
despite this - continued to support his recommendation of concentrating on aid 
and charitable giving (Singer, 2009). He has continued to concentrate on donation 
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and aid rather than consider the political causes of poverty and what action 
governments could take to help alleviate or at least not encourage the problem.  
The analysis above suggests that charitable giving by individual donors is not the 
most effective, respectful or fair means of addressing the issue of poverty long 
term. Furthermore it suggests that a deeper analysis of poverty and the means of 
alleviating it is required.  
As previously explained, I do not believe Singer is wrong to suggest that a duty of 
aid requires that we assist those in poverty. However, I do believe that it is likely 
that aid is not the only duty demanded in current circumstances with respect to 
poverty. If there are indeed other duties relevant to poverty alleviation, it may be 
the case that if these duties are fulfilled our duties of aid will be made 
considerably less burdensome. This could prevent the dilemma of having to 
choose between a counter-intuitive over-demanding duty of aid and an equally 
counter-intuitive assessment of duties which leaves some to suffer. The analysis 
here suggests that there may be duties to work with others to prevent poverty 
rather than simply assist its victims. It also suggests that poverty should be 
understood as a form of injustice requiring a political solution. The account of 
obligations proposed in this thesis will take these insights in to account.  
One possible political approach that treats global poverty as injustice is political 
cosmopolitanism. Political cosmopolitanism is a theory that suggests that at least 
some demands of justice are global in scope. Political cosmopolitanism suggests 
that poverty indicates global injustice that requires a global political solution. In 
the next chapter the plausibility of this claim will be considered.  
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Chapter 2: Political Cosmopolitanism, Poverty and Obligation 
In the previous chapter, it was argued that collective solutions are likely to be 
better at dealing with poverty and that political institutions may be the most 
appropriate tools for permanently reducing poverty.  Amartya Sen’s analysis of 
famine was used to suggest that poverty is a social and political problem 
concerning legal entitlement to resources.  It was suggested that the social and 
political causes of poverty are relevant in assigning obligations in relation to it.  I 
argued that systems of entitlement are part of social and political institutions that 
could be otherwise.  Andrew Kuper’s critique of Peter Singer’s aid based approach 
to global poverty was used to suggest that in fighting poverty an account of global 
justice was required detailing the aims of poverty reducing action. Thus I 
established that what is required is a political account of poverty and obligation to 
supplement the obligations of charity that Singer identified.  It was argued that 
such an account must recognise that poverty is a political problem and must 
consider solutions that involve acting collectively and setting up or altering 
institutions capable of preventing poverty.   
This chapter will consider in detail whether current levels of poverty indicate 
global injustice and whether there are duties to prevent such injustice continuing.  
The aim of this chapter is to work out whether poverty can be understood as a 
form of global injustice that requires a global political solution as well as what 
moral obligations follow from such an insight.  Over the last decade or so, various 
cosmopolitan accounts have been developed that identify global social injustice 
and recommend global political institutions or global political duties of some kind.  
This literature discusses what demands of social justice apply at a global level.  
Cosmopolitan theorists argue that at least some of the demands of social justice 
concerning control and consumption of resources should apply globally.  They 
argue that there is something unjust about how wealth, income and opportunity 
are currently determined.  They propose that the current global situation 
concerning the production and consumption of resources is unjust and that some 
sort of institutional change is required to remedy this fact.   
This chapter will investigate various ways in which global social injustice can be 
understood and several theories of the obligations agents have in relation to that 
injustice.  Two sophisticated forms of cosmopolitanism are critically considered 
and an explanation is offered as to why an additional account of global injustice 
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and obligation is required.  It will be argued that understandings of global poverty, 
social injustice and moral obligation could benefit from adopting a structural 
approach that recognises social structure as a site of injustice and thus takes into 
account the complex relationship between individuals and structural injustice.   
The first account discussed focuses on differences in opportunities and outcomes 
between people born in different states. Simon Caney develops a humanity based 
account that states that some basic principles of social justice apply regardless of 
the particular relationships that hold between individuals (Caney, 2011).  Caney 
suggests that there are obligations to support institutions that secure the 
fulfilment of the socio-economic rights of other human beings (Caney, 2005).   It is 
suggested that this approach treats injustice as a particular sort of unfortunate 
state of affairs.  It is then argued that it is important to distinguish humanly 
caused problems from unfortunate states of affairs that could be otherwise.  It is 
explained that this distinction is significant because socially caused unjustifiable 
inequalities are likely to attract extra duties in addition to the humanity centred 
obligations that Caney identifies.  I conclude that there may be negative duties in 
relation to global economic injustice in addition to positive duties to support just 
institutions and to promote justice. 
The second cosmopolitan approach analysed here concentrates on the justice of 
coercively enforced institutional arrangements governing access to resources. This 
approach, exemplified by Thomas Pogge, focuses on negative obligations to avoid 
harming other humans by imposing resource regimes which promote avoidable 
socio-economic human rights deficits (Pogge, 2010).  This approach concentrates 
on Amartya Sen’s insight that extreme poverty is a matter of a lack of entitlement 
to resources.  It considers who imposes this system of entitlement.  Pogge 
suggests that that there is a negative duty to avoid imposing systems of 
entitlement that perpetuate serious deprivation in essential resources.  Several 
potential problems with Pogge’s approach are briefly outlined.  Next, it is argued 
that it is often difficult to identify whether it is global or national institutional 
orders which should be held responsible for poverty and other human rights 
deficits.  It is concluded that there are obligations to avoid imposing injustice on 
others and that some affluent governments are guilty of violating this duty.  
However, the fact that it is often difficult to connect deprivation first to a 
particular institutional order and then to the citizens of affluent states who 
impose this order is noted.   
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At this juncture it is suggested that sometimes global injustice is the result of 
multiple institutions, practices and trends coming together to cause problems.  It 
is argued that understandings of poverty and global social justice could benefit 
from a conception of injustice that can deal with these cases.  I suggest that in 
addition to states of affairs that could be otherwise and coercively imposed 
institutional orders there may be a third site of global injustice and that there may 
be additional obligations relating to this site of injustice.  Following Iris Young, I 
suggest that when a range of humanly caused factors come together to produce 
significant arbitrary inequality this constitutes structural injustice.  In these cases 
no single agent can be held causally responsible for the injustice yet it would be a 
mistake to treat these cases as merely unfortunate states of affairs because they 
are the result of human choices and social institutions.  I argue that although in 
these cases no agent has violated their negative duty to avoid imposing injustice 
on others, the fact that humans are responsible for these states of affairs is 
significant.  I suggest that these structural injustices are likely to attract duties in 
addition to the humanity centred positive obligations identified by Caney.   
I go on to highlight some potential problems with Iris Young’s account of the 
obligations agents have in relation to structural injustice and to develop an 
alternative account of such obligations that aims to avoid these difficulties.  
Ultimately, I argue that a structural account of global social justice is plausible and 
can help us identify additional obligations in relation to global social injustice.  By 
the end of the chapter a provisional proposal is made that global poverty shows 
structural injustice and that all those who make on-going contributions to that 
injustice have obligations to make efforts to regulate that structure to prevent 
future structural injustice.  The rest of this thesis will argue for this account in 
detail.  The role of this chapter is to explain how this account fits within the 
existing literature and contributes to our understanding of global social justice 
and obligation. 
Humanity Based Cosmopolitanism 
The first of the aforementioned approaches claims that demands of justice apply 
regardless of background social relations and institutions. This approach suggests 
that certain distributions of resources or opportunities between persons are 
unjust regardless of whether or not people share a common institutional 
background, coercive regime or substantive social community.  This approach is 
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characterised by cosmopolitans like Simon Caney.  Caney argues that some 
demands of justice apply between all people in virtue of the fact that they share 
moral personality.   Arbitrary factors, such as nationality or state of residence, do 
not affect this moral personality based claim. Caney proposes four principles for 
global distributive justice. They include a right to a basic level of subsistence, a 
right to equal opportunities, a right to equal pay for equal work, and a proviso 
that says that benefitting people is more important the worse off they are (Caney, 
2005, pp. 122-125). For the sake of this argument I am not concerned with the 
nature of demands of global social justice. I am simply concerned with when 
certain demands of social justice apply and what obligations agents have in 
relation to these demands.  
Caney suggests that individuals have an obligation to support the institutional 
arrangements which best promote global distributive justice (Caney, 2005, p. 
121). This is a positive obligation to support institutions that bring about 
distributive justice. Thus, Caney suggests that establishing distributive justice 
requires establishing ‘institutional arrangements’ which effectively secure justice 
rather than relying on individual transactions that aim to bring about a more just 
distribution of resources (Caney, 2005, pp. 109, 121-123) (Caney 2005, 109, 121-
123).27  Henry Shue also endorses an account of social justice that is global in 
scope and based on humanity.  He claims that all humans have basic rights and 
that they have corresponding obligations not just to avoid violating these rights, 
but to protect the rights of others and to compensate individuals who have had 
these rights violated.  Shue argues that these duties are best discharged by 
building governing institutions that can fairly share the burdens of protecting 
these rights (Shue, 1996, pp. 52-55). 
 One key difference between Singer’s humanitarian approach and Caney’s 
humanity based approach is that Caney argues that everyone has a right to an 
institutional set up that guarantees they do not live in poverty.  Whereas, Singer 
only argues that there is a humanitarian obligation to assist those who live in 
poverty. Caney’s account recognises the need for a global order which secures 
people’s freedom from poverty and fulfils demands of global distributive justice. 
He believes that there is a positive obligation that we support those institutions 
                                                          
27
 Caney makes a distinction between a humanity centred obligation of justice and a 
humanitarian duty. 
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that effectively secure these rights.  Caney’s approach identifies poverty as 
injustice and recognises duties to support just institutions.   
Critiques of Humanity Based Cosmopolitanism 
Caney’s theory states that demands of distributive justice apply between all 
people no matter what their relationship. According to Caney’s theory if two 
entirely independent groups of people enjoy different levels of opportunity or 
different levels of pay for the same work, and these inequalities could be 
eradicated, this constitutes injustice. However, according to a rival understanding 
of injustice, a difference in conditions cannot be identified as unjust unless it is 
the result of human practices or institutions. This rival understanding of poverty 
claims that whilst it is unfortunate that some people live in poverty, it is only 
unjust when, for example, a government passes and enforces laws that condemn 
some people to live in poverty. This ‘political approach’ distinguishes injustice 
from misfortune.  Injustice is understood as a species of negative circumstance for 
which someone or some group is in some sense liable or causally responsible. This 
understanding of injustice is based on the intuition that where differences in 
wealth exist between independent people it is difficult to see why this should be 
considered a case of injustice unless they share a political regime of some kind. 
Under this conception states of affairs need not conform to the demands of 
fairness.  Rather, it is authorities that have an obligation to act fairly. This account 
of distributive justice suggests that we cannot demand that the world accord with 
some rules of distribution, but we can demand that we are treated justly by those 
with power over us.  
This political account rejects the idea that a mere lack of resources cannot be 
considered unjust or just.  Instead it insists that only a coercively enforced 
entitlement to resources is open to criticism for being unjust.  The easiest cases of 
injustice to identify are ones in which laws discriminate between people in ways 
that cannot be justified. For example a law which prevented members of a certain 
ethnic group from owning property would be a prime example of injustice rather 
than misfortune. In more complex cases a combination of laws leads to a situation 
of injustice. Thus, a more sophisticated approach explains that states enforce a 
set of rules determining use and control of resources and that it is the regime of 
law enforced by an authority which can be judged as just or unjust. According to 
this account, distributive justice only applies when such a coercive body enforces 
a regime of property rights. This view suggests, contra-Caney, that there can only 
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be distributive justice or injustice within a coercively enforced system of 
entitlement.  Thus it insists where agents do not share an authority that imposes a 
system of entitlement vast differences in opportunities and resources are not 
unjust. 
Many political theorists share the view that critiques of distributive justice should 
only be applied to coercively-enforced institutional orders. They argue that 
egalitarian demands of distributive justice only apply in specific circumstances. 
Some of these political theorists reject the idea that there is global distributive 
injustice on the grounds that there is no global authority claiming a monopoly of 
legitimate violence. For example, Thomas Nagel argues that strong demands of 
distributive justice apply within a state because co-citizens share a coercively 
enforced property regime (Nagel, 2005).  
Nagel argues that demands of social justice only apply in a very specific set of 
circumstances. He quotes Dworkin to explain that when there is an effective 
leviathan making a plausible claim to legitimate authority, this leviathan must 
treat its subjects as equals (Nagel 2005, 120-123, Dworkin 2000, 6). In a 
democratic society where the state is thought of as the instrument of the people 
and power is wielded in their name, citizens have an obligation not to use political 
power to enforce a system on others which does not treat them as equals.  Nagel 
explains that demands of justice only apply in circumstances where agents share 
such a political authority (Nagel, 2005, pp. 121-123). He follows Rawls in asserting 
that demands of justice are norms for the basic structure of a nation state and 
should be distinguished from the appropriate normative demands for 
international relations or individual conduct (Rawls, 1999). 
Where there is no such shared political authority, Nagel explains, demands of 
distributive justice simply do not apply. Further, Nagel suggests that in such a 
situation there is no obligation to enter into the political relation of sharing an 
authority (Nagel 2005, 121). He supports what he describes as the ‘political’ 
conception of distributive justice whereby authorities are not a means by which to 
discharge pre-existing duties of social justice. Rather, to live under a shared 
authority is to have a special relationship with others. Entering into such a 
relationship, where no such relation currently exists, is not compulsory. However, 
when agents do share a government which makes a plausible claim to a monopoly 
of legitimate violence, that government may only enforce a regime of access to 
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property which treats people as equals and this requires fulfilling norms of 
distributive justice. 
These ‘political’ accounts based on the coercive imposition of injustice draw on 
the fact that poverty is often a question of insufficient legal entitlement to goods 
rather than insufficient goods. They suggest that it is only when poverty results 
from insufficient legal entitlement to goods that it constitutes injustice rather 
than misfortune.  These accounts identify the coercive imposition of a property 
rights regime as the cause of poverty.  If the regime is not justifiable or fails to 
treat citizens as equals it is unjust. 
Caney argues that although these political accounts may successfully establish 
that claims of distributive justice apply within a coercively enforced regime they 
do not establish that demands of distributive justice only emerge within coercive 
regimes.28  
Those committed to a ‘coercive imposition’ account (as I will refer to it) deny that 
justice demands the establishment of just shared institutions where none exist. 
They insist that there are no duties to support the establishment of just regimes 
or to create a more egalitarian distribution of resources where there is no such 
regime in place (Nagel, 2005, p. 121).  In contrast Caney insists that demands of 
justice apply between all humans regardless of whether or not they share a 
political authority. 
Coercive imposition accounts insist that special duties of justice apply where 
agents share a political authority.  Caney argues that his account need not deny 
that this is the case (Caney, 2011, p. 507).  However, he insists that some 
standards of distributive justice apply between agents who do not share a political 
relationship or common authority.  Caney allows that the argument from Nagel 
and other political accounts aim to show that demands of distributive justice 
apply between those who share a state.  However these accounts do not show 
that no demands of distributive justice apply between those who do not share an 
authority.  It could be that there are greater demands that fall on those who share 
an authority, yet there are still demands concerning the just distribution of goods 
and just social relationships between agents living in different states (Caney, 
2011, p. 507). 
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 As voiced in a presentation July 2012. 
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It is plausible that there is both a negative duty not to impose an unjust regime on 
others and an additional positive duty to support the establishment of a just and 
secure property regime. As previously mentioned there are likely to be multiple 
duties which require agents to set up institutions capable of lessening poverty.  
There could be obligations to promote justice and to protect rights and also 
obligations to avoid helping to impose political regimes that do not treat those 
subject to their power as equals.  The demands of justice required when agents 
do not share a coercive regime may differ from those required when they do.29 
The political approach has a very narrow definition of when distributions can be 
unjust.  Yet, these accounts offer no definitive reason to have the concept of 
justice limited in this way.  However, the political approach does recognise the 
fact that whether or not a distribution of goods is imposed is morally significant.  
Whether or not a distribution of goods is imposed matters because there are 
moral restrictions on what individuals may do to each other.  These restrictions 
prevent the imposition of some distributions. Where a distribution is permitted to 
continue but is not imposed by any agent or agents there will be positive duties to 
amend the distribution to consider.  Yet, in such cases there are no negative 
duties that if honoured would prevent the problematic distribution.  In contrast 
where a distribution of goods is imposed there may also be negative duties that 
are being violated.  These duties may proscribe imposing the current distribution 
of goods. 
Institutional Cosmopolitanism 
In response to the objection that demands of justice only apply where a coercive 
regime is imposed, many cosmopolitan theorists have sought to identify features 
of the global situation that could justify the appropriateness of making demands 
of global distributive justice. Various ‘institutional’ cosmopolitan approaches have 
been developed which cite features of global interaction and organisation and 
argue that these features make it appropriate to apply demands of social justice 
to the global order (Caney 2005, 106). These accounts identify negative 
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 Whether in both cases the same demands of justice apply is a question that is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. Furthermore, whether we identify duties to promote more 
justifiable distributions of property between independent states as demands of humanity 
or justice may not be important. It is not a question that I seek to take a stand on in this 
thesis. What agents are obliged to do is more important than what these duties are called. 
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obligations to avoid imposing injustice in addition to the humanity centred 
obligations to support justice which Caney explicates.   
One form of institutional cosmopolitanism is proposed by Thomas Pogge.  Pogge 
suggests that there is a global economic institutional order that is coercively 
imposed by the affluent states (Pogge 2010, 21). Pogge claims that this order 
knowingly and avoidably perpetuates human rights deficits (Pogge 2005).30  Pogge 
suggests that the global institutional order is imposed by the governments of 
powerful and affluent states in the interests of their business and finance elites 
(Pogge 2010, 16-25). 
Pogge defines an institution as a social practice governed by publicly known rules 
which stipulate roles and responsibilities (Pogge, 1989). Understanding this 
definition of institution is essential for understanding Pogge’s ideas about global 
justice.  According to Pogge, the central social practices of a society, which have a 
pervasive impact on people’s life prospects, make up the institutional order of a 
society (Pogge 1989). Pogge thinks that demands of justice apply to institutional 
orders and hence whenever agents share an institutional order there are 
standards of justice that the order must fulfil.  
Pogge argues that the global institutional order has not simply evolved from 
international interactions.  He thinks that the global institutional order has been 
imposed by affluent governments and their representatives.  They have achieved 
this by using their superior bargaining position to design the order to serve their 
economic interests.  This superior bargaining position results from economic 
development, superior capital and economic might.  Pogge states that the current 
order has been insisted upon by affluent nations and acquiesced in by the 
governments of poorer nations (Pogge 2005: 5).  
Pogge argues that there is a moral obligation to refrain from coercively imposing 
an institutional order which is deeply unjust (defined as knowingly and avoidably 
perpetuating human rights deficits). This Pogge argues is a negative institutional 
duty and part of the duty to refrain from harming others. Pogge does not claim 
that we have a negative duty to refrain from imposing an institutional order which 
falls short of maximal justice. Our negative duty only requires that we refrain from 
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 Thomas Pogge’s emphasis is on the fact that there is a global institutional order which 
should be subject to normative assessment rather than on the fact that it is imposed by 
the affluent states (Pogge 2010, 24).  
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imposing any order that is seriously unjust (this is defined as an order that 
knowingly and avoidably perpetuates human rights deficits) (Pogge 2010, 29).  
Pogge suggests that citizens of the affluent liberal democratic states have some 
responsibility for the actions of their governments because they live under 
democratic political regimes.  He explains that because citizens could prevent 
their governments from continuing with the offending policies, citizens are in a 
sense responsible for these policies (Pogge, 2010, p.7).  He implies that because 
citizens fail to prevent this imposition they are complicit in it.  Citizens could 
prevent the government from imposing injustice by protesting en masse against 
it, through a campaign of civil disobedience, or through voting out governments 
who continue to impose injustice.  Pogge suggests that the fact that citizens have 
this power but do not use it makes them responsible for their government’s 
policies, including the global economic system it helps uphold (unless they take 
compensatory action) (Pogge, 2010, p.7).  Pogge even argues that if current 
political arrangements prevent citizens from influencing policy, then citizens have 
a responsibility to reform these systems (Pogge, 2010, p.8). 
Pogge also suggests that by contributing financially to their government citizens 
become implicated in the acts of their government (Pogge, 2005, p.71).  This is 
implied by his talk of contributions to the imposition of global institutional 
injustice.  Obedience to law can also be perceived as a contribution to the 
government’s imposition of injustice because such obedience enables the 
government to rule and maintain its position (Pogge, 2005, p.71).  Obeying 
governments that impose injustice helps uphold their rule and the social 
institutions they impose.  Voting in an election could also be considered a 
contribution to the government and therefore indirectly a contribution to the 
imposition of injustice.31 
Pogge argues that citizens have a negative duty not to make uncompensated 
contributions to the imposition of seriously unjust institutional orders.  He says 
                                                          
31
 At other times Pogge suggests that citizens are complicit in the imposition of an unjust 
global economic order because they benefit from that order. Pogge believes that our duty 
to avoid violating the basic socio-economic rights of others ‘institutionally’ includes a duty 
not to ‘profit from the unjust impoverishment of others’ (Pogge, 2001, p.60). This suggests 
that he believes that profiting from a rights violating institutional order is a way in which 
an agent can collaborate in the institutional violation of rights. Pogge outlines a negative 
duty not to profit from injustice without taking compensatory action(or as he later puts it 
not to take advantage of injustice) (Pogge, 2005, p.71). In this thesis I will not be engaging 
with this strand of Pogge’s argument. 
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that those who take compensatory political action or make compensatory 
donations to poverty charities are not in violation of this negative duty.  He 
further suggests several different routes through which citizens of the affluent 
states, which dominate the global economic system, can be understood to 
contribute to the maintenance of that unjust global economic system. 
Potential Problems with Institutional Cosmopolitanism 
Pogge’s theory suggests that there may be negative duties to avoid imposing 
injustice in addition to positive duties to promote justice, support just institutions 
or protect rights.  He suggests that currently these negative duties are being 
violated.  His account is interesting and plausible.  However there are some issues 
that his account must address in order to establish that citizens of affluent states 
are currently violating these duties.  Below some of these problems are briefly 
outlined. 
The first controversial claim of Pogge’s I will examine is whether the global 
institutional order is imposed by the wealthy states.  At present there is no global 
agency or centralised power that effectively enforces the current regime through 
a claim to the monopoly of legitimate violence. The current global economic order 
is based on negotiations and agreements. In these negotiations economic and 
militarily dominant states dictate terms because they have a better bargaining 
position. No individual government unilaterally determines policy. This fact means 
that the global institutional order does not perfectly fit the leviathan model on 
which the political approach to distributive justice is based. Many global economic 
rules and norms have emerged through bargaining and tradition rather than being 
imposed by a unified power centre. However, the G8, a group of powerful states 
that meets regularly to discuss policy and global coordination exercise significant 
power in these negotiations.  In the past, the G8 has been able to mould global 
financial and economic policy.  However, in more recent years the G20 (a larger 
group of states that have begun meeting regularly) has had more power as the 
economic might of the eight, G8, countries has been threatened by the rise of 
other economic powers.  In order to establish that the current order is imposed by 
affluent states this claim needs to made precise and evidence must be 
demonstrated for the claim that global policies are being effectively imposed by 
these groups.   
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To a certain extent, Pogge’s account avoids this critique by giving a broad 
definition of what constitutes ‘coercive imposition’ and ‘institutional order’ so 
that his account can apply to the global economic institutions which are shaped 
by the larger global economies and major Trans-National Corporations (TNCs) and 
from which smaller states cannot effectively opt out.32 Moreover, it does seem 
that the governments of rich states are using their power to create an 
international order that benefits their economies and maintains that power.  In 
doing so they actively seek to expand globalisation and shape it to serve their own 
interests. This claim appears plausible considering the character of WTO decisions 
and bilateral ‘free trade’ agreements.  It also seems plausible when the 
procedures and actions of the Bretton Woods international institutions are 
considered.  It also fits with the aims expressed by negotiators for affluent states 
and multi state bargaining groups.  Powerful states appear to impose intellectual 
property laws that benefit western corporations at the expense of poorer citizens.  
Rich states also use their power to forbid protectionist policies in poorer states as 
a condition for trading with them and gaining access to foreign markets and 
investment.  Poorer states can be threatened with the removal of foreign 
investment if they fail to comply.  In the past states who have not complied with 
the wishes of affluent states have suffered economic isolation, asset seizures, 
funding opposition parties, covert missions to destabilize and remove their 
governments as well as military actions like air strikes.33  
However, states are not the only global actors to actively influence the global 
institutional order.   Powerful Trans-National Corporations (TNCs) also lobby to 
shape the global socio-economic order to suit their interests.  TNCs shape global 
trade policy at the WTO via powerful corporate lobbying.  These groups exert 
particularly significant influence on delegates from the USA and EU.  They have 
extensive access to delegates and receive information about delegates’ positions 
that is not made available to the public or NGOs representing social or 
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 Trans-National Corporations are large firms that produce and sell goods and services in 
various states and our registered in more than one state. 
33
 For example, an Argentinian war ship was seized by a Ghanaian court after an injunction 
was granted to creditors who did not accept the country’s default. The creditors in the 
case were a hedge fund who purchased outstanding Argentinian debt at rock bottom 
prices from the original creditors when Argentina defaulted on payments as a speculative 
investment based on a strategy of litigation to obtain payment from Argentina of an 
amount significantly in excess of the amount they paid for the debt (The Economist, 2012).   
Other examples include the Cuba’s economic isolation and covert CIA operations in South 
America to destabilise the states of non-compliant leaders (like Salvador Allende) in the 
1980s. 
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environmental concerns (Action Aid, 2006, pp. 2-3).  They have even taken part in 
preliminary talks, negotiating directly with representatives of developing 
countries.34   TNCs also lobby developing world governments directly in efforts to 
get them to adopt trade laws beneficial to their interests.35   This gives reasonable 
grounds for the claim that TNCs share in blame for the imposition of unjust 
international trade rules.  In pressuring representatives to adopt certain positions 
(with reasonable success), and directly negotiating with governments, lobbying 
groups for TNCs assist in the designing of the global institutional order.  
TNCs are made up of employees who could be held responsible for the actions of 
the TNC in the same way that citizens are held responsible for the actions of their 
governments.  In both cases it is likely that decision-makers should be held 
primarily responsible for the acts of governments and TNCs.  Thus in the case of 
TNCs it is likely that senior management or share-holders should be held 
responsible for the actions of the TNC.  However, TNC’s are aided and abetted in 
their actions by consumers, suppliers and workers as governments are aided and 
abetted by citizens, politicians and civil servants.   The argument for complicity in 
the actions of TNC’s may run similarly to the complicity of citizens.36  If citizens of 
states that help impose the global institutional order can be held responsible for 
that imposition or for assisting in that imposition it may be that employees or 
consumers of powerful TNCs can likewise be held responsible.   
A second potential problem with Pogge’s account is that it is not legitimate to find 
citizens of affluent states blameworthy on the basis that if they worked together 
they could have prevented their governments’ aggressive economic policy.37  In 
Politics as Usual, Pogge argues that because a majority of citizens could mobilise 
to alter their state’s foreign policy, citizens of a democratic state can be held 
responsible for the policy of their states.  Yet he admits that any individual citizen 
is powerless to alter foreign policy given that other citizens are reluctant to 
support such efforts (Pogge, 2010, p.7).  He argues that citizens are only 
powerless if they do not work together.  Pogge is suggesting that citizens within 
these countries share responsibility for their government’s foreign policy because 
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 The USA delegates brought lobbyists to the meetings in the run up to the WTO Hong 
Kong summit in 2005 (Action Aid, 2006, p. 3). 
35
 In 2005 phARMA encouraged the Indian government to push through a new patent law 
(Action Aid, 2006, p. 4). 
36
 I do not explore this possibility fully here. It is a possibility that could be investigated in 
future research. 
37
 A similar argument could be made about the employees and/or customers of TNCs. 
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a majority of citizens acting together (in an affluent democratic state) could alter 
that policy.   
However, we cannot find individual citizens morally responsible for omitting to 
alter their government’s foreign policy because they lack the power to do that.  
Perhaps we can find citizens collectively responsible for failing to alter their 
government’s policy.  However, more needs to be said to establish that citizens 
are a collective in the sense required for the attribution of omissions to that 
agent.  Some work has been done on filling this gap (Pasternak, 2011).  An 
alternative possibility is that the aggregate are collectively responsible for failing 
to work together to prevent their government acting in this way.38  However 
Pogge chooses to flesh out his claim, it is vital to propose a theory in which we 
judge an individual citizen on the basis of their own actions or omissions rather 
than those of others.   
It is not legitimate to blame any individual citizen on the basis that the citizenry as 
a whole omitted to alter their government’s foreign policy.  To do so is to blame 
an individual for what is beyond their control.  It is to find them morally 
responsible for omitting to do something that is beyond their abilities to do. It is 
unjustifiable to praise or blame an agent for what is beyond their control.  
Therefore, agents cannot be blamed for failing to prevent the imposition of 
injustice because their ability to prevent the imposition of injustice is severely 
limited.  What agents can be held responsible for is working towards the reform 
of the order of which they are a part.39  
Pogge states that it would be ‘absurd’ to absolve all citizens of responsibility on 
the basis that no individual citizen has the power to alter their government’s 
policy (Pogge, 2010, p.7).  However, it cannot be the case that individual can be 
blamed for something that they cannot avoid. If the citizenry were to form a 
collective and take political action they could alter their government’s policy.  It 
could be argued that individual citizens have an obligation to try to establish such 
a collective and take action that aims to influence the policy of their government.  
In this thesis an account of such obligations will be developed.  However, the 
existence of such obligations does not mean that individual citizens can be blamed 
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 Virginia Held has an interesting proposal for the obligations of random collectives that 
could be usefully applied to this case (Held, 1970). 
39
 Pogge’s analysis actually suggests that citizens ‘compensate’ for contributions to the 
imposition of injustice in this way. 
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for the policies of their government.  This is because they can only be fairly 
blamed for what they themselves do or fail to do.  In order to establish that 
citizens are responsible for the actions of their government Pogge must provide a 
detailed account of why they can be held so responsible.  This account must avoid 
blaming individuals for what is beyond their control.  To my knowledge Pogge has 
not yet provided such an account.40 
Are Global or National Institutions Responsible for Poverty? 
It is useful here to turn to David Miller’s critique of Pogge.  I will use Miller’s 
critiques to demonstrate why an additional theory of justice is required to 
understand the duties agents have in relation to social injustice.   
Miller argues that citizens of affluent states do not have the obligations Pogge 
outlines.  He argues for this on the basis that the poverty and deprivation that 
Pogge identifies are not caused by the global institutional order.  The global 
institutional order, Miller claims, cannot be identified as the cause of human 
rights deficits because national institutions also have an effect on whether human 
rights are secured. Miller explains that national institutions and cultural factors 
significantly affect the levels of poverty within any state. He demonstrates that 
these factors have an effect by comparing different development outcomes 
within the same global economic system (D. Miller 2007, 236-241). 
Miller is right that the global economic institutional order is not the only factor 
which affects the extent and acuteness of poverty within a territory. The global 
institutional order is significantly different to the idealised notion of basic 
structure within a closed society described by Rawls (Rawls 1971). In Realizing 
Rawls, Pogge develops Rawls’ conception of a ‘Basic Structure’.  Pogge explains 
how important social and economic institutions have a pervasive impact on 
people’s opportunities and outcomes. He explains that it is this institutional order 
which is the subject of accounts of justice. However, when we consider central 
global economic institutions, it is only in conjunction with local norms, laws and 
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 Similarly, consumers and workers of TNCs may be at fault if they fail to organise and 
oppose the actions of the TNC. However, this does not mean that they can be held 
responsible for the actions of the TNC that they contribute to. This is because like citizens 
in respect to states they are not able to effectively control the TNCs they buy from or work 
for. However, in the case of TNCs they may have an obligation to give up working or 
buying from the TNC. Whether or not they have such an obligation will depend on the 
seriousness of the TNCs misdeeds and whether the costs of leaving work or ending 
consumption are excessive. 
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institutions that they determine people’s opportunities and outcomes.41 Since the 
central global economic legal institutions do not effectively determine the 
entitlements of individuals we may not – and Miller claims we cannot – hold them 
responsible for these entitlements.42 
According to Miller’s account, in order to hold an agent obliged to aid those in 
poverty we must either prove that the agent is responsible for that poverty or 
that the poverty is the result of natural forces beyond the control of those living in 
it (Miller, 2007, pp. 250-258). He argues that if national factors are responsible for 
poverty in a nation, then no outsiders are obliged by enforceable duties to assist.  
When it comes to the current economic order’s responsibility for present poverty, 
Miller argues that outcome responsibility for poverty cannot be predominantly 
attributed to the international system.  Miller disagrees with Thomas Pogge’s 
analysis of moral duties that follow from poverty.  He argues that affluent states 
and their citizens are only at fault for imposing the global institutional order if that 
order is ‘outcome responsible’ for poverty in the developing world. 
David Miller uses the examples of Ghana and Malaysia to demonstrate that the 
development policies pursued by the governments of poorer nations have a 
dramatic effect on whether their people continue to live in poverty.  Miller alleges 
that Malaysia has adopted an economic policy which has allowed the nation to 
develop and to pull its citizens out of poverty.  Contrary to this, Ghana has 
adopted a different policy and as a result still has many citizens living in extreme 
poverty.  This, Miller argues, suggests that national factors have a significant 
effect on the level of poverty within a country.  Miller accuses Pogge of arguing 
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 Central social and economic institutions alone determine the outcomes and 
opportunities at the national level. Informal institutions and patterns of action also 
contribute to the positions agents find themselves in. 
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 In his account of global justice David Miller seeks to develop an account of responsibility 
to alleviate poverty which is sensitive to what he identifies as the causes of poverty. Miller 
argues that current poverty is predominantly to do with national factors rather than the 
result of the global institutional order. Miller thinks that it is necessary to determine which 
actors are ‘outcome responsible’ for poverty in order to know how to assign ‘remedial 
responsibility’ to take action to improve their condition. He adopts a principle of justice 
according to which those who are outcome responsible for a problem should be liable for 
the resultant costs. He uses this principle to attribute primary responsibilities for 
alleviating extreme poverty (Miller, 2007, p. 90). Miller argues that it is only if a 
responsible agent is incapable of assisting, or refuses to assist, that duties pass on to those 
who are not ‘outcome responsible’ (Miller, 2007, p. 257). In cases where responsible 
actors refuse to (or are unable to) take responsibility the duties of assistance pass to other 
actors but becomes an unenforceable duties of humanity rather than a duties of justice 
(Miller, 2007, p. 258). Miller argues that only when no agent is outcome responsible for a 
consequence, because it is the result of natural forces, are there enforceable and 
obligatory duties of aid (Miller, 2007, pp. 253-256). 
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that because under alternative international structures Ghana may not have such 
widespread poverty, responsibility for that poverty lies with those who impose 
international economic structures (Miller, 2007, p.240).  This Miller argues is an 
ungrounded claim.  Miller states that the fact that countries like Malaysia have 
developed and prevented poverty, shows that, contra Pogge, some considerable 
share of responsibility for poverty and underdevelopment rests on the shoulders 
of the undeveloped nations.  Miller argues that at the very least outcome 
responsibility is shared between poor nations and rich nations who impose the 
global trade order (Miller, 2007, pp.244, 247).   
It is controversial to claim that the reason why some poorer states struggle whilst 
others thrive in the global economic order is a matter of poor governance or a 
poor national work ethic. There are many possible explanations for the lack of 
growth in one state and its prevalence in the other.  It may be that the global 
economic environment treated the two countries differently.  Furthermore, there 
may be that the difference in fortunes can be explained by facts about 
populations and resources beyond the control of the governments.  However, 
undoubtedly the policy of local governments has some effect on economic 
outcomes. 
Governments within developing countries make their decisions concerning 
economic policy within an international order of explicit agreements, ruling 
bodies, network power and inequality in bargaining power.  This order affects 
what options are available to that government and what burdens and benefits are 
likely to be the consequence of any particular choice.  Finding national 
governments outcome responsible for negative consequences is unfair when the 
structures in which these actors make their decisions force them to make many 
harmful choices. 
Analysis of global economic trends has suggested that in the late 1980s a dramatic 
change in policy by the USA led to a new global economic environment.  Some 
developing states did well in this new environment whereas others struggled 
(Arrighi, 2002, pp. 17-24).  Miller’s analysis suggests that either global or national 
factors must be responsible for the flat-lining in growth that occurred in most 
Sub-Saharan African countries.  However Arrighi’s analysis suggests that regional 
and historical differences may also have played a role in the difference in 
outcomes different developing countries experienced.  
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 Furthermore, Arrighi explains that before this period of intense competition 
some poorer countries received preferential treatment by the USA for strategic 
reasons.  This preferential treatment came in the form of aid, market access and 
permitting protectionism (Arrighi, 2002, pp. 30-31).  This put these states in a 
stronger position to face the dramatic change in situation.  However, Arrighi notes 
that in many cases poverty has been exacerbated by the actions of national 
governments.  He notes that national governments can increase or decrease 
poverty depending on the domestic policies they adopt and that this is true of 
both rich and poor states (Arrighi, 2002, pp. 35-36). 
Regardless of whether Arrighi’s analysis of the causes of the African crisis is 
accepted, there are good reasons to think that the global institutional order has a 
dramatic effect on outcomes for individual states.  Consequences that follow from 
a state policy are always the result of a variety of factors including actions by 
other global actors and natural forces.  This means that the consequences that 
follow an action are never completely under the state’s control even if they have 
a fairly wide choice set.  This is because the consequences of a particular choice 
are largely determined by the global institutional background.  The actions of 
other states as well as global trade norms and specific agreements in part 
determine what the consequence of an action will be.  A state government can 
alleviate poverty and redistribute wealth nationally as well as adopt policies that 
maximise growth given the situation their state faces.  However, they must do this 
within a global institutional order that provides certain opportunities and denies 
others.  They are thus restricted by the global economic situation they face as well 
as by national and historical factors that may favour or undermine their chances 
of development. 
On top of this the global institutional order can also influence the decisions and 
character of national governments by attaching benefits and burdens to certain 
behavioural choices.  Thomas Pogge has argued that features of the global 
institutional order like the resource and borrowing privileges, which entitle those 
in effective control of a state to borrow on its behalf and sell its resources, 
incentivise coups and corrupt practices by groups wishing to better themselves 
financially.  Pogge argues that under a global regime in which resource and 
borrowing privileges are offered to those who seize power it is likely that groups 
wishing to further their own interests at the expense of the general population 
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will seize power.  Thus poor and corrupt national governance may be causally 
related to the global institutional order (Pogge, 2010, pp. 47-50). 
Pogge’s analysis of the way in which the global institutional order affects the 
character of poorer state governments suggests that we cannot simply compare 
Ghana’s economic policy to what it could have been and blame the people of 
Ghana for the deficiencies of their government. Instead, we must also consider 
what the Ghanaian government may have been like in a different global 
institutional order. Miller's criticism rests on holding the Government of Ghana 
constant, but there may be good reason to believe that a more just global order 
would, in turn, have produced a better and more just Government in Ghana. 
In response to arguments of this sort, Miller suggests that nations are ultimately 
responsible for the outcomes of their choices even when those choices are made 
within a difficult international economic order.  He uses the example of cars 
negotiating a difficult roundabout to model nations negotiating the international 
economic system.  Miller asserts that even if a roundabout is statistically more 
likely to produce crashes than an alternative (like traffic lights) this does not make 
the roundabout ‘outcome-responsible’ for the crash (Miller, 2007, p. 240).43   
However, it seems problematic to judge a driver responsible for a crash when it 
occurs on an extremely dangerous roundabout and when the condition and skill 
set of the driver are themselves related to the structure of road traffic.  Similarly a 
state can only be fairly held responsible for outcomes within a reasonably just 
system that offers sufficient opportunity for the state to do well.  If the global 
order is such that it is difficult for poor countries to develop then it is problematic 
to hold them entirely responsible for their poverty.  States can only be held 
responsible for causing an outcome against a background of just institutions.  In 
the absence of such a just institutional order responsibility for outcomes cannot 
be easily identified.     
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 This is a problematic way of understanding the situation because it suggests that the 
global economic order is stable and that there are sensible and irresponsible ways of 
negotiating it. However, the reality is that the global order is forever changing and 
evolving. Furthermore, the strategies one state adopts affect the likelihood of success for 
other states (Arrighi, 2002, pp. 31-32). For example, lowering business rates may attract 
foreign investment and therefore boost development. However, all states lower business 
rates they will not all benefit from increased growth. This policy works by attracting 
investment in one location over another. Thus if all locales pursue the policy it fails to 
have the same result. Thus the analogy is misleading. 
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This suggests that we should aim for a global system that offers a decent level of 
opportunity for states to develop and to achieve good governance.  Only within a 
background of just global background conditions, in which nations have a decent 
degree of sovereignty, can we fairly and conclusively judge nations to be 
responsible for their poverty.  When just institutions have been established, which 
provide a decent number of options and determine fair consequences, agents can 
be fairly and uncontroversially be judged outcome responsible for consequences.  
This does not mean that being rewarded for more or less productive choices 
cannot be considered in designing a theory of justice for the global economic 
order.  Nor does this mean that institutions that ensure states receive different 
benefits and burdens depending on their causal contribution to producing 
benefits or burdens cannot and should not be designed.   
Miller acknowledges that when individuals have very few options to choose from, 
all of which produce negative consequences, then the outcome responsibility of 
the agent is mitigated.  To illustrate this point he uses the example of an engineer 
who must choose between flooding one village or another.  He argues that in such 
a case the engineer has only a trace of outcome responsibility and that they 
should not be liable for compensation to the villagers who are subject to the flood 
(Miller, 2007, p.93).  If this is the case then surely a state that selects an economic 
policy that condemns a large section of its population (say 100,000 people) to 
poverty only has a trace of responsibility for the outcome if they had to choose 
between policies that would result in extreme poverty for 100,000 or 150,000 
people. 
Miller also acknowledges that our outcome responsibility is limited by what can 
reasonably be expected from us and others in eliminating risk.  He explains that 
we are not responsible for burdens which follow our actions if they are 
exaggerated by the failure of other individuals to take reasonable precautionary 
measures.  When this is the case Miller says we are only responsible for the 
burdens our actions would have produced if others had acted reasonably.  For 
example, if I hold a bonfire that spreads to my neighbour’s property and causes 
damage I am usually outcome responsible for that damage.  However, if my 
neighbour fails to call the fire brigade and instead lets his property burn, then I am 
only responsible for the damage that would have occurred if the fire brigade had 
been called.  This is because we can reasonably expect others to call the fire 
brigade to protect their property.  The same sort of reasoning could be used to 
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argue that individuals should not be identified as responsible for the actual 
consequences that follow from their actions if these consequences are in part the 
result of an unreasonable social order. 
These examples demonstrate two cases in which individuals are not held outcome 
responsible for the consequences of their actions.  In the first case it is a natural 
disaster that forces the agent to choose between two bad scenarios.  In the 
second case the unreasonable behaviour of others exacerbates the damage done 
by the action.  In a similar way the outcome responsibility of national factors for 
poverty could be reduced to a trace if the nation were place in circumstances 
where bad consequences would follow whatever policy they selected.  Similarly, if 
the nation’s policy resulted in widespread poverty because other states acted 
unreasonably the nation could not be held responsible for the actual 
consequences of its policy.  This suggests that the conditions in which nations 
develop their economic strategy can mitigate their responsibility for the results of 
that policy.  It also suggests that if the unreasonable behaviour of other states 
aggravates or increases the poverty that results from a developing nation’s 
economic policy the nation cannot be held outcome responsible for the poverty 
that results.  This suggests that nations should only be held outcome responsible 
for their poverty if the institutional order in which they operate offers them 
reasonable opportunities to avoid poverty and other states do not act 
unreasonably so as to exacerbate their poverty.  To return to the roundabout 
analogy: the car using the roundabout can only be held responsible in the event of 
a crash if the roundabout offered a reasonable opportunity to avoid crashing and 
the other roundabout users do not drive irresponsibly. 
Miller discusses whether it is herculean effort that allows a few ‘Horatio Nelson 
type’ nations to develop or whether it is bad governance and a low effort culture 
that perpetuates poverty in countries which fail to develop their economies 
(Miller, 2007, p. 241). Miller argues the key question in assessing whether global 
economic institutions contribute is: 
“Whether the global order provides reasonable opportunities for societies to lift 
themselves out of poverty or whether it places obstacles in their path that are 
quite difficult to overcome, require extraordinary economic performance on the 
part of a developing society.” (Miller, 2007, p. 241)  
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He is discussing how we determine whether the global institutional order offers 
sufficient opportunities to develop. If only a few nations can manage it the 
current order may not offer sufficient opportunities to develop.  Miller denies that 
this is the case.  In contrast, Pogge argues that there is a relationship between the 
global institutional order and levels of poverty and that this order causally affects 
the level of poverty.  He does not deny that national factors also play a role.  
However, he insists that the current institutional order perpetuates poverty. 
It appears that Miller and Pogge agree that assessing the global economic order is 
a matter of considering whether the global institutional order offers sufficient 
opportunities for development. Where they differ – dramatically – is in their 
assessment of the current order.  Pogge judges the global institutional order as 
failing to offer reasonable opportunities for development and instead being 
ordered in such a way as to offer inadequate opportunity for development.  Pogge 
assesses the order as being such that the interests of wealthy states and powerful 
corporations are put before the interests of poorer states in developing and 
eradicating poverty.  Pogge condemns this order for not being designed so as to 
prioritising development. 
On closer examination it is clear that Thomas Pogge and David Miller have two 
different ways of understanding what can be expected of the global institutional 
order.  Pogge sees the global institutional order as placing states in particular 
positions in terms of options, powers, wealth and likely outcomes of various 
policies.  Whereas Miller sees the institutional order as offering states 
opportunities which they can use to their benefit or fail to take up. 
The Pogge/Miller debate is a replication of a national debate between holding 
people or institutions responsible for outcomes.  Those who hold people primarily 
responsible for their poverty believe the domestic basic structure need offer only 
opportunities to become wealthy that agents can take up or fail to take up.  
Whereas, others who see structures as being responsible for levels of domestic 
poverty believe justice requires structures to ensure that poverty is avoided 
completely.  There is a difference in understanding concerning on what basis a 
basic structure should be judged as fair.  Either the structure need only give 
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reasonable opportunity to escape poverty or it must additionally ensure that no 
one who behaves reasonably decently will end up poor.44 
Pogge and Miller agree that causal responsibility for poverty is shared between 
global institutions and national governments.  Neither can prove that the other 
factor is irrelevant.  They also agree that altering either factor can improve the 
situation.  They disagree on how just an institutional order needs to be for a 
nation to be held responsible for their poverty and on their understanding of the 
amount of opportunity for development offered by the current global institutional 
order.  
One way to avoid the debate as to whether national or global institutions are 
primarily responsible for poverty is to adopt an account of poverty and obligation 
that can assign obligations in cases where poverty results from the combination of 
a range of factors.  Injustice can emerge from the combination of global and 
national institutions.  Identifying injustice in social structures offers a way to avoid 
having to attribute responsibility for poverty to either the global or national 
institutional order.  Just as separate institutions can come together to 
disadvantage some whilst benefitting others, institutional orders can come 
together to put people in difficult circumstances.  
Often problems are the result of a variety of humanly caused factors.  In such 
cases the problems people face should not be considered merely misfortunes or 
natural difficulties.  Rather, they should be considered as related to human 
choices, actions and institutions.  This fact is relevant to how they should be 
viewed and the obligations agents have in relation to them.  The concept of 
Structural Injustice developed by Iris Young identifies injustice which emerges 
from a variety of different humanly caused factors. 
                                                          
44
 Most people on first reflection expect much more of the domestic basic structure than 
merely to provide opportunities for wealth and success. Most liberals see the basic 
structure as responsible for ensuring not only reasonable opportunity for all but also 
reasonable outcomes for all. In liberal egalitarian political philosophy there has been a 
general consensus that our government must ensure even those who do not succeed in 
becoming affluent or successful have access to sufficient resources to live decent and 
fulfilling lives free from poverty and able to interact with other members of the 
community as equals. However, with the re-emergence of individual responsibility this 
consensus has been eroded. 
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Multiple Forms of Injustice and Multiple Obligations of Justice 
The two forms of cosmopolitanism so far discussed identify a form of injustice and 
describe a moral obligation. Caney states that any situation where basic socio-
economic human rights are not fulfilled or there are inequalities in opportunities 
or remuneration for the same work is unjust. He suggests that there is a positive 
moral obligation to support institutional arrangements that secure the human 
rights of others and fulfil other principles of distributive justice (Caney 2005, 121). 
Thomas Pogge suggests that the current global institutional order is unjust 
because it foreseeably and avoidably gives rise to human rights deficits. He argues 
that there is a negative duty that prohibits agents from making uncompensated 
contributions to the imposition of any institutional order which foreseeably and 
avoidably gives rise to human rights deficits (Pogge, 2010, p. 29).  
Caney and Pogge are offering two alternative ways to understand poverty and the 
obligations which follow from it.  Caney identified current levels of global poverty 
as an unjust state of affairs.  He identifies obligations to support institutions which 
can bring about a just distribution of resources and opportunities globally.    
Thomas Pogge identifies global poverty as the result of an unjust global economic 
institutional order.  He identifies obligations not to impose institutional orders 
that foreseeably, predictably and avoidably perpetuate human rights deficits.  
Caney believes that question of social justice concerns normatively appraising the 
opportunities and resources available to distinct individuals.  In contrast, Pogge 
identifies social justice as appraising institutional orders. Hence there is a 
disagreement between the two theorists concerning what the subject matter of 
accounts of justice should be.  They disagree over what it is that must be just or 
over what is the site of justice. 
There are difficulties with both these approaches. However, I do not wish to argue 
that either approach is wrong.  Rather, what I wish to argue is that in addition to 
the two duties which Pogge and Caney identify there may be additional duties in 
relation to structural injustice.  It is likely that there are positive duties to establish 
justice between individuals by setting up institutions that can ensure fairness 
between individuals.  Furthermore, elements of the global institutional order have 
no doubt been imposed by affluent governments and influential Transnational 
Corporations.  It is likely that this order is not just or fair.  There have been many 
accounts of how economic prescriptions that favour the interests of the rich have 
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been imposed on poorer states.  This suggests that the global institutional order is 
both unjust and imposed by the affluent states.  Undoubtedly imposing unjust 
rules and practices does violate a negative duty.  Thus, if there is evidence of the 
unjust imposition of policy on poorer states then those who are imposing it 
violate a negative duty.  Connecting this violation to citizens in general may be 
more difficult.  However, these difficulties could potentially be overcome.  
Recognising multiple duties in relation to global justice is something that is widely 
endorsed by cosmopolitans.  Pogge does not deny that there are positive duties to 
secure the human rights of others in addition to the negative duties for which he 
argues (Pogge, 2010, p. 28) (Pogge, 2005, p. 102). Simon Caney acknowledges that 
in addition to the positive obligations he describes there may be the sorts of 
negative obligations identified by Pogge (Caney, 2011, p. 513).  There may indeed 
be a range of obligations relevant to the question of obligations to the global 
poor.  In his discussion of basic rights Henry Shue identifies both negative duties 
to avoid violating rights and positive duties to protect these rights and assist those 
who suffer violations (Shue, 1996, pp. 60-70).  
In this section I suggest that social structure may be a site of global injustice and 
that there are additional obligations relating to this site of injustice.  I argue that 
some injustices are humanly caused but are not the result of a single action, 
institution or even institutional order.  It is often the case that a number of 
humanly caused factors come together to produce injustice.  Following Iris Young, 
I identify these problems as structural injustices.  In these cases no agent can be 
held causally responsible for the injustice.  Young’s analysis suggests that it would 
be a mistake to treat these cases as merely unfortunate states of affairs because 
they are the result of human choices and social institutions. Although in these 
cases no agent has violated their negative duty to avoid imposing injustice on 
others, the fact that humans are responsible for these states of affairs is 
significant.  Thus these structural injustices are likely to attract duties in addition 
to the humanity centred positive obligations identified by Caney. 
What I am proposing is that there are demands of social justice that apply 
whenever individuals indirectly affect the position of others in terms of the 
resources available to them and their relative bargaining position. I argue that 
there are moral obligations that require people who contribute to the social 
position of others to work towards the secure fulfilment of these demands.  This is 
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not a negative duty to avoid imposing injustice or a positive duty to support or 
promote justice.  Rather, it is an obligation to make efforts to prevent injustice 
emerging from the combination of one’s actions with those of others.  The 
connection between individuals and the unjust states of affairs is complex; they 
should be considered neither causally responsible agents nor innocent 
bystanders. 
I will begin by outlining Iris Young’s account of structural injustice. I will then 
explain why this may be a useful way to understand global economic injustice. I 
will then set out a corresponding account of social structural obligations.  This 
account will suggest that individuals have a precautionary obligation that requires 
them to critically assess the social structures to which they contribute and to work 
with others to lessen any structural injustice they identify. I will then explain the 
benefits of understanding the obligation in this way over Young’s own analysis of 
the obligations agents have in relation to structural injustice. 
Structural Injustice 
In Responsibility for Justice, Iris Young develops an account of structural injustice. 
Young describes how various human institutions and social rules, along with past 
actions that have permanently altered the physical environment, serve to create a 
social structure which places agents in various positions. This social structure is 
experienced as an objective fact that determines the options available and the 
outcomes attached to different choices. Part of the effect of such a structure is to 
determine individuals’ access to opportunities to acquire resources. This structure 
is experienced as both a physical constraint on what an agent can achieve and an 
enabling channel allowing them to achieve certain things. When significant 
differences in options provided by a social structure are unjustifiable there is 
social injustice (Young 2011, 52-64). Young specifies that structural injustice 
occurs when social structural processes place a group of agents in a position 
where they are vulnerable to domination or deprivation relative to others.45 
To illustrate this idea Young introduces the example of Sandy, a woman seeking 
accommodation for herself and her young children. In the story, Sandy works as a 
sales assistant in an out of town shopping centre. Sandy has to move because the 
                                                          
45
 For the sake of this thesis I will bracket the issue as to how we determine the justice or 
injustice of social structures. What matters is the idea that some inferior social positions 
should be identified as unjust. The matter of which positions these are and why can thus 
be left aside. 
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owner of the apartment building in which she rents wishes to convert the building 
into a condominium. There is no cheap accommodation near Sandy’s work. Sandy 
judges the cheap accommodation in town not to be sufficiently safe or decent for 
her family. She cannot find any housing which allows her access to affordable 
transport to work, so she realises she must get a car. She looks into subsidised 
housing but the waiting list is two years long. She finds a tiny place forty-five 
minutes from work but lacks sufficient funds for the deposit because she has 
spent all her savings on a down payment for a car. Sandy faces the prospect of 
homelessness (Young 2011, 43-45).  
Young alleges that Sandy is suffering from structural injustice. The options 
available to Sandy place her in a position where her access to housing is insecure 
(relative to other people). However, Sandy’s situation is not the result of an unjust 
law or immoral act (Young 2011, 47). Sandy’s situation is one she shares with a 
significant section of her society (working class single mothers). The causes of her 
problem are multiple, large scale and relatively long term. She is in a situation 
where she is vulnerable to being deprived of housing. She is part of a group which 
face a ‘systematic wrong’ whereby they are put in a position of relative and 
significant deprivation in terms of opportunities to develop and exercise their 
capacities compared to their peers (Young 2011, 72). 
Distinguishing Structural Injustice from Misfortune 
At this stage it is worth discussing whether what Young describes as structural 
injustice is nothing more than a species of misfortune. Structural injustice is a 
concept that identifies groups of people who find themselves vulnerable to 
domination and deprivation which cannot be causally linked to a specific 
perpetrator and is not imposed by any identifiable actor or agency. If experiencing 
structural injustice cannot be distinguished from merely being in a difficult state 
of affairs, the only duties that apply are a humanity based duty to bring about a 
better state of affairs and a humanity based duty to bring about fairness between 
persons. If this is the case, then the concept of structural injustice adds nothing to 
humanity based cosmopolitanism.  
Young suggests that injustice implies that there is something wrong with current 
social and political arrangements. The cases Young describes constitute injustice 
rather than misfortune because they are the result of a combination of actions, 
policies and social practices performed by people. This makes them humanly 
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caused. The fact that the problem is in some sense a social one means that it 
appropriately attracts feelings of anger, disappointment, regret and responsibility 
which are not present in identifying misfortune or natural disaster.  
Injustices of this sort, as opposed to misfortunes, are things for which we hold 
society responsible. Hence, we believe them to press more urgently on the 
attentions of members of the society than outsiders. We feel that society could 
and should have been set up in such a way that it did not cause the problem. The 
power of Young’s account is to make us consider social structures as a human 
responsibility rather than as natural and inevitable. Understanding an injustice as 
the result of the combination of human action, institutions and social processes 
makes us implicitly recognize an obligation to try to change social processes 
(Young 2011, 33-34) (Shklar 1990); recognising a disadvantage as the result of 
human factors gives us an additional justice based reason to do something about 
it.  
Structural Injustice and Obligation 
Structural injustice is defined as injustice which is produced by the combination of 
various factors: trends, social institutions and past actions. This means that no one 
individual, agency or collective agent can be found causally responsible for a 
structural injustice. In the case of Sandy and her housing difficulties one might 
claim that her government is to blame for coercively enforcing a regime in which 
working class single mothers are vulnerable to being deprived of housing relative 
to other citizens. One might suggest that Sandy’s government is violating an 
obligation not to impose an unjust institutional order.  One could additionally 
suggest that people have a duty to promote and support arrangements in which 
working class single mothers no longer face these difficulties. I wish to suggest 
that there is a further sort of injustice and obligation present in this case.  This 
obligation requires individuals to critically assess the social structures they 
contribute to and to work with others to lessen any structural injustice. 
Young outlines a way of identifying agents charged with duties to alleviate 
structural injustice on the basis of their social connection to that injustice. She 
argues that participating in institutional processes that produce structural 
injustice is the basis on which an agent can be identified as sharing in 
responsibility for remedying injustice.  She states that: 
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“The social connection model finds that all those who contribute by their actions 
to structural processes with some unjust outcomes share responsibility for the 
injustice.” (Young, 2011, p.96) 
However, Young makes explicit that agents are not blameworthy for the 
connection to injustice which makes them eligible for responsibility. Hence Young 
argues for a conception of responsibility that shares more with a role based 
notion of responsibility rather than fault based responsibility (Young, 2011, 
pp.104-06).   
This forward looking responsibility is ‘essentially shared’ in that individuals bear 
responsibility in the awareness that others bear it with them (Young, 2011, p.110).  
The responsibility is shared because it belongs to each individual but only as part 
of a group.  Young avoids using the term ‘collective responsibility’ because it is not 
clear that collective responsibility distributes down to all members of the 
collective in this way.  Young insists that the responsibility is shared by the 
individuals.  This forward looking shared responsibility (to transform structural 
processes so as to reduce and eliminate the injustice they cause) can only be 
discharged by joining with others in collective action (Young, 2011, pp.110-13).  
Young’s account gives obligations to citizens of poor nations and rich nations alike 
because responsibility to act is connected to participating in a structural process 
rather than to imposing an order.   
Martha Nussbaum has criticised Iris Young’s approach because it involves a 
perpetually forward looking responsibility (Nussbaum, 2009, pp.140-5).  
Nussbaum insists that agents who currently share a forward looking responsibility 
to alleviate injustice should as time passes become agents guilty of failing to 
remove injustice (Nussbaum, 2009, p.142).  Nussbaum argues that Young should 
not insist that responsibility to reform unjust institutional orders must not entail 
blameworthiness if one fails to fulfil those responsibilities.  Nussbaum argues that 
to do so does not have the pragmatic benefits that Young claims (Nussbaum, 
2009, pp.142-44).   
It is odd to insist that agents have a forward looking shared responsibility to 
reform unjust institutional orders, but that they are not blameworthy if they fail in 
this task.  The practice of asserting that an agent has a certain responsibility 
functions so as to make demands of agents which they can be blamed for failing 
to fulfil.  Nussbaum stresses that this ‘follows from the logic of ought’ (Nussbaum, 
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2009, p.142). When we claim that parents, police men or managers have role base 
responsibilities we are claiming that these roles entail certain obligations.  These 
obligations may include acting in a particular way, seeing that certain outcomes 
obtain or doing all that can be reasonably asked of them to promote certain aims 
(Young, 2011, p.104).46  If agents fail to fulfil these obligations they are at fault 
and liable for blame. What would it mean to have a responsibility that one can 
never be blamed for failing to fulfil?  Claiming that someone has a certain moral 
responsibility ‘x’ is stating that they are morally obliged to do certain things that 
constitute achieving ‘x’.  This means that (other things equal) they are morally at 
fault and liable for blame if they fail to do things which constitute ‘x’.  This must 
mean that agents who fail to lessen injustice when they have a shared 
responsibility to do so are guilty of failing to fulfil their shared responsibility.   
Nussbaum suggests that Young’s account could avoid this problem by admitting 
that those who fail to fulfil their responsibility to lessen structural injustice can be 
blamed (Nussbaum, 2009, p.142).  However such a move could be problematic 
because it may mean that an individual could share in blame for failing to lessen 
injustice even if they did all that could reasonably be expected of them. 
Nussbaum insists that agents should be found blameworthy if they fail to do their 
part in lessening injustice and that they as a result share part of the blame for 
continuing injustice (Nussbaum, 2009, p.142).  However, Young is committed to 
the idea that the responsibility is essentially shared and is not disaggregatable 
into distinct shares.  She is also committed to the idea that blame is shared by the 
individuals (Young, 2011, p.85).  This suggests that if the shared responsibility is 
not taken up the group as a whole must share blame for the failure.   
Young is right that all those who participate in structural processes are alike in 
having obligations to work towards the removal of structural injustice.  She is also 
right that these obligations will require agents to work together.  What may be 
wrong with her account is that she argues for a responsibility which is ‘essentially 
shared’ rather than for each agent having an individual obligation to make 
reasonable efforts to lessen injustice through getting involved in collective action.  
Young, by describing the responsibility as ‘essentially shared’, implies that it is a 
responsibility that the group achieves or fails to achieve together.  This means 
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 Young references Henry S Richardson “institutional divided moral responsibility” in Ellen 
Frankel Paul, Fred D Miller and Jeffrey Paul, eds. Responsibility Cambridge university press 
1999 218-249 
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that over time the group may share blame for failing to lessen injustice. The logic 
of responsibility suggests that this blame must be ‘essentially shared’ in the same 
way responsibility is shared.  This means that agents will accept blame in the 
awareness that others bear it with them.  Although Young denies this by claiming 
the responsibility is always forward looking the logic of responsibility requires that 
as time passes unfulfilled responsibilities can ground legitimate criticism of 
responsible parties.   
Such sharing of blame is unfair because it holds individual agents blameworthy on 
the basis of outcomes it is not in their power to guarantee.47  Young avoids this 
outcome by insisting that the responsibility must remain forward looking.  
However, as discussed above, this means that the responsibility has no teeth: it is 
a responsibility which agents cannot be blamed for failure to fulfil and hence 
which they are not at fault for ignoring.  An account based on Young’s, which does 
hold agents responsible for fulfilling their duties, would have to be careful to 
stipulate that individuals cannot be blamed unless they fail to take reasonable 
steps to work with others to lessen injustice.  It would have to explain what was 
demanded of individuals and thereby have an account of individual 
responsibilities and not just shared responsibilities. 
An Alternative Account of Structural Injustice and Obligations 
I will now briefly offer an alternative account of the duties that fall on agents who 
participate in unjust institutional orders.  I will utilise a concept of political duty to 
explain the intuition that agents’ participation in an unjust global institutional 
order entails obligations on those agents.  Pogge and Young both encourage a 
campaigning response to injustice over unilateral attempts to compensate 
through charitable donation (Pogge, 2007) (Young, 2011).  I agree that in cases 
where an agent contributes to an unjust social structure what is morally required 
is political action which attempts to alter the institutional order that reproduces 
this injustice.   
Individuals often cannot be held morally responsible for social structural injustice 
on the basis of their contribution to the social structures which contain these 
injustices. However, such individuals should not be considered innocent 
bystanders with no relationship to the injustice in question. The connection in 
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 Just as it is unfair to hold individual citizens responsible for the actions of their 
governments it is unfair to hold those socially connected to structural injustice responsible 
for failing to lessen it. 
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question is insufficient grounds for attributing blame or responsibility.48 However, 
those who share such a social connection to structural injustice cannot reasonably 
reject a demand to work towards the alleviation of the injustice. 
However, it is unreasonable to require any individual to ensure social structural 
justice. This is beyond what an individual can guarantee. Instead we can posit that 
each individual has an obligation to make reasonable efforts to work with others 
in order to establish and maintain a just and legitimate system of regulation which 
prevents social structural injustice in those structures to which she contributes. 
My suggestion is that, just as one must ensure one’s behaviour does not directly 
harm or disrespect others, one has an obligation to do what can be reasonably 
expected to ensure one’s actions or behaviour does not indirectly contribute to an 
unjust social structure.  
I propose that there is a general duty to engage politically to promote justice in 
the social structures to which one contributes.  The proposed political duty 
requires agents to critically evaluate their social structure and to take political 
action to work towards the reform of any injustice within those orders.  This duty 
is one which all citizens can fulfil.  Individual citizens can be commended if they 
fulfil it and are blameworthy if the fail to fulfil it.  This way of conceiving of the 
problem avoids blaming citizens for what is beyond their control.  However, it is 
an obligation which individuals can be blamed for failing adequately to fulfil.  
Therefore, it is better than a notion of shared responsibility which can find 
individual agents liable for blame even when they do all they can to remove 
injustice and yet injustice remains because others do not join them in the 
campaign.49   
This modification of Young’s account can allow us to identify the political duties 
that come with participation in an institutional order.  If these obligations are 
fulfilled by a sufficient number of participators, then injustice can be lessened 
over time.  Each agent can be fairly judged not on the basis of whether attempts 
to overcome injustice succeed, but on the basis of whether they fulfil their 
political duties to identify injustice within their institutional orders and work 
                                                          
48
 I discuss this in detail in my paper “Complicity and Obligations to Reform the Global 
Economic Order” which was tabled at the ECPR general conference 2011. 
49
 It could be argued that by ‘shared responsibility’ Young is suggesting that the aggregate 
of individuals who contribute to social structures each has an obligation to work with 
others to lessen injustice in that social structure. If this is the case then my proposal is an 
explanation of her theory rather than an objection to it. 
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towards its eradication.  Although such a duty will require agents to seek to work 
with others it cannot be conceived of as a shared responsibility.  It is an individual 
responsibility to do what can be reasonably expected to work towards eliminating 
injustice in the institutions one shares with others.  It requires agents to try to 
establish working relationships with others in order to find collective solutions to 
structural injustice.   
Just as one must ensure one’s behaviour does not directly harm or disrespect 
others, one has an obligation to do what can be reasonably expected to ensure 
one’s actions or behaviour does not indirectly contribute to a social structure that 
harms or disrespects others. Social structural injustices are systematic and 
widespread therefore they cannot be tackled through a single agent altering their 
behaviour; they require multiple agents to take action. The proposed obligation 
could be effectively discharged by people working together to establish and 
maintain a just and legitimate system of regulation for their social structure. Any 
such regulation or reform would need to meet the demands of moral 
permissibility. Therefore, any agencies for reform and regulation must be 
legitimate and just in addition to being effective. 
The distinctive feature of my account is the claim that an agent A contributing to 
and living within a social structure X which features social structural injustice Y in 
its treatment of B, is grounds on which B can reasonably demand more of A in 
terms of alleviating the problem Y. There may be a positive obligation for A to 
work towards the alleviation of injustice Y as an act of humanity fulfilling the 
general duty to promote the wellbeing of others when they suffer from 
deprivation and one can help without significantly worsening one’s life (Miller, 
2010).  There are also positive duties that demand all agents who can promote 
justice try to establish a political solution to the problem.  However, the fact that 
B’s problem Y is a species of structural injustice to which A contributes and under 
which both live provides grounds for B to legitimately demand more from A.50  
This proposed duty captures the popular ideal of ‘social responsibility’, which 
suggests that individuals should take an interest in the justice of the social 
relations they help to reproduce. Just as one must ensure decency in one’s own 
behaviour, one additionally must normatively assess the justice of one’s society 
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 Notice that this additional obligation also falls on B if b also contributes to the social 
structural injustice that disadvantages her. 
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and work towards lessening any injustice. The reason usually given for this 
demand is that one’s society is in some sense one’s business. If individuals do not 
have a commitment to ensuring justice in their social structures there is an ever 
present risk of great social injustice emerging from action which is morally 
permissible when considered in isolation. This fact alone speaks in favour of a 
norm demanding agents look out for and work with others to remove structural 
injustice. 
The obligation I have outlined is unusual because it is an obligation to work 
towards the achievement of a collective project. It demands individuals pursue 
outcomes which they cannot individually guarantee. Moral analysis usually 
considers what an individual should do out of the options available given 
background assumptions about what others are doing. Instead this moral demand 
obliges individuals to take actions to interact with others in an attempt to alter 
what they collectively cause: it asks individuals to take action with others in an 
attempt to alter the society that is the aggregate result of their actions and those 
of others. 
Considering the possibility of taking action together allows us to imagine 
possibilities which are not available whilst we only consider what can be achieved 
through unilateral action. There has recently been a wealth of work concerning 
backward looking collective moral responsibility. This literature predominantly 
considers moral blame for collective acts (Isaacs 2011;Kutz 2000; May 1992). 
What I am proposing is a moral obligation to try to join with others and perform 
collective acts. Contemplating collective action allows us to consider new 
solutions to problems that result from the aggregation of multiple actions and 
institutions (Isaacs, 2011, p. 36). 
The demandingness of the proposed obligation will depend on what can be 
reasonably expected of those who participate in the current global institutional 
order.  Factors that will determine what can be expected include how unjust the 
institutional order is and the position of the agent within the order.  The agent’s 
position will determine both the opportunities for, and the costs of, political 
action. Those in positions of relative power within an institutional order have 
more opportunities to alter the order and those in positions of relative weakness 
are more vulnerable to the costs that can follow from political intervention. What 
can be expected of an agent charged with an obligation to engage politically will 
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depend on the power the agent has to affect the institutional order (which will 
depend on the abilities of the agent, the structural position of the agent, and the 
availability of others willing to collaborate in this project) and the costs and risks 
associated with political engagement for the agent (which will depend on the 
political system in which the agent lives and their position within that system).  
The exact nature of the demand and what it requires in differing scenarios will be 
discussed in detail in chapters 5 and 6.   
Global Poverty and Obligations to Alleviate Structural Injustice 
Having sketched an understanding of injustice and obligations I will now conclude 
this section by briefly outlining how this approach can help us make progress in 
the global debate concerning obligations to alleviate global injustice in general 
and global poverty in particular.  
Thomas Pogge in World Poverty and Human Rights outlines in detail the plight of 
people living in difficult conditions: these people lack secure access to adequate 
nutrition, housing, health care and education (2005). Pogge aims to explain this 
situation as unjust rather than simply unfortunate. The power of this change in 
perspective is to convince people to stop considering famine as a misfortune 
requiring aid and to start thinking of it as an injustice requiring social and political 
change. Young’s theory offers an alternative way to understand the plight of these 
people. Her theory suggests that these individuals are systematically placed in a 
position where they are vulnerable to deprivation and domination relative to 
others. These positions are part of a social structure which is the cumulative result 
of various human actions and institutions. 
In the modern world many people are placed in positions of vulnerability to 
deprivation as a result of a range of sources which include global factors. There 
are global formal legal, political and economic institutions like the United Nations, 
International Criminal Court, World Bank and International Monetary Fund. 
Voluntary associations like the World Trade Organisation have been established 
(Pogge 2010, 14). These associations provide norms for trade and attach 
significant advantages to members and disadvantages to non-members. National 
economies and financial markets have become increasingly interdependent. 
Trends, laws and acts of government in one state can have a pervasive impact on 
conditions abroad. The latest evidence of this can be seen by the effects of the 
latest global financial crisis which have reverberated across the world. In the 
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modern world there are transnational corporations that operate in multiple 
territories and link the fates of people in distant communities. These companies’ 
policies have a huge impact on the lives of their employees and the economies in 
which they choose to operate. Consumer habits, worker’s rights and tax regimes 
in one state can have an impact on the life prospects of agents in other states. 
More informally, global communications technology has allowed global trends 
and fashions to develop. One result of these changes is that trends, patterns and 
laws in one state can contribute to instances of structural injustice in another 
state. The integration and interdependence created by these factors means that 
individuals living in one state can contribute to social structural positions in other 
states. From this it follows that there can be obligations to lessen social structural 
injustice in country A which fall on agents in country B. This means that we cannot 
treat states as if they contain discrete social structures and we cannot assume 
that individuals only need be concerned with local social structures.  
In order to show how a social structural account can help us to understand distant 
poverty and obligations it may be helpful to consider one example of structural 
vulnerability to poverty and consider who has the obligation to alleviate that 
injustice by regulating or otherwise altering the social structure in question. In 
Responsibility for Justice, Young describes the circumstances faced by workers in 
the global apparel industry (Young 2011, 125-35). Considering the position these 
workers find themselves in can help show how an understanding of structural 
injustice can assist the global justice debate. The social position inhabited by 
those working in factories to produce garments for the global apparel industry is 
one of extreme vulnerability to deprivation and domination (both relatively 
speaking and in absolute terms). These people (predominantly young women) 
lack other reputable employment options. This means they are wise to continue in 
their factory work no matter what conditions are imposed. They are unlikely to be 
protected by their government because bringing in regulations to improve pay 
and conditions is likely to result in the work being relocated to other states. 
Global competition for manufacturing contracts drives down wages and 
conditions. In this industry violence and intimidation is regularly used against 
those who seek to collectively bargain or form unions. These conditions are 
consistent across much of the global south, where many countries rely on 
external investment to provide jobs. The position such countries find themselves 
in means that they often cannot take unilateral action to improve conditions for 
92 
 
their apparel workers without radically increasing unemployment and poverty 
(Young 2011, 126-34). 
Young’s analysis suggests that we understand the plight of these garment workers 
as a form of structural injustice. The structure in question is made up of national, 
global and transnational factors (or social structural processes as she calls them). 
This means that we cannot isolate particular global formal institutions or national 
governments as causally responsible for the position workers find themselves in. 
However, we can still identify the poverty of these workers as an injustice which 
should be alleviated. Many of the relevant factors are contributed to by 
individuals around the world. According to the theory I have proposed here, these 
individuals have an obligation to work with others to alter the social structure so 
as to remove the injustice by trying to establish effective and legitimate ways to 
regulate global social structures.51 Individuals could discharge this obligation in a 
number of ways.  
One way to do this may be to campaign for global regulation or international 
collective agreements that can enable state governments to effectively regulate 
internal social structures. Individuals could also work with others to build 
collective action networks and attempt to alter social structures directly through 
changing norms. Arguably this is what organisations that promote fair-trade or 
boycotts of particularly exploitative companies are attempting to do. Trade unions 
could also play a significant role in forcing better pay and conditions for those 
who work in the apparel industry. 
Possible routes an individual trying to discharge his or her obligation could take 
include: campaigning for global minimum labour standards, lobbying politicians 
for legal changes and joining or showing solidarity with trade unions fighting for 
global reform. Individuals could also support alternative clothing networks which 
provide decently paid labour in good conditions as a means of demonstrating the 
effectiveness of different ways of organising the global economy. They could also 
draw attention to the problem and try to improve conditions by campaigning 
outside shops that use sweat shop labour. 
The conception of injustice and corresponding moral obligation I have outlined 
obliges people to monitor their social structures and work towards the alleviation 
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of any structural injustice within them. I am not suggesting that structural 
injustice is the only form of global injustice. Nor am I proposing that the 
obligations to assess one’s social structures and work with others to lessen 
structural injustice is the only obligation people have in relation to global 
economic justice. I have argued that structural injustice is one sort of injustice that 
individuals can experience. I have stated that the obligation I propose can fit 
alongside positive humanity based obligations to promote justice and negative 
obligations to refrain from imposing sufficiently unjust institutional orders on 
others. I have not had room to address the various possible objections to the 
account I have proposed or to clarify the details of that account. If such an 
account is to be plausible more must be said to justify the reasonableness of the 
proposed obligation. More need to be done to show that it is intuitively plausible 
that contribution to a problem can ground an additional obligation to work 
towards overcoming it. My aim in this chapter has been to show how a structural 
approach to global economic injustice and obligation can help us to understand 
the obligations the affluent have in relation to global poverty.  In the central 
section of this thesis this account of global injustice and obligation will be 
developed.  It will be argued that social structure is a potential site of injustice and 
that current levels of extreme poverty are evidence of global structural injustice 
to which national and global factors contribute.  Then it will be argued that 
individuals around the world must make efforts to form a collective to lessen 
structural injustice as a precaution to avoid future contributions to global 
structural injustice.  
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Part 2: Structural Injustice and Precautionary 
Obligations 
This thesis argues that global poverty should be understood as a structural 
injustice that results from a range of global and national socially caused factors. 
The first part discussed existing accounts of poverty and obligation. Chapter one 
contained a discussion of Peter Singer’s analysis of poverty and moral obligation. 
It suggested that poverty and obligation is a social and political problem requiring 
a social and political solution. The second chapter discussed various theories of 
global justice and cosmopolitan obligations. It suggested that the global justice 
debate could benefit from recognising structural injustice and considering what 
obligations agents have in relation to the structural injustice to which they 
contribute. 
In this central section of this thesis I develop my own account of global injustice 
and obligation. In the first of these chapters I defend the idea that social structure 
can be a site of social injustice. After this I proceed to argue that social structures 
are global in scope and that bringing about global structural justice will require 
international or global co-ordination of some kind.  The kinds of global 
coordinating institutions that could facilitate structural justice are explored and 
some potential dangers discussed. Chapter four also outlines why extensive 
poverty and extreme inequality indicates structural injustice. 
Next, the obligations that agents have in relation to poverty (understood as 
structural injustice) are outlined.  Chapter 5 considers positive and negative duties 
agents have in relation to structural injustice (which is identified as an essentially 
aggregative harm).  It proposes that there are duties that demand agents make 
efforts to establish collectives and take action to prevent structural injustice from 
continuing. Chapter 6 proceeds to outline potential collective action strategies.  It 
also considers what limits morality places on such collective action.  It also 
discusses what can reasonably be demanded of agents in different social 
positions. 
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Chapter 3: Social Structure as a Site of Injustice  
At this juncture, why we must recognise social structural injustice in addition to 
other sorts of injustice is considered. I have argued that recognising structural 
injustice can help identify an important aspect of the relationship between an 
individual and distant poverty. I have also argued that recognising social 
structures as a site of injustice can allow us to recognise duties to lessen injustice. 
Whatever the pragmatic benefits of recognising structural injustice may be, we 
cannot recognise such a site of injustice if it turns out that a social structure is not 
an appropriate subject for a critique of injustice. In this section I explore why 
social structures should be accepted as potential sites or subjects of injustice. 
There is an extensive philosophical literature concerning the site or subject of 
accounts of social justice.52 As previously explained, in this thesis I do not wish to 
establish that justice applies only to one site. It is likely that there are a number of 
different sorts of injustice that apply to different sites. In this chapter I argue that 
it is vital to acknowledge that there can be injustice which is not the result of 
direct government coercion. I defend the idea that social structures in addition to 
coercively imposed institutions can be unjust. I explain why social structures 
should be considered a potential site of injustice and explore some of the 
advantages of recognising such a site. I proceed to discuss an objection to 
recognising social structure as a site of injustice.  
Accounts of the sites of social justice determine which sorts of states of affairs 
may be judged unjust. The sites of justice which we recognise matter because 
such recognition can have a significant impact on the conclusions we come to 
about the requirements of justice and our assessments of existing arrangements. 
What explains disagreement on questions of justice is often the site of justice 
people recognise rather than the values they endorse. For example, libertarians 
and liberals often share the same values (freedom and equality) but disagree as to 
whether justice concerns the just use of coercive force by any actor or the 
maintenance of a just institutional order.  
A further example of why it matters what sites of justice we recognise comes from 
the feminist movement. For feminists to argue that the treatment of women 
within the home was unjust they had to question the assumption that it is only 
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legally enforced institutions that can be just or unjust. With their famous slogan 
‘the personal is political’, third-wave feminists argued that problems concerning 
the treatment of women by partners, husbands and parents within the home was 
an appropriate subject for analysis of justice and not merely personal (Hanisch, 
2006).  
The current global justice debate concerns in part whether accounts of social 
justice developed within states can be applied globally: whether the scope of 
social justice is global.  In order to determine the scope of social justice we must 
have an understanding of what sites of injustice there are and when concerns of 
justice or injustice may arise. Thus deciphering which sites of injustice there can 
be can helps identify whether there can be global social injustice.  
In this chapter I consider two accounts of the site or subject matter of justice; the 
coercive imposition account and institution based account.  In both cases I suggest 
that what makes us wish to appraise these subjects normatively should also lead 
us to examine other sites. I argue that both accounts of justice are normative 
appraisals of states of affairs and processes that are socially caused, and have a 
significant and systematic effect on people’s lives and could be otherwise. I argue 
that social structures, too, are the result of human action, have a significant and 
systematic effect on people’s life chances and could be otherwise. Hence I 
conclude that social structure is also a site of justice. I discuss how various 
theorists have extended coercive and institutional accounts to include some 
aspects of social structures. I discuss in detail why informal institutions, norms 
and trends and patterns in treatment should be considered relevant sites of 
injustice in addition to formal institutions which are coercively imposed. 
I defend the idea that social structure is a distinct site of injustice that must be 
clearly distinguished from states of affairs that have a pervasive impact on 
people’s life chances. I explain why a state of affairs must be socially caused and 
alterable in order to be considered part of the social structure. Finally, I stress the 
importance of not diluting the meaning of structural injustice by including all 
significant sub-optimal states of affairs.  
Coercion as the Site of Injustice 
I will begin by considering the theory that accounts of justice concern the 
normative appraisal of the use of coercion. I will first explain why such a theory is 
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plausible. I then proceed to show why the reasons that lead to our monitoring 
uses of coercion for injustice should also lead us to be concerned with 
phenomena beyond the use of coercion. 
The legal system is often called the justice system. This suggests that the term 
‘justice’ describes the existing system that, amongst other things, applies existing 
laws to rectify legitimate claims and hands out punishments which penalise those 
found guilty of transgressing laws. Of course, individual verdicts in court cases can 
be described as ‘just’ or ‘unjust’. This judgement concerns the belief as to whether 
justice has been done. This suggests a normative meaning of the term justice. It 
suggests that what is just is the verdict that should have been given. Declaring a 
verdict unjust may have originally been a way of saying that the law has not been 
correctly applied. However, laws themselves can also be judged as just or unjust. 
For example, a law that arbitrarily treats one group of people differently to others 
could be described as unjust. This suggests that injustice describes not just the 
incorrect application of existing law but an incorrect law. This means that the way 
laws should be is being discussed and not just what they are.  
Sometimes laws can operate together to produce unjust treatment. For example 
if one law bans cars and another requires individuals to vote at polling stations 
which are inaccessible by public transport. Hence it may be better to consider 
whether a set of laws is just rather than simply considering each law in isolation 
from the legal system in which it operates.   
What criticising verdicts, laws and sets of laws, have in common is that they are all 
criticisms of the use of government power. Rulings, laws and sets of laws are all 
uses of state power (or the power of collections of states). The political 
conception says that questions of justice exclusively concern the use of coercion 
by an authority acting in the name of the people (Nagel, 2005, pp. 120-123) (as 
discussed in chapter 2). The political account of the subject of justice suggests that 
judging what is coercively imposed by a government is what accounts of justice 
are primarily about. These accounts claim that the subject matter of an account of 
justice is primarily the regime of law that is coercively imposed on a people. These 
accounts suggest that ‘justice’ describes the regime that should or may be 
coercively imposed whilst ‘injustice’ describes that which deviates from what 
should be applied.  
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The aforementioned ‘political account’ is based on the idea that accounts of 
justice chiefly concern law and acts of government. According to this theory, it is 
the use of coercive power that marks out these topics for normative appraisal. As 
previously discussed, Nagel’s political account suggests that the subject of an 
account of justice should be the use of coercive power by a legitimate 
government acting in the name of the community (Nagel, 2005).  
There are similarities between the political approach and Robert Nozick’s account 
of the subject of justice. Nozick’s account identifies the actions of agents as the 
subject matter of justice. This includes the actions of governments as well as the 
actions of individual people or groups. Libertarians believe that the permissible 
use of coercive power is the same for individuals and states. They believe the 
permissible use of coercion is extremely limited and that acting in the name of the 
people does not confer any right to shape society by violating rights. Nozick’s 
account suggests that the demands of justice (demands not to violate rights by 
harming, killing, imprisoning, threatening or interfering with the property of 
others) apply to all agents including persons and states. His account therefore 
takes the subject matter of justice to be the actions of agents. In contrast Nagel’s 
political account understands the use of coercive power by an agent who 
represents the people to be the subject matter of an account of justice.  
In recent years political theorists and political campaigners have attempted to 
extend critiques of injustice beyond criticising the use of power by the state. 
Those who support the political account of the site of justice have resisted the 
extension and denied that there can be other sites of justice. Many cosmopolitans 
recognise additional or alternative sites of justice. However, in her contribution to 
the global justice debate Laura Valentini develops an account of coercion as the 
site of justice that goes beyond the use of intentional force by a unified actor 
(Valentini, 2011). Valentini’s extension of the concept of the coercively imposed 
will now be examined. I will argue that Valentini’s account succeeds in showing 
that the reasons that lead us to evaluate the use of coercive power by the state 
should also lead us to recognise additional sites of injustice.  
Valentini’s Extension of the Coercion Account 
Valentini develops an account of ‘systemic coercion’ to describe how freedom can 
be non-trivially constrained by norms and practices. Valentini describes the way 
that patterns of action and institutions shape choices as a form of systemic 
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coercion. Her account explains that successful coercion thwarts the victim’s ability 
to act autonomously (Valentini, 2011, pp. 121-154). This leads Valentini to suggest 
that a system of rules (formal institutions, informal social practices, stable 
patterns of interaction or a combination of these) can be coercive if it restricts 
freedom (Valentini, 2011, p. 137). Valentini argues that if such a system 
foreseeably and avoidably places non-trivial constraints on some agents’ freedom, 
when compared to their freedom in the absence of that system, then it requires 
justification and is a potential site of injustice (Valentini, 2011, pp. 137-8). 
Valentini distinguishes interactional coercion where an agent intentionally uses 
force to constrain the options of others from systemic coercion in which a system 
of rules or conventions (or some combination of the two) come together to 
restrict agents’ options in non-trivial ways. 
Valentini admits that her extension of the application of the term ‘coercion’ is 
controversial. ‘Systemic coercion’ like interactional coercion involves the 
constraint of freedom however unlike interactional coercion it lacks a perpetrator 
who intends to force others to alter their behaviour. Hence it deviates from our 
typical understanding of the term ‘coercion’. Valentini explains that what is 
important is not that we accept her use of the term ‘coercion’, but rather that we 
acknowledge that questions of justice should be applied to systems (and 
combinations of systems) and not just to the results of government coercion 
(Valentini, 2011, pp. 123-124).  
Valentini’s account shows that what motivates normative appraisal of the use of 
interactional coercion should lead to the appraisal of what she identifies as 
‘systemic coercion’. What makes us concerned about interactional coercion, 
according to Valentini, is that it places non-trivial restrictions on the options 
agents have. This is why we require its use to be justified. What Valentini 
describes as systemic coercion also places non-trivial restrictions on the options 
agents have and therefore should also attract concern and require justification.53  
Direct state coercion requires justification because it is one way in which human 
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understanding of rights. Taylor’s argument suggests that when we say that an agents right 
to x should be respected this is because we believe that x is important. Therefore we 
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terms of x (Taylor, 1985). Valentini could argue against a libertarian that if they are 
concerned with rights violations in which an agent coerces another they should also be 
concerned when systems coerce and thereby deprive individuals of options and 
capabilities they would otherwise have. 
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action significantly and avoidably affects the options of people have. However, 
coercion is not the only social phenomenon that non-trivially limits the options 
available to agents. As Valentini recognises, systems, practices, conventions and 
combinations of these can also non-trivially restrict the options agents have. 
Valentini suggests that her account coheres with the way theorists and activists 
use the term ‘injustice’. She produces a host of examples of established domestic 
injustices and shows how they are best understood as the result of systemic 
coercion rather than interactional coercion on the part of the government. She 
describes a culture of sexism as a form of systemic injustice. She argues that if 
sexism is unjust it must be that criticisms of injustice can apply to patterns of 
treatment (Valentini, 2011, p. 138). She also suggests that markets are an obvious 
subject for assessments of justice and identifies markets as systems. She explains 
that markets are not the direct result of government coercion. Rather they are the 
result of many individual transactions and common practices (Valentini, 2011, pp. 
136-137). 
Libertarians, who focus on interactional coercion, deny that systems or structures 
can cause problems of injustice. They maintain that it is only the use of force by a 
responsible actor (either an individual or a state) which can violate the demands 
of justice. Thus they recognise only interactional coercion. There are consistent 
positions which concentrate on the evaluation of coercive action and refuse to 
apply normative critiques to patterns, practices or the cumulative effect of 
actions. It could be insisted that only the action that Valentini describes as 
‘interactional coercion’ should be evaluated. A theorist could consistently resist 
evaluation of markets, norms and patterns. Some theorists are not convinced that 
markets and trends in behaviour are concerns of justice. They believe that what 
matters is interactional coercion. They fear that including systemic coercion will 
lead to support for forms of interactional coercion which aims to prevent unjust 
systemic coercion. They believe that the existence of constraints on freedom 
produced by voluntary practices and informal organisation cannot justify state 
action which alters these constraints through coercion.54 Although this position is 
consistent it is difficult to see why we should only care about interactional 
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101 
 
coercion and not be concerned with other ways in which human action and social 
practices constrain people’s lives and undermine their abilities. 
Valentini argues that those who support the political conception of the site of 
justice and limit accounts of justice to appraising what is coercively imposed by 
governments fetishize state coercion (Valentini, 2011, pp. 125-126). Her point is 
that the reasons we care about coercion by the state should also lead us to care 
about systemic coercion. We care about state coercion because it interferes with 
freedom. However, if our real concerns is with non-trivial restrictions on freedom 
(understood as ability to do something rather than freedom from interference) 
systemic coercion should be treated as seriously as interactional coercion.  
Those who adopt the political approach to the site of justice are right that we 
should be concerned with the legitimacy of government action, the permissibility 
of political acts and the explicit use of coercion. The use of coercive power by a 
government is a potential site of injustice and there can be unjust uses of coercive 
power.  
Libertarians are also wise to be wary of the use of coercive power to prevent 
systemic coercion. Using coercive state power has costs and dangers that should 
be weighed up in deciding whether to try to regulate social structures. Using state 
power usually requires giving power to officials and this allows some persons to 
wield extensive power over others in ways that can be dominating and 
problematic. Systems that are not governed by any particular office holder or 
official are not open to the abuse of power that can come with coercively imposed 
laws. Furthermore, there is a unique form of morally problematic domination that 
comes from having one’s options intentionally limited by another person that 
does not feature in cases where one’s options are restricted by a set of 
conventions. This suggests that it is important to consider uses of state power as 
significantly different from systemic power. Thus it is important to treat the 
coercively imposed as a unique subject of justice. 
However, Valentini’s argument shows that there is reason to appraise the way 
social norms, practices and trends constrain and enable different individuals. The 
reason why the use of coercion is of concern is not simply because it creates 
problematic power relations between agents and risks abuse of those relations. 
State coercion is also of concern because it shapes opportunities, advantages and 
access to resources. Institutions and conventions also shape advantages, 
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opportunities and access to resources. They also have an effect on the power 
relations between agents; they can increase vulnerability or make some persons 
dependent on others or decrease the relative bargaining power of some actors. 
Hence, Valentini is right that we should also be concerned with the way 
institutions, practices and norms constrain and enable individuals. Systems and 
practices should be recognised as sites of justice. What they have in common with 
direct coercion is that they are socially caused and have a significant effect on the 
opportunities of agents. However, an account of the sites of justice can include 
what Valentini identifies as ‘systemic coercion’ without stretching the meaning of 
the term coercion.  
Institutions as the Subject of Justice 
As Valentini suggests, we often think of major social institutions, like the market, 
as paradigm cases of phenomena which should be evaluated in accounts of social 
justice. There is an alternative to the coercive imposition account which sees 
institutions or practices as the primary subject of justice. Such an account states 
that evaluations of justice should focus on assessing practices and institutions 
rather than merely acts of coercion. However, there is extensive disagreement as 
to which institutions should be included in the subject matter of justice. 
In this section I will introduce the idea of considering institutions or practices as 
the primary site of justice. I will give reason to support recognising social 
institutions as a site of injustice. Then the dispute concerning which institutions 
and practices should be included as sites of justice will be discussed. It will be 
argued that the reasons that support recognising central coercively imposed 
institutions should also lead us to include informal institutions in the subject 
matter of accounts of justice. These informal institutions include voluntary 
associations, societal norms and shared practices in treatment.  
John Rawls is the most famous supporter of the institution based approach to the 
site of justice. Rawls’s A Theory of Justice famously proposed that justice is ‘the 
first virtue of social institutions as truth is of systems of thought’ (Rawls, 1971, p. 
3). Rawls defined an institution as a rule governed activity that people participate 
in. It is important to recognise that his understanding of an institution was not 
that of an explicitly political public body charged with governance. Instead an 
institution was defined as a set of people following a set of publicly known rules. 
Rawls talks about how complex institutions may include roles, rights, duties and 
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permissible moves. Thus, institutions are in some ways like games (Rawls, 1971, p. 
54). In society, interaction is often governed by many explicit and implicit rules 
which govern how to proceed and what to expect of others. Examples of 
important social institutions include the market economy, the family and the legal 
system (Rawls, 1971, pp. 54-55).  
Rawls believed that the fundamental social institutions of society considered as 
one scheme should be the primary subject of accounts of social justice. Hence, he 
did not apply his theory of justice to social institutions individually, but rather 
considered how the fundamental social and economic institutions work together 
to have a pervasive impact on people’s life prospects (Rawls, 1971, p.7). The 
reason for this is that Rawls thought that features and effects of some institutions 
can be offset by the features of others such that overall they are just. He also 
thought that institutions considered just in isolation could work together to put 
individuals in challenging and unfair positions. Hence he concluded that it was the 
position that these fundamental institutions together put people in – in terms of 
their prospects, opportunities and powers – that matters.   
By considering the effects of the basic institutions considered as a whole Rawls 
acknowledges how sets of institutions can mistreat members of certain groups 
without explicitly designating them for inferior treatment. This is important and 
progressive because it allows oppressed groups to identify that they are suffering 
from injustice even if no individual law or practice can be identified as unjust 
when considered in isolation (Rawls, 1971, pp. 7, 57). This means that Rawls’s 
account can recognise that an institutional order that includes programs that 
specifically target individuals from minority backgrounds and assists them to 
achieve and succeed could be justified as part of a basic structure which does not 
overall favour members of the minority.  
As Thomas Pogge recognises, under Rawls’s theory what an institutional order 
brings about is as important as what it simply lets happen and that what an 
institutional order foreseeably engenders is treated as seriously as what it 
establishes (Pogge, 1989, p. 44). In Realizing Rawls, Pogge builds on Rawls’s 
understanding of the subject of justice. Pogge argues that an account of justice 
should normatively assess the institutional order which is made up of publicly 
known and followed norms, laws, practices and offices which govern human 
interaction. Pogge describes Rawls as setting up a powerful and accessible debate 
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by framing arguments of justice as discussions of how social institutions should 
be. Pogge explains that Rawls is “trying to bring about a broad debate about the 
justice of existing institutions and feasible avenues of institutional reform.” 
(Pogge, 1989, p. 3)  
Rawls’ theory shifts debate away from a discussion about what government 
should be like and what sort of use of coercion is justified to a discussion about 
what set of norms and laws should govern our societies. By focussing the debate 
on what a just set of institutions would be like Rawls asks for the basic rules of 
society to be justified in light of possible alternatives. These norms and laws are 
not seen as natural or inevitable but instead as humanly caused and open to 
reform. Rawls encourages debate around what rules should govern the major 
social institutions of our society. By framing the debate in this way Rawls calls for 
social arrangements to be justified. Rawls does not focus on what government 
may do but instead asks what justifies us living by one set of norms (rules, rights 
and obligations) rather than another. This is in stark contrast to the libertarian 
approach of Nagel who, as we have seen, concentrates only on what sort of 
coercion can be justified. Normatively assessing institutions rather than the acts 
of agents (be they persons or governments) is a radical shift in approach. Such a 
shift highlights injustices that would remain invisible were evaluations restricted 
to acts of governments. 
One advantage of this approach is that it allows us to draw a clear distinction 
between two sorts of normative analysis: morality and justice. Aaron James has 
suggested that moral analysis is a matter of evaluating the actions, intentions and 
dispositions of agents. In contrast, justice concerns the evaluation of shared 
practices or collective institutions. James insists that in addition to analysis of 
agents and their actions we need to assess practices and institutions. Hence the 
concept of justice is required in addition to morality (James, 2005). 
 James’ analysis is in stark contrast to that of Robert Nozick who suggests that 
justice is a matter of agents fulfilling their negative obligations not to violate the 
rights of others (Nozick, 1974). James would insist that the obligation not to 
violate rights is part of morality not justice. James believes justice is matter of 
evaluating not what individual agents do but how institutions, practices and 
organisations are. He believes that this analysis is needed in addition to 
evaluations of the actions of moral agents. The problem with libertarianism is that 
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it suggests that institutions need not be evaluated as all that matters are the 
actions of agents. 
Justification for Accepting the Institutional Order as a Site of Justice 
James suggests that normative analysis of social institutions and organisations is 
needed because they hold power over agents (they have a pervasive impact on 
the opportunities, advantages and rights of individuals). He insists that the way 
practices work and the way institutions are organised can have a significant effect 
on the lives of others (James, 2005, pp. 40-45). A different sort of evaluation is 
needed in addition to the moral evaluation of agents because these practices and 
institutions are usually not the result of the actions of a moral agent. Rather, they 
are participated in by a variety of agents none of whom has complete control of, 
or responsibility for, the practice in question. 
Rawls’s rationale for normatively evaluating the central social institutions of a 
society and calling for them to conform to principles of fairness is that these 
central social institutions ‘considered as one scheme’ are present from birth and 
have a pervasive impact on agents’ life chances. It is because these central social 
institutions have a pervasive effect on agents’ prospects, rights and duties that 
they require justification (Rawls, 1971, pp. 6-7). 
The way an agent treats others is a matter of legitimate concern to others. It is 
plausible that the actions of individuals must be brought under moral analysis 
because they affect the lives of others. This is why the motives, acts and 
dispositions of agents can be subjected to analysis for their morality rather than 
simply being normatively assessed ethically.55 My account states that moral 
evaluations and obligations are distinguished from ethical discussions concerning 
the good life and what is of value. Moral questions concern whether an agent’s 
dispositions, actions and motives are justifiable to those affected. It is a question 
of whether the agent has been satisfactorily considerate of others. It is because 
the actions and dispositions of agents affect others that they can be judged as 
moral or immoral and agents can be criticised for transgressing moral standards. 
Practices, organisations and institutions also have a significant effect on people’s 
lives, perhaps to an even greater extent than the acts and dispositions of 
individuals. Important social institutions have a huge impact on the advantages, 
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 As previously discussed morality concerns justifiability to others whereas ethics is a 
matter of coherence with one’s own values and deep convictions (see the Introduction). 
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liberties and capabilities individuals and groups enjoy within a society. They also 
influence the power relations that exist between people putting them in stronger 
or weaker bargaining positions and making them more or less dependent on 
others. They even affect the rewards that are attached to different decisions that 
individuals make. Furthermore, they alter how people are viewed by others in 
society and can undermine their self-respect. Often these institutions produce a 
situation where some are constrained and others enabled based on arbitrary 
factors. The norms and laws which govern social interaction often explicitly favour 
certain groups.  Other times they come together to place certain groups in inferior 
positions without law makers intending to disadvantage these groups. Different 
institutions contribute to different patterns of outcomes. These patterns can be 
altered when the norms, rules and practices of the society change. Hence there is 
reason for persons within a society to be concerned with the central institutions 
of their society.  
Rawls, James and Valentini’s analysis of social justice provide powerful arguments 
for why we should bring shared human practices under normative analysis. Justice 
can ask whether these institutions and practices are justified. Normatively 
assessing institutions and practices is a legitimate activity because these practices 
have a significant effect on the opportunities and advantages available to agents. 
These institutions are human creations that have a pervasive impact on people’s 
lives and could be otherwise.  
On further consideration it is clear that much of what we consider coercively 
imposed by the state is made up of institutions that are reliant on the beliefs, 
practices and actions of individuals.  Valentini suggests even the coercively 
enforced and democratically amended legal system of a western democracy may 
not be best understood as an act of interactional coercion (Valentini, 2011, pp. 
141-143). The legal system is maintained by the actions and beliefs of a variety of 
agents who participate in the court, system, government system and comply with 
the law. It is only the obedience of these agents that allows government to make 
law that will be effectively enforced.56 Furthermore the government is made of up 
of many individuals who have varying levels of influence over policy. The decisions 
of the government are also constrained by what they believe the legal profession, 
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 G. A. Cohen makes a similar point in his discussion of the basic structure (Cohen, 2008, 
pp. 144-154). Cohen argues that formal institutions are brought about and maintained by 
the on-going obedience of many people. Thus they are not that different to the informal 
norms he wishes to include in the basic structure. 
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police, citizenry, and powerful groups will accept. Hence the government does not 
have the power to make any law it desires. Given these facts, it may be better to 
understand the legal system as an institution that has a pervasive impact on 
individuals’ lives that is therefore liable to normative analysis rather than as an act 
of coercion by the government which must be morally justified. If Valentini is 
right, when we assess legal systems for justice we are judging not what is 
coercively imposed by an agent, but a social practice. This means that the 
assessment of law (the original subject of justice) is in fact an evaluation of a 
practice rather than the use of coercion by an agent. 
What should be included in the institutional order? 
Rawls identifies some fundamental social institutions which have a pervasive 
impact on peoples’ life chances and deems them together to constitute the ‘basic 
structure’.  This structure includes the political constitution and the principal 
economic and social arrangements of the society. However, Rawls does not spend 
much time discussing which institutions are included in the basic structure and 
which are not. Nor does he offer a clear rationale for why some institutions 
should be considered as part of the primary subject matter of an account of social 
justice, whilst other institutions should not.  
It is not clear whether informal institutions made up of practices and norms which 
are not coercively imposed by the state or formally set out as mandatory should 
be included in the basic structure. Pogge’s analysis of what constitutes an 
institution suggests that informal norms should be included. However, Rawls’s 
analysis suggests that it is only major social institutions that should count. Many 
informal norms and practices are not universally practiced. This may be grounds 
for considering them out with the subject matter of justice. 
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls does not apply his two principles of justice to the 
internal workings of private organisations and voluntary societies. He explains 
that his principle may be inappropriate, irrelevant or unfair if applied to these 
informal institutions. However, Rawls states that the ‘monogamous family’ is part 
of the basic structure (Rawls, 1971, pp. 7-8). The family is not a universally 
practiced institution nor is it coercively imposed by the government. It is an 
informal institution. However, membership is by no means voluntary for children.  
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In his later work, Rawls includes the family in a set of informal institutions and 
organisations that should not be internally interfered with but can be externally 
regulated.  Rawls suggests that some of these institutions can be made to avoid 
discrimination and certain practices can be banned. He explains that this can be 
necessary to ensure the two principles obtain in the society (Rawls, 2001, pp. 10-
11). Rawls has always insisted that the two principles apply to the basic structure 
considered as a whole and not to the internal workings of any institution. Thus, 
obviously they do not apply to the internal workings of a church, university or 
family. Nor do they apply to the internal workings of property law or the 
economy. They apply only to the basic structure considered as a whole. The 
interesting question is whether families, voluntary associations, churches and 
universities are part of the basic structure: whether they are they part of the 
‘background social framework’, or are just associations that act within that 
framework or are merely actors that take action within that framework (Rawls, 
2001, p. 10). Rawls’s discussion in Justice as Fairness suggests that the family is, 
the church is not, and the status of the university is unclear.57 
However, in this thesis what is of interest is not whether Rawls considered the 
informal institutions part of the basic structure but whether they should be 
considered part of the subject of justice. In the following sections I will consider 
whether informal institutions, voluntary organisations and social norms should be 
considered sites for evaluations of justice.  
Norms and Informal Practices 
I will now consider whether informal norms should be included in the subject 
matter of justice. In the discussion of morality and justice it was suggested that 
the reason why normative critiques of the institutional order are necessary is 
because they have a pervasive impact on the opportunities, outcomes and social 
relations of agents. In order to determine whether or not to include informal 
institutions in the subject matter of an account of justice it must be asked 
whether these institutions have a pervasive impact that requires justification. 
Informal practices, which are enforced by ideas about what is good or normal or 
through disapproval and social ostracism, can have an effect on the advantages 
and opportunities available to individuals. In his discussion of liberty, John Stuart 
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 Rawls suggests that the university must not discriminate in order not to undermine 
equality of opportunity (Rawls, 2001, pp.10-11). This suggests that it is part of the basic 
structure, but the discussion is a little confusing. 
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Mill emphasised the restriction that social norms can have and recommended 
that those who practiced different ways of life that are harmless to outsiders 
should not be criticised (Mill, 1863). Thus he recommended allowing liberty in 
norms as well as in formal laws. 
Aaron James has suggested that the potential site of injustice should include 
informal norms and practices. He claims that an analysis of justice is appropriate 
whenever agents act in a coordinated manner. His analysis suggests that just as 
individuals must ensure that their actions are justifiable, so collectives are 
responsible for ensuring that their coordinated activity is just. James’s analysis 
suggests that norms can have a pervasive impact on the abilities and 
opportunities individuals have. In support of this point he offers the example of an 
airline industry in which a norm of not reporting safety breeches is rife. In the 
example, the practice of ostracising and criticising those who report a safety 
breech prevent such breeches from being reported. James explains that the 
existence of the norm and sanctions effectively restricts the options individuals 
have (James, 2005, pp. 40-41). 
Whether informal norms should be included in the basic structure of society is 
something that G. A Cohen has discussed at length. Cohen argues that because 
these institutions have a pervasive impact on people’s life chances they should be 
included in the basic structure of society (Cohen, 2008, pp. 135-140). Above I 
explained that Rawls sees the basic structure as the primary subject of justice 
because it has a pervasive impact on people’s life chances. Both formal laws and 
informal norms are human creations that have a pervasive impact on life chances 
and could be otherwise. Thus it seems plausible to include both in the subject 
matter of justice. Given that both rely on the obedience of a sizable portion of the 
population for their existence there does not seem much reason to limit analysis 
of justice to formal coercively imposed institutions. Below I offer some examples 
that support this analysis. 
Racism and sexism are often thought of as paradigm examples of injustice. 
Campaigners have long insisted that equal civil and political rights have not ended 
the injustice faced by minority groups. Feminists have insisted that ‘the personal 
is political’ and that discussing the difficulties individual women suffer in their 
lives can reveal injustice (Hanisch, 2006). These problems are often the results of 
norms concerning the treatment of women and the informal rules concerning 
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responsibility for labour within the home. The effects of these norms are 
profound and the result of human actions and behaviour. This suggests that they 
should be considered part of the subject matter of justice. 
Susan Moller Okin has suggested that what she calls ‘the gender system’ is unjust. 
This is a set of customs and assumptions concerning what is natural, correct and 
appropriate for persons of different sexes. She explicitly includes ‘customs’ as part 
of this system. Okin suggests that justice requires an equal division of caring and 
household labour within a family and it is current attitudes, assumptions and 
patterns of behaviour which prevent this. Okin explains that they can have a 
pervasive impact on the opportunities women have and the goods to which they 
have access, their dependence on others, and their ability to participate in paid 
work and politics, and finally on their self-respect (Moller Okin, 1987). 
The informal practice of treating members of different genders and races in 
different ways has persisted in spite of legal changes granting people equal rights 
and banning discriminatory hiring policies and restrictions on access to public 
institutions and private businesses. When a norm operates stipulating how a 
particular group should be treated it can lead to disadvantage in terms of 
opportunities and outcomes for members of that group. For example, a norm of 
treating women as emotionally vulnerable and irrational can lead to their 
opportunities being narrowed and their being denied positions of responsibility. 
These norms alter how women are treated and viewed. It can mean they are seen 
as less suitable than men for positions of responsibility and that they are 
therefore not offered such positions. It may also alter how they behave and what 
they aim for (Young, 1990).  
These norms operate at the level of informal institutions. Yet they are commonly 
referred to as unjust. In Justice and the Politics of Difference, Iris Young describes 
how assumptions about certain groups that can operate unconsciously can lead to 
individuals being frustrated in their opportunities because of their social group 
classification. Statistical research suggests that double standards still operate 
subconsciously in the rating of candidates for jobs. A piece of research which 
involved getting established scientists to rate candidates for jobs in their field 
based on CV alone found that the CVs with female names attached were 
consistently rated lower than those with male names. Female candidates were 
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offered lower starting salaries and thought less suitable for mentoring. However 
they were thought to be more fun (Moss-Racusin, et al., 2012). 
The examples discussed above suggest that informal rules and practices do have 
an effect on the opportunities, outcomes and social positions of agents. This 
suggests that there is a norm within the scientific community of judging women 
more harshly than men and that this norm reduces the job opportunities women 
have and decreases the pay they will receive. Not only does this show that norms 
can have an effect on opportunities, it also suggests that norms can have a 
significant effect on outcomes. 
A Defence of Restricting Analysis of Justice to Formal Institutions 
It could be objected that what this example shows is not unjust informal norms 
but unjust formal structures. It could be argued that justice requires changes to 
the way in which candidates are selected and salaries set or harsher penalties for 
discrimination and better enforcement of existing laws. In fact it is changes in law 
and national policy that feminists often demand in response to evidence that 
women are being treated unequally. Such responses suggest that it is the formal 
institutional order that needs to be changed so that it can produce the best 
outcomes and processes given people as they are and this includes people’s sexist 
attitudes. A Rawlsian who wished to restrict the basic structure to formal 
institutions could argue that justice concerns how formal institutions should be 
but that these institutions should be designed to promote the best outcomes 
given people as they are. They could argue that it is the absence of state 
intervention to prevent sexist attitudes limiting women’s employment 
opportunities that is unjust and not those attitudes themselves or the fact that 
women’s employment opportunities are limited. This position is in line with the 
project Rawls sets himself. Rawls follows Rousseau in suggesting that accounts of 
justice should take ‘men as they are and consider laws as they could be’ (Rawls, 
1999, p. 13). It could plausibly be argued that taking people as they are includes 
taking attitudes, norms, dispositions, assumptions and beliefs as they are. This 
includes taking informal institutions like norms as given.  
However, there are several deficiencies in any approach that restricts the subject 
matter of justice to formal institutions. It seems plausible that the fact that 
women fine it harder to get positions in science and get lower salaries given the 
same talent and experience is unjust. It seems reasonable to say that it is the 
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practice of expecting more from women to achieve the same position and salary 
which is unjust not the current formal institutions that fail to prevent this practice. 
Thus, a better theory of the subject matter of justice would be one that could 
include all these things as injustices.  
Furthermore, limiting the subject matter of justice to formal institutions restricts 
discussions of justice to what formal institutions can achieve. This means that if 
the formal institutions cannot tackle a systematic social problem then the 
problem cannot be said to constitute or indicate injustice. It follows from this that 
if the practice of under-rating female candidates for jobs cannot be eradicated 
through formal legal changes (or should not be eradicated because any changes 
that could achieve this would undermine basic liberties) then there is nothing 
unjust going on. This understanding of justice requires that before something can 
be deemed unjust it must be shown that it can be resolved through altering 
formal institutions. There are undoubtedly some forms of disadvantage and 
inequality can only be addressed through changing norms. These problems must 
be considered not to be unjust according to an account that restricts the subject 
matter of justice to formal institutions despite the fact that they are socially 
caused, have a pervasive impact, and could be otherwise. 
A further disadvantage of not recognising that informal institutions can be unjust 
is one which has been highlighted by G A Cohen in his rejection of Rawls’s 
conception of the subject of justice (Cohen, 2008, pp. 143-144). Consider two 
societies A and B that have the same formal institutions, but different norms. 
Society A has worse social norms and as a result the objective constraints faced by 
the least advantaged in society A are worse than those faced by the least 
advantaged in society B. Cohen argues that we should be able to say that society 
B is more just than society A. However, equipped only with a theory that 
constrains analysis of justice to formal institutions enforced by the state we 
cannot make this judgement. 
There is a further, even more significant problem with restricting appraisals of 
justice to formal institutions. Consider an unjustifiable and significant social 
inequality that could be overcome through altering formal institutions. According 
to the restricted understanding, if such an injustice is overcome by a change in 
laws then injustice has been eradicated. However, imagine instead that the 
inequality is eradicated by a change in norms. If this occurs we cannot say the 
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society has become more just according to the restricted understanding of the 
basic structure. This is despite the fact that a significant unjustifiable inequality 
that used to exist is no longer present. This is a very odd consequence of 
restricting the subject matter of justice to formal institutions.58 
Those who defend restricting the basic structure to formal institutions could 
defend themselves against this charge. They could insist that the society after the 
change in norms can be called more just because the society now has all the laws 
it requires to prevent unjust inequalities, whereas previously it was missing some 
laws that could have removed unjustifiable inequality. Thus the society has 
become more just because it no longer has deficient formal institutions. 
Previously the society lacked laws that could have removed inequalities and thus 
it was unjust. After the norm change this is no longer the case. After the norm 
change the set of laws the society has are appropriate to the society and justice 
obtains. This is because after the norm change laws are the best they can be. 
However, it could be insisted that this does not mean that norms are part of the 
subject matter of justice. 
This means that a campaign for such changes cannot be identified as a campaign 
for justice. However, a campaign to address the same problem through the formal 
institutions can be described as a campaign for justice. The fourth major 
disadvantage of restricting justice to an assessment of formal institutions is that it 
means a strategy of informal collective action aimed at changing norms directly 
cannot be described as a campaign for justice. Restricting accounts of justice to 
appraising formal institutions suggests that only action that demands legal 
changes are campaigns for justice. However, many feminists are involved in 
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 Perhaps this analysis of the change is right. In the society that has an informal norm 
change those who no longer experience inequality cannot be secure in their protection 
from that inequality. This is because there freedom depends on the choices of others. 
Thus they are still subject to the arbitrary interference of others even if they enjoy more 
opportunities. This is of course unless we consider dominant norms as coercive. If that is 
the case than the liberty of the previously deprived is reasonably secure and injustice has 
been eradicated. To discover which is right consider a society in which women suffer from 
lack of opportunity because there is a norm of only spending family income on the 
education of males. If the state were to guarantee free education for women they would 
resolve this problem. This would mean an injustice had been resolved. However, if instead 
the norm was replaced with a norm of spending family resources educating all children 
equally would the injustice have been removed? The women would have more 
opportunities. However, they would not be guaranteed access to education. However, 
they would not be more vulnerable of being deprived education than males. This suggests 
that they would not be suffering an unjustifiable vulnerability to deprivation relative to 
others. Thus the injustice would no longer be present. 
114 
 
campaigns to alter norms and attitudes rather than change laws or social 
provision.  
It seems arbitrary to insist that feminist activities that aim to alter the position of 
women by challenging informal norms are not about justice when campaigns 
concerning the very same issue that seek legal changes are seen as concerning 
justice. Why should an action that tries to improve the position of women by 
encouraging men to be equal parents be described as not concerning justice 
whilst a campaign for equal parental leave entitlements is a campaign concerning 
justice?  
One example of a feminist protest that aims to alter informal norms is the series 
of ‘slut walks’ which took place in 2011 (BBC, 2011). One of the aims of this 
campaign was to alter people’s attitudes (The Toronto Observer, 2011). The 
action sought to try to get people to question their assumptions concerning why 
women are sexually assaulted, how women should behave, and how women may 
be treated.  
The ‘slut walks’ aimed to question attitudes and object to norms. The organisers 
wished to change these norms as a means to improving the lives of women 
(Slutwalk Toronto, 2012). These actions seek to alter informal norms and 
therefore alter the social position of women so that they are less disadvantaged, 
more independent, have more opportunities and more control over assets and 
resources (Slutwalk Toronto, n.d.). Such action seeks to alter informal institutions 
as a means to overcoming socially caused disadvantage. An understanding of 
justice which suggests that justice is simply a matter of just formal institutions 
cannot identify such actions as aiming to alleviate injustice because they do not 
aim to alter formal institutions. This represents a deficiency in such a theory. 
The discussion above suggests that restricting the site of justice to formal 
institutions prevents us from recognising some significant instances of socially 
caused disadvantage as unjust. It also prevents us from recognising societies with 
better informal institutions as more just. Finally it prevents us from recognising 
that injustice can be alleviated and justice can be brought about without using 
coercive power. This excludes anarchistic forms of organisation that attempt to 
overcome injustice through collective agreement and using norms backed up with 
sanctions of disapproval. 
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These anomalies suggest that we should expand our understanding of potential 
sites of injustice to include informal norms and the conjunction of formal and 
informal norms. Informal institutions wield the same sort of power as formal 
institutions. Some difficult positions in society result from the way formal and 
informal institutions work together. These problems can be altered by changing 
formal or informal institutions. Societies with better informal institutions can be 
more just. Attitudes stereotypes, norms and types of informal organisation can 
change over time. They can also be altered through informal collective action. This 
action is action aimed at promoting justice. Thus these informal institutions 
should be included in the subject matter of justice. 
Voluntary Organisations 
It has been argued that informal practices and norms should be included as a 
possible site of injustice because they are socially caused, could be otherwise and 
have a significant impact on the opportunities, advantages and outcomes of 
individuals within a society. Voluntary organisations like churches, fraternities and 
social clubs also have an effect on people’s opportunities and advantages. Thus 
perhaps they too should be included in the subject matter of justice. 
Susan Moller Okin’s suggests that a girl brought up a Catholic who admires and 
wishes to emulate the priest but is told she cannot because she is a girl may have 
her self-respect significantly undermined (Moller Okin, 2005, p. 242). Such a child 
also has her career opportunities restricted by the gender rules of the 
organisation. Thus the rules of private organisations can have a pervasive impact 
on people’s lives. 
It could be argued that since these organisations are voluntary they should not be 
included in the subject matter of justice. The idea is that because members 
consent to be part of these organisations they may be organised and involve any 
practices they choose. There are two problems with this solution. The first is that 
many children are brought up within such organisations. They do not choose to be 
a part of these organisations. Worse still, in later life they may have become 
dependent to an extent on these organisations. Being brought in to these 
institutions at a young age may undermine people’s autonomy. Furthermore, the 
existence and activities of these voluntary organisations also has an effect on 
outsiders without their consent. These organisations can exclude some in a way 
that limits their opportunities. Moreover, people within them can act together to 
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alter the distribution of advantage to favour some groups over others. 
Furthermore, if these voluntary organisations control important goods they can 
be less voluntary than they first appear. Hence, the consent of adult members 
cannot exclude these organisations from normative analysis. This suggests that 
these voluntary organisations must be included in the institutional order that is 
the subject matter of justice. 
There may be good reason to allow voluntary groups and private organisations a 
degree of freedom in how they organise themselves. However, this does not 
mean that they must be exempt from regulation or external incentives. Nor does 
it mean that they are not part of an institutional background that needs to be 
justified to those they affect. There is a difference between suggesting that 
private organisations are part of the institutional order and suggesting that in-
egalitarian organisations can be justified as a means to ensuring freedom. Thus 
including voluntary organisations as part of the institutional order need not mean 
preventing individuals from having a large degree of freedom in terms of creating 
such organisations and running them as they please. The only regulation required 
is that which is necessary to ensure a just institutional order all things considered. 
What is being argued is that these institutions are part of the subject matter of 
justice, not that a particular notion of justice should be applied to them. 
Individual Institutions or Institutional Order 
As is the case with formal institutions, informal institutions and voluntary 
organisations that can pass normative appraisal when considered in isolation can 
come together to create injustice. For example, the norm of women taking on the 
majority of house work and caring duties within the home in combination with an 
economic situation in which both partners must work full time to achieve the level 
of income to maintain their position in society puts an excessive burden on 
women in terms of labour. Similarly formal or informal institutions that look 
problematic because they favour certain groups over others when considered in 
isolation can come together as part of an institutional order which is just overall. 
Hence, a voluntary organisation which seeks to improve the employment 
opportunities of ethnic minorities which appears unjust if considered in isolation 
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can be part of an overall institutional order in which no group is advantaged all 
things considered. Hence, there is a need to appraise the institutional order as a 
whole rather than assess only its constituent parts. This means that informal 
institutions must be normatively appraised as part of the institutional order. 
Social Structure as a Site of Injustice 
I have argued that informal institutions and voluntary organisations should be 
included within the subject matter of justice on the basis that like formal 
institutions they are the result of human action, have a significant impact on the 
position of agents (in terms of their opportunities, outcomes and relationships 
with others), and could be otherwise. However, trends and patterns of action that 
are not the result of norms or informal organisation can also have a significant 
effect on agents’ options and outcomes. Patterns in treatment are not always the 
result of practices with publicly known norms and rules. Yet, even when they are 
not, they can have significant effect on opportunities, outcomes and relationships.  
To see this consider an example in which many different people unilaterally 
decide to buy a holiday home in a particular country village. The result of this 
pattern of action is that house prices and rents increase. As a result many local 
people find that they can no longer afford to live in their home town. This is 
because they are priced out of being able to buy their own home and can no 
longer afford local rents. As a result local working class people suffer from housing 
deprivation. In such circumstances it does not matter whether it is a norm of 
buying a country residence in the village that has caused the problem. It could be 
that there is no such norm and that individuals simply all happened to make such 
a decision. Whether or not the problem is the result of a norm, a trend or an 
amalgamation of actions makes no difference to the resulting situation for local 
working class people. Patterns, trends and the amalgamation of human actions 
can have pervasive impacts on people’s life chances as can norms. These factors 
are humanly caused and could be otherwise. It would be odd to describe the 
housing deprivation as unjust only if it was the result of an informal norm, but not 
if it is the result of a random pattern of behaviour. Thus there is a case for 
including the results of amalgamations of individual actions as well as trends and 
patterns in the subject matter of justice. 
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 Young’s structural account suggests that we also include trends and patterns in 
treatment in the subject matter of justice. She proposes that we examine all that 
is humanly caused and that has a systematic effect on opportunities, outcomes 
and relationships (Young, 2011). Her structural account suggests that all that is 
socially caused, has a pervasive impact on agents and could be otherwise can be a 
site of injustice. 
As explained in chapter 2, Young takes the social structure that has a pervasive 
impact on what agents can do and achieve as the primary subject of accounts of 
justice (Young, 2011, p.44). She describes how various sorts of human action work 
together to produce a social structure which is experienced as an objective force 
in people’s lives, both constraining and enabling them in different ways. She 
expands Rawls’s theory arguing that this social structure is the result not only of 
institutions and laws but also of uncoordinated human actions, social norms and 
past acts (Young, 2011, pp.54-55). All these factors which originate in human 
actions contribute to the positions in which agents find themselves in terms of 
what capabilities powers and opportunities they have. This structure is the 
cumulative result of many different (and often uncoordinated) human actions. 
According to Young this social structure is the subject of justice rather than the 
institutions that help to create it. The difficult situations in which agents 
sometimes find themselves are partly the results of other agents’ choices, and the 
norms that shape those choices as well as laws of the formal institutions of their 
society. According to Young, accounts of justice look at human situations at the 
structural level and highlight cases of injustice; that is, where groups of individuals 
systematically find themselves in situations where they are vulnerable to 
oppression, domination or deprivation. In cases of structural injustice there need 
not be a perpetrator who intends the situation or is causally responsible for it. Nor 
need there be an informal institution or social norm that is responsible for the 
problem. It is simply about how social structures are. This, Young explains, are the 
socially caused background conditions in which actors live (Young, 2011, pp.43-
75). She argues that when assessing justice or injustice one must look at the 
whole society in a particular way; one must look for patterns in the relations 
among people and the positions they occupy relative to one another (Young, 
2011, pp. 70-71). 
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In Young’s view the distinction between moral analysis and analysis of justice is 
that they take up different points of view in considering social relations. Moral 
analysis considers direct relations between agents whereas accounts of justice 
take ‘a more macro view on social processes’ (Young, 1990, p. 71). Accounts of 
justice analyse society to identify structures and patterns of treatment. Young 
explains that the subject matter of justice is the background conditions in which 
the activity of agents take place (social structure), whereas the subject matter of 
morality is the activities themselves (the individual actions or interactions of 
individuals or associations) (Young, 2011, pp.67,71) 
Young’s approach reflects the idea that it is the social position of disadvantaged 
groups which is unjust. We may demand institutional change in order to lessen 
this injustice but the injustice is in the difference in opportunities, liberties and 
access to resources that a disadvantaged group experiences without a justifiable 
reason. Identifying injustice is about the structure which agents objectively 
experience. We do not need to look at practices or legal rules to identify injustice. 
We can simply look at the situation of particular groups within a society.59 If there 
are commonalities in personal experiences of restraint and lack of liberty, power 
or access to goods, then we can argue that this group is disadvantaged and 
occupies an inferior social position. We can then investigate whether the group is 
suffering from a structural injustice by considering whether their position is worse 
than others, whether it could be otherwise and whether it is justified. The social 
structural account of the site of justice also allows us to criticise inferior treatment 
that is not the result of conscious discrimination but rather the result of 
unconscious stereotypes that may lack the consciousness required to be classified 
as norms or informal practices. 
Advantages of Recognising Social Structure as a Site of Injustice 
Social structures are socially caused and in part determine the opportunities, 
advantages and access to goods agents have. They also help to determine power 
relations between individuals. Recognising structural injustice in addition to 
recognising injustices in an institutional order can allow us to show why there can 
be injustice even when human interaction is not mediated through institutions. In 
such scenarios agents can still affect each other’s opportunities and advantages 
through interaction, trade, and having an effect on a shared environment. This 
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 Groups are sets of individuals that share particular characteristics or have been 
traditionally identified as a social or cultural group. 
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means that there is still a social structure even though there are no formal or 
informal institutions. Such institutions may in fact be required in order to regulate 
that structure and prevent injustices. This is because even when there is no such 
coordination significant and unjustifiable inequalities in social structural position 
can still occur. Without coordination these inequalities that constitute structural 
injustice cannot be overcome. 
Understanding that there can be structural injustice can also allow us to recognise 
that injustice can be tackled without using coercive regulatory institutions: that 
changing norms or engaging in collective action can also produce justice. Norms 
and patterns of treatment are part of the social structure. Altering these can 
prevent structural injustice without government action. Recognising structural 
injustice helps us to realise that groups of persons can work together to lessen 
injustice. It also helps us to see justice as a collective project rather than 
something achieved only by governments or power holders.  
Recognising structural injustice can also help us to adopt a plausible account of 
the difference between morality and justice. It shows that they have a similar root 
because they both concern justification. However, it shows that they have a 
different subject matter. Questions of morality consider what sorts of action and 
dispositions are justifiable. In contrast, questions of justice examine human action 
at the meta-level and questioning the justice of the positions into which human 
action as a whole places individuals. It concerns the justification of practices, 
institutions, norms and structures. Questions of justice emerge because the 
aggregative effect of action and interaction can be problematic and unjustifiable 
even if all the actions that contribute to it can be justified.  
Distinguishing Social Structure from States of Affairs 
A state of affairs approach to justice considers the justice of the situation agents 
find themselves in and compares it to other feasible arrangements. Such an 
approach concentrates on what could be made otherwise rather than what is 
socially caused. Thus, it does not draw a distinction between what is socially 
caused and what is natural. Instead, these accounts distinguish injustice from 
misfortune by designating injustice to describe misfortunes of a particular kind 
that institutions can and should be used to overcome. In contrast, a social 
structural approach identifies structural injustice as the result of human choices, 
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actions, and institutions that could be otherwise. It demonstrates a connection 
between persons and injustice and causally connects people to these problems.  
An approach that concentrates on what could be made otherwise suggests that it 
does not matter if a person’s situation is natural or socially produced. However, 
whether a situation is the result of human actions and practices is morally 
significant.  Recognising injustice in one’s social structure is significant because 
one is a participator, contributor and member of that society. This makes 
structural injustice in some sense one’s business.  Not distinguishing social 
structure from unfortunate states of affairs (of a particular kind) that could be 
overcome when thinking about injustice neutralises this moral power.   
When a person is disadvantaged by states of affairs that are not socially caused it 
is not clear who must attempt to provide a justification for the situation. It is not 
clear who (apart from God) can be held responsible for a person’s situation, nor is 
it clear who is accountable for it. Others may be responsible for failing to address 
the unfortunate state of affairs and there may be positive duties in relation to it. A 
supporter of the states of affairs view could insist that a society is not responsible 
for causing the problem, but is responsible for allowing the disadvantage to 
continue when they could overcome it. However, the structural approach insists 
that the distinction between socially caused disadvantage and disadvantage that 
could be socially alleviated is morally significant. Although we may believe that 
the demands of justice may not be restricted to what is socially caused, we may 
still think that there is something additionally bad about socially caused 
disadvantage. Disadvantage that is socially caused should be distinguished from 
other forms of disadvantage because it may attract additional duties. There may 
be duties to alleviate socially caused disadvantage that operate in addition to 
duties to oppose avoidable disadvantage. When an unfortunate situation is 
socially caused it is likely that there are negative duties to avoid causing the 
problem that have been violated. These duties may require members of that 
social structure to prevent that state of affairs from occurring.60 
However, it is not obvious that socially caused disadvantages can in practice be 
distinguished from unfortunate states of affairs that could be prevented or 
alleviated through social change.  Identifying what is the result of an accumulation 
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 The relationship between contributor to an unjust social structure and that injustice is a 
complex one. They cannot be correctly characterised as innocent bystanders or 
perpetrators. This relationship is discussed in detail in chapter 5. 
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of human factors requires an idea of what would be the case in the absence of 
such factors. What is required is a baseline against which to judge current 
conditions in order to identify what is socially caused. However, it is impossible to 
determine what a person’s situation would be like in the absence of any effect 
from social practices, institutions and/or the choices of others. Persons have 
never been free from the effects of other people’s actions, practices and 
institutions.  Nor is it easy to imagine what an individual’s situation would be like 
in the absence of social structures. In fact there is good reason to believe that 
humans cannot develop the capacities of rational thinking and autonomy used to 
define persons without being part of a wider community. These communities 
shape human beings and help them develop into persons capable of action and 
choice. In the absence of contact with other humans it is unlikely that a human 
being could survive let alone develop into a fully functioning person capable of 
autonomous choice (Taylor, 1985, pp. 187-211). Hence, it makes no sense to 
consider the position a person would be in in the absence of social structures 
because it is unlikely that they would be a person at all. 
In G A Cohen’s discussion of the problem of how to judge whether a social system 
makes an individual worse off he suggests that we must judge current social 
conditions against how they could be rather than against how an individual would 
fare in the absence of society (Cohen, 1995, pp. 78-80). Another alternative in 
judging society is to compare current institutions with a set of minimum 
requirements. Both these ways of solving the ‘baseline problem’ avoid 
differentiating the socially caused from the unfortunate. Instead they judge 
current society compared to other feasible ways of organising social life. Utilising 
one of these strategies means that theorists do not have to distinguish between 
what is natural from what is caused by current social arrangements. Instead of 
arguing that a particular situation is socially caused, they argue that a particular 
situation could be alleviated by alternative institutions.  
In my account of poverty and obligation I wish to consider what can be identified 
as socially caused in order to identify negative duties to avoid causing it. Thus I do 
not wish to adopt Cohen’s approach of comparing what is with what could be. 
However, it is difficult to distinguish the socially caused from states of affairs. In 
Iris Young’s discussion of this question, she explains that determining what is 
misfortune and distinguishing it from socially caused injustice is indeterminable. 
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She quotes Shklar to suggest that what is deemed socially caused by a society has 
changed over time and is matter of struggle and debate (Young, 2011, p.34).  
For example, there is currently a struggle over whether the disadvantages faced 
by those who are visually impaired are natural or socially caused. It has 
traditionally been assumed that to be born without sight is a natural disadvantage 
and that society may compensate those who are so disadvantaged by offering 
additional help or resources. However, this view has been challenged by those 
who suggest that much of the disadvantage faced by those without sight is caused 
by the way society is organised. By organising public institutions and spaces as 
well as private businesses, work places and recreational areas with the 
assumption that the customers, users, employees and citizens can see we 
systematically put those without sight at a huge disadvantage. Activists have 
suggested that the choices made in designing and organising social life seriously 
disadvantage those who cannot see. Public and private institutions could have 
been designed in a different way, but they have not been. Hence, it is alleged that 
much of the disadvantage faced by blind people is in fact socially caused or 
constructed (Anderson, 1999) (The Union of the Physically Impaired Against 
Segregation and The Disability Alliance, 1975; Oliver, 1990). 
 Shklar suggests that because the socially caused cannot effectively be 
distinguished from mere states of affairs according to robust criteria and is rather 
a matter of instinct and opinion we would do better to concentrate on what she 
calls ‘passive injustice’ in which agents allow bad states of affairs to continue 
when they could be altered. She suggests injustice can occur when institutions 
could improve conditions under other feasible arrangements but do not do so 
(Shklar, 1990, pp. 54-56). This is to retreat to assessing what could be otherwise. 
Just like Cohen’s solution it involves comparing how things are arranged with how 
they could be arranged. Both these solutions fail to differentiate the socially 
caused and states of affairs and therefore cannot be used to differentiate 
between negative duties to avoid designing society in a way that disadvantages 
some from positive duties to assist those who are naturally disadvantaged.  
Any social problem results from a combination of natural and human factors. This 
means that it can be difficult to determine whether the problem is a socially 
caused injustice for which the social structure is causally responsible or a natural 
misfortune that could be alleviated through social institutions.  Below I develop a 
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way to distinguish the socially caused from mere states of affairs. I will consider 
how we determine causal responsibility for outcomes in the case of agents. I will 
use this analysis to show that what we hold an agent responsible for is dependent 
on a conception of what we can reasonably expect from an agent. I will use this 
insight to suggest that what we hold society responsible for causing depends on 
what we can reasonably expect society to avoid. I will develop an account of what 
we can reasonably expect society to avoid. I will then use that account to suggest 
what society can be held causally responsible for.  
In the physical world any outcome is the result of a multiplicity of contributions 
none of which can be identified as the unambiguous cause. However, in human 
discussions we do identify causally responsible parties. In everyday life only being 
one factor among many is no barrier to that factor being legitimately identified as 
the cause. Furthermore, we identify people as causally responsible for outcomes 
to which multiple people contribute. In a similar fashion, it may be legitimate to 
define as ‘socially caused’ positions and situations to which both human and 
natural factors contribute. How this can be done will be explored below. 
In discussions of liability we identify agents who are outcome responsible for 
states of affairs in a number of complicated ways. Often we identify a morally 
responsible party because they intend to cause the result and knowingly 
intervene to alter what would have otherwise occurred. When they act, agents 
intentionally alter their behaviour in order to alter outcomes and change states of 
affairs. We thus hold agents causally responsible and liable for the states of affairs 
they intentionally create by intervening. This way of identifying a causally 
responsible party is inappropriate for identifying things that are socially caused. 
This is because society does not have any shared intentions. Social structures 
result from the aggregation of a multiplicity of acts and practices. No agent can be 
held responsible for this structure or what it causes. 
There are cases where we hold agents liable for outcomes although they do not 
intend to bring about those outcomes. These cases may help in establishing how 
to determine what is socially caused. We sometimes identify an agent as liable for 
an outcome because their action comes together with normal background 
conditions to produce an outcome. This is because we expect agents to act 
responsibly and this involves navigating a complex background environment and 
being aware of the likely results of their actions and behaviours given predictable 
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background conditions. We expect competent agents to bear in mind the likely 
outcomes of their actions before taking action. Thus we hold competent actors 
causally responsible for the outcomes that their actions and normal background 
conditions come together to cause. 
For example, we hold an individual who strikes a match in a clearly labelled 
flammable area liable for the fire whether or not they intended to cause the fire. 
This is the case despite the fact that the lit match was just one of the factors that 
came together to cause the fire. Other factors included a flammable material and 
an atmosphere containing oxygen. What explains the practice of holding the 
agent liable for the fire is the fact that we identify these other factors as normal 
background conditions. We see the agent as responsible for navigating this 
environment and competently engaging with it. Hence we identify the agent as 
liable for the fire. In cases where an agent’s action causally contributes to an 
outcome in unpredictable conditions we may not identify the agent as liable for 
the outcome. For example, an agent who strikes a match in a scenario where the 
room they have entered has secretly been filled with highly flammable material 
would not be liable for the resulting explosion. 
An account of the social caused could attribute liability to social structures for 
only those outcomes that result from the amalgamation of human action and 
normal background conditions. We could identify social structures as liable for 
those states of affairs that social factors contribute to when they operate under 
predictable normal background conditions. This would mean that social structures 
can be considered liable for states of affairs unless they are the result of unusual 
and unpredictable natural events. Where the natural background is normal and 
predictable, social structures can be held responsible for the position agents find 
themselves in. For example, when a portion of society suffers from a common 
disease, and this group could have avoided this disease under alternative social 
arrangements, the social structure can be found liable for their suffering. 
Whereas, if agents within a society are struck by an unforeseeable and rare 
plague the social structure cannot be identified as liable even if society could have 
been organised so as to prevent their suffering. In the same way that the agent 
who strikes a match in a room that has been secretly filled with flammable gas 
cannot be identified as liable for the explosion, the social structure in which 
people suffer from the unforeseeable or rare plague cannot be identified as liable 
for the victims suffering. In both cases we judge the action or structure as liable 
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for the outcomes it contributes to in normal conditions. Where the conditions an 
agent or society operates in are abnormal we do not identify the action of the 
agent or structure of the society as liable for causing the resultant state of 
affairs.61 
The account of why agents are held causally responsible for outcomes they 
contribute to relied on the idea that agents can reasonably be expected to 
navigate background conditions. This is what justifies identifying agents as 
causally responsible for outcomes that result from their own action in 
combination with the actions of others. However, when it comes to social 
structures there is no agent whom we can hold responsible for negotiating normal 
natural background conditions. This is because there is no agent who can be held 
accountable for how human actions and practices come together to affect the 
positions agents find themselves in. If there is no agent responsible for the socially 
caused there is no-one whom we can expect to ensure that the socially caused 
does not work with normal background conditions to cause significant problems. 
Hence we cannot hold the social structures liable for the outcomes it contributes 
to in normal background conditions. 
However, there may be a set of agents that can be expected to navigate normal 
background conditions and avoid putting anyone in an unjustifiable position of 
significant disadvantage. It could be that those who contribute to social structures 
can reasonably be expected to work together to navigate normal background 
conditions. It could be that they must work together to avoid their action coming 
together with background conditions to put anyone in a position of significant and 
unjustifiable disadvantage. I propose that those who contribute to a social 
structure are remedially responsible for ensuring that structure does not come 
together with normal background conditions to cause problems for people. Thus 
it is the community of contributors who can be expected to work together to 
navigate normal background conditions and avoid placing any agent in an 
unjustifiable position of significant disadvantage. If this group can be reasonably 
expected to work together to avoid causing structural injustice in predictable 
background conditions, this mean that we can hold social structures causally 
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 It is interesting to note that this means that in cases like the rare plague once this 
plague becomes part of the foreseeable background conditions in which society functions 
future suffering that could have been prevented by alternative arrangements can be 
identified as caused by the social structure. 
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responsible for the positions agents are placed in given normal background 
conditions. 
The idea that those who contribute to social structures must work together to 
avoid those structures from coming together with predicable background 
conditions to cause unjustifiable disadvantage will be discussed in chapter 5. 
However, for now it is enough to establish that social structures can be identified 
as causally responsible for the positions agents find themselves in given normal 
background conditions. In judging a social structure, we should hold that structure 
responsible for the overall position agents find themselves in given predictable 
background conditions. This means we can understand the positions agents are 
placed in as socially caused rather than simply something that could be socially 
alleviated. Thus, a distinction can be drawn between states of affairs and what 
social structures are causally responsible for. Social structures are only 
responsible for those states of affairs that are caused by social factors in 
combination with predictable background conditions which it is reasonable to 
expect those who contribute to social structures to avoid. 
However, this account is incomplete. This is because it does not consider whether 
it is always reasonable to expect a social structure to navigate background 
conditions. There may be some cases where it is too difficult for us to expect the 
social structure to do so. Identifying causal responsibility in agents, even given 
normal natural background conditions, can be problematic in cases where 
individuals have few options or face tough choices. It is often the case that agents 
must choose between options none of which will produce good outcomes. In 
these cases it seems unfair to claim that the agent is causally responsible for the 
outcome that follows. For example take a person on a low income living in the 
USA. This person has to choose between paying monthly fees for health insurance 
and having enough money properly to heat their home in the winter. Say they 
decide not to get the insurance. Later they get sick and face high medical costs. It 
seems unfair to claim they are causally responsible for facing these costs even if 
the illness they develop is common and the risk of contracting it part of normal 
background conditions. If they choose to purchase the insurance and suffer from 
health problems due to the cold it also seems unfair to hold them responsible for 
their condition. Intuitively, it is unfair to hold the agent morally responsible in 
either scenario. Furthermore, it also seems incorrect to hold them causally 
responsible. The person does not cause themselves to be vulnerable to illness or 
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liable for the costs of medical treatment. It is their action in collaboration with the 
social and natural environment that creates the outcome. The reason why it is 
intuitively unappealing to find such an agent responsible is that is unreasonable to 
expect such an agent to navigate such a difficult environment successfully. This 
suggests that it is only where an agent faces normal and reasonable 
circumstances that we can hold them responsible for the outcomes they 
contribute to.62 
In the case of identifying the socially caused in some cases it would be 
unreasonable to expect those who contribute to social structures to avoid agents 
ending up in a position of disadvantage. In these cases the disadvantage should 
not be identified as socially caused. These are cases in which it would be 
impossible or very burdensome for contributors to social structures to prevent an 
individual ending up in such a position. Where background conditions are 
particularly difficult or individuals are particularly self-destructive it is 
unreasonable to expect contributors to social structures to avoid some people 
ending up in a position of disadvantage. As working together is difficult, social 
structures cannot be expected to be as competent as agents in negotiating 
background conditions. However, contributors to social structures can reasonably 
be expected to work together in many cases to avoid the combination of their 
actions and the predicable natural background coming together to disadvantage 
some significantly and unjustifiably. 
To recap, we can only hold societies (collections of people who contribute to the 
positions agents are placed in) causally responsible for the states of affairs they 
contribute to in circumstances that are not just normal (foreseeable and standard) 
but are also reasonable. When a social community contributes to outcomes in 
circumstances where their choices are unfairly limited by an unreasonable 
environment we cannot hold that society responsible for outcomes even if that 
environment is predictable.63 This suggests that we cannot consider unfortunate 
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 This suggests we should only hold agents responsible for outcomes when they face a 
reasonable range of choices. This suggests that in order to hold agents accountable for 
their outcomes in everyday life we must ensure a social environment that is reasonably 
fair and offers a decent range of opportunities. This mirrors, to a degree, the debate 
between David Miller and his critics considered in Chapter 2. 
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 This also suggests that when a national community contribute to outcomes for people 
(within their state) in a global environment that severely limits their choices or attaches 
difficult burdens to whatever choices they make they cannot be held responsible for the 
outcomes to which they contribute.  
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social positions as socially caused in circumstances where social structures cannot 
reasonably be expected to prevent inequality given the background conditions.64 
Review 
The coercion account of injustice is important. It is vital that state power is used 
justly and legitimately and not used to do great evil. Many Twentieth Century 
disasters resulted from the use of state power and collective violence. The use of 
coercive law and punishment does matter. It can be unjust both in terms of who 
has it and what they do with it.  Legitimacy and justice questions concerning 
procedures, powers, opportunities, rights, advantages and relations are also 
important. However, the absence of collective planning, organisation, regulation 
or restraint can also lead to great evil (Hayden, 2010, p. 33). This is why humanly 
caused constraint more generally is also a concern of justice. It is not only 
intentional constraint that is significant. Hence, Valentini is right that if we care 
about coercion because it constrains we should also be concerned with forms of 
constraint that do not result from agents intentionally exercising power over 
others. 
The institutional account captures the idea that practices can have a significant 
and extensive effect on people’s life chances and therefore should also be the 
subject of normative appraisal. I have shown that informal institutions, voluntary 
organisations and norms can also have a pervasive effect on life chances. The 
structural account recognises that much of the restraint that agents experience is 
the aggregative result of human action, practices and institutions; it describes 
how injustice can emerge from a variety of sources coming together. Thus, it 
identifies that trends and patterns in treatment can also have a pervasive impact 
on the life chances of individuals. 
Accounts of social justice normatively appraise the social world. What the 
coercion, institutional and structural accounts of injustice have in common is that 
they believe justice to be the appraisal of something that has a significant and 
extensive effect on the lives of people, is caused by human action and could be 
otherwise. These accounts recognise constraint that is not natural but socially 
caused. They stress the fact that it is a human creation which could be otherwise. 
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 These considerations of reasonableness mean that in some cases where an agent ends 
up in a disadvantaged position it may be the case that the social structure cannot be held 
causally responsible. This is because it would be unreasonable to expect the social 
structure to prevent this disadvantage because doing so is very difficult. 
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This means that agents recognise a connection to these problems and may 
acknowledge a responsibility to lessen this injustice because of that connection. A 
structural account of injustice is different from an account which considers states 
of affairs that could be otherwise because it identifies these problems as socially 
caused and dependent on ways of life and organisation that could be otherwise. 
This fact is morally significant and motivationally important.  
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Chapter 4: The Requirements of Social Structural Justice 
I have argued that understanding that social structure can be a site of injustice 
can allow us to recognise forms of injustice that are not coercively enforced by a 
centralised government. I have suggested that this can help us to recognise forms 
of social injustice that are the result of both local and distant factors. The central 
aim of this thesis is to establish that ‘global poverty’ is a case of structural injustice 
to which agents around the world contribute and that agents who contribute to 
this structural injustice have an obligation to work towards alleviating this 
injustice. Before considering what obligations fall on individuals (the task of the 
next chapter) it is important to consider what recognising social structure as a site 
of justice means for the debate concerning poverty, inequality and global justice. 
This is the topic of this chapter. 
This chapter argues that social structures are just when they are justified to all 
those they affect in terms that cannot reasonably be rejected. It then suggests 
that social structures that place some in a position of extreme poverty in which 
their basic needs are frustrated cannot be justified to those they condemn to such 
a position and thus it will be argued that such extreme deprivation constitutes 
structural injustice. This claim is then extended to extreme inequality. It is also 
noted that it can be widely accepted that extensive poverty and extreme poverty 
violate demands of social justice even by those who do not accept the validity of 
contractualism.  
I then argue that achieving structural justice requires having institutions that 
regulate social structures effectively. It is suggested that making social structures 
just will require global coordination. This is because state governments often lack 
the power to determine social structures effectively. I note that states have 
particular problems in addressing poverty and securing socio-economic rights. 
Hence, they aim for progressive realisation rather than effectively securing these 
rights now. I also note why state governments have problems addressing 
inequality. 
The chapter then considers some potential problems with global governing 
institutions. Whether such institutions will undermine national sovereignty and 
force all societies to adopt the same conception of social justice and whether such 
institutions represent a threat of global totalitarianism are discussed. Some ways 
in which global institutions could be organised in order to minimise these threats 
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are outlined. Finally, it is claimed that the likely benefits of such institutions 
outweigh their likely costs. 
As noted in the Introduction, in this thesis I adopt a contractualist account of 
justice. According to contractualism justice is a matter of justifiability. Thus a 
social structure is just when it has been justified to those whom it affects in terms 
they cannot reasonably reject. A rejection is reasonable when it can be endorsed 
by a person committed to living among others on terms that are fair. Thus, 
according to contractualism, debates about the requirements of justice concern 
what constitutes a reasonable compromise between agents (with conflicting 
interests) who are motivated to live together on terms that respect the equal 
standing of all. 
In this chapter I repeatedly draw on the contractualism to justify my points. 
However, each time I also argue that these points can also be accepted by those 
who do not recognise the validity of a contractualist account of morality and 
justice. 
Avoiding a Comprehensive Account of Social Structural Justice 
In this section I will discuss what structural justice requires. I will not be laying out 
a comprehensive theory that outlines what social justice requires social structures 
to be like. I will now explain the reasons behind this choice.  
The aim of this thesis is to show that the scope of social justice is global, that 
extreme poverty indicates social injustice, and that there are negative duties that 
require citizens of the world to take political action that aims to eradicate this 
structural injustice. In order to establish this central thesis it is not necessary for 
me to lay out a comprehensive theory outlining the requirements of social justice. 
All that needs to be shown is that extreme poverty and inequality of prospects 
indicate social injustice and that tackling social structural injustice requires global 
governing institutions. Therefore, an account of the general principles or precise 
demands of social justice is outwith the scope of this thesis. Below I will explore 
some other reasons why it may be inadvisable to engage in a comprehensive 
account of the precise demands of social justice. However, I wish to note that the 
arguments of this thesis do not rely on the truth of the observations detailed 
below. 
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Laying out a comprehensive theory of social justice would require extensive 
knowledge of the current social circumstances and the effects of different 
approaches to public policy. It would also require extensive knowledge of the 
positions, interests, values and worldviews of the population. This is knowledge 
that as a political philosopher focussing on normative issues I lack. Furthermore, 
there is good reason to believe that any lone theorist seeking to establish the 
demands of social justice is unlikely to come up with a comprehensive account 
which is fully just. This is because the knowledge and understanding of any 
individual is necessarily limited. A political theorist can access facts concerning the 
social positions of others as well as their needs, desires and values. However, 
even a theorist with access to data on these issues would still be lacking the 
personal experience of being in any particular position other than their own. Such 
personal experience is important because it draws attention to particular 
problems that others may overlook.  
In the existing social justice literature, well intentioned authors have often failed 
to notice aspects of their prescriptions that others could reasonably reject. This 
could be explained by the fact that these reasons did not become apparent to the 
authors in question because these authors do not belong to the subsector of the 
community who can reasonably reject their prescription. One obvious example of 
this is John Rawls’s neglect to consider the fact that some aspects of the 
monogamous family household can be reasonably rejected by women because 
they undermine their access to equal opportunities. In A Theory of Justice Rawls 
includes the monogamous family in the basic structure of society (Rawls, 1971, p. 
462). He goes on to sketch out what institutions conforming to his principles of 
justice would be like. However, he neglects to analyse whether the ‘monogamous 
family’ is just.65 In doing so he neglects to notice that some aspects of this 
institution are unjust to women and that it teaches people to accept and 
propagate injustice. This neglect could be explained by the fact that this injustice 
was to some extent invisible to him because he had not experienced first-hand 
gender discrimination within the family or because he was not aware that the 
traditional family’s organisation undermines the aims and interests of many 
women. 
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 Rawls’s neglect to discuss the requirements of gender justice in his theory is discussed 
at length in Susan Moller Okin’s article ‘Justice and Gender’. 
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There are aspects of subjective personal experience that simply cannot be 
grasped by ‘armchair’ appraisal. Thus those who do not share a particular social 
position, value scheme or world view cannot fully understand that position, value 
or world view. Although, they may gain objective knowledge of these things they 
will always lack the particular knowledge that comes from experiencing a 
particular position or holding a particular value scheme or world view. It could be 
argued that this knowledge is essential for knowing whether a particular policy 
prescription is one that can be reasonably rejected by those within the social 
position or have that value scheme or world view. If this is the case then in order 
to establish whether or not a particular social structure is just it is essential to 
discuss the matter broadly and come to conclusions through deliberation with a 
diverse cross section of those affected.66  
However, it is not clear that in order to work out general principles of social 
justice one must actually engage in public deliberation with all those affected. It 
may be that subjective experience of a social position, world view or value system 
is not required and that objective knowledge of social positions, world views and 
value systems are sufficient for establishing whether a particular social structure 
is just. It is likely that general principles of social justice can be formulated ‘from 
the armchair’, even if their precise application requires personal experience. 
Individual theoretical reflection can at the very least establish that certain 
practices are unjust by showing that they cannot be justified in a manner 
consistent with understanding people as equals. For example, when social 
structures violate the basic interests of some or make arbitrary exceptions for 
others it can be theoretically established that these structures are unjust.  
However, in reality any individual’s access to objective knowledge will also be 
limited. Thus, even if subjective knowledge is not essential for determining 
whether a principle or policy can be reasonably rejected, the precise 
requirements of just public policy can much better be determined by including 
those with a diverse range of standpoints, experiences and interests. This is 
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 Iris Young has argued that instead of looking for objective and impartial solutions to 
moral problems in which interests and values conflict what is required is an inter-
subjective agreement. Young argues that any claims to be impartial or objective usually 
involve adopting a particular view point or perspective and passing it off as objective. 
Instead she recommends coming up with principles and legislation through participatory 
democracy (Young, 1990, pp. 96-122). This account of the limits of theoretical enquiry is 
controversial and not fully defended here. However, as explained above my thesis does 
not rely on the validity of this criticism of theoretical reflection on the requirements of 
justice. 
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because a diverse group of people will have knowledge and understanding of a 
wide range of interests, perspectives, value systems and social positions. This 
diversity will allow them to understand some of the problems with existing social 
structures. It will also allow them to have greater insight as to whether any 
proposed changes to social structures will unfairly undermine the interests, 
position, plans or values of a particular sub-sector of the community. This means 
that it is less likely that a key injustice or significant problem will be missed. Thus 
for practical reasons the best way to come up with valid principles of social justice 
and public policy prescriptions may be to have public deliberation involving 
representatives of different views, social positions and value schemes.  The lack of 
knowledge of any individual reasoned also suggests that the use of experts in the 
effects of different public policy prescriptions, knowledge of the current situation 
and statistical data outlining the positions, views and values of the wider 
population would also be advisable. 
Furthermore, any governing organisation that co-ordinates activity on a large 
scale and regulates social structures will wield significant power and will therefore 
need to fulfil legitimacy criteria. Legitimacy requires transparency and 
accountability concerning the decisions such an organisation makes. This requires 
having a decision making mechanism which is not the preserve of a minority who 
enforce their conception of justice on others. Legitimacy requires that all those 
affected by any legislation have the chance to authorise, reject or reform that 
legislation. This is important to avoid dominating people by imposing a particular 
coercive institutional order upon them. 67 
All of the above points suggest that what is most urgently needed is not a set of 
policies but a procedure and a mechanism for establishing structural justice. It is 
only once such a procedure has been set up that a discussion of what sort of 
policies should be enacted will be required. Hence, at this stage it is better to 
consider what institutions are required in order to establish structural justice 
rather than considering the demands that social structures must meet in order to 
be just. 
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 The account of legitimacy often referred to in this thesis is not fully developed within it. 
However, what I wish to note is that it is likely that constraints of legitimacy will require 
that political institutions meet some basic requirements concerning participation and non-
domination. 
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Human Rights and Global Poverty 
Although there are barriers that prevent an individual theorist without extensive 
knowledge from identifying the precise requirements of social structural justice in 
a particular context, this does not mean that such a theorist cannot identify social 
structural injustice. An individual theorist may be able to show that a particular 
state of affairs, social structure, institutional order or legal system is unjust by 
showing that it cannot be justified or that any justifications for it can reasonably 
be rejected by some party affected by it.68  
What is needed in order to show that global levels of poverty and inequality 
indicate structural injustice is an argument that shows that any justification of 
structures that put a large portion of the global population in a position where 
they are vulnerable to acute deprivation and in which they are desperately poor 
relative to others can reasonably be rejected by those placed in positions of 
poverty.  
Those who live in poverty could reasonably reject the social structures that 
avoidably place them in a position of such extreme vulnerability because these 
structures make them vulnerable to having their most basic interests undermined.  
In The Right to Justification, Rainer Forst suggests that Universal Human Rights are 
a list of political demands. They describe a set of minimum standards the violation 
of which cannot be justified to those affected (Forst, 2010, pp. 711-740). Human 
rights declarations are political documents outlining a set of minimum 
requirements of justice that can attract widespread agreement. There may be 
serious disagreement about the justice of social structures. However, there is 
likely to be broad agreement that these structures should not condemn anyone to 
deprivation in terms of basic needs. Thus even those who do not accept a 
contractualist understanding of justice could support the premise that the 
violation of such rights is unjust. 
Many of the rights described in such declarations proscribe certain sorts of 
government coercion. However, some of the socio-economic rights outlined in 
these documents do not fit this model. These rights could be understood as 
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 Coming up with positive prescriptions can be more difficult because it may be that some 
of those affected can reasonably reject the proposal for reasons that the theorist has 
overlooked because they lack knowledge or understanding of the value system, position 
of world view of the party who can reject their prescription. 
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proscribing certain sorts of social structures; as demanding that no individual be 
placed in a social position that does not meet these standards.  
The International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights states that 
those living in deprivation are having their fundamental human rights violated. It 
suggests that those who lack a healthy living environment, decently paid work, 
basic healthcare, social security, education and accommodation suffer from a 
fundamental injustice (UN, 1966). The extreme deprivation faced by a large 
portion of the world’s population involves the violation of many of the socio-
economic rights. Thus, this suffering violates minimal standards and can be agreed 
to be unjust because there can be no possible justification for this sort of 
deprivation.  
These socio-economic human rights can be interpreted in a number of ways. It 
could be argued that it is unjust to leave people living in conditions that fall below 
these standards when institutional changes could end extreme deprivation. 
Alternatively, it could be claimed that it is unjust that a particular institutional 
order imposes conditions of extreme deprivation on these people. However, in 
many cases the conditions that fail to meet these standards are the result of a 
variety of institutions, practices and trends none of which is entirely responsible 
for the resulting injustice. A social structural account offers a plausible way to 
understand extreme deprivation as determined by social structures that violate 
basic rights. Such an account suggests that it is unjust that social structures place 
people in positions where their fundamental rights are not secured. 
Social structures that place groups in a position where they are vulnerable to 
serious deprivation cannot be justified to the members of these groups. 
Recognising that such social structures violate human rights is a way of 
recognising when it is uncontroversial to recognise these structures as unjust. 
Those who are vulnerable to being deprived of the means to fulfil their basic 
needs can reasonably reject the social structure that places them in such a 
situation. This is because it is not unreasonable to reject a social structure that 
places one in a position where one is vulnerable to being deprived of basic 
necessities. There are alternative achievable social structures in which large 
portions of the global population are not made so vulnerable. Given the fact that 
this vulnerability is avoidable, arbitrary and extreme there can be no justification 
for it that is not reasonably rejectable. Thus it is unreasonable to expect 
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individuals to tolerate such a social position. Hence such on-going vulnerability 
constitutes serious structural injustice. The human rights to make a living through 
work and the right to enjoy just and favourable conditions at work prohibit social 
structures that leave people in social positions where they have no non-
exploitative employment opportunities (UN, 1966).  Such individuals are 
vulnerable to being deprived of basic necessities or falling in to submissive or 
exploitative working relationships. 
Likewise, when a social structure avoidably places some in a position where they 
are liable to ill health due to their living and working conditions no justification 
that cannot be reasonably rejected can be offered. There can be no possible 
justification for unnecessarily placing some in a social position where they are 
vulnerable to significant health problems relative to others and in absolute terms. 
Just as being vulnerable to being deprived of the basic goods required for a 
healthy life is something it is unreasonable to expect some to accept, it is equally 
unreasonable to expect some to accept living and working conditions that 
significantly threaten their health and well-being. Thus a social structure that 
avoidably condemns many to living and working in poor conditions can be shown 
to be unjust. The human rights to health, the right to safe and healthy working 
conditions aim to protect people from such structural injustice (UN, 1966).  
Agreement by representatives from various different states on a set of basic 
socio-economic rights indicates a shared understanding that societies that do not 
secure these rights are unjust. The International Covenant on Economic Social 
Cultural Rights was produced by a committee containing members of 7 different 
states and has been signed or ratified by 167 states (UN, 2013). This suggests that 
these basic rights can attract widespread support.69 
I will now argue that social structures that contain gross inequality cannot be 
justified (in terms they cannot reasonably reject) to those condemned to an 
inferior social position. The sort of extreme differences in life chances between 
members of different classes and different states is the result of the fact that 
global social structures place individuals in radically different starting positions. 
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 Those who do not accept the validity of a contractualist understanding of justice could 
agree that the violation basic socio-economic rights indicate structural injustice. These 
rights could be defended on the basis of the essential dignity of human beings or by the 
existence of natural rights. Utilitarianism is also likely to support the idea that widespread 
extreme poverty is unjust because such poverty causes extensive suffering and extreme 
deprivation prevents the satisfaction of desires. 
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This sort of extreme inequality in opportunities cannot be justified to those who 
suffer from it.70 An attempt to justify these inequalities could point out that the 
differences in prospects between members of different classes are just because 
they result from differences in the efforts made by some individuals’ ancestors 
compared to those of others. It could also be claimed that differences in 
prospects between agents born in different states are the just results of different 
cultural attitudes to work and differences in the priorities of different nations or 
peoples (cf. the discussion of David Miller in Chapter 2). There may be good 
reason to doubt that current inequalities in prospects are a result of these factors. 
However, even if they are, both of these justifications can reasonably be rejected 
by those who find themselves radically deprived compared to others. This is 
because a structure that disadvantages individuals on the basis of choices made 
by others in their family, culture or society can be reasonably rejected. One can 
reasonably reject a justification of disadvantage that is based not on what an 
individual has done but on what others have done. This is because it is not fair to 
hold an individual liable for the actions of others. Individuals may be able to 
contribute to the on-going culture and priorities of their community. However, 
they cannot fairly be held liable for the actions and choices that were made 
before they were born or before they became adults. Thus these justifications of 
the dramatic difference in prospects between individuals (even if they hold, which 
as was seen in Chapter 2 is unlikely) can reasonably be rejected. This argument 
suggests that social structures with massive inequalities in prospects between 
different sectors of the population cannot be justified in terms that cannot be 
reasonably rejected.71 
The purpose of this section has been to show that poverty indicates injustice in 
social structures and that inequality in prospects and positions could also be a sign 
of social structural injustice. This is because unnecessary extreme deprivation 
cannot possibly be justified to those who suffer from it and extreme inequality 
will be very difficult to defend to those who experience it. Thus, there is good 
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 There is also good reason to think that a social structure that places agents in 
dramatically different social positions depending on their class and nationality cannot be 
justified even if all people have equal opportunity to compete for a position in the most 
privileged class. This is because such large inequalities prevent people from interacting 
politically and socially as equals and undermine the social basis of self-respect. 
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 Massive inequalities can also be identified as unjust by those who do not accept the 
contractualist method. Different conceptions of justice will reject social structures 
containing extreme inequality for their own reasons. For example, such inequality violates 
the demands of utilitarianism due to the law of diminishing marginal utility. 
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reason to think that global inequality and extreme poverty are indicators of global 
structural injustice. It has also been suggested that socio-economic human rights 
could be interpreted as outlining some minimum requirements for social 
structures that can attract widespread agreement. 
Institutions for Establishing Just Social Structures 
In order for structural injustice to be avoided some institutions must be 
established which can coordinate behaviour. Such institutions must have the 
power to legislate over the actions and practices that contribute to social 
structures. Thus these institutions will have power over people and thus must also 
avoid violating the norms of coercive justice. They must also be legitimate. As 
previously discussed, this will require that they are in some way authorised by 
those over whom they rule.  
For there to be structural justice requires political institutions for determining 
policy and enforcing that policy. These institutions can determine what structural 
justice requires by including the viewpoints of those with different social 
positions, value systems and world views. In this way they can establish what 
social structures are justifiable to all in terms they cannot reasonably reject. These 
institutions can then take action to coordinate behaviour to avoid structural 
injustice.  
Such institutions can also provide an arena in which competition between 
different conceptions of the precise demands of social justice can be fought out. 
Thus they can allow decisions to be reached that can be provisionally accepted by 
all those affected even where substantial disagreement remains. 
Structural Injustice and Global Coordination 
The social structure that currently denies those in poverty essential resources is 
contributed to by local, national and global sources, including trends in consumer 
choices, the aims and organisation of TNCs, global competition and the rules of 
the World Trade Organisation. Furthermore, often national governments lack the 
power to shape local social structures so as to avoid extreme poverty. Some 
countries are so poor that local wealth or income redistribution cannot prevent 
some people from being placed in social positions where they are vulnerable to 
being deprived of basic goods. Furthermore, all countries’ abilities to use taxation 
to redistribute income are limited by the fact that wealthy individuals can assume 
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residence or nationality in a foreign country where they will be taxed less. This 
means that there is competition between states to attract wealthy individuals by 
decreasing taxes on the wealthy. There is also competition between states to 
attract businesses with low tax rates.72 Attracting manufacturing through offering 
low costs can also be achieved by minimising health and safety requirements and 
allowing low wages. Thus, some countries cannot raise minimum wages high 
enough to lift workers out of poverty because in doing so they risk increasing 
unemployment. This is because in the absence of low wages Trans-National 
Corporations can move the manufacture of their goods elsewhere.  
Competition between states that decreases standards and prevents the 
realisation of social structural justice is often described as a ‘race to the bottom’. 
The ILO have noted that where countries simultaneously adopt a policy of 
decreasing wages it can create such a race to the bottom (ILO, 2013, p. xiv). These 
factors suggest that tackling structural injustice requires global coordination. Such 
coordination could prevent competition of this sort between states from 
undermining their ability to ensure social justice. 
As discussed in chapter 2, in Responsibility for Justice Iris Young describes the 
circumstances faced by workers in the global apparel industry (Young 2011, 125-
35). Considering the position that apparel workers in export processing zones find 
themselves in can help show why tackling poverty requires global coordination to 
be overcome.  
The social position inhabited by those working in factories to produce garments 
for the global apparel industry is one of extreme vulnerability to deprivation and 
domination (both relatively speaking and in absolute terms). These people 
(predominantly young women) lack other reputable employment options. This 
means they are wise to continue in their factory work no matter what conditions 
are imposed. They are unlikely to be protected by their government because 
bringing in regulations to improve pay and conditions is likely to result in the work 
being relocated to other states. Global competition for manufacturing contracts 
drives down wages and conditions. In this industry violence and intimidation is 
regularly used against those who seek to form unions or engage in collectively 
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 For an example of this see the TJN-A and AAI report on the results of tax completion in 
East Africa. The report finds that countries tax revenues suffer as they provide tax 
incentives in an attempt to attract foreign direct investment (TJN-A & AAI, 2012, p. v). 
However the report suggests that these policies do not offer much benefit to states. 
142 
 
bargaining. These conditions are consistent across much of the global south, 
where many countries rely on external investment to provide jobs. The position 
such countries find themselves in means that they often cannot take unilateral 
action to improve conditions for their apparel workers without radically increasing 
unemployment and poverty (Young 2011, 126-34). 
The national government in the case described face a situation where they must 
choose between allowing these exploitative conditions to continue or suffer 
widespread unemployment and underdevelopment. This is because the 
companies that commission the products the factories make can easily use 
alternative factories in other countries if utilising the current suppliers becomes 
too expensive. Keeping costs down requires making the workforce work long 
hours for low pay. It also requires minimising the amount spent on the safety and 
comfort of the workforce.  
The only way that the local government can improve working conditions, wages 
and hours without losing investment and risking a rise in unemployment is to 
agree to, and enforce, global minimums in terms of pay, hours and conditions. 
Local unions (where they exist) have a similar problem. Union activity is often 
heavily punished as it threatens the livelihood of factory owners and managers 
who must keep costs down in order to win contracts. Where workers are 
organised into unions locally they cannot demand better wages without risking 
loosing employment. The only way to overcome this problem is to coordinate 
with unions around the world to secure better pay, conditions and hours 
worldwide. 
The above example demonstrates that structural injustice experienced by agents 
within a particular state cannot always be effectively dealt with by local 
governments or civil society organisations, even if that government or 
organisation has the ability to control agents within its borders. This is because 
external institutions, organisations, norms, trends and markets contribute to the 
social positions in which residents find themselves. These factors cannot be 
regulated or controlled by the national government or local organisations. In 
some cases the national government can navigate the external factors and 
compensate for them so as to avoid structural injustice. However, in other cases 
national governments cannot alleviate structural injustices without causing more 
serious structural injustices to emerge. This is because external factors and inter-
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state competition constrain what the government can achieve and prevent the 
alleviation of structural justice. These factors can also undermine a national 
government’s ability to tackle structural injustice. This can be through making it 
more difficult to address such injustice or through providing adverse incentives. 
These can discourage dealing with structural injustice directly or can prevent 
countries from establishing governments motivated to address injustice.73 Global 
coordination is required to overcome these problems. This suggests global 
institutions must be established in order to allow structural injustice to be 
eliminated and social justice secured. 
Risks of Global Institutions 
The case made in this chapter is that the kind and degree of poverty characteristic 
of the modern world indicates global structural injustice. It has been argued that 
in the case of widespread and extreme poverty structural injustice can only be 
avoided by the establishment of global governing institutions. These institutions 
can coordinate action around the world and thereby allow structural injustice to 
be avoided. However, the fact that such institutions could prevent structural 
injustice does not in itself show that they are required. These institutions could be 
rejected on the basis that the benefits of such institutions are outweighed by their 
costs. There are good reasons to be wary about the establishment of institutions 
of global co-ordination. Using coercive force can be dangerous and can produce 
more injustice than it tackles. However not co-ordinating globally allows structural 
injustice to continue with no organisation with the power to prevent it.  
Any governing or coordinating institution limits the negative liberty of those 
agents who fall under its jurisdiction. Coordination and regulation has definite 
costs. Global regulation would restrict the liberty of states and constrain their 
choices. This would involve limiting what they can do and interfering with their 
plans. Thus such regulation comes with significant costs. 
Establishing powerful institutions represents a significant risk because these 
institutions could be used to impose injustice. A global governing institution could 
impose injustice on a massive scale. It could end up controlling every aspect of 
people’s lives and undermining their ability to live decent lives. Worse still it 
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 . These problems with the global order are outlined by Thomas Pogge in his work on 
global justice and are discussed in detail in chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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would be impossible to escape its dictates because one could not leave its 
jurisdiction.  
It is vital to be aware that potential solutions to structural injustice could be 
(come) worse than the original problem. Powerful governing institutions are 
capable of significant harm. During the 20th century actions by states have 
revealed the capacity of governments to impose extreme injustice. Governing 
institutions can be used by a minority to promote their own interests and to 
oppress and punish others. Establishing a means of imposing decisions on all 
effectively risks agents using this mechanism to serve private interests. It also risks 
them using this mechanism not simply to ensure justice but to impose a certain 
way of life on all.  
In the most extreme cases repressive states have used their power to eradicate 
sections of their population. This practice has occurred when settlers or colonials 
have systematically exterminated local populations as part of their rule. This has 
occurred in North and South America, Canada, Guatemala, Australia, Namibia. 
Other cases involve the eradication of particular sections of a domestic population 
on the basis of membership of a particular ethnicity, religion or social group. In 
some cases these actions have been coordinated by the government. Cases of 
such large scale murder and deportation include the Armenian Genocide, the 
Jewish Holocaust, Stalin’s Terror, Mao’s Cultural Revolution, and the Rwandan 
Holocaust (Jones, 2006). 
Global governing institutions could represent an even greater threat because they 
offer the potential power to do even more evil. If the governance of the globe was 
usurped by minority interests they could impose their demands on the whole 
world. Worse still, if such an institution were to conduct a campaign of 
discrimination or engage in ethnic cleansing people could not escape through 
emigration. This represents a serious and significant threat to humanity.  
With global coordination or global institutions backed up by coercion there is a 
threat of abuse of power. The power to intervene in the lives of distant peoples 
and states can be abused to further a state’s or institution’s own interests. It can 
also be used to impose local understandings of justice or efficiency on far-away 
places. There is a risk that rulings will favour the interests or ideals of the 
powerful. 
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Global institutions are often dominated by the richest or most militarily advanced 
states and are used to promote their interests and values. This would explain why 
many global organisations impose institutional arrangements that favour wealthy 
states and their Trans-National Corporations at the expense of the autonomy and 
interests of poorer and weaker states and their people (Pogge, 2008, pp. 26-28) 
(Pogge, 2010, pp. 34-36). Worse still, a global governing body with the power to 
enforce its rulings could represent a dangerous force. There would be no escape 
from its power and it could enforce injustice on states and peoples that they could 
not escape. Moreover, there would be no alternative power-holder to compete 
for the loyalty of governments and peoples. Without such competition there 
would be no need for the governing institution to favour the interests of those 
states it wishes to control. All of this gives good reason to be suspicious of 
coercively imposed global institutions. 
Having discussed some of the potential costs of global institutions, I will now 
proceed to discuss some ways of organising global institutions that could minimise 
the likely costs. After this discussion whether or not the likely benefits of global 
institutions outweigh the likely costs can be evaluated. 
Global Minimalism 
One solution to the risks posed by institutions of global co-ordination that has 
been proposed is to limit global regulation to enforcing human rights claims. By 
restricting the function of global government to enforcing a set of universally 
agreed minimum standards the threats of global totalitarianism and cultural 
imperialism can be avoided. I will discuss this strategy below and give reasons 
against adopting it. 
Some have sought some global regulation, but believe it should be minimal and 
restricted to standards that can attract global consensus (Rawls, 1999) (Wenar, 
2006). The minimalist approach seeks global institutions that protect populations 
from having their fundamental rights violated by their governments. Such theories 
recommend that global institutions come up with a minimal list of injustices that 
can be the subject of global agreement. Then these institutions can sanction 
military intervention to depose governments that violate these standards. They 
support a system where the sovereignty of states is respected unless they violate 
these minimal standards. 
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There are some advantages to such an approach. An approach that is minimal in 
terms of what it demands avoids the dystopian nightmare of a global governing 
body that coercively imposes unjust institutions. Furthermore, it can minimise 
external intervention in the business of states. This approach is modelled on 
dealing with cases of extremely unjust acts of government coercion such as 
genocide. When states cross the line and perform acts that violate minimal 
standards of decency, global institutions can sanction and carry out invasion to 
prevent the continuance of the action.  
A minimalist approach prevents global coercive institutions from imposing rules 
that have not been justified to the global population. The idea is that by 
demanding only norms be imposed that cannot and are not reasonably rejected 
by any peoples this approach avoids global injustice whilst protecting some 
fundamental rights and preventing crimes against humanity. If rights are 
understood as standards the violation of which is required to justify military 
intervention on humanitarian grounds, then it is important to ensure they are 
subject to consensus and that they can attract almost universal agreement. 
However, the minimalist approach fails to deal with problems of social justice 
adequately. One proponent of the approach, Leif Wenar, claims that there should 
not be any principles of social injustice enforced by global coercive institutions. 
His justification for this is the fact that there is unlikely to be global agreement on 
principles of social justice. Wenar argues that in the absence of any sort of 
overlapping consensus as to what social justice requires there should be no 
coercively enforced global demands of social justice (Wenar, 2006). Hence, 
Wenar’s account remains unresponsive to claims of social injustice.  
It is not clear why Wenar believes reaching an agreement on minimum standards 
of coercive justice will be any easier than reaching agreement on minimum 
standards on social justice. There are currently two international covenants on 
rights. One outlines civil and political rights. The other outlines social, economic 
and cultural rights. This suggests that there can be global agreement on both 
kinds of justice. It is not clear why the coercive imposition rights should be 
considered any less controversial than the socio-economic rights. My discussion 
above suggests that these socio-economic human rights should be interpreted as 
requiring that social structures avoid placing individuals in positions where they 
are vulnerable to being deprived of these rights.  
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An institutional model that aims to enforce minimal standards through 
legitimising intervention when they are not fulfilled does not look like a good 
model for ensuring the secure fulfilment of these socio-economic rights. The 
rights detailed in the covenant concerning social, economic and cultural rights 
include a right to fair wages, healthy working conditions, paid holidays, free 
education and a right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress (UN, 1966). As 
discussed above, often governments cannot achieve the fulfilment of these rights 
given the political and economic circumstances they find themselves in. The 
sweatshop case described above demonstrates how governments can be unable 
to secure decent wages and working conditions whilst maintaining decent level of 
employment. The ‘race to the bottom’ in wages and tax can prevent governments 
from securing social structures which do not violate these rights. Furthermore, 
lack of development in some states can also represent a barrier to their fulfilment.  
Where a government is unable to secure socio-economic human rights, invading 
the country on the grounds that the government has failed to secure these rights 
would be unjust and unwise. This is because this would involve punishing 
governments for failing to do something that they are unable to do. Taking such 
action would thus be unfair and ineffective: such a system cannot incentivise 
states to do better (since they cannot do better). This suggests that simply adding 
minimal socio economic demands to the minimalist approach will not work. Thus, 
recognising structures as a site of injustice highlights a problem with only 
enforcing a minimal set of demands that can garner global consensus through 
coercing states that fail to fulfil them. This minimalist approach could work to 
prevent governments from directly imposing extreme injustice. However, it does 
not work as a means to ensuring that social structures do not violate socio-
economic rights.  
Global institutions could try to apply the minimal standards of social justice 
outlined in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(UN, 1966) by directly ensuring that social structures do not place any individual in 
a position where these rights are not secure. Such an approach would require 
global institutions to directly regulate populations and agencies. There may be 
reasons not to support a global state that directly regulates social structures in 
this way (some are detailed in the section following this one). 
148 
 
Furthermore, when it comes to social justice the strategy of only enforcing basic 
socio-economic rights (on which there can be a global consensus) may be 
problematic. This is because having no regulation unfairly favours the status quo. 
Under a global system that only enforces socio economic rights less extreme 
structural injustices will not be addressed. When no enforcement mechanism is in 
place, norms, associations, voluntary organisations, informal institutions and 
trends are left to constrain the abilities of governments to determine social 
structures. This means that in a scenario where only minimal demands are 
imposed by global coordination the result could be social structures no one 
believes to be just. Furthermore, enforcing such minimal socio-economic rights 
globally will not give nation states the power to deliver more comprehensive 
conceptions of social justice locally. Thus, national governments may not be able 
to overcome the status quo bias. 
Recognising social structural injustice is important because it counters the trend 
towards global regulatory minimalism. A suspicion of coercion can lead to an 
argument for minimal global regulation. However, the structural approach can 
allow us to recognise the fact that there can be much injustice in the absence of 
coercive regulation or military intervention and that regulation or coordination 
can be necessary in order to alleviate such injustice.  
Global Super State 
However, a rejection of minimalism does not mean that a global super-state that 
can enforce a maximal conception of structural justice should be imposed upon 
the world. Such a solution would be problematic for many reasons. Firstly, such an 
institution would have extensive powers and there would be a threat of global 
despotism or totalitarianism. Furthermore, it may be that different populations 
wish to make different demands of their social structures. A global system without 
federalism would have difficulty meeting this demand. Secondly, a global system 
involves a concentration of extreme power in the hands of one organisational 
unit. Diversity in power holders can be a means to avoiding the worst forms of 
domination and injustice. It provides agents with options and prevents any single 
entity having complete control. Many studies in political science prefer pluralistic 
systems of governance for this reason (Dahl, 1978). Chantal Mouffe has argued 
that progress requires a multi-polar world in which weaker powers can play off 
the most powerful regimes and thereby achieve gains (Mouffe, 2008). This gives 
us reason not to support a universal single ruling power.  
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Problems of legitimacy also speak against such a proposal. If we wish to establish 
democracy in global governance, as well as accountability and responsiveness to 
claims of injustice, this will probably require a system for selecting leaders and 
holding them to account. The more people involved in such a vote, the less power 
each individual has to influence the decision and the more powerless they are. In 
addition, democracy requires a common language in which to publicly discuss and 
articulate competing regimes. It may be difficult to establish a global public 
sphere to debate policy and to hold leaders to account.  
All these reasons speak against a centralised universal government that can 
effectively tackle structural injustices. They favour breaking up a global 
constituency into smaller units that govern within specific areas as part of a 
federal system. A plausible option is that global institutions, instead of directly 
regulating social structures, should seek to establish and maintain effective 
control for each nation over their own social structures through a federal system. 
What is needed is a solution that limits coercive government so as to minimise the 
dangers of corruption and abuse of power and yet addresses the need to 
coordinate action to tackle structural injustice and tame global forces effectively.  
The concern to avoid coercively imposed injustice, avoid domination, imperialism, 
corruption and abuses of power, and a need to ensure legitimacy in any coercive 
body, will lead us to prefer some solutions to tackling structural injustice over 
others. Below I will discuss some proposed systems of global coordination that 
operate along these lines. 
Federal Systems and 21st Century Sovereignty 
Miriam Ronzoni and Iris Young have proposed new concepts that could help in 
delivering global justice without endorsing a global super-state or falling back on 
global minimalism. Ronzoni has developed an account of the requirements of 
global justice based on a new conception of global sovereignty. She proposes a 
conception of sovereignty not simply based on an absence of direct interference 
by another nation state, but instead based on the capacity to maintain internal 
problem-solving capabilities and make meaningful discretionary choices on a 
range of national issues (Ronzoni, 2012).  
Ronzoni suggests that in the modern world individual states often lack the power 
to determine policy independently within their territory. The problems that 
national governments have in preventing structural injustice (discussed at length 
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above) are one example of such difficulties. Ronzoni recognises that states can 
lack the capability to make significant choices about policy even if they are not 
coercively constrained by the threat of military intervention by another state. 
States’ internal problem solving capabilities and their ability to make meaningful 
discretionary choices about local social structures can be undermined by 
dependency, poverty, a lack of domestic capital. Contrary to a traditional 
negative-liberty understanding of sovereignty, under Ronzoni’s account 
cosmopolitan global institutions are not necessarily a threat to sovereignty. In fact 
Ronzoni suggests that positive sovereignty can only be secured through such 
institutions (Ronzoni, 2012, p. 574). 
Ronzoni’s positive conception of sovereignty is interesting and plausible. She 
suggests that global coordination and regulation is needed to secure positive 
sovereignty (Ronzoni, 2012, p. 574). She recommends that global institutions be 
established that can take action to ensure positive sovereignty. By constraining 
governments and states coercively, global institutions can thus secure each state’s 
ability to make meaningful discretionary choices on national issues.  
To see how external regulation can increase rather than undermine state 
sovereignty consider the case of European Union (EU) directives on food 
production. The EU constrains what its member states can do by making 
regulations that cover all members. However, by making shared rules the EU 
allows its member states to establish policies and outcomes that would otherwise 
not be possible. States within the EU in the absence of any collective agreement 
are often constrained in their domestic policy by competition between states to 
attract investment and secure trade. For example, any member state that sought 
to enforce stricter animal welfare rules on food production would cause their 
farmers to be at a significant comparative disadvantage. For example, banning 
battery chicken farms in the UK would have forced UK farmers not to participate 
in the practice. However, battery eggs and poultry would still be on sale in the UK 
because they could be imported from other member states. The result of the 
legislation would not be fewer battery chickens. The legislation would just have 
moved production abroad and disadvantaged British farmers. The creation of EU 
wide welfare standards that outlaw battery cages of a particularly inhumane kind 
in poultry farming allowed the preventing of maltreatment of birds within the UK 
(and of course elsewhere) without disadvantaging British farmers or creating the 
equivalent of a welfare race to the bottom (Barclay, 2012). Thus the existence of 
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regional governing institutions actually increases rather than decreases the 
sovereignty of member states by increasing the number of meaningful policy 
options available to member states.  
In a similar way, global minimum labour standards or minimum levels of corporate 
tax could prevent the race to the bottom on working conditions. It could thus 
allow poorer states to improve the conditions and pay in the apparel industry 
without threatening investment in their states. In this way the actual choices 
available to poorer state governments would increase rather than decrease and 
as a result their real sovereignty would be bolstered rather than undermined. 
Thus, a global federal system could give state governments more meaningful 
choice over domestic policy through regulation and coordination. This regulation 
and coordination would constrain governments. However, overall it would ensure 
all states had positive sovereignty to make real choices concerning domestic 
policy. A global organisation for coordination and regulation backed up by a 
reliable enforcement mechanism that can offer assurance could make this new 
conception of sovereignty a reality for constituent governments. This would mean 
that if a local government has sufficient local power to determine social structures 
and residents have a mechanism for rejecting or accepting a government’s 
justifications for their policies, then just social structures can be pursued. Thus 
establishing global institutions that guarantee states’ positive sovereignty does 
not mean that social structural justice will necessarily follow. However, 
establishing such institutions removes a significant barrier to establishing 
structural justice. It is only in combination with strong, just and legitimate national 
institutions that such global institutions will result in structural justice. 
Iris Young also recommends a federal solution as a means to establishing global 
justice. Her account tries to establish that self-determination for states can be 
compatible with transnational government coordination. Young develops an 
understanding of self-determination as non-domination rather than non-
interference (Young, 2007, pp. 39-57). Thus, under her account, global 
coordination does not necessarily undermine self-determination. Rather, it is only 
when global institutions have the power to interfere arbitrarily that self-
determination is undermined (Young, 2007, p. 52). Thus if global institutions do 
not have power to interfere arbitrarily, then they do not undermine self-
determination. 
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Young suggests that states have a right to self-determination. However, she insists 
that this does not mean that outsiders should have no say over what a 
government does. She explains that a right to self-determination comes with an 
obligation to respond to claims by outsiders that they are being harmed by the 
state’s activities (Young, 2007, pp. 6-8). 
Young suggests that in a mutually interdependent world securing non-domination 
for each state requires global federalism. Young’s federalist proposals involve 
members of the federation designing a system of fair cooperation that secures 
self-determination as non-domination. She explains that the federalist system 
does not overrule state governments. Instead the federal system consists in 
‘regulated practices of negotiation and cooperation among units’ (Young, 2007, 
pp. 6-8).  Young insists that ‘peoples’ must have a prima-facie right to set their 
own governance procedures.  However, she insists that they must also explains 
that peoples relationship with others requires they ‘acknowledge the legitimate 
interests of others’ (Young, 2007, p. 51). 
These two examples of federalist cosmopolitanism show that there are ways of 
imagining global institutions that can allow for the regulation of social structures 
whilst avoiding the perils of a global maximalist state. These proposals suggest 
that global regulation or coordination is required as a means to allow states to 
determine justice within their borders, rather than as a constraint on their self-
determination.  
Weighing the Case for Global Institutions  
In the section above various ways to minimise the threat to sovereignty and the 
risk of tyranny that global institutions represent were discussed. The proposals 
discussed suggested that global coordination does not necessarily require a global 
super-state that governs all aspects of people’s lives. It was argued that a 
federalist system of global coordination could prevent the threat of global 
injustice being imposed and could avoid recommending that one contentious 
conception of social structural justice be imposed on the world.  
The seriousness of current global structural injustice and the necessity of global 
coordination to overcome this injustice mean that global governing institutions 
that can allow state governments to regulate their social structures effectively are 
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required. This is because the benefits of such institutions easily out-weigh the 
risks associated with establishing such institutions.  
Global structural injustice is currently very serious, predictable and on-going. It 
causes many deaths, immense suffering and extensive frustration of autonomy 
and liberty. Current social structures condemn millions of people to premature 
deaths. Thomas Pogge argues that this represents the largest crime against 
humanity ever committed (Pogge, 2010, pp. 1-3). Patrick Hayden has argued that 
this is a new form of banal evil (Hayden, 2010).  
Much of this injustice cannot be addressed without global coordination. This is 
because it is contributed to by transnational and global factors that state 
governments cannot regulate. In some cases competition between state 
governments prevents them from being able to tackle structural injustice. This is 
the case when it comes to competing to attract global capital with low taxes, 
cheap labour and low environmental and other standards.  
Worries about a global government imposing injustice should be addressed by 
considering ways in which the danger can be alleviated through the balancing of 
power and the use of democratic mechanisms that allow governing officials to be 
held to account. Global institutions must be transparent and accountable and 
great care must be taken to avoid tyrannous global government. Thus global 
governing institutions must have their power limited by other institutions.  
Furthermore, such worries should lead us to ensure that the use of global 
coordination is limited and that the majority of decisions are made at a local level. 
A federalised system of the sort recommended by Iris Young offers a system 
where global power is limited, but includes a means through which global 
coordination can be achieved (Young, 2007, pp. 13-77). Miriam Ronzoni’s 
conception of sovereignty suggests that global coordination is required to ensure 
the sovereignty of states. Under global institutional arrangements that maximise 
state sovereignty the threat of cultural imperialism would be minimised. Instead 
of taking power away from states, global institutions would actually increase their 
power. Thus the coordination does not prevent different states from having 
radically different policies (Ronzoni, 2012). This means that there would not be 
one set of global policies, but variation around the world. This offers citizens the 
chance to escape injustice through emigration in a way that would be unavailable 
in an unjust global super state. 
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It is vital to be aware of the potential danger that global institutions represent. 
However, the threat these institutions represent should lead us to be careful in 
the design and maintenance of these institutions, rather than to avoid addressing 
structural injustice. 
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Chapter 5: Obligations and Structural Injustice 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the duties agents have in relation to the 
serious and significant problem of global poverty. So far it has been established 
that we can understand much of the troubling poverty identified by Singer and 
Pogge as a form of structural injustice to which both local and national factors 
contribute. The purpose of this analysis of the problem is to develop an 
understanding of poverty which can be utilised to identify the obligations agents 
have in relation to extreme poverty. Identifying obligations in relation to accounts 
of injustice is important. This is because it is not much use to recognise something 
as unjust if no agent or agency is identified as responsible for ending the injustice. 
Statements about structural injustice alone do not make a direct claim on any 
party to change their actions. If an account of poverty as structural injustice is to 
have any chance of motivating change it must be connected to an account of who 
can and should take action to bring it about. 
In this section I will proceed to the central task of this thesis: identifying 
obligations that arise in relation to poverty. In this chapter a thorough analysis of 
the obligations agents have in relation to structural injustice will be undertaken. In 
the chapter that follows this one, these findings will be applied to the case of 
global poverty and details will be given of the courses of action agents could 
follow in order to fulfil their obligations.  
In this chapter a systematic approach will be utilised. The first section of the 
chapter considers whether there are positive duties in relation to structural 
injustice. First the positive obligations individuals have to take direct unilateral 
action in relation to structural injustice will be considered. Next, the idea that 
considering collective action possibilities could reveal additional duties will be 
introduced. Whether a collective agent could promote structural injustice will 
then be discussed. Next, the possibility that members of an aggregate can 
sometimes have obligations to form a collective will be investigated. Virginia 
Held’s discussion of the responsibilities of a random collective will be utilised to 
suggest that agents have an obligation to work with others to form a collective 
capable of ensuring structural justice. It will then be proposed that an aggregate 
that could form a collective capable of ensuring structural justice has a positive 
duty to do so.  
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I have previously suggested that identifying an injustice as socially caused rather 
than simply something that can and should be socially addressed is significant (see 
chapters 2 and 4). Recognising a problem as socially caused suggests that 
members of the society may have additional responsibilities in relation to the 
problem in question. It suggests that there may also be a negative duty not to 
cause the problem in the first place. This possibility will be considered in the 
second part of this chapter. 
Again, it will be individual obligations to act unilaterally that will be considered 
first. Thus whether there is an individual duty to avoid contributing to structural 
injustice will be investigated. After which the analysis will again proceed to the 
collective level. Whether there is a collective agent who causes structural injustice 
will be investigated. It will be found that the group of individuals who contribute 
to structural injustice should not be considered a collective agent but an 
aggregate. Virginia Held’s analysis of the obligations of random collective will then 
be extended to consider whether an aggregate who together cause harm violate 
the duty to avoid harming others. It will be suggested that an aggregate that 
together causes a structural injustice violates a duty to form a collective capable 
of avoiding the injustice. It will be argued that this obligation is distributable such 
that each member of the aggregate has a duty to work towards forming a 
collective capable of preventing each from causing aggregative harm.  
It will be suggested that where individuals are members of an aggregate that not 
only could prevent a significant problem but which actually causes the problem 
they have an additional reason to form a collective that can take preventative 
action. It will be argued that the fact that they are causally linked to the 
impending injustice grounds an additional moral reason to form a collective and 
take action. This is on top of the members of that aggregate’s duties to prevent 
suffering and to promote justice. Possible explanations for this additional reason 
will then be explored. It will be suggested that agents have an obligation to form a 
collective capable of preventing structural injustice as a precaution to lessen the 
chance of future contribution to structural injustice.  
Individual Obligations to Aid the Victims of Structural Injustice 
Individuals can feel powerless when confronted with the fact that much of the 
world’s population is condemned to lives of extreme poverty. There is very little 
any individual acting alone can do to alleviate or prevent this problem. This is true 
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regardless of whether the problem is identified as the result of human institutions 
or of an amalgamation of institutions and patterns of treatment. Peter Singer’s 
work (The Life You Can Save: acting now to End World Poverty) highlights the fact 
that an individual can save lives and prevent suffering by sending money to those 
in poverty or by using money to buy essential resources that can protect the poor 
from premature death. Singer suggests that each individual with income in excess 
of what is needed for essentials could save many lives every year. He thus 
identifies a positive individual duty to take action to save lives in this way (Singer, 
1972).  
The obligations individuals have in relation to structural injustice in general will 
now be considered. Individuals can take individual action to assist the victims of 
structural injustice. In this way, those who suffer from serious structural injustice 
can have their suffering relieved through individual acts of assistance. Structural 
injustice causes significant suffering. Since agents have positive moral obligations 
to relieve suffering, assisting the victims of structural injustice is required as part 
of this positive duty of assistance.  
By taking individual action to alleviate suffering from poverty individuals 
contribute to bringing about a distribution of resources closer to the distribution 
that is required by justice. Thus it could be that such action is required for reasons 
of justice as well as reasons of humanity. If individuals have positive duties to 
promote justice then it could be that these actions may be a means of fulfilling 
this duty.  
This thesis has identified poverty not simply as a misfortune that can be alleviated 
but as a form of injustice that should not continue. The suffering inflicted by 
poverty is the result of a combination of human actions and practices and is thus 
unjust. Individual action to alleviate poverty adds to the combination of human 
actions and practices so as to improve the position of some of those who will 
otherwise be placed in a difficult and unjustifiable position. However, the gross 
structural injustice that systematically makes much of the global population 
vulnerable to extreme poverty cannot be altered through individual assistance of 
its victims. This is because such assistance does nothing to alter the fact that a 
significant sector of the population is vulnerable to extreme poverty. Those who 
receive such aid have no guarantee that this assistance will continue; they are 
vulnerable to having assistance cut off on the whim of the individual who aids 
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them. Furthermore, individuals who receive such aid are dependent on aid in a 
way that will make them vulnerable to domination. If the aiding individual makes 
assistance conditional on going to church or adopting a particular way of life the 
dependent will have no option but to fulfil this demand.  
This example shows that those who rely on aid can be dominated by those who 
give aid. Thus individual aid is not a means by which the poor can have a minimum 
level of income, wealth and opportunity secured and thus avoid vulnerability to 
serious deprivation and domination. Justice requires that no individual is placed in 
a social position where they are vulnerable to significant deprivation and 
domination relative to others. Since aid cannot remove such vulnerability it 
cannot promote justice. Hence, such individual giving cannot be a means of 
fulfilling a positive obligation to promote structural justice.  
Even if we understand justice as a state of affairs in which no individual is 
arbitrarily disadvantaged in terms of access to resources opportunity and wealth 
(compared to others), individual assistance cannot promote justice. This is 
because it does not secure a just position for those who are aided. Individual acts 
of assistance do not bring about an alternative system of distribution of income in 
which the socio-economic rights of those who are currently poor are secured. As a 
result, such action cannot be seen as fulfilling the positive demand to promote 
justice. Thus the moral demand to promote justice cannot be fulfilled through 
individually assisting those who are in unjustifiable positions of disadvantage. 
However, this does not undermine the fact that the moral demand to assist those 
who suffer does ground an obligation to assist the victims of structural injustice.  
It looks as if there can be no positive duties to promote structural justice because 
individuals cannot alter social structures so as to prevent systematic vulnerability. 
However, so far we have considered only what an individual can achieve by acting 
unilaterally. Although there is little individuals can do to bring about structural 
injustice, there could be much a committed collective of individuals could do to 
bring about structural justice. As previously mentioned, Tracy Isaacs has discussed 
how considering collective action can allow us to identify possibilities which would 
otherwise remain invisible (Isaacs, 2011, p. 36). Collectives can produce effects 
and perform actions which go well beyond what a group of uncoordinated 
individuals can achieve. It could be that considering collective action possibilities 
is the key to identifying obligations with regards to structural injustice. 
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Collective Action and Positive Obligations 
Organisations and institutions have much greater power to address poverty than 
do individuals. Aid organisations can coordinate donations, make assessments of 
need and deliver assistance effectively and efficiently to those suffering from 
poverty. If individuals donate to such agencies they work together with others to 
assist those who are suffering and thus amplify the effects of their efforts. Singer 
recommends that assistance take the form of donation to organisations that 
coordinate relief efforts and spend money efficiently. He recommends websites 
that rate charities for their ability to change money into positive results in terms 
of lives saved (Singer, 2009, pp. 81-90). Individuals can best alleviate suffering and 
assist the victims of structural injustice by acting through these agencies. By 
joining their relief efforts with those of others they can do more to assist those 
who suffer. Thus individuals can best fulfil individual duties to assist by donating 
to organisations whose aim is to alleviate such suffering. Individuals could work 
with existing organisations to promote the goal of poverty alleviation. 
Alternatively, they could work with others to establish new organisations that aim 
to assist the victims of structural injustices.  
Collective efforts can do more than assist the victims of structural injustice. 
Particular sorts of organisations could actually prevent the continuance of 
structural injustice by securing access to income and opportunities and thus 
preventing vulnerability to deprivation and domination. Some institutions can 
alter social structures so as to end systematic disadvantage and secure access to 
resources, opportunities and wealth. Institutions can stop groups from being 
vulnerable to serious deprivation by regulating behaviour to avoid actions coming 
together to place agents in inferior positions or by securing access to resources 
and services that dramatically and securely improve agents’ social positions. This 
can be done through governing institutions that coercively enforce these 
measures or by forging collective agreements with enforcement mechanisms. In 
this way the socioeconomic rights of the poor can be guaranteed and their 
vulnerability to deprivation ended. These organisations can set in place 
arrangements whereby the poor have secure access to basic necessities either by 
regulating the practices and trends that lead to structural injustice or by providing 
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a collective means to improve the position of the poorest through a safety net of 
benefits and social security.74 
The positive duty to promote justice gives agents moral reason to work together 
to overcome structural injustice through these sorts of organisation. Organising 
regulatory institutions to coordinate their action to avoid injustice is one way in 
which structural injustice can be prevented. Individuals can join existing 
organisations or create new organisations that aim at this purpose. Working with 
others to alter structures permanently and systematically offers individuals a 
means to overcoming structural injustice because it secures access to goods and 
income and therefore ends vulnerability. Furthermore, using regulatory 
institutions can allow people to fairly share out the costs of avoiding structural 
injustice.  
The possibility of working with others offers individuals the opportunity to make 
more of a difference. If successful, such action can maximise the efficiency of 
efforts to promote justice. If collective action to establish institutions that prevent 
the continuance of structural injustice works then the effort expended on 
establishing these institutions will have done more good than a similar amount of 
effort aimed at directly assisting those who suffer from structural injustice or 
working with organisations that aim to assist the victims of structural injustice.75 
Whether individuals have an obligation to develop such institutions will now be 
investigated. This is a difficult question because establishing such institutions 
requires collaboration between agents. It is not something that individuals can 
achieve alone. I will consider whether random collectives of individuals can be 
obliged to work together to achieve particular outcomes.  
Virginia Held has developed an account of how in some cases a random collection 
of individuals can be obliged to work together to prevent a tragedy. In her analysis 
Held draws on an example in which a group of bystanders could prevent a serious 
assault if they worked together. She suggests that in certain circumstances a 
                                                          
74
 Henry Shue in his account of obligations to fulfil human rights to subsistence suggests 
that obligations to protect individuals from having their basic rights violated can be 
fulfilled by establishing governing institutions that can coordinate action and fairly 
distribute the burdens of such action. He explains that there is a duty to develop and 
preserve such institutions (Shue, 1996, pp. 17, 54-62). 
75
 For this reason charitable organisations, like Oxfam, engage in lobbying governments 
and international institutions and trying to forge international agreements that improve 
the position of the global poor. By taking such action they aim to permanently alter 
structures as an effective means to preventing future suffering and deprivation 
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random collection of individuals must become a collective and take action to 
prevent a tragedy. Held’s account of the responsibilities of bystanders suggests 
that in the absence of organisations powerful enough to prevent a significant 
moral problem a random collection of individuals, who could form such an 
organisation, have an obligation to do just that. This organisation then has a 
positive duty to take action to prevent the problem (Held, 1970). Held’s account 
suggests that people have a responsibility to form such a collective in order to 
prevent suffering. She even suggests that this obligation is ‘distributive’ such that 
each member of the random collective has an obligation to work with others to 
establish a collective capable of preventing the problem (Held, 1970, pp. 475-
477).  
In a similar way, in the absence of the existence of an organisation with the ability 
to prevent structural injustice, otherwise seemingly unconnected collections of 
individuals could have an obligation to create such an organisation. Where there 
are no governing institutions capable of coordinating activity in such a way as to 
prevent an on-going structural injustice, those who could form such institutions 
could be obliged to form such an institution. Where the on-going structural 
injustice is significantly serious the duty to relieve suffering as well as the duty to 
promote justice will require such action. Each individual who could be part of an 
organisation that prevents structural injustice from continuing is obliged to work 
towards such an organisation. 
So far this analysis has suggested that in relation to global poverty there are not 
just individual duties of aid. There are also duties to work with others through 
existing collectives like charitable organisations to alleviate the suffering caused 
by structural injustice. Where there are no such charitable organisations agents 
can work together to establish such organisations. In addition to these duties I 
have proposed that there are obligations to work with others to establish and 
maintain governing institutions charged with preventing the continuance of 
structural injustice. Any such governing organisation must fulfil the demands of 
legitimacy in order to have the proper authority to systematically shape social 
structures. Where such governing organisations are absent individuals can work 
together to form an organisation capable of shaping social structures. However, 
any such organisations they create must meet the standards of legitimacy if they 
are to avoid illegitimately coercing others.  
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The analysis here suggests that individuals have positive obligations both to aid 
the victims of structural injustice and to work towards establishing a collective 
organisation capable of ending this injustice.76 If these institutions are successfully 
established aid will become unnecessary. However, whilst these institutions have 
not been fully established there will still be obligations to assist the victims of 
structural injustice directly. Thus, in many scenarios, individuals will have to split 
their efforts between campaigning for political change and providing direct 
assistance. 
Agents who are committed to charitable assistance efforts cannot argue that they 
have discharged their duties to promote justice by taking such action. This is 
because direct assistance efforts cannot secure social conditions in which agents 
are not vulnerable to deprivation or domination (as argued above). However, if 
the charitable organisation in question attempts to alter social structures 
permanently by lobbying governing institutions or establishing sustainable 
businesses their action becomes political and can count as promoting justice. In 
such circumstances such action cannot be distinguished from collective efforts to 
bring about just social structures.  
However, agents who take political action may claim that by doing so they 
discharge duties to relieve suffering as well as promote justice. Thus they may 
claim that by taking such action they fulfil obligations of assistance. However, it 
could be argued that such agents still have moral reason to assist the victims of 
structural injustice in the short term because it is unlikely that political efforts will 
be immediately successful. This argument relies on the idea that it is 
unreasonable to ignore an individual’s legitimate request for aid on the basis that 
one is trying to prevent others requiring aid in the future. Whether direct 
assistance is required in addition to political action will depend on whether this 
argument is successful.77 
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 Shue in his analysis of duties in relation to basic rights suggests that there are both 
duties to establish and maintain institutions that protect basic rights and duties to assist 
the victims of rights violations (Shue, 1996, pp. 59-63). 
77
 There is also a problem with claiming that one has fulfilled an obligation of assistance by 
attempting to relieve suffering. The success of political action is by no means certain. Thus 
although agents aim to relieve suffering in this way they cannot ensure suffering will be 
relieved. 
163 
 
Structural Injustice and Negative Duties 
Structural injustice is the result of human actions, practices, organisations and 
institutions. Those suffering are not only facing misfortune but suffering from 
injustice. They are not just in a situation that social institutions could alleviate, 
they are in a situation that is in an important sense socially caused (see chapter 3). 
The problems they suffer from are systematic, humanly caused and avoidable. 
The fact that their situation is the result of human actions, choices and capacities 
suggests that there may be negative duties on others in addition to the positive 
duties so far discussed. In cases where a potential problem is humanly caused 
there are often negative duties to refrain from continuing to cause the problem in 
addition to positive duties to avert the problem.  
Such negative duties arise because there is a moral obligation to avoid harming 
others. Agents are obliged to negotiate the world in such a way as to avoid 
illegitimately risking setting back the interests of others in certain ways. This relies 
on the idea that individuals are entitled to not have their interests harmed in 
particular ways (Ripstein, 2004, p. 377). For a harm to be prohibited it must be 
significant and a prohibition on causing the harm must not be reasonably 
rejectable. Thus, a balance must be struck between ensuring sufficient negative 
liberty and protecting people’s essential interests from damage by others.  
Structural injustice places sections of the population in social positions where they 
are vulnerable to being dominated or deprived in serious and significant ways 
relative to others. Thus, structural injustice significantly and seriously threatens 
the essential interests of those it places in inferior social positions. Individuals are 
entitled to having their basic needs fulfilled and to avoiding domination. The 
social positions structural injustice places agents in are by definition unjust: they 
cannot be justified in ways that those affected cannot reasonably reject. This 
suggests that if an agent is causally responsible for structural injustice there is a 
strong case for suggesting that they have violated the duty to avoid harming 
others. This is because the suffering structural injustice causes is significant and 
concerns people’s essential interests. This suffering cannot be outweighed by the 
interest agents have in avoiding excessive obligations. 
It could be that some agent or agents can be held responsible for the social 
structures that treat people unjustly. However, there is no individual who can be 
identified as causally responsible for structural injustice according to traditional 
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criteria. As discussed in Chapter 3, when there is one human factor that 
contributes to a state of affairs amongst a host of natural and predictable 
background factors we identify the human action as the cause. However, 
structural injustice results from the combination of a range of different actions 
and practices. Thus a causally responsible party cannot be isolated in this way. In 
cases where there are multiple human factors which contribute to a problem 
sometimes we can determine the morally responsible party by isolating those 
who, for example, intend to cause a particular result. However in typical cases of 
structural injustice no agent intends to bring about the injustice.  
A third way that a morally responsible party can be isolated is by identifying those 
contributing actors who do something unusual or violate an established norm. In 
these cases the other contributing factors can be considered as part of the natural 
background of the world. However, in the case of structural injustice it is 
impossible to isolate any contributor on the basis that they act unusually or 
violate an established norm. Hence, there is no clear basis for isolating a causally 
responsible individual. 
This means that no particular contribution to structural injustice can be identified 
as the cause of the problem and thus no individual can be identified as liable. 
Typically all that can be said of any particular individual is that they contribute to 
the unjust social structure. This suggests that individuals have a negative duty to 
avoid contributing to structural injustice. In some cases where harm results from 
the combined effect of many different actions agents have an obligation to avoid 
contributing to the harm. This is because the seriousness of the harm can 
reasonably justify prohibiting their contributions to it. If such a norm is followed, 
then significant suffering can be avoided without unreasonably inconveniencing 
anyone. The next section takes up the possibility of there being an obligation to 
avoid contributing to structural injustice. 
Individual Negative Duties 
There are many reasons to doubt that there is a general prohibition on 
contributions to structural injustice. In modern society it is likely that many of an 
agent’s actions make small contributions to structural injustice. This suggests that 
it may in fact be impossible for individuals entirely to avoid contributing to 
structural injustice across their lives. In fact, it is almost certain that all individuals 
have already made substantial contributions to continuing structural injustice. The 
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effects of actions and practices continue even after the acts or practices have 
finished (for example, when they permanently alter the physical landscape). This 
means that past actions can contribute to future structural injustices. Thus by the 
logic of ‘ought implies can’ there cannot be a duty to avoid all contributions to 
structural injustice if it is not possible to fulfil this duty. 
Individuals could try to avoid making any more contributions to structural 
injustice by withdrawing from social life so as to minimise their impact on others 
from now on. If such a strategy is possible it would require refraining from 
engaging in social life and living an isolated existence of self-sufficiency. However, 
such a life is unavailable to many who lack the resources or opportunities to take 
up such a difficult project. Worse still, those who do adopt the life of a hermit may 
still fail to avoid contributing to structural injustice. This is because they will still 
have an impact on the local and global environment which will affect the social 
position of others. The hermit could take precautions to off-set any use of 
resources or emissions to combat this problem. However, by utilising land and 
resources they will still be preventing others from using or consuming them. Thus 
they will still have some effect on the position of others. In theory it may be 
possible to live off the land in a way that does not have any impact on the social 
position of others. This could be by making sure that the land is still open to use 
by others and that its person supporting capacity is not diminished by their 
actions. 
There are moral and prudential reasons that speak against taking action to avoid 
contribution to social structures. These reasons, coupled with the fact that 
refraining to contribute will do little or no good towards preventing the problem, 
suggest that it is unreasonable and unwise to demand such action.  
Cooperating with others can be highly beneficial to both parties. Individuals can 
gain from trades and can enrich their lives through valuable interactions. Thus, 
adopting the life of a hermit is demanding because it involves forgoing such 
benefits. Such isolation deprives an individual of community and company which 
are essential human interests. Becoming a hermit to avoid contribution would be 
extremely costly as it would seriously restrict one’s opportunities and likely 
damage one’s wellbeing. It is unreasonable to demand agents take such action in 
the circumstances, especially when these contributions are required to maintain 
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their livelihood or to fulfil their other obligations. Furthermore, it is unlikely that 
agents will be motivated to fulfil such a demanding duty.78 
In addition, those suffering from vulnerability to deprivation might lose rather 
than gain from affluent individuals withdrawing from social life because they 
would lose the opportunity of benefiting through trade or other interactions. In 
many cases even exploitative interaction is better than none at all. The desperate 
neediness of some individuals means that even exploitative trades or work 
arrangements can benefit them. Thus, by withdrawing from interactions agents 
may actually worsen the position of those suffering from structural injustice. This 
provides a moral reason in support of continued interaction. 
Finally, the moral reasons in favour of such a prohibition are relatively weak 
because refraining from making a contribution to structural injustice will not 
prevent the harm from taking place and will make no significant difference to the 
seriousness of the problem. Hence, there are significant reasons to doubt that 
agents have a moral duty always to avoid making contributions to structural 
injustice. 
Negative Duties and Collective Action 
Above it was argued that no individual can be identified as liable for structural 
injustice. Perhaps instead we should consider whether the group of all those who 
contribute to social structures can be held liable for injustices within those 
structures. It might be that those who contribute to a social structure are 
collectively liable for injustices within that structure; after all it is this group 
together that creates the social structure which is unjust.  
One difficulty with holding contributors as a group responsible is that it is not 
clear that this sort of group can be held responsible for their acts or omissions. It 
is unlikely that just any set of individuals can share responsibility for what they 
collectively cause. It is more plausible that a set of agents can only be held so 
responsible when they fulfil some sort of criteria. In her account of collective 
responsibility, Tracy Isaacs defines two sorts of collective that can be held 
responsible for their actions. These sorts of collective can potentially be held 
liable for what they cause because they are capable of taking action. The first sort 
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 In his account of obligations in relation to basic rights, Henry Shue suggests that in some 
cases where harm is the result of a number of human actions coming together it is 
unrealistic to insist agents refrain from such actions (Shue, 1996, p. 43). 
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of collective Isaacs discusses is an organisation. Individuals knowingly join 
organisations and act to further the organisation’s goals. These organisations have 
decision making mechanisms which determine the goals and strategies of the 
organisation (Isaacs, 2011, pp. 23-25).  
Some of the factors that contribute to structural injustices are the acts of 
governments, corporations and other organisations. However, structural injustice 
occurs when a variety of actors (organisations and individuals) contribute to a 
situation in which agents face unjustifiable constraint and occupy a social position 
that cannot be justified. Hence, no particular organisation is causally responsible 
for structural injustice. 
To see this consider again the case of women in export processing zones who 
work for poverty wages in poor conditions. These women accept work at factories 
that supplies the global apparel industry. They usually work for a local 
manufacturing organisation. However, this organisation cannot be held 
responsible for their plight. This organisation is a group of people with shared 
aims and shared decision making structures. It provides the women with work. 
This offer of work is taken up because it offers a means to a better situation. The 
organisation does not harm these women by offering them work, rather it 
benefits them. Thus, the organisation cannot be held responsible for harming the 
women by causing their vulnerability to deprivation and domination. The 
vulnerability of these women is the result of a multitude of social and economic 
factors that are beyond the control of the organisation for which they work.79 
The organisation cannot be held responsible for the situation of its workforce in 
which the employees must choose to continue working for low pay and long 
hours. Nor can it be held responsible for the fact that it cannot offer decent 
wages, conditions and hours without going bust. The organisations works within a 
very competitive environment where it will not receive orders from apparel TNCs 
unless it can keep costs down. The women who work in these factories suffer 
from a social structure that places them in a position where they have few 
opportunities and their lives are vulnerable to exploitation and deprivation. The 
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 This does not mean that the organisation is exempt from criticism. All it means is that 
the organisation is not responsible for the structural injustice from which these women 
suffer. By allowing sexual harassment within factories, restricting toilet visits and 
demanding unpaid overtime this organisation is guilty of not treating its workforce 
decently. However this organisation cannot be held fully responsible for the poor pay that 
they offer.  
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problem is one of structural injustice. This injustice is contributed to by factors 
that are both local and global. However, no particular organisation is causally 
responsible for this structure. 
The other example of a morally responsible collective which Isaacs highlights is a 
‘goal orientated collective’. A goal orientated collective is a group of individuals 
with a collective goal. All those who share in this goal are part of the collective. 
The goal is essentially collective because the individuals intend to do something 
with others; usually something they cannot achieve alone. Goal orientated 
collectives need not have a formal decision making procedure or extensive 
organisation. All that is required is that they have a shared collective intention and 
that they alter their individual actions to be responsive to the actions of others 
(Isaacs, 2011, pp. 23-25). 
Those who contribute to structural injustice do not intend to take part in any 
collective project encompassing all contributors. The group in question does not 
share a collective goal the pursuit of which causes harm. Each contributor is 
consumed with a variety of individual and collective projects none of which 
includes all contributors to structural injustice and none of which is causally 
responsible for structural injustices. Some contributors to the structure are 
intentionally engaged in complex collective practices. However, no single practice 
or shared activity is responsible for the social position of vulnerability to 
deprivation that characterises structural injustice. Structural injustice is not a 
collective enterprise or the foreseeable result of any particular collective 
enterprise. The group of all those who contribute to structural injustice have no 
shared goal. Hence they cannot be identified as a goal orientated collective. 
Without some form of organisation or shared collective goal, contributors to 
structural injustice are just a set of individuals. They are in no sense a collective 
that takes action. Therefore, it appears that the concept of collective causal 
responsibility cannot be applied in such cases. Rather each individual contributes 
marginally to structural injustice; they each make a small contribution to an 
aggregate of actions which causes the injustice.  
Structural injustice is the result of the aggregation of human actions. The 
vulnerability to deprivation and domination experienced by those who suffer from 
structural injustice is part of a social structure that is humanly caused and could 
be otherwise. Although those who contribute to structural injustice are not part 
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of an organisation or collective that can be held directly liable for causing that 
injustice, the fact that they contribute to the problem is relevant to the 
obligations they have in relation to it. Those who contribute to social structural 
injustice are not perpetrators of injustice but nor are they innocent third parties 
who have only positive duties. 
Essentially Aggregative Harm  
To recap, the group of individuals that contribute to a social structural injustice 
are not a collective that can take action and be held morally responsible for the 
results of that action. These individuals can be identified as a set only because 
they all contribute to the social structure or structural injustice. This makes them 
an aggregate rather than an organisation or a group of individuals engaged in a 
shared project.  
 Structural injustice is an essentially aggregative problem because it is the result of 
the aggregation of a number of independent actions. Harm can be classified as 
essentially aggregative when it results from the combined efforts of various 
uncoordinated acts and is not instantiated (even in a minimal form) by any of its 
sources. Harm is essentially aggregative when the suffering is caused by a number 
of individual acts and the suffering would not have occurred as a result of any one 
of those acts if it were performed in circumstances where the other contributing 
acts did not occur.80 
Essentially aggregative harms are interesting for several reasons. Unlike regular 
harms no agent (either a collective agent or individual person) is morally 
responsible for the harm caused. Essentially aggregative harms can occur even 
when every actor’s actions are impeccable when considered in isolation.81 Yet, it 
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 For an instance of harm to be classified as essentially aggregative it need not be the case 
that the acts in question do not make a significant difference to the amount of essentially 
aggregative harm done. However, if it is the case that harm is significantly increased by 
the number of actors involved there may be moral obligations not to contribute. 
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 Judith Lichtenberg distinguishes essentially aggregative harms from aggregative harms 
which are made up of individual acts that are wrong in themselves (Lichtenberg, 2010, p. 
568). However, it is possible that several actions which are wrong in themselves 
contribute to a different harm which is more than the sum of its parts. For example 
hunting an animal to extinction is an aggregative harm. Suppose that each act of hunting is 
wrong in itself. This fact would not change the fact that causing extinction is an essentially 
aggregative harm. This is because the wrong that is causing an animal to become extinct is 
distinct from the wrong that is hunting. Hunting an animal to extinction has significance 
beyond killing a large number of animals; it is more than the sum of its constituent acts. 
Hence, even if hunting is wrong in itself, hunting to extinction can be considered an 
essentially aggregative harm. However, the interesting forms of essentially aggregative 
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would be wrong to treat an essentially aggregative harm as simply a misfortune. 
Structural injustice will not occur unless a set of people act in a particular way. 
The aggregate that contributes to a structural injustice causes the injustice even if 
there is no collective actor who can be held morally responsible for that injustice. 
This makes it difficult to assess these scenarios normatively. How to deal with 
cases like these is an important question in moral philosophy. 
Some of the acts that contribute to structural injustice may be wrong when 
considered in isolation. However, structural injustice is an essentially different 
harm to the harm of any wrongful act which contributes to the overall injustice. 
For example, the widespread consumption of sweatshop produced goods by 
consumers in affluent countries is a significant part of social practice that 
contributes to the social structure that places sweatshop workers in an 
unjustifiable situation. Any particular purchase is therefore a contribution to the 
social conditions faced by these workers. Such purchases contribute to a global 
social structure which places some individuals in positions of extreme 
disadvantage (both relative to others and in absolute terms). These individuals 
(among them those who labour in sweatshops) suffer from the sort of systematic 
disadvantage Young identifies as structural injustice. 
It could be argued that purchasing shoes produced in sweatshop is wrong because 
it involves taking unfair advantage of an injustice. Judith Lichtenburg gives buying 
products made in exploitative conditions as an example of an act which is wrong 
in itself and not a contribution to an essentially aggregative harm (Lichtenberg, 
2010, pp. 9-10). Similarly, on Thomas Pogge’s account (Pogge, 2005, p. 72), 
purchasing the shoes is an act in which an individual profits from injustice. 
However the wrong of profiting from exploitation is distinct from the structural 
injustice to which it contributes. Structural injustice is not simply the sum of many 
acts of exploitation. Rather, it is the sum of acts, laws, institutions and trends 
which make exploitation possible and in some cases unavoidable.  
Having identified structural injustice as an essentially aggregative harm, I will now 
proceed to discuss the moral reasons agents have to be concerned with alleviating 
essentially aggregative harms. All agents have humanity based reasons to alleviate 
essentially aggregative harms. It is well established that individuals have moral 
                                                                                                                                                   
harms are ones in which the actions are not wrong in themselves because these cases 
pose a dilemma as to whether contributing actions should be avoided.  
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reason to improve the wellbeing of others in difficulty. Individuals have 
humanitarian obligations to benefit others. One way in which they can benefit 
others is by assisting those who suffer from essentially aggregative harms. 
Positive obligations to assist the victims of structural injustice and promote 
structural justice have been discussed at length above. 
Alternatively agents could assist others by preventing essentially aggregative 
harms.82 The idea that individuals who are potential contributors to an essentially 
aggregative harm have an additional moral reason to try to prevent its occurrence 
is intuitively appealing. Judith Lichtenberg argues that it is prima facie plausible 
that a causal connection to a problem gives an additional moral reason to be 
concerned with resolving it (Lichtenberg, 2010). In the following section possible 
explanations for why a causal connection to an essentially aggregative harm can 
ground an additional moral reason to address that problem are explored. 
The Negative Duties of Aggregates 
There may be cases where a collection of individuals have not got a collective goal 
or formed an organisation and yet they can be held liable. Unlike organisations or 
collectives an aggregate does not form intentions or shared goals and it does not 
take action in pursuit of those goals. However, this does not necessarily mean that 
an aggregate cannot be held liable for causing a problem.  
There are cases in which an agent can be held liable for things that they do not 
intend to cause. An agent (individual or organisation) can unintentionally cause 
harm but remain liable for the consequences. This is because it is reasonable to 
demand that the agent negotiates background conditions in such a way as to 
avoid harm to others. Thus, in some circumstances, we can hold the agent liable 
for what is caused whether intended or not. This shows that there can be liability 
in the absence of intention. It is worth investigating whether aggregates, despite 
their lack of shared intentions, can be held liable in a similar way. It could be that 
we can hold aggregates responsible because they could reasonably have been 
expected to avoid the outcome by forming a collective and taking action. In this 
section I will explore such a possibility. 
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 Standing with others and offering protection from essentially aggregative harm as part 
of a reciprocal arrangement of mutual support could be another moral reason to justify a 
demand to assist. In the absence of such a scheme there may be an obligation to enter 
into one. However, such solidarity based obligations are not explored in this thesis. For 
discussions of obligations of solidarity and injustice see (Gould, 2004) (Gould, 2007) (Sholz, 
2008). 
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Aggregates do not have intentions so they cannot be found liable for something 
on the basis that they intend to cause it. Usually we cannot expect aggregates to 
negotiate the background environment because they lack the organisational 
mechanisms to do so. However, aggregates can become collectives or 
organisations and take action. In certain extreme circumstances we could demand 
an aggregate become a collective or organisation so as to avoid aggregative harm 
or to perform an emergency rescue. However, this is a fairly demanding request 
that could only be reasonable in circumstances where the threat is reasonably 
serious. As a result it can only be justified in scenarios where the threatened harm 
is significantly serious. An aggregate is required to take such action in cases where 
the action is required to prevent their causing a serious, avoidable and 
foreseeable harm. In these cases members of an aggregate have an obligation to 
form a collective and the collective has an obligation to avoid the harm. In such 
cases, if the aggregate fails to organise into a collective and avoid the problem, 
the aggregate could attract blame precisely because they should have organised 
to become a collective and avoided the harm. In these cases the individual 
members of the aggregate do not just fail to perform a rescue, they fail to act 
responsibly so as to avoid causing, or risking, harm. They are not merely 
bystanders who could have prevented a tragedy; they are contributors to the 
tragedy who should have organised to avoid causing it.  
As previously discussed, Virginia Held has argued that in certain circumstances a 
random collection of individuals can be expected to work together to prevent 
harm (Held, 1970). She uses examples where the harm threatened is serious and 
the required action is obvious to the reasonable person (Held, 1970). Held’s 
account is interesting and plausible. The circumstances Held identifies are ones in 
which bystanders can prevent a tragedy if they work together. Thus, she identifies 
that in certain circumstances aggregates can have a positive duty to act and 
individuals can have a positive duty to work with others to prevent a tragedy. 
Held’s account goes as far as to suggest that in some cases where members of an 
aggregate fail to work together to prevent a tragedy they are guilty of an 
omission: they fail to fulfil a required positive duty. She states that when the 
action called for is obvious to the reasonable person and the expected outcome is 
clearly favourable, the collection of individuals may be held responsible for not 
taking collective action (Held, 1970, pp. 475-477). 
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Held’s account shows that it can be reasonable to demand an aggregate organise 
in certain circumstances. Held restricts her discussion to considering cases where 
an aggregate could prevent some given independent harm. But, the argument can 
be expanded to cover cases where an aggregate causes harm. The discussion 
above suggests that under certain circumstances aggregates can be reasonably 
expected to form a collective and thereby avoid causing aggregative harm. In 
these cases the aggregate may be held liable for the harm because they could 
reasonably be expected to avoid it by working together as an organisation. 
This account could be applied to cases of serious and uncontroversial structural 
injustice. An aggregate can be held liable for an essentially aggregative harm 
when they could reasonably be expected to form a collective so as to avoid the 
problem.83 This suggests that in cases of structural injustices the aggregate who 
contributes to the injustice (understood as contribute to the position an agent or 
group faces) could be held liable for the injustice on the basis that they should 
have formed a collective and prevented the structural injustice from occurring. 
Thus, members of an aggregate that is otherwise likely to cause a serious 
aggregative harm have an obligation to work towards forming a collective capable 
of preventing the harm.  
Those who currently contribute to structural injustice could avoid future 
contributions by forming a collective and acting together to regulate behaviour or 
alter practices so as to avoid structural injustice. Any individual acting unilaterally 
has very few choices and could do very little to overcome structural injustice. 
However, by forming a collective they can prevent the injustice from occurring or 
continuing. Aggregates have an obligation to form a collective in order to avoid 
serious aggregative harms such as structural injustice. This obligation is 
distributable such that all individuals who contribute to an on-going or potential 
structural injustice have an obligation to work towards establishing a collective 
capable of ending that injustice. However, the demand to avoid illegitimately 
imposing one’s will on others requires that individuals must establish a collective 
that is legitimate and thus has the right to regulate behaviour and impose 
sanctions. If this action is successfully pursued the members of the aggregate can 
avoid causing structural injustice and thereby avoid violating a negative duty. 
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 The liability of individual members of an organisation, group pursuing a shared goal or 
aggregate who contribute to an essentially aggregative harm, is a further question. 
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Whether the proposed obligation is a positive or negative duty is a difficult 
question to answer. Each member of the aggregate who together cause an on-
going structural injustice has an obligation to take positive action to work towards 
establishing a collective. They must do this so as to fulfil their positive duty to 
promote justice. However, the fact that they will otherwise contribute to 
structural injustice provides an additional reason for them to take such action. 
Members of the aggregate must take positive action to establish a collective that 
can prevent aggregative harm as part of their duty to avoid harming others. If 
they fail to take this action they will contribute to aggregative harm and they will 
be part of an aggregate liable for causing structural injustice.84 
It seems odd to suggest that individuals must take action to avoid violating 
negative duties. However we often take positive actions to avoid causing harm. 
These actions are known as precautions. Responsible individuals take precautions 
in order to avoid causing harm to others. 
Taking Precautions 
Obligations to avoid harming others sometimes require that individuals take 
action prior to, or during engagement in, a risky activity in order to reduce the risk 
of the activity causing harm to others. For example, those wishing to conduct 
firework displays are required to take certain precautions in order to avoid 
causing harm to others. Being responsible requires that agents take these 
precautions. This example shows that the obligation to avoid harming others 
sometimes requires ex-ante precautionary action.  
Action that aims at alleviating structural injustice through coordinated change can 
reduce the likelihood and severity of structural injustices. Thus such actions could 
be seen as reasonable precautions that those who contribute to social structures 
must take. In times of grievous structural injustice informed and targeted 
campaigning or organising can make structures more just. In times of more minor 
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 My analysis of obligations to take precautions to avoid structural injustice has revealed 
that the distinction between positive and negative duties is somewhat artificial at the 
collective level. Fulfilling negative duties is a matter of avoiding what we can reasonably 
be expected to avoid, whereas positive duties are a matter of doing what we can 
reasonably be expected to do. However, when it comes to the socially caused avoiding 
essentially aggregative harm requires taking collective action. Fulfilling a negative duty to 
avoid essentially aggregative harm requires taking action to create a collective. The 
distinction between avoiding harm and doing good dissolves to a certain extent. This is 
because taking positive action to form a collective enables an aggregate to avoid causing 
harm. 
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structural injustice such efforts can prevent future structural injustices by 
overcoming them. Both sorts of action can be understood as a precaution against 
future contribution to structural injustice.  
As previously discussed, it is unreasonable to ask individuals not to contribute at 
all to structural injustice and there are moral reasons for them to continue to 
contribute to social structures. However, these reasons do not speak against 
trying to establish collective solutions that prevent the continuance of structural 
injustice. I am proposing that one has an obligation to do what can be reasonably 
demanded to prevent one’s action contributing to an essentially aggregative 
harm. In the case of structural injustice this requires taking action together with 
others to form a collective to prevent structural injustice. 
In cases of structural injustice where ending contributions directly is unreasonably 
demanding, and morally suboptimal, potential contributors to aggregative harm 
should make efforts to form a collective and prevent the harm that may otherwise 
result from the aggregation of their actions. By working together agents can agree 
on a scheme and adopt an enforcement mechanism that provides reasonable 
assurance that structural injustice will be avoided. Taking action of this kind will 
reduce to an acceptable level the risk of structural injustice resulting from the 
aggregation of their actions. 
Taking a precaution is never guaranteed to prevent one’s actions causing harm. In 
the case of a fireworks display there remains a risk of injury. The precautions 
taken aim to reduce the risk of injury to an acceptable level. Similarly, efforts to 
establish a collective charged with preventing future structural injustice will only 
reduce the risk of future structural injustice. They do not guarantee that all 
structural injustice will be overcome. 
Acting responsibly to avoid harm encompasses more than simply taking 
precautions. It is also involves maintaining an awareness of the world around us 
and the likely consequences of our actions. Moving responsibly in the world 
requires an awareness of background conditions and the likely consequences of 
particular actions. This knowledge is required to avoid harmful actions, negotiate 
background conditions, and take necessary precautions. An awareness of 
aggregative harm should lead us to look out for potential aggregative harms and 
organise with others so as to be able to avoid them. Individuals who live in a 
shared social environment and have an indirect impact on the social position 
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faced by others will inevitably contribute to structural injustices unless they 
establish agencies charged with avoiding this sort of injustice. Responsible 
individuals must work towards establishing such agencies. Once they are 
established they must obey and support these agencies. However their 
obligations do not end here. They must also look out for potential structural 
injustices, raise awareness of these problems and hold their agencies to account if 
they fail to address them. This is an obligatory part of moving responsibly through 
the world and avoiding harming others. In a shared environment where humans 
interact individuals must be socially responsible and this requires these actions. 
Individuals must monitor social structures and draw attention to structural 
injustices. They must support governing institutions that are collectives capable of 
preventing structural injustice. They should draw attention to any failures to 
address structural injustice and work with others to encourage these institutions 
to respond. If these institutions are regularly unresponsive they may need to be 
reformed or replaced. Where this is the case, individuals must form a collective 
with others to achieve this goal. The populations who are ruled by institutions 
must form a vague collective known as a public in order to hold these institutions 
to account. This public can identify injustices and work together to prevent them 
by pressuring the government to take action.  
In cases where there is no governing organisation capable of ending the structural 
injustice, individuals have an obligation to reform institutions so that these 
institutions gain this capacity or forge new institutions through collective action. 
Social movements are a means through which individuals can build or reform 
governing institutions. Where such movements are absent, agents must work 
together to establish them. 
Problem: Who is Included in the Aggregate? 
In this final section of the chapter I will head off some potential criticisms of the 
obligation to take precautions to lessen the chance of contributing to structural 
injustice. It has been suggested that members of the aggregate who are 
contributors to structural injustice must try to organise a collective of aggregate 
members and take action aimed at preventing the continuance of structural 
injustice. Such a collective could create or form governing agencies that regulate 
and coordinate behaviour to end structural injustice. However, it is not clear how 
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to identify who to include in the aggregate who contribute to structural injustice. 
This problem will now be explored. 
In cases of structural injustice a range of humanly caused factors come together 
to place a group (or groups) at a significant disadvantage. Any individual 
contribution to any one of these factors is very unlikely to make the situation any 
worse. Thus if contributors to a problem are identified by their particular 
contribution making the problem worse, no such individuals can be identified. 
This is an unsatisfactory state of affairs because these are problems that are 
humanly caused. In response to this difficulty it is legitimate to develop an 
alternative way to identify contributors.85 
Designating which individuals should be considered members of the aggregate 
that together cause structural injustice is a difficult task. There is a general 
problem with identifying agents who can be held responsible for causing 
aggregative harms. Accounts of responsibility become more complex where no 
individual’s action is necessary or sufficient for causing a problem. Where no 
individual’s marginal contribution makes a problem better or worse the difficulty 
is further amplified. It is a difficult philosophical puzzle to establish how we 
identify who is to be included in an aggregate responsible for a particular 
problem. Derek Parfit has discussed this problem at length (Parfit, 1986, pp. 67-
86).  
It is not enough to say that a particular aggregate is responsible if the problem 
would not have occurred had members of the group not taken the actions they 
did. This is because such an approach allows the adding of individuals at random 
to the aggregate: it places no limit on who may be included. To see this, consider 
the following grisly example of aggregative harm. Imagine a case in which an 
unconscious patient is in a hospital room attached to a life support machine. 
Many doctors within the hospital are faced with patients desperately in need of a 
blood transplant. During the night a number of different doctors sneak in to the 
room and take a pint of blood from the unconscious patient. The next day the 
patient dies. Now consider who is responsible for the death. No single doctor’s 
                                                          
85
 Altering the means by which we identify the contributors in order to hold agents 
responsible for aggregative harm may seem an illegitimate move. However, the way we 
determine causal responsibility is complex and not purely based on the physical facts. 
Agents are held responsible for outcomes when they act in ways we can reasonably 
demand that they avoid. If we can reasonably expect individuals to form collectives to 
avoid suffering, then we can hold them responsible if they fail to do so. 
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actions were sufficient to kill the patient. All of the doctors act unusually and none 
of their actions belong to what are described above as normal background 
conditions. Although we may say that all the doctors’ behaviour was 
impermissible it is not clear that any individual can be held responsible for the 
death. Instead it may be better to consider a group of people responsible for the 
death. If we just choose a group whose actions together are sufficient to kill the 
patient membership of that group is unlimited. Within that group could be 
included randomly selected individuals like John Travolta or Eric Pickles. Even with 
these additional members the group still meets the condition that their actions 
are sufficient to kill the patient. Thus there needs to be some way of limiting who 
may be included in the group responsible for the death.  
The problem of how to identify who should be included in the aggregate who 
contribute to an essentially aggregative harm will be discussed in detail in Chapter 
8. For now, the argument need only rely on the idea that some individual’s actions 
are clearly causally relevant to an outcome whereas another’s are not. Where an 
agent participates in a practice, or contributes to a trend, or supports an 
institution or collective that in turn contributes to structural injustice, they can be 
considered a contributor to that structural injustice. 
In real life there are epistemic problems with determining whether a given 
individual contributes to a trend or supports an organisation or institution that 
contributes to a particular structural injustice. This means that any individual can 
never be sure that they have not contributed to any given structural injustice. 
Given this uncertainty, being responsible requires forming or joining a collective 
and then acting with others to end any structural injustices that threaten to 
emerge. This is best done by establishing political institutions and working with 
others to monitor them for responsiveness and justice. In this way individuals take 
action that is likely to prevent them from being a member of the liable group. It 
also allows them to ensure they do not free ride on the efforts of others to avoid 
structural injustice.86 
The precautions individuals who live in a social environment must take are 
precautions to avoid being within an aggregate responsible for structural injustice. 
Once a collective is formed and structural injustice has been avoided no one will 
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contribute to structural injustice. In such conditions agents may be obliged, by 
fairness, to join the collective and take on their fair share of the burden of 
preventing structural injustice. Members of the collective are obliged to ensure it 
continues to prevent structural injustice and help support and maintain the 
collective, ensure it is fair and legitimate, and act as required by the collective. If 
such a collective has been formed and yet structural injustice remains members of 
that collective are obliged to work together to prevent this continuing. In these 
conditions non-members of the collective who contribute to social structures 
must join the collective and work towards lessening structural injustice as a 
precaution to avoid contributing to that injustice. That is, unless the collective is 
acting in a radically unjust way or is illegitimate, in which case they are obliged to 
work towards establishing an alternative collective. If no justice promoting 
collective has been formed, agents must make efforts to form such a collective as 
a precaution to prevent being a member of the group of actors whose actions are 
sufficient to cause structural injustice. 
All individuals have positive duties to organise to establish a just regime that 
prevents structural injustice as part of their positive duty to promote justice. 
However, it is significant that contributing to a structural injustice grounds an 
additional reason to take this action. By fulfilling this positive duty, potential 
contributors also fulfil their duty to take reasonable precautions to avoid 
contributing to foreseeable essentially aggregative harm. An individual will almost 
certainly contribute to structural injustice unless a regime is established to 
identify structural injustices and coordinate behaviour to avoid them. The 
epistemic situation means that all those who contribute to a social structure must 
work towards forming a collective and that collective must try to prevent 
structural injustice. This is required as a precaution to avoid contributing to 
structural injustice as well as being required by a positive obligation to promote 
justice. 
Problem: Can there be Unavoidable Precautions? 
One objection that could be formulated against the obligation to take precautions 
to avoid contributing to structural injustice is that it is unfair to demand agents 
take precautions when they have not chosen to take part in a risky activity. Since 
agents cannot avoid contributing to structural injustice they cannot avoid the 
obligation to take precautions. In the fireworks example it is justifiable to demand 
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those who put on fireworks displays take precautions to avoid harming others. 
These individuals choose to put on such displays and can avoid the costs of taking 
precautions by not putting on such displays. However, because individuals cannot 
avoid contributing to social structures there is no way that they can avoid the 
obligation to take precautions. It could be argued that it is simply implausible that 
agents can have unavoidable precautionary obligations of this kind because it is 
unfair to demand agents take costly precautions in cases where they cannot avoid 
the risky activities in question.87 
The demand to take a precaution could be interpreted as a special obligation that 
applies to an agent in virtue of the risky activities they choose to participate in. 
Special obligations are demands that can be made of agents on the basis of roles 
they take on, agreements they make or relationships they form. Agents can avoid 
these obligations by not entering into these relationships, not taking on these 
roles, or not making these agreements. In contrast, general obligations are ones 
that fall on all people by virtue of their being moral persons.  
Intuitively, it is unfair arbitrarily to burden some individuals with more obligations 
than others. Thus assigning special obligations must be done on the basis of some 
morally significant factor. In most cases this factor is the choices an agent has 
made. This is the case where an individual has special obligations as a result of 
contracts, relationships or roles they have taken on. In other cases agents have 
extra duties because of the activities they choose to engage in. For example, when 
individuals take part in risky activities they gain special duties to take precautions 
to avoid harming others. The justification for making the demand that agents take 
these precautions is as follows: the agent has chosen to undertake some action 
which is only permissible when they take precautions. Thus they have through 
their choices become liable for the costs of such precautions. It could be argued 
that it is only reasonable to demand individuals take precautions where they 
could avoid these costs by making different choices.88 The intuition behind the 
claim that persons do not have obligations in relation to unavoidable 
contributions to structural injustice is that it is unfair to make extra demands of 
particular agents on the basis of states of affairs they could not have avoided. The 
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idea is that an agent should not have greater burdens to carry as a result of bad 
luck rather than their own choices. 
However, in the case of precautionary obligations to minimise the risk of 
contributing to structural injustice particular agents are not being singled out for 
additional obligations. Rather, these obligations fall on all individuals. This is 
because all individuals contribute to social structures simply by living their lives.89 
Thus, the obligation to take precautions to lessen the risk of contributing to 
structural injustice is one that falls on all individuals. It is not an obligation that 
singles out some unfortunate individuals for additional duties that they cannot 
avoid. Thus it does not unfairly burden some people compared to others in an 
unreasonable manner.  
It could be argued that it is still unreasonable to expect individuals to take 
precautionary obligations because they cannot avoid these obligations even if 
these obligations fall on all people. However, not taking precautions in these 
cases would be unreasonable because it would lead to a situation in which some 
individuals suffer from structural injustice. Not tackling structural injustice would 
be unreasonable to those who suffer as a result of it.  
However, in reply it could be said that the reasonable demand to make efforts to 
prevent structural injustice should be made on the basis of ability to help rather 
than contribution to the problem. In response to such a claim what must be 
explained is that there are positive obligations that fall on all people to alleviate 
structural injustice in order to promote justice and avoid suffering. However, it 
seems disingenuous to identify obligations as purely positive when they are 
obligations to prevent a problem to which the individual will contribute (if the 
problem is not averted). This is true even if the individual cannot avoid 
contributing to social structures and thus cannot avoid the precautionary 
obligation. To describe these obligations as purely positive would be to treat such 
problems as unfortunate circumstances that could be addressed rather than 
humanly caused problems to which individuals themselves contribute. Thus it is 
more accurate to identify negative duties in addition to positive duties. 
The objection to obligations related to unavoidable precautions may work better 
against the general duty to take precautions to avoid contributing to essentially 
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aggregative harm outlined in this chapter. In many cases of essentially aggregative 
harm only an identifiable group of people contribute to the harm. In these cases it 
could be argued that it is unfair to burden this sub-sector with precautionary 
duties. However, when it comes to essentially aggregative harms it is usually the 
case that contributors can avoid such precautionary obligations by avoiding 
contributing to the potential problem. Thus, in these cases the precautions are 
avoidable and thus the objection does not apply.  
There may be some incidences of essentially aggregative harm to which 
contributors cannot individually avoid contributing, but to which not all 
individuals contribute. In these cases it may be unreasonable to demand that 
contributors take precautionary obligations. This is because in such cases some 
individuals shoulder greater moral burdens for reasons they cannot avoid. 
Methane is a significant contributor to greenhouse gas. Through no fault of their 
own a proportion of the human population produces methane in their 
flatulence.90 This methane represents a threat to the well-being of all because it is 
a green-house gas that contributes to climate change. However, intuitively it 
would be unfair to demand that those who produce methane in this way must do 
more to prevent climate change than other people. However, the duty proposed 
here recommends that in such circumstances methane producers have an 
additional negative duty to take precautions to avoid causing climate change. This 
operates in addition to the positive duties all people have to work together to 
prevent problematic climate change and their negative duties to take precautions 
to avoid contributing to climate change through burning fuel. 
There is something morally problematic about demanding more from those who 
through no fault of their own produce methane in this way. However, the moral 
reasons against such demands are not decisive.  In many cases it is not 
unreasonable to demand more from some individuals than others in cases where 
they cannot effectively avoid these extra burdens. Often complying with negative 
duties is more burdensome for some rather than others. For example those who 
have a tendency to be aggressive and are quick to temper may find it burdensome 
to avoid physically assaulting others. They cannot avoid this additional burden and 
have not chosen to have it. The additional burdens such individuals face are 
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unfortunate. They may even be to some extent unfair. However, this is not 
grounds for rejecting the negative obligation in question. In cases where morality 
burdens some more than others, through no choice of their own, it may be 
possible for others to alleviate this burden to some extent. In these cases there is 
likely to be a positive obligation to do so out of fairness. However, this does not 
mean that those with heavier burdens do not have the burdensome negative duty 
in question. 
Likewise, in some cases positive duties of rescue can be more burdensome on 
some rather than others. Some people come across needy people in need of 
rescue more often than others. This means that fulfilling a general duty of rescue 
is more burdensome for them than it is for those who never come across others in 
need of rescue. Often these people cannot avoid being in a position where they 
can rescue others. The burdensomeness of fulfilling their duty is unfortunate and 
there may be positive duties on those less burdened to compensate these 
individuals. However, it does not mean that there cannot be such a positive duty. 
The general duty to take precautions to avoid contributing to essentially 
aggregative harm – like the two duties described above – may demand more of 
some than others. There may be a duty of fairness on those who are not overly 
burdened to compensate or assist those who are. However, this does not mean 
that there is no duty to take precautions to lessen the chance of contributing to 
essentially aggregative harm. 
Problem: Is it Wise to Regulate Social Structures? 
The account proposed so far suggests that populations should mould their social 
structures to ensure that social injustice is avoided. The account has suggested 
that there is a remedial responsibility on contributors to ensure that their social 
structure navigates normal background conditions to avoid placing agents in 
unjustifiable positions of disadvantage. F A Hayek has written a series of books 
criticising approaches that seek to achieve social justice through institutional 
intervention. He argues that people should not collectively organise to mould and 
shape their social environment so as to fit particular ideals. Hayek objects to any 
approach that he sees as trying to make collective life rational and which rests on 
a conception of society as a large organisation. He believes any approach of this 
kind is fundamentally flawed. Hayek’s criticism is extensive and contains several 
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inter-connected strands. I engage below with some of the central arguments of 
these strands (Hayek, 1982). 
Hayek suggests that many or the norms, patterns and trends that determine social 
life are the result of social evolution rather than conscious planning (Hayek, 1982, 
vol. 1, p. 8). These practices spring up randomly or because someone changes 
their actions and others follow suit (Hayek, 1982,vol. 2. p. 26). These outcomes 
often benefit from widely dispersed knowledge and efforts. They survive because 
those societies that contain them do better (Hayek, 1982, vol. 2, P. 15). Hayek 
suggests that these practices can achieve better outcomes than those that are 
likely to result from intentional organisation (Hayek, 1982, vol. 2, p. 30). 
Hayek attacks a sort of rationalist philosophy that seeks a justification for social 
practices and ways of going on. He argues that we should not dismantle the 
practices and trends that spontaneously emerge and replace them through 
planning a rational social life based on a conception of the will of all or the 
common good (Hayek, 1982, vol. 1, pp1-31). Presumably he would also object to 
regulating social structures according to a conception of structural justice. 
There are several reasons for Hayek’s rejection of social planning and regulation. 
The first is that the practices that emerge spontaneously are usually useful and 
valuable. Hayek suggests that the fact they have emerged from a process of social 
evolution suggests that they are useful for human purposes. Hayek also rejects 
rational planning because he thinks that in order to be good the socially caused 
does not need to be in accordance with a rational plan. He rejects wholeheartedly 
what he understands to be a Cartesian project of dismantling all that cannot be 
justified (Hayek, 1982, vol. 1, pp. 9-11). Instead he believes that the fact that a 
way of going on has emerged and survived is evidence that it serves human 
purposes. Furthermore Hayek is sceptical about the ability of people to construct 
just social orders according to a rational plan. He believes that these plans will 
always be less clever and efficient than the solutions that emerge through social 
evolution.  
In addition, Hayek holds that these rationally constructed social orders require a 
general will or conception of a common good. However, there is no such thing 
according to Hayek. Such projects simply mean that the conflicting interests and 
aims of individuals are frustrated by a totalitarian system that enforces one 
particular will or one set of interests. Establishing a common good and moulding 
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social life to fulfil it undermines freedom. Instead Hayek recommends a society of 
freedom that is not explicitly organised according to a plan. He suggests that we 
should recognise the benefits of social evolution and not hubristically try to 
replace them with a humanly constructed ideal. 
The account I have so far outlined suggests that society is remedially responsible 
for social structures that emerge. It suggests that members of society should 
regulate their social structures so that they navigate background conditions in 
order to avoid suffering and unjustifiable disadvantage. A Hayekian critic could 
argue that a society has no responsibility to mould social structures and ensure 
they navigate normal background conditions to avoid structural injustice. This is to 
make the mistake of believing that social structures are something that society 
must shape. It is to treat society as a cohesive organisation rather than as a 
conglomeration of free individuals. It is to believe that humans together can have 
a single will that should shape social structures.  
Furthermore a critic could argue that the social structures that emerge without 
collective intervention are likely to be the best for a free society and that 
attempts to shape social structures will be inefficient and restrict freedom. This 
criticism is interesting and revealing. It suggests that the approach I have adopted 
may be deeply flawed. In this section I will explore whether it proves fatal for a 
social structural account.  
The social evolution of order that Hayek postulates is based on the idea that the 
best ways of going on are the ones that outcompete others and survive. However, 
the fact that the social practices in question survive does not mean that they are 
good. Often the practices that emerge favour the dominant and powerful. Worse 
still, often they condemn many to significant suffering. Our critical function allows 
us to analyse these practices for deficiencies. It allows us to identify when the 
practices and trends that survive are problematic. We can then seek to reform the 
practices that emerge so as to avoid significant injustice.  
Hayek acknowledges the importance of criticism. However, he insists we can only 
criticise rules for conflicting with other established rules. He insists that criticism 
must be a matter of internal critique from within a cultural tradition (Hayek, 1982, 
vol. 2, p. 25). However, he thinks that on the whole traditions emerge that are 
conducive to avoiding social disturbance and resolving clashes of interests. I do 
not share this optimism about the rules and norms that emerge from a social 
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order. These norms survive but it does not mean that they are the best way to 
coordinate action, nor the way that is fair between competing interests. Hayek 
himself admits that rare but serious social disturbances cannot be prevented by 
the rules of spontaneous order. The norms that emerge from the spontaneous 
order should be subject to critique and norms which are found to contradict more 
fundamental norms should give way. Critique can function to improve laws and 
norms according to general and universal criteria that agents can agree are fairer 
than existing practices (Hayek, 1982, vol. 2 pp. 25-30). 
Furthermore, our critical faculties and ability to organise can allow us to move 
ahead of evolution and avoid the sometimes painful mechanisms of evolutionary 
change. We can plan and organise effectively to make our society more free by 
altering rules through coordination or coercion. Problems with current rules and 
norms can be identified and agreed upon. These rules can be altered. 
Furthermore, social evolution alone cannot be relied upon to avoid serious social 
problems. There is no reason why collective action which does not violate norms 
of permissibility and legitimacy cannot be used to improve problematic social 
structures. 
Hayek is right to suggest that we should not design social structures in accordance 
with a conception of a shared will or substantive common plan for the good. Such 
an approach is problematic because it treats all members of society as one 
organism. It is problematic to design society so as to serve a controversial 
conception of the good. Instead, liberal political theorists suggest that a just 
society fairly arbitrates between competing interests. Rawls recommends that a 
just basic structure facilitates conditions in which individuals and groups can 
pursue their own conception of the good life (Rawls, 1971, pp.185-95). Reforming 
social structures to bring them in line with demands of social justice does not 
require enforcing a comprehensive conception of the good life. Instead, social 
structures can be shaped to allow individuals to pursue their own aims, interests 
and values.  
Hayek identifies the threat of using government to create specific states of affairs 
thought to be required by justice. He explains that such a project involves 
extensive use of force and coercion to create particular states of affairs. Such 
action violates the demands of justice which restrict what may be coercively 
imposed. As discussed in chapter 2, coercively imposed institutions are limited in 
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what they may do by demands of justice. Furthermore, such institutions must 
meet standards of legitimacy (this fact was discussed in chapter 1 and chapter 5).  
In concentrating on the threat posed by coercive institutions Hayek prioritises 
avoiding coercive injustice and rejects social structural injustice. As previously 
noted, such a move unjustifiably prioritises avoiding direct coercion over avoiding 
other forms of constraint.91 The values that lead us to criticise the use of coercion 
should also lead us to criticise forms of constraint that result from an aggregation 
of a number of human factors. Not to acknowledge the injustice of other forms of 
humanly caused constraint is to fetishize state coercion (Valentini, 2011, pp. 125-
126). 
However, Hayek’s analysis draws attention to a significant concern. It warns of the 
fact that regulating social structures so as to ensure they are just can involve 
morally problematic forms of coercion. There may be good reason to avoid a 
system of government that seeks to mould social structures to fit a particular 
pattern or design. The coercive organisations required to achieve this could 
commit coercive injustice. 
However, there is no need for the social community to come together to 
determine a shared comprehensive plan that effectively brings about ideal social 
structures. This account does not demand such an approach. Instead what is 
being suggested is that we identify where social structures are inconsiderate or 
harmful. The aim is not to demand that agents enforce an ideal social structure, 
but rather to remove blatant injustices. 
A theorist can be acutely aware of how regulation and institutions can undermine 
freedom, and also be aware that existing structures also undermine freedom. This 
fact means that institutions are needed to regulate social structures. However, it 
also means that regulatory institutions must be monitored, limited, and restricted 
so they do not transgress the demands of justice themselves. Recognising multiple 
sites of injustice can allow us to formulate a balanced account in which we do not 
fetishize coercively imposed injustice. Instead we recognise that social structures 
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can also be unjust and thereby seek to prevent such injustice without proposing 
solutions that become a problem of injustice themselves. 
A critical approach to social structures does not seek to impose structures that 
can be determined through pure reason or a common will. Nor does it seek the 
replacement of all that cannot be supported through rational argument. An 
approach which is critical rather than foundational seeks to reform those 
structures that can be shown to be problematic. This approach seeks to prove the 
injustice of certain aspects of social structures and then reform those parts. It 
identifies serious and significant problems where human interests are seriously 
undermined by current structures.  
Contributors to social structures do not need to be responsible for social 
structures in the same way that agents are responsible for their actions. The 
group together are not a conscious actor. However, just as we must be concerned 
with how our life plans affect others and be considerate we need to be aware of 
how social structures affect others and ensure they are not seriously 
inconsiderate. Demands of justice do not call for actions or structures to be 
justified as rational. Instead they call for their effects on persons to be justifiable 
as sufficiently considerate. 
Conclusion  
In this chapter several different obligations agents have in relation to structural 
injustice have been identified. Positive obligations to assist those suffering from 
structural injustice were identified first. Next it was suggested that by forming a 
collective, or joining existing collectives, agents can do more to assist those 
suffering from structural injustice. It was suggested that individuals have 
obligations to join or form such collectives. Next it was suggested that by forming 
a collective people can go beyond assisting the victims of structural injustice: they 
can actually prevent structural injustice from occurring. A sufficiently large 
organisation could systematically alter social structures through regulating or 
coordinating behaviour. In this way structural injustice can be ended. It was 
suggested that taking such action is demanded by moral obligations to relieve 
suffering and promote justice. It was also noted that any organisation with the 
power to shape social structures must meet the requirements of legitimacy 
because it will exercise significant power and will probably have to utilise an 
enforcement mechanism involving coercion. 
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Next the account proceeded to consider negative obligations. First individual 
obligations to avoid contributions to structural injustice were considered and 
rejected. Instead it was suggested that individuals have precautionary duties that 
require that they work to establish a collective that can prevent structural 
injustice. This precaution should be taken so as to avoid contributing to structural 
injustice by being part of an aggregate that causes harm when it is not 
unreasonable to demand the formation of a collective so as to mitigate the risk of 
that harm. It was concluded that this precautionary duty demands that agents 
organise and then establish and maintain agencies that can address structural 
injustice. Furthermore, it was suggested that individuals must ensure these 
agencies address structural injustices through the formation of a collective ‘public’ 
that holds these agents to account. Thus this account has identified positive and 
negative duties to form a collective and to take action to establish and maintain 
agencies that can permissibly prevent structural injustice, in addition to positive 
obligations to assist, through organisations, those who suffer as a result of 
structural injustice. 
It is important to note that the reasoning in my account of structural injustice and 
obligations is circular, but virtuously rather than viciously so. In chapter 3 I defined 
the socially caused as that which society causes in predictable background 
conditions. This was justified by the fact that it is reasonable to expect society to 
navigate these conditions in order to avoid placing individuals in positions where 
they are vulnerable to serious deprivation and domination relative to others. In 
this chapter I have argued that serious vulnerability to deprivation and 
domination relative to others attracts negative duties because it is socially caused. 
I have explained that negative duties require agents to work together to form a 
collective so as to avoid causing significant vulnerability to deprivation and 
domination relative to others. However, the fact that society has an obligation to 
work together to avoid causing serious vulnerability to deprivation and 
domination relative to others is what was used to identifying this vulnerability as 
socially caused. Thus the judgement that vulnerability to deprivation and 
domination is socially caused and the judgement that society must avoid causing 
vulnerable to deprivation and domination are interdependent and mutually 
supporting. My account of poverty as socially caused relies on a belief that society 
should avoid poverty in normal background conditions and my account of 
obligations in relation to poverty relies on a belief that poverty is socially caused. 
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This circularity also exists in accounts of individual causal responsibility and 
negative duties. As Ripstein notes in his discussion of the reciprocity conception of 
responsibility it is feature of this conception that individuals are only held morally 
responsible for the injuries they had a duty to avoid imposing (Ripstein, 2004, 
p.374). Judgements on what an agent should be held responsible for depend on 
judgements about what can be reasonably demanded of them, whilst judgements 
about what can be reasonably demanded of an individual depend on what they 
are responsible for causing. 
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Chapter 6: Poverty, Structural Injustice and Collective Action 
Strategies 
The last chapter provided a general account of the obligations that agents have in 
relation to structural injustice. It proposed that those who contribute to social 
structures ought to work together to regulate action to permanently alter those 
structures so as to prevent the continuance of structural injustice. It was 
suggested that obligations to promote justice require that agents take part in such 
collective efforts to alter social structures. It was then argued that it is not 
unreasonable to demand that those who contribute to a structure make such 
efforts in order to avoid future contributions to essentially aggregative harm. It 
was explained that although these efforts cannot guarantee that agents do not 
contribute to any particular structural injustice, they do lower the chance of 
contributing to serious structural injustice. Thus they should be considered 
necessary precautions required to limit contribution to serious structural injustice.  
This chapter considers the particular structural injustice of widespread and 
extreme poverty. It explores what the above account means for those who 
contribute to global social structures that condemn much of the global population 
to serious deprivation. The aims of this chapter are to make the case for 
obligations to take political action to alleviate future deprivation and to discuss 
what form such political action could take.  
I begin by outlining the obligations that global poverty attracts because it is a form 
of structural injustice. I then proceed to suggest possible forms the action 
required could take. The limit legitimacy places on such political action will also be 
considered. Then, what this obligation requires of individuals in different 
situations is examined. The extent of the precautionary obligations different 
agents have in relation to global poverty is discussed. Finally, I consider whether 
the objection can be rejected on the grounds that it is overly demanding. 
Precautionary Duties and Poverty 
In this first section I will bring the analysis of previous chapters together to 
formulate an account of the precautionary obligations agents have to lower the 
risk of contributing to future poverty (understood as structural injustice). This 
thesis proposes that there is an obligation to make efforts to form a collective and 
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take political action. Such political action must be aimed at establishing global 
institutions capable of coordinating action so as to allow state governments to 
tackle structural injustice in general and extreme poverty in particular. Extreme 
poverty is understood as a feature of social structures that systematically and 
avoidably places a sector of the global population in an inferior social position of a 
particular kind. A social position can be understood as one of extreme poverty in 
any of the following circumstances. The social position is one that significantly and 
unacceptably undermines the person’s health and well-being because they live in 
un-healthy conditions. The social position is one in which the agent is acutely 
vulnerable to being deprived of the means to fulfil their basic needs. The social 
position is one in which an agent is acutely vulnerable to domination and 
exploitation by others because it is one in which they are likely to agree to work in 
conditions that significantly and unacceptably undermine their health, well-being, 
autonomy and self-respect because accepting such an offer will improve their 
position all things considered. I will now break down this proposal and justify each 
part of it referring back to the analysis outlined in previous chapters. Along the 
way I consider in detail the case of garment manufacturing workers in Bangladesh 
in order to demonstrate the practical implications of my normative proposals. 
Poverty as Social Structural Injustice 
As discussed in chapters 1 and 4, the current global social structure places many 
of the world’s population in social positions where they are vulnerable to acute 
deprivation, domination and exploitation. These agents lack entitlement to the 
basic resources required to maintain a healthy existence and many die 
prematurely. Their poverty is avoidable and foreseeable and a range of global and 
local formal and informal institutions contribute to their social position. They lack 
resources with which to pursue their own plans and the way they live is 
determined by necessity; many have to spend all their time merely securing the 
necessities to maintain their existence. Often they spend almost all their waking 
hours in work where their every action is determined by their superiors. Thus, 
their autonomy is undermined and they are dominated as well as deprived. 
Their position is the result of a combination of both humanly caused and natural 
factors. However, as discussed in chapter 3, we can identify their situation as 
socially caused because the natural factors that contribute to their vulnerability 
are predictable and standard rather than anomalous. The claim that this 
vulnerability is socially caused relies on the assumption that we can expect social 
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structures to be organised so as to avoid condemning people to poverty given 
normal circumstances. This is because we can reasonably expect people to take 
responsibility for what they collectively cause such that in normal circumstances 
they can ensure that the social structures their actions together produce do not 
result in suffering.92  
The individuals who face deprivation make choices that in some cases contribute 
to their difficult circumstances. However, the vast numbers that face such 
deprivation suggest that individuals who end up poor do not make unusually bad 
choices. As Pogge suggests ‘it is bad luck to be born in to a family that is too poor 
to feed one… the fact that a quarter of all children are born in to such families is 
not bad luck but bad organization.’ (Pogge, 1998, p. 531 n. 12) The fact that a life 
of acute deprivation is the lot of so many families suggests that their poverty is 
not always the result of very bad decisions but bad social circumstances. Thus we 
can safely conclude from the fact that a billion of the world’s population are 
undernourished and that 50,000 people face premature death as a result of 
poverty every day that the social position these agents find themselves in is unjust 
(Pogge, 2008, p. 3) (Pogge, 2010, p. 4). This shows that the levels of deprivation 
and exploitation in the world currently indicate structural injustice. 
An examination of the conditions the global poor face confirms this fact, as does 
an examination of the groups who end up in this situation. Examining the 
situation of some in poverty reveals that they were placed in a starting social 
position in which the risk of deprivation was high. This suggests that deprivation is 
extremely difficult to avoid. Just as we can demand that social structures should 
be organised so as to avoid extreme deprivation in normal natural conditions we 
can demand that social structures be so organised so as to avoid deprivation given 
a reasonable and normal level of competence and decency on the part of actors.  
To support this analysis a particular example of poverty and structural injustice 
will be considered: the case of garment workers in Bangladesh. These workers are 
badly paid and work long hours. Their pay can be as low as 37$ a month 
compared to minimum wages in China of up to 200$ a month (Banjo & Al-
Mahmood, 2013). They work in conditions that are radically unsafe. The buildings 
                                                          
92 Although this account derives responsibility from causality and causality from what can be expected, the 
circularity is not vicious. The same relation coexists between individual responsibility and what can reasonably be 
demanded (Ripstein, 2004). This point is discussed in chapter 5. 
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in which they work are dangerous and as a result these workers are vulnerable to 
premature death. 414 workers were killed in fires between 2006 and 2009. The 
high number of deaths is the result of “substandard buildings, poor emergency 
procedures, inadequate and blocked fire exits and overcrowded workspaces.” 
(The Clean Clothes Campaign, 2012). In spring 2013, 1,127 workers were killed in a 
single building collapse (Hossain & Alam, 2013).  
The situation faced by garment workers in Bangladesh is the result of a range of 
local and distant humanly caused factors. The clothes they manufacture are sold 
in the European Union and the United States. The Bangladeshi government is 
keen to attract orders from transnational clothing brands and therefore tries to 
keep costs down. Local factory owners are in competition and bid for orders on 
price. They seek to be able to deliver orders fast and at low cost (The New York 
Times, Editorial Board, 2013). Garment factory workers are often rural migrants. 
They leave their local village to seek work in factories. This is in part because there 
are very few opportunities in the country and because of the low value of crops. 
They leave the villages because of unemployment and poverty. Those involved in 
agriculture in the ‘manga’ regions face problems with meeting the input costs of 
agriculture and the lack of employment outside of harvest and cultivation times. 
Others face problems with flooding and river bank erosion which destroys their 
means of subsistence in the country. Other factors include getting into debt 
(Farhana, et al., 2012).  
Once they have left their villages and gained employment, the high competition 
for jobs in garment factories keeps wages low and government rules that require 
factory owners’ permission to form trade unions prevent workers from forming 
unions and bargaining for higher pay. These laws help to create a cheap 
environment in which to produce clothing and thus attract international brands to 
Bangladesh. Factory owners have the power to demand much of workers because 
they can threaten them with dismissal if they do not comply.  
Agents from around the world contribute to the social structure that places a 
billion of the global population in a position of vulnerability to deprivation. All 
those who live on the planet contribute to the social structures under which 
others live: this is because they necessarily contribute to the physical 
environment that others face through interacting with that environment. Most 
also contribute to social practices, institutions and trends that make up a 
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significant part of social structures. However, identifying which individuals 
contribute to global patterns of deprivation is difficult. Who it is that contributes 
to the factors that together place many agents in positions of vulnerability to 
extreme deprivation can be difficult to determine. However, for any particular 
individual who participates in the global economy it is very likely that they make 
contributions to at least one of the institutions, trends and practices that place 
others in positions of vulnerability to extreme deprivation and domination. 
Obligations in Relation to Structural Poverty 
In Chapter 5, it was suggested that in most circumstances it is impossible to avoid 
contributing to social structural injustice by refraining from contributing activities. 
This is because persons cannot avoid contributing to social structures entirely and 
it is exceptionally difficult to ensure that one’s contributions do not contribute to 
structural injustice. This is often the case with structures that create poverty. 
Chapter 5 also suggested that there is moral reason not to withdraw from social 
practices, institutions and interactions that may contribute to social structural 
injustice. Often these collaborations have many positive benefits that it would be 
wrong to stop providing. Furthermore, often these activities are vital for a decent 
life and it would be unreasonable to demand that agents withdraw, especially 
when their contributions to structural injustice are likely to be marginal.  
In the case of factory workers in the apparel industry in Bangladesh, one could 
attempt to limit contributions to the structures that place these workers in a 
situation where they are vulnerable to premature death by not purchasing 
clothing made in the country. However, such action is likely to make the position 
of these sweatshop workers even worse. Given the difficult situation people in 
poor countries face, refusing to trade with them would significantly disadvantage 
them. Thus, there is a moral reason not to withdraw from trade.  
However, it is not unreasonable to demand that agents take precautionary efforts 
to reduce the likelihood of contributing to serious structural injustice. Chapter 5 
concluded that agents have an obligation to work towards removing any serious 
structural injustices in the social structures to which they contribute. It also 
suggested that agents who contribute to a social structure have a responsibility to 
work with others to make that structure just. These duties are best discharged by 
working with others to establish institutions capable of shaping social structures 
so as to avoid serious injustices and bring about social justice. Thus those who 
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contribute to social structures have positive and negative obligations that require 
they promote structural justice and work to lessen structural injustice.  
I argued that these duties are best served by engaging in collective action aimed 
at permanently altering social structures. Individual unilateral efforts can make 
very small differences to social structures. However, they cannot systematically 
alter social structures unless many individuals take unilateral actions that come 
together to alter social structures in a positive way. Thus agents must work with 
others to alter social structures by coordinating behaviour through organisation or 
regulatory institutions. 
Collective Action to Alter Social Structures 
Having established that poverty is a form of structural injustice and that there are 
precautionary duties to make efforts to form a collective and lessen structural 
injustice I will now proceed to consider what form this collective action could 
take. 
Social structures are the result of human practices, institutions and trends. Human 
actions, in the absence of coordination reproduce these structures. By altering 
human action en masse these structures can be altered. Thus, by forming a 
collective, agents can coordinate their action and work to permanently alter social 
structures. If individuals get together to form collectives they can decide on 
collective action strategies and bring them about. In this way collectives gain the 
power to alter social structures. To do this they require a decision making 
mechanism, the results of which are recognised and followed by the group.  
There are three different strategies that collectives can adopt in order to alter 
social structures. They can seek to directly alter social structures by coordinating 
their action in new ways.  Alternatively they can work to establish coercively 
imposed institutions that can coordinate everyone’s actions so as to avoid 
structural injustice.  A third possible strategy is to influence existing power holders 
to coordinate action in ways that can prevent structural injustice. I will consider 
each of these strategies in turn in relation to structural poverty. 
Directly Altering Social Structures 
Collective action that aims to eliminate structural injustice can directly alter social 
structures through coordinated behaviour. This involves a large group taking 
action together. Membership of the group is voluntary and the success of the 
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project depends on sufficient numbers joining the group and acting in line with 
the results of the decision making mechanism. Direct action of this kind involves 
joining together with others to form institutions and then taking coordinated 
action to alter social structures systematically. This would work by permanently 
altering structures so they do not place agents in positions where they are 
seriously vulnerable to deprivation and domination relative to others.  
This anarchistic response to the problem involves citizens of the globe 
coordinating action on a voluntary basis to alter social structures. Such action is 
encouraged by members of the global justice movement who support civil society 
solutions and believe they can ‘change the world without taking power’ as John 
Holloway suggests (Holloway, 2010). The World Social Forum is an example of 
such an effort.93  
Putting Pressure on Power Holders  
A second strategy an organised collective can take is to act together to pressurise 
current power holders into altering their behaviours. If power holders do not 
respond to pressure the collective can threaten en masse to refuse to follow their 
dictates. If this threat is realised by a large enough collective they can disempower 
current power holders. This option does not require the group to be as large, as 
the group required for a successful anarchistic strategy, in order to have a 
significant effect on social structures. This is because the group works together to 
influence a larger and more established group with much greater powers.  
In this strategy, is the dictates of the established existing institutions, parties, 
governments or organisations that have a significant effect on social structures. 
Recognising the existing organisations power, collectives of committed activists 
work together to influence the decisions made by these more powerful and better 
established institutions. They work together to influence current decision makers 
who are recognised and followed by many. These are the decision makers within 
powerful organisations like corporations, the police or the civil service. 
Those who have the power to direct institutions, organisations and practices have 
the power to influence social structures in a dramatic way. This is because they 
can alter the behaviour of many actors at once by setting rules or reforming 
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 See http://www.fsm2013.org/en. The aims and ability of the forum to address social 
injustice is a matter of much debate. Criticism of the undemocratic nature of the forum 
and its collaboration with big business has been widespread (Holmes, 2013).  
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practices. Individuals that have such power can fulfil obligations to make efforts to 
work with others to prevent structural injustice simply by directing the behaviour 
of others by altering the policy of the organisations they direct or reforming the 
practices they co-ordinate. However, the majority of individuals are not in such 
positions of power and therefore cannot fulfil their precautionary obligation in 
this way. Instead they must work with others to form a collective and try to 
pressurise power holders to alter social structures.  
If such campaigns are to be successful organisers must be well informed and 
research the likely effects of proposed reforms. They must also act strategically to 
maximise the chance of success. Much of campaigning will be a matter of raising 
awareness and encouraging others to support the campaign. Once these activities 
have taken place the level of support must be demonstrated through actions or 
petitions. If governing institutions fail to respond to these demonstrations direct 
action may be required to pressure them to act. Such action could include 
boycotts, strikes, sit-ins or collective civil disobedience.  
Such action will not by itself solve structural injustices, nor will it prevent agents 
from contributing to these injustices. However, it will alter the political climate in 
which governing organisations act. Thus, it will make some policies possible and 
undermine the feasibility of others. The political climate effects the decisions 
taken by governing institutions (and to some extent the leadership of private 
organisations). Campaigners can thus make certain policies more or less likely by 
attaching costs and benefits to different courses of action. This means that 
protest and civil disobedience can function to lower injustice over time. Smart 
forms of collective action by informed publics can dramatically lessen structural 
injustices. 
Often protests fail to prevent specific government acts or policies; however they 
do chastise governments and alter their future plans so as not to attract further 
demonstrations. To give one example it is often argued that the anti-Vietnam war 
movement in the USA altered the political climate in such a way as to make the 
use of nuclear force in the conflict politically impossible (Hari, 2010). Why such 
protest action can be effective will now be considered.  
When agents are described as being ‘in power’ it is usually because other 
individuals obey their dictates. Power is generally understood as the ability to 
bring about certain states of affairs. Thus, to some degree agents have power in 
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virtue of being able to direct the action of others. However Hannah Arendt’s 
theory of power is interesting because it turns this commons sense analysis on its 
head.  Arendt suggests that groups of people can grant or deny others power by 
obeying or disobeying their dictates. Arendt suggests that instead of describing 
individuals as being ‘in power’ we can describe them as having been ‘empowered’ 
by the group of individuals who choose to follow their directions (Arendt, 1970, p. 
143).  
To see this, consider any powerful committee or individual. It seems that we 
describe them as powerful because they have the ability to make what they 
decide or desire come to pass. This is usually because people do as they dictate or 
pre-empt such dictates by taking action that serves their goals, desires or 
interests. In the typical case, their dictates are explicitly obeyed. If their dictates 
were not adopted and obeyed they would have no power. Describing these 
individuals as ‘powerful’ suggests that others are in some sense compelled to 
obey their dictates. In contrast, describing these individuals as empowered 
suggests that others grant them power by obeying their dictates.  
In most cases of power both of these descriptions have elements of truth. It is 
typically the case that a powerful individual has the ability to make other 
individuals do as they desire. In usual cases, these others have a strong prudential 
reason to obey because this individual can ensure they suffer if they do not obey 
and benefit if they do. Thus the individual in question has power over them. 
However, it is also the case that this powerful individual can only ensure this 
because a substantial group of people obey their dictates. If this group were 
collectively to withdraw their obedience, then the individual in question would 
lose their power and could do nothing to punish the group because they lack the 
auxiliaries to carry out the punishment. Thus the powerful depend on the 
obedience of a large group of others for their power and are unable to maintain 
their power in the face of a large enough organised group of disobedient 
individuals. 
Often a given entity’s power to alter social structures is amplified by the fact that 
those who follow through their dictates work together to impose them on others. 
In some cases, the auxiliaries who impose the dictates on others use violence or 
threats to coerce those who do not follow their commands. The police force could 
be understood as the auxiliaries of government power.  However, the strategy of 
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utilising auxiliaries cannot work when the auxiliaries come up against a larger 
group well of organised individuals. Thus, a government’s power is dependent on 
the fact that the majority of people do not oppose their rule.94 This analysis 
suggests that if an organised collective opposed to the governments rule becomes 
large enough it can effectively disempower the government by refusing to obey 
its dictates. 
Campaigns to pressurise governments to take action to tackle global poverty 
could take many different forms. These campaigns could use political parties, 
charities, churches, unions or other civil society groups. These campaigns could try 
to get governments to alter policies that perpetuate global poverty.  An example 
of such a campaign is the Jubilee Debt Campaign’s efforts to get the UK 
government to stop lending money to regimes that do not meet legitimacy 
criteria and drop debt obligations falling on countries as a result of the deals made 
by previous regimes that do not meet these standards. The current campaign 
focusses on the debt that was taken out by Hosni Mubarak and that Egypt is now 
being called on to pay ('Jubilee Debt Campaign', n.d.).  
Alternatively campaigners could try to get existing governments to work together 
to establish systems of global coordination that can allow structural injustice to be 
tackled.  One example of such a campaign is organised by the UK international 
development charity Action Aid. The campaign is putting pressure on David 
Cameron the Prime Minister of Britain. It is asking Cameron to make efforts to 
establish a collective solution to Tax Havens at the G8 summit (which the UK 
hosted in 2013). Currently tax havens allow transnational corporations and 
wealthy individuals to avoid paying taxes. The tax income they avoid in this way 
could be used to improve schools, hospitals, welfare and the enforcement of the 
rights of the poor. The charity is getting supporters to email David Cameron to 
demand he takes action ('Action Aid', n.d.). 
Another option open to those agents who seek to prevent an aggregate of which 
they are a member from causing structural injustice involves utilising international 
organisations and power blocks like the EU or OECD. Groups from member states 
                                                          
94
 In some cases this obedience may be the result of fear or greed. However, the reason 
why the government can offer rewards and punishments to those who obey or disobey is 
the result of the obedience of the majority or a significantly large group. The root of 
power is the general obedience of a group (Arendt, 1970, pp. 139-170). This obedience 
could be the result of convention, habit, a trust in stability, self-interest or support for the 
system. 
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could campaign to get these groups to alter their policies in the same way that 
they pressurise national governing institutions. The pan-European campaign to 
alter subsides for E.U. farmers is an example of such an effort. Campaigners are 
convinced that these subsides unfairly disadvantage farmers in the majority 
world. Their campaign wishes to change EU policy and thereby permanently and 
systematically alter the conditions faced by farmers and potential farmers outside 
the E.U. World Development Movement is currently lobbying the EU to get 
tougher regulation on food speculation by financial institutions in Europe. Their 
research suggests that this speculation cause spikes and troughs in prices that can 
impoverish farmers and those on low incomes ('World Development Movement', 
n.d.). 
Collective action to alter social structures can also pressurise unofficial power 
holders (like transnational corporations) to work together to alter social 
structures. Many modern campaigns aim to use consumer and/or worker power 
to alter the policies of transnationals. Sometimes these campaigns target 
particular brands. At other times they call on industry leaders to organise pacts to 
improve working conditions.  
In Chapter 4 it was argued that currently many governments lack the power to 
address social structural injustice within their jurisdiction. Facts concerning global 
competition and under-development were used to argue that state governments 
are constrained by global factors in ways that prevent them from dealing with 
social structural injustice. Thus it was argued that if poverty is to be tackled global 
coordination must be established. This suggests that collectives must concentrate 
on either pressurising existing global governing institutions or establishing new 
global governing institutions. 
Reforming existing global institutions would require a global campaign linking 
agents in different locations. This could involve global social movements, NGOs 
and other players in global civil society. A collective made up of many different 
actors can work together to put pressure on global governing institutions to 
address the problems that prevent states from dealing with structural injustice. 
However, currently many powerful global institutions lack transparency and are 
not accountable to the people. A campaign to change this could be the first step 
towards tackling structural injustice. Democratising these institutions and making 
their decisions open to criticism is important because it can create conditions in 
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which a collective can scrutinise their decisions and take political action to 
pressure the institutions to address structural injustice or to enable national 
governments to deal with that injustice. 
An example of collective action aimed at pressuring global decision making 
organisations is the effort to pressure the G8 to take action to promote global 
social justice. For the 2013 G8 summit of the 8 largest economies, NGOs charities 
and civil society groups have put together an agenda to tackle global hunger. 150 
organisations have come together to lobby the G8 about aid, tax, land and 
transparency. The campaign aims to get people to sign up to indicate their 
support and to take part in actions and lobbying before and during the G8 
('Enough Food For Everyone If', n.d.). Ahead of the G8, the ‘World Development 
Movement’ is collecting money to assess the effects of G8 countries’ current 
policies and to design policy suggestions that could prevent structural injustices. 
Campaigning and action must be informed by sound knowledge of the current 
situation and well thought out policy proposals that can effectively combat 
systematic poverty ('World Development Movement', n.d.).  
Forming New Institutions 
A third way in which collectives can tackle structural injustice is by trying to 
establish new governing institutions. In the case of poverty, establishing new 
global governing institutions is a means through which this structural injustice can 
be addressed or the circumstances that prevent state governments from tackling 
it can be addressed. 
If established, global formal institutions can enforce policy that guarantees state 
governments the ability to make meaningful decisions about local social 
structures. This is to follow Ronzoni (discussed at length in chapter 4 (Ronzoni, 
2012)). Alternatively, global institutions could provide a means through which a 
state government’s action can be made responsive to the claims of outsiders 
affected by their policy decisions. This proposal is outlined by Young and again 
discussed in chapter 4 (Young, 2007, pp. 13-77). 
Alternatively, global institutions could seek to alter the social structure directly. 
They could provide a global safety net that provides necessities to those in need. 
Another possible policy could establish a global fund for health priorities. This 
could cover treatment costs or provide funds for researchers to work on solving 
public health problems. These institutions could also make global interventions to 
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establish certain key industries or achieve development. They could potentially 
coordinate production to make it more efficient and to ensure it serves the needs 
and desires of the global population. 
Furthermore, a global institution could establish and maintain global minimum 
standards in terms of minimum wages and health and safety at work. This would 
prevent different states competing for investment by lowering these standards. 
Thereby, it can enable states not to have to choose between securing decent 
standards and securing investment. A global institution could also agree and 
enforce minimum levels of tax. This would allow states to tax corporations and 
wealthy individuals without fear that the targets of taxation will relocate to other 
states. A global institution could also regulate Trans-National Corporations to 
ensure that they serve the people who consume their products and those who 
work for them. It could also establish global competition law.  
Any such institution – or institutions – would have to be designed in a way that 
minimises the chances of tyranny and that ensured responsiveness to the 
demands of the global population. They would have to be designed so as to avoid 
being an instrument through which powerful states impose their interests and 
values on others, as is noted in chapter 4. 
An organised collective could work together to establish new institutions that can 
effectively impose regulation on all people within a given sphere. These 
institutions could then regulate behaviour to avoid structural injustice. This 
strategy will only be successful if sufficient numbers of people work to establish 
them, a sufficient number of people commit to imposing their decisions, and a 
majority of the people who they aim to constrain obey their dictates. Without the 
obedience of the majority it is likely these institutions will lose their ability to 
enforce their decisions. 
Global institutions of the kind being discussed could be realised in a number of 
different ways. Existing governments could make efforts to establish them and to 
cooperate on fair terms rather than compete for advantage in the global sphere. 
Populations could pressurise their governments to make such efforts through 
campaigning and voting for those parties that respond to these campaigns. 
Individuals could discharge their obligation to take precautions to avoid 
contributions to structural injustice by campaigning for their governments to 
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cooperate internationally and by voting for those parties that respond to their 
demands.  
Another strategy would be for a global collective to elect representatives to 
informal global institutions. These institutions could make decisions 
democratically about global concerns. Those who support these institutions could 
obey these informal institutions. This would have a significant effect on social 
structures if the number of those taking part was sufficiently high. Furthermore 
these institutions would represent a threat to the power of existing institutions. 
This would put pressure existing global governing institutions to enforce the 
recommendations of the informal institutions.   
Collective Action to Alleviate the Structural Injustice Experienced by 
Apparel Workers 
The plight of those who work in apparel factories in Bangladesh was described 
above. I will now consider how collective action could alleviate the structural 
injustice they experience. This injustice is a form of poverty. Those who work in 
these factories stand in a social position where they are vulnerable to taking on 
work in conditions that undermine their basic interests. This is shown by the fact 
that they accept employment in conditions that are dangerous and unhealthy and 
for wages that are insufficient to secure goods required to fulfil their basic needs. 
The structural injustice that results in many individuals working in appalling 
conditions could be overcome by governments coordinating to establish global 
minimum standards in working conditions. Individuals could put pressure on 
governments to create such an agreement. Alternatively, it could be tackled by 
consumers of apparel working together to boycott those brands that are supplied 
by factories that do not meet minimum conditions. A third strategy could involve 
the workers forming a global collective and refusing to work in conditions that do 
not meet minimum standards. 
In the wake of the 2013 factory collapse in which many workers lost their lives 
there have been renewed efforts to tackle the poor conditions in apparel factories 
in Bangladesh (Banjo & Al-Mahmood, 2013) (Jakarta Globe, 2013). The 
International Labour Organisation, trade unions UNI Global Union and IndstriALL, 
local trade unions, the Bangladeshi government, German officials, NGOs, local 
factory owners associations and global clothing brands and retailers have entered 
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in to discussions to establish an effective system of regulation that can enforce 
health and safety standards. The discussions have led to the ‘Accord on Building 
and Fire Safety.’ The agreement commits signatories to finance and implement a 
plan to enforce health and safety regulations through inspections and orders to 
make changes. It includes clauses that demand workers at factories that are 
abandoned by brands because they do not meet standards are relocated to safe 
factories. It also involves a commitment to pay workers whilst renovations are 
taking place. In addition, it offers workers the right to refuse to work in conditions 
they reasonably believe to be unsafe without losing pay. As of the 22nd May 2013, 
the following companies had signed the accord: H&M, Inditex, C&A, PVH, Tchibo, 
Tesco, Marks & Spencer, Primark, El Corte Inglés, jbc, Mango, Carrefour, KiK, Helly 
Hansen, G-Star, Aldi North, Aldi South, New Look, Mothercare, Loblaw, 
Sainsbury’s, Benetton, N Brown Group, Stockmann, WE Europe, Esprit, Rewe, 
Next, Lidl, Hess Natur, Switcher, Abercrombie & Fitch, John Lewis, Charles Vögele, 
V&D, Otto Group, s.Oliver, Bonmarche, HEMA, Comtex, Fat Face, Newtop. The 
Accord, and the process leading up to it, offer an example of how different 
contributing agents can come together to produce a collective solution to 
structural injustice. It is also an example of how individual contributors can 
coordinate their action to work towards a solution. Over a million people signed 
an online petition calling on CEOs to sign up to the agreement (Avaaz.org, 2013) 
and 12,000-20,000 Bangladeshi workers and supporters protested for better 
conditions (Blake & Farid, 2013) (ChannelNewsAsia AFP, 2013). This collective 
action put pressure on CEOs, factory owners and government officials in turn to 
take collective action. 
This example is one in which various agents who contribute to a structural 
injustice have formed a collective and taken action to alter social structures. By 
working together workers, consumers, governments and corporations have been 
able to alleviate a significant structural injustice. They have managed to achieve 
something which none of these agents could have achieved by working 
unilaterally. If carried out the proposal will result in the right to a safe work 
environment being effectively enforced within the garment industry in 
Bangladesh. This will mean that the Bangladeshi working class will no longer be 
placed in a position where they are vulnerable to enter into employment in 
conditions that are severely detrimental to their health and in which their lives are 
at risk. As a result these people’s right to safe and healthy work environment will 
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have been secured.95 Thus the collective action (if followed through) will 
effectively tackle a form of structural injustice and a form of deprivation 
characteristic of poverty. This is an example of the sort of action that my account 
is proposing as a moral obligation that falls on all people. 
Limits of Legitimacy 
Those taking political action to try to lessen structural injustice must be careful 
not to act unjustly or illegitimately themselves. Political action involves using 
collective power. Uses of power must be legitimate and just. Thus power relations 
in political campaigns are important. A political movement cannot be legitimate if 
it allows some individuals’ interests and opinions to drown out those of others 
who have a stake in the issue on which they are campaigning. For example in an 
anti-sweatshop campaign it is vital that rich and powerful consumers in affluent 
states do not ignore the judgements and interests of those who currently work in 
sweatshops and those who currently lack employment opportunities. Thus 
organisations formed to address structural injustice must be organised in a way 
that fulfil demands of legitimacy. The aims of the movement must be determined 
in a process in which the interests of all relevant parties are thoroughly 
considered and the autonomy of all is respected. 
This account has suggested that agents must make efforts to form a collective and 
take action to prevent structural injustice. Actions that such collectives could take 
to pressure power holders to address structural injustice include civil 
disobedience, strikes and direct action. These strategies are controversial because 
they often involve breaking the law and/or inconveniencing or harming the 
interests of bystanders. The seriousness of structural injustices can sometimes 
justify such actions. If such actions undermine legitimate democratic processes 
there may be good reason not to employ them. However, these means are 
required when the democratic process offers no reasonable means of addressing 
these problems.  
In some extreme cases using violence or armed revolt to force governments to 
address structural injustice may be necessary, particularly in cases where 
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 This solution relies on a commitment by a wide range of retailers not to stop producing 
garments in Bangladesh despite the additional costs of producing in safe conditions. Thus 
it manages to secure better conditions for Bangladeshi workers without the risk of TNCs 
moving production. This coordination between TNCs is what allows social structural 
injustice to be improved in Bangladesh. 
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governing institutions are unresponsive to public demands. However, some uses 
of violence may be excluded as never permissible no matter how serious an 
injustice may be. Furthermore, it could be that some violent action can only 
permissibly be used in response to serious coercive injustice (where a governing 
institution explicitly uses violence in an unjustifiable way) and cannot be justified 
in cases where suffering is not directly caused by the government. These are 
difficult questions to consider and will not be fully addressed here.96  
However, it is worth noting that in many cases violence is unlikely to be a means 
through which just governing institutions can be built that address structural 
injustice. Tackling unjust and illegitimate institutions through violence causes 
suffering but has no guarantee of success. Furthermore, it is difficult to build just 
and legitimate institutions through violence. If violent action is not a strategy that 
can reasonably be believed to advance structural justice then those who wish to 
end structural injustice have no reason to employ it. If violent action is not a 
means through which structural justice can be secured, then such violent action 
cannot be justified by the fact that it will remove structural injustice. Thus, there 
can be no moral reason to support such violence. However, it is not clear that 
violence is never a realistic strategy for bringing about structural justice. In cases 
where violence is one possible means among others which can achieve structural 
justice there is moral reason to adopt the other means if it involves causing less 
harm. However, in cases where violence is the only possible means to achieving 
structural effective it must be considered. Whether the moral reasons in favour of 
ending structural injustice outweigh the moral reasons against using violence 
would then need to be decided on a case by case basis.97 
The Extent of the Efforts Required 
Having outlined that people around the world have obligations to make efforts to 
form collectives to address structural injustice, I will now consider how to 
determine the extent of the efforts required of any particular individual. In 
determining the extent of an agent’s obligations with regards to addressing 
injustice there are two possible ways to proceed. The first is to begin by 
                                                          
96
 Some of these issues are discussed in Ted Honderich’s exposition of the subject 
(Honderich, 1989). 
97
 For example, Honderich argues against the use of violence by the IRA in the 1980s on 
the basis that it was unlikely to be a means to achieving justice (Honderich, 1989, pp. xi-
xx). 
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considering what can be reasonably demanded of an agent given all the facts 
about their personal situation and their relationship to the problem. The second, 
by considering what is required in order to address the problem satisfactorily. This 
second approach begins by considering the rights of the party whose interests are 
threatened and then proceeds to assign duties to alleviate the problem based on 
splitting up the required work fairly between all those with an obligation to act.  
However, whichever end of the problem a theorist begins with, they must weigh 
the legitimate demands of the (potential) injured party against what can 
reasonably be demanded of the obligated individual. Factors that must influence 
the judgement concerning how much can be demanded of a particular individual 
will include concerns about the problem and the injured party. These will include 
the seriousness of the problem, the number of people affected, the importance of 
the threatened interests, and what is required in order to prevent the injury. The 
judgement must also consider facts about the obligated individual. These will 
include how much they contribute to the problem, whether they benefit from the 
problem, the time and resources to which they have access, the extent of their 
abilities to address the problem, whether they have a social network, whether 
they themselves will suffer as a result of the problem, and what risks and costs 
they face in fulfilling the obligation.  I will now demonstrate why adopting the 
second method is inadvisable for determining the extent of obligations to make 
efforts to form a collective and prevent structural injustice.  
The seriousness of structural poverty means that the obligations that arise in 
relation to it are demanding. However, it is difficult to determine how much effort 
will be required to establish and maintain just social structures. This fact speaks in 
favour of being careful to ensure that the efforts that are demanded are sufficient 
to address the problem. This can be achieved by demanding an amount of effort 
that will definitely succeed in ending the injustice. 
Given that individuals have different relationships to structural injustice, different 
abilities to help, and different costs to absorb in taking collective action, it is 
unlikely that each contributor is obliged to take an equal share of the task of 
organising and taking political action. This is because more can be reasonably 
demanded of some than others. It would be unreasonable to demand the same 
amount of effort from individuals who have different connections to the problem, 
levels of political influence and amounts of time to engage in such activity. Much 
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effort could be demanded from an affluent upper-class person, who lives in a 
country that has benefitted from imperialism and in which their right to vote, 
protest and collectively organise is recognised and enforced. If this person has no 
dependents, a high income and has inherited shares in various concerns this 
should also influence our judgement. The fact that they regularly purchases goods 
made under exploitative conditions and work only 30 hours a week may also lead 
us to demand they make considerable efforts to promote structural justice. In 
contrast not much can reasonably be demanded of a lower class person who 
works long hours and supports several dependent relatives. If they live in a society 
where they are prohibited by law from demonstrating or seeking to influence 
government and face serious penalties for disobeying, then we cannot demand as 
much from them. This means that determining an individual’s fair-share of efforts 
to establish and maintain structural justice will require extensive knowledge of 
the position of all those so obligated. Given that no person has access to such 
knowledge it is impossible to work out what precisely an individual’s fair-share of 
efforts would be. 
Furthermore, there is good reason to think that agents are obliged to do more 
than the minimum required to avoid the problem. This is because others may fail 
to do their share of preventing structural injustice. Given that if this occurs the 
victims of structural injustice will suffer and efforts expended on trying to alleviate 
the injustice will be wasted, it is important that this is avoided. Thus there is good 
reason to insist agents must go beyond a fair share of the minimum action 
required. Those who are obligated to do more than their fair share may 
legitimately object to the laziness of others giving them additional burdens. 
However their right not to be so burdened is not as morally significant as the 
potential victim’s right to be free from structural injustice and thus it must give 
way.98 
For these reasons it is implausible to adopt the approach of determining what is 
required in order to prevent structural injustice and then to allocate fair-shares of 
that task to all those obligated to alleviate it. It is instead more practical to 
consider what can reasonably be demanded of an individual and why. The 
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 Once just institutions are established the costs of avoiding structural injustice can be 
fairly shared. However, the demand to maintain the justice of social structures may still 
mean that some must take on more burdens because of others’ failure to comply. The 
politically active could offset these costs by using governing institutions to demand more 
of the apathetic. However, this is likely to be controversial. 
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seriousness of structural injustice will still be a significant part of this assessment, 
as will the shortfall in efforts that currently exists. Thus, I will assume that all 
those obligated to make efforts to form a collective and prevent structural 
injustice must put considerable effort in to this project. I will then consider what 
limit reasonableness places on what can be demanded of them.  In each case a 
high level of demandingness can be justified.  This is to ensure that the morally 
required efforts would eradicate structural injustice if practiced by a reasonably 
large number of agents.  However, what this requires of a particular individual will 
depend on their circumstances.   
Personal Circumstances 
This section will consider the limits to what can reasonably be demanded of 
different individuals in terms of establishing and maintaining institutions that 
regulate social structures so as to avoid structural injustice. The obligation to 
make efforts to maintain institutions and ensure they do what is necessary to 
tackle structural injustice will be limited to some extent. Each individual’s personal 
circumstances will have an effect on what can reasonably be demanded of them. I 
will now discuss the constraints that limit what can be demanded of individuals. 
Each person is in a unique situation in terms of ability to help establish and 
maintain just institutions. Some will have other obligations, some will be in a 
position where contribution will be more costly, and others may have to dedicate 
the majority of their time to maintaining their existence. The obligation to make 
reasonable efforts will require different amounts of time and commitment from 
different individuals based on the precise circumstances of their case.  
An agent’s position will determine both the opportunities for, and the costs of, 
political action. Those in positions of relative power within an institutional order 
have more opportunities to alter the order and those in positions of relative 
weakness are more vulnerable to the costs that can follow from political 
intervention. Moreover, the demandingness of an agent’s obligation to engage 
politically will depend on the seriousness of structural injustice. What can be 
expected of an agent charged with an obligation to engage politically will depend 
on the power the agent has to affect the institutional order (which will depend on 
the abilities of the agent, the structural position of the agent, and the availability 
of others willing to collaborate in this project) and the costs and risks associated 
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with political engagement for the agent (which will depend on the political system 
in which the agent lives and their position within that system). 
As discussed above, the intense seriousness of global poverty means that much 
can be expected of individuals. This means that obligations to act with others to 
alter global social structures can be demanding. Each agent’s position will 
determine both the opportunities for, and the costs of, political action. 
In certain political contexts organisation and campaigning is illegal and those 
involved in such action are persecuted. In such circumstances the dangers and 
risks involved in such action can outweigh the deprivation and domination risked 
by failing to deal with the collective action problem. Obviously considerably less 
can be expected of individuals for whom participating in such action carries a high 
risk of serious retribution by the state. Citizens of affluent democratic states have 
ample opportunity to engage politically with their government’s global economic 
policy without fear of reprisal. This means that more can be reasonably expected 
of such individuals compared to those who toil in the sweatshops of developing 
nations with less open systems of government.99  
Another case in which less can reasonably demanded of an individual is when 
fulfilling an obligation may require neglecting other significant obligations. 
Sometimes the ability to fulfil special obligations can be undermined by the 
demandingness of a general obligation. For example, a parent has an obligation to 
provide for the needs of their young children.100 More effort to engage in political 
action to end structural injustice can be expected from those who do not have to 
care, or pay, for dependent others. 
Those in positions of relative power within an institutional order have more 
opportunities to alter the order and those in positions of relative weakness are 
more vulnerable to the costs that can follow from political intervention. Citizens 
of affluent democratic states have ample opportunity to engage politically with 
their government’s global economic policy. Furthermore, their governments are 
the ones who are imposing the current order (Pogge, 2010) (Pogge, 2005). If 
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 Young argues that considerations of power, privilege, interest and collective ability 
should be utilised in assessing what can reasonably be expected of agents who share in 
forward looking responsibility (Young, 2011, pp.142-47). 
100
 Of course who is charged with special responsibilities will depend on the norms and 
rules within which the individual lives. In most circumstances agents will have an 
obligation to fulfil the obligations outlined by local norms given that the system is not 
particularly in-egalitarian or overly demanding (Dworkin, 1986).  
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citizens of affluent states work together they have the ability to make substantial 
progress towards eradicating global injustice. These considerations come together 
to suggest that more can be demanded of such individuals than of those who toil 
in the sweatshops of developing nations with less open systems of government. 
Both groups have a significant connection to structural injustice. However, the 
costs to affluent consumers of taking political action are much less. This means 
more can be reasonably demanded from them. Given their action is likely to be 
more successful, this means more can be expected from them in terms of results. 
In weighing up the likelihood of success against the costs of taking action it is clear 
that where the likelihood of success is high and the risk of action is low, there is a 
stronger case for taking action. 
What can reasonably be expected of many individuals is limited by their personal 
circumstances. However, there are many individuals of whom substantial efforts 
can be expected. Thus, if a decent sized portion of obligated individuals were to 
fulfil their obligations global coordination could be established. This is because it 
is possible for global coordinating institutions to be established without any 
individual being unreasonably burdened. If political leaders can gain sufficient 
support for establishing such institutions and are committed to tackling these 
problems then such coordination can be established. Furthermore if a decent 
sized portion of people engaged politically to the extent that this can reasonably 
be expected of them, much structural injustice could effectively be alleviated. If a 
decent portion of the global population commits itself to being politically engaged 
and takes action to pressure institutions into tackling injustice then much progress 
can be made. Thus, it is not the case that limits on what can be reasonably 
demanded of individuals means that structural injustice cannot be effectively 
tackled.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have set out an account of what agents must do in relation to 
poverty. I have argued that poverty is a form of structural injustice. In chapter 5 I 
established that agents who contribute to social structures have an obligation to 
make efforts to form a collective to take action to prevent structural injustice. In 
this chapter I have outlined what this requires in the case of poverty. I have 
outlined several different strategies collective action could take and offered some 
examples of such action.  
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Next I proceeded to consider what limits what can be demanded of agents who 
contribute to the structural injustice that is global poverty. I argued that 
legitimacy demands that political movements meet certain criteria and briefly 
discussed the conditions under which collective action that attempts to force 
others to change their action can be justified. 
In the final section, I argued that the demand to make efforts to form a collective 
and tackle structural injustice must be limited by what can reasonably demanded 
of an individual. Finally I outlined the factors relevant for determining the extent 
of the obligation that falls on any particular individual.   In the final part of this 
thesis various objections to obligations outlined in this thesis will be discussed.  
Whether the demand to make efforts to form a collective to prevent structural 
injustice will be explored can be reasonably rejected will be explored. 
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Part 3: Objections 
In this final part of this thesis some objections to the obligation to make efforts to 
form a collective and take action to prevent structural injustice as a precaution to 
lessen the risk of contributing to structural injustice will be considered. Chapter 7 
discusses whether the fact that many other agents are not fulfilling their 
precautionary obligations in regards to global poverty can be used as a reasonable 
excuse for an agent not to comply with the duty. Then, in Chapters 8, two 
separate inconsequentialist objections are explored.  
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Chapter 7: Apathy 
This chapter considers two objections to the claim that there is an obligation to 
make efforts to work with others to form a global collective capable of preventing 
structural injustices. These objections state that there cannot be such an 
obligation given that others will not make similar efforts. If other global citizens 
are apathetic and unlikely to participate in establishing a collective solution, then 
it may be unreasonable to demand that any particular individual makes efforts to 
establish such a collective solution.101  
There are two possible ways in which an agent could use the fact of others’ 
inactivity to reject the obligation to make efforts to form a collective to take 
action to prevent structural injustice. In such circumstances, any agent who makes 
such efforts will be at a disadvantage compared to others as they will have 
expended time and effort trying to establish a solution. Thus it could be argued 
that it is unreasonable to demand that agents take action that will put them at an 
unfair disadvantage relative to others. The first objection states that because 
others will not make similar efforts it is unfair to demand an agent complies with 
the obligation. The second objection states that the general apathy of the global 
population means that any efforts to form a collective to tackle structural injustice 
will fail. Thus, it is argued that individuals cannot be obliged to waste their efforts 
in this way. This is because there cannot be an obligation to take precautions that 
are unlikely to work. In such circumstances it would make more sense to insist 
that agents take action to assist the victims of structural injustice rather than take 
pointless precautions against future injustice. In circumstances where an 
individual’s efforts are unlikely to be successful they will not avoid contributing to 
harm. Furthermore, if their efforts fail then agents do not even lessen their 
contributions to aggregative harm. It is difficult to see why such efforts should be 
seen as necessary precautions if they are unlikely to have any effect on future 
contributions to structural injustice. 
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 The failure of others to acknowledge the obligation means there are fewer people to 
promote a collective solution so the burden on those who do take up the demand will 
increase if they are to be successful.  This is not just a case of sharing the same work 
between fewer people. This problem means that there are more people to persuade and 
pressure to join in a collective solution and therefore more work to do. It may be 
unreasonable to pursue a collective solution to the destruction of the commons in such 
circumstances. 
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I will begin by discussing whether it is the case that apathy is widespread and thus 
the likelihood of a collective able to tackle structural injustice being formed is 
small. I will then proceed to consider whether apathy can be used as grounds for 
reasonably rejecting an obligation to make efforts to form a collective and prevent 
structural injustice. I will first discuss whether complaints of unfair disadvantage 
can ground a rejection of the obligation. Next, whether there can be reason to 
make efforts to form a collective to prevent structural injustice in conditions 
where such action is likely to fail is explored. First the long term effects of such 
failed efforts are considered. Then, it is suggested that there can be pattern based 
reasons that require agents to take action on the grounds that it is part of a 
pattern of action with certain qualities and consequences. I discuss whether such 
‘pattern based reasons’ apply in circumstances where there are insufficient others 
willing to take part in the pattern. I then consider whether agents have an 
obligation not to be part of a set of actors who prevent collective action to 
prevent structural injustice from succeeding. Finally, I argue that there is 
something unreasonable about justifying inaction on the basis of a social fact to 
which your inaction will contribute. 
Is the Global Population Apathetic? 
It is not clear whether the population of the globe is on the whole apathetic. The 
political cultures of societies across the globe differ radically and there is no 
general trend to observe. However, over the last few years there have been a 
number of protest movement that have attracted mass participation. The so 
called ‘Arab Spring’ involved populations across the middle-east taking political 
action to address structural injustice and government abuses. Large protests took 
place in Tunisia and Egypt among others (National Staff, 2011). In Europe, protests 
against austerity measures have also been prevalent, with significant unrest in 
Greece and Spain (BBC, 2013) (Robinson, 2011). More recently in Brazil protests 
about bus fares have turned in to large mobilisations against inequality and the 
priorities of politicians (BBC, 2013). There have also been dramatic protests in 
Turkey against creeping totalitarianism and the destruction of green spaces 
(Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, 2013). This suggests that parts of the global 
population are not averse to taking political action. However, it by no means 
shows that it is realistic to believe that sufficient individuals will make efforts to 
form a collective and prevent structural injustice. 
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In this chapter I will consider whether widespread apathy could in theory justify a 
rejection of the obligation to make efforts to form a collective and prevent 
structural injustice. However, I will not be making a judgement on whether or not 
the global population’s level of apathy is likely to prevent the success of efforts to 
address structural injustice collectively. Instead I will be considering whether, if 
there is such apathy, it can provide a legitimate excuse for rejecting the positive 
and negative duties to make efforts to form a collective and prevent structural 
injustice. 
Fairness and Problems with Obligations to Make Efforts When Others Do 
Not 
Supposing that the majority of people will not fulfil the precautionary obligation 
to make efforts to form a collective and prevent structural injustice, will this place 
those who do make such efforts at a disadvantage? They will have expended 
considerable effort and time in taking action. This will mean they are 
disadvantaged relative to those who take no action. Individual action takers could 
argue that this is unfair. They have a moral reason to object to this unfairness. 
However, it is not sufficiently strong to ground a rejection of the obligation. This is 
because their right not to be disadvantaged in this way is outweighed by the 
rights of the victims of structural injustice not to be seriously and significantly 
disadvantaged. Only in cases where the disadvantage that falls on those who 
contribute is greater than the disadvantage involved in a particular form of 
structural injustice could this objection be reasonable. 
However, it could be objected that there is no moral reason in favour of making 
efforts to form a collective and prevent structural injustice in circumstances 
where those efforts will fail. It makes no sense to insist that agents owe the 
victims of structural injustice efforts that will not improve their situation. Thus, 
there is no moral reason in favour of taking action that can outweigh the reasons 
against acting (the fact that it will put an individual at a disadvantage). It could be 
argued that it is unreasonable to demand agents make these efforts and thereby 
put themselves at an unfair disadvantage since it will not reduce the unfairness 
from which the victims of structural injustice suffer.  
Thus, whether or not this excuse works depends on whether or not there is 
reason to make efforts to form a collective and prevent structural injustice in 
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circumstances where those efforts are likely to fail because insufficient numbers 
will join the collective.  
Rejecting the Obligation on the Basis that it is Unlikely to Work 
In cases where efforts to establish a collective capable of preventing structural 
injustice will not succeed it could be argued that there is no moral reason to take 
this action and thus there can be no obligation to take this action. It could be 
objected that making such efforts will not only fail to do any good, but will also 
put those who make the effort at a disadvantage. Alternatively, it could be argued 
that one’s time and effort could instead be spent assisting the victims of structural 
injustice. This is because this alternative action will actually improve the lives of 
those who are currently suffering.  
Collective efforts to alter social structures to make them more just will only 
succeed if sufficient numbers participate. Thus, if there is reason to believe that 
sufficient numbers will not join collective action, it is likely that such effort will be 
wasted and not result in any significant gains. The first strategy described in 
chapter 6 is most vulnerable to the critique that these efforts are likely to be 
wasted because it requires the largest number of actors to be successful. An 
anarchistic strategy of individuals voluntarily joining together and coordinating 
their action to avoid structural injustice will need nearly all people to join if it is to 
eradicate structural injustice fully.102 Thus it will only work if the majority of 
people join the collective.  
A more realistic strategy that a collective could adopt would involve campaigning 
to get power holders to work together to establish global coordination and then 
tackle structural injustice. For this strategy to work it does not require the 
majority of the global population to contribute. Thus it may be the most realistic 
approach to tackling structural injustice because it requires a smaller number of 
individuals to participate in order to be successful. However, the group 
pressurising the power holder to take action must be sufficiently large to 
outweigh the influence of organisations and individuals who are opposed to 
global coordination or fairly tackling structural injustice. It is likely that those 
organisations and individuals who profit from structural injustice may oppose 
                                                          
102
 However, this approach could eliminate or lessen structural injustice with a smaller 
group of committed individuals. This fact will be returned to in the discussion of reasons 
to reject the objection. 
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such action. It is likely that those organisations and individuals will be able to 
exercise considerable power over decision makers because they are likely to be 
wealthy (in part because they have benefited from structural injustices). It is likely 
that some TNCs, rich states and wealthy individuals may oppose efforts to 
undermine structural injustice through global coordination. This is because they 
benefit from the fact that global competition between states produces low 
manufacturing costs and low taxes. Large TNCs and wealthy individuals are likely 
to be able to influence political decision makers because they can offer bribes, 
fund electoral campaigns, and/or bring jobs and lucrative contracts to a state. The 
leaders of rich states can influence the decisions of leaders in poorer states by 
offering trade benefits, low cost loans, aid, military support or threatening 
economic isolation or military intervention. 
 This suggests that unless the group campaigning for change is large and well 
organised they will not be unsuccessful in their efforts to get political leaders or 
other powerful decision makers to work together to establish global coordination 
and avoid structural injustice.  
The aim of the collective is to pressurise power holders to establish new 
institutions. However, the success of the project will require that a larger number 
of people accept and obey the institutions once they are built. Thus, this strategy 
depends on a large number of people complying with any new institutions that 
are established. 
These strategies are all vulnerable to failure if insufficient numbers take part. If 
insufficient numbers join the collective action, then the action will fail and the 
efforts expended on the project will have been wasted. In the case of direct action 
the worry is that insufficient numbers will join to alter social structures 
permanently and effectively. In the case of political action aiming to influence 
existing power holders the worry is that insufficient numbers will join and thus 
their influence and power will be outweighed by existing groups and powerful 
institutions. Once global institutions have been established there is a further 
worry that insufficient numbers will support the new institutions.  
Thus, if not many people are committed to joining a collective and taking action to 
prevent structural injustice it will not succeed. I will now consider whether there 
can be reason to make such efforts in conditions where they are likely to fail to 
prevent structural injustice because insufficient individuals will participate. 
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Thinking Long Term 
Although apathy may make it unlikely that global coordinating institutions will be 
brought about in the near future there may still be positive consequences of 
political action that aims to achieve such coordination. A political movement may 
fail in its primary aim but still manage to influence decision-makers’ behaviour.  
Political movements affect public opinion, draw attention to particular issues, and 
communicate particular messages to the electorate. They put certain issues on 
the agenda to be discussed and challenge decision makers to justify their choices. 
They directly and indirectly affect the political climate and this in turn affects the 
decisions that are made by power holders who rely on others to maintain their 
position. This means that although a political movement may fail to achieve its 
target of establishing global institutions it may cause some states to coordinate on 
particular issues. These achievements can then be built on by future campaigners 
and may lead to further cooperation in the future. This more likely possibility can 
justify making such efforts where succeeding in establishing global governing 
institutions is unlikely. Furthermore, the long term effects of participating in 
collective action aimed at alleviating structural injustice in terms of alleviating 
suffering, promoting justice and preventing contributions to structural injustice 
may be able to justify the demand to take such action. 
One long term effect of participating in political action is to promote politically 
active citizenship. Taking political action can encourage others to talk about 
justice and to take part in campaigns. In this way a climate where people are 
concerned about justice and take action to bring it about develops. Disparate 
people can develop into a group of concerned citizens who debate political issues 
and take political action. In this way a public can develop that holds government 
to account and demands the government alleviate structural injustice, avoids 
imposing injustice, and promotes good states of affairs. In this way a norm of civic 
engagement can be developed. The public can begin to recognise that they have a 
social responsibility to analyse their society and work together to remove any 
injustices. A norm of civic engagement and active citizenship could be a long term 
consequence of collective action aimed at pressurising governments to alleviate 
structural injustice through global coordination.  
Political action can set an example which encourages others to change their own 
action. Approval and praise of those who take collective action to try to alleviate 
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structural injustice, and disapproval of those who contribute to social structures 
but take no interest in their justice or injustice, can help to develop a norm of civic 
engagement. Norms can develop such that people generally approve of those 
who recognise a duty to look for injustice and take action with others to try to 
alleviate it when they find it.  
Social norms and human behaviour change over time and cannot be relied upon 
to remain constant. This means that current norms should not be considered 
immutable facts in considering new norms or new applications of existing norms. 
For moral analysis to accept facts concerning human behaviour as static would be 
to accept that moral argument cannot convince people to alter their behaviour. 
This would make moral discussion pointless. Moral argument aims in part to alter 
individuals’ choices. If enough individuals are convinced by a moral argument to 
change their action then this can alter social facts. Moral arguments should take 
in to account, but also try to change, social facts. 
Thus, widespread apathy should not be taken as a permanent inalterable fact. It 
could be that by adding to efforts to establish a collective agreement an individual 
contributes to altering the norm of apathy and replacing it with one of 
conscientious activism. In determining what can be reasonably demanded of 
others current facts concerning apathy and likelihood of success must to some 
extent guide judgement. However, an awareness of the ability of these social facts 
to change through individuals being convinced to alter their behaviour should also 
affect judgements concerning what can reasonably be demanded. Thus the fact 
that in current conditions collective action is likely to fail to establish global 
coordination to remove structural injustice should not lead us to judge it 
unreasonable to demand that individuals make efforts to work together to try to 
promote structural justice. 
Reasons and Collective Action 
The objection considered here (that rejects the demand to make efforts to form a 
collective and take action to lessen structural injustice on the basis that such 
action is unlikely to succeed) assumes that it is only the likely consequences of a 
particular action that can justify a moral demand to take it. Thus, if the lessening 
of structural injustice is not a likely consequence of making efforts to form a 
collective and prevent structural injustice, there is no reason to take the action in 
question. However, likely consequences are just one way of justifying demands to 
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take action. There are many alternative proposals as to what could justify a moral 
demand. For example, it could be that the intrinsic worth of an act, or what that 
act symbolises or expresses, justifies the demand for it.103 I will now consider 
reasons other than likely consequences that could potentially justify a demand to 
take the recommended action. I will assess the plausibility of an approach that 
suggest that sometimes an agent can be obliged to take action not because it is 
likely to have particular consequences but because it is part of a pattern of action 
that is likely to have consequences of a particular kind.  
Christopher Woodard has argued that the value or rightness of a whole pattern of 
action can provide a reason to perform a part of it (Woodard, 2008, p. 65). He 
points out that sometimes we perform a particular act because it is part of a 
pattern which we have reason to enact. In such cases, it is the merits of the 
pattern that justify the action. Sometimes this is a long term individual pattern, as 
when we adopt a fitness regime to improve our health. In other cases the pattern 
involves many different actors. The purpose of each actor’s act is to contribute to 
a pattern which they have reason to bring about.  
It is a pattern based reason that justifies the demand to make efforts to form a 
collective and prevent structural injustice. The demand is justified by the potential 
effects of a pattern in which many people take such action. If such a pattern is 
realised, it will prevent essentially aggregative harm and remove structural 
injustice. Individuals are obliged to promote justice and avoid contributing to 
harm. They are obliged to take action to establish a collective and prevent 
structural injustice because it is part of a pattern to avoid contributing to harm 
and promote justice. It is the merits of this pattern that justify taking the action. 
Where it is likely that sufficient numbers will participate, and as a result it is likely 
that the pattern will succeed, the obligation is clearly justified. However, if it is 
unlikely that sufficient numbers will join in then it is likely the pattern will fail and 
it is less clear that agents have such an obligation. In these cases the objection 
considered here suggests that there is no reason to make such efforts. The 
objection rests on the idea that unless a pattern is likely to be realised, there can 
be no moral reason to do your part in it. Woodard explains that many theorists 
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accept pattern based reasons only where a ‘willingness requirement’ is fulfilled.104 
Thus they state that there is only reason to support doing an action as part of a 
pattern if others are also willing to perform their part in the pattern. They argue 
that where others are not willing to do so there is no pattern based reason to 
support the action.  
Woodard rejects the willingness requirement. He argues that there can be moral 
reason to do one’s part in a pattern even if it is unlikely that others will cooperate. 
He states that there can be reason to take an action (which is part of a possible 
pattern of action that could be realised) even if it is unlikely that others will do 
their part. He argues that it is the fact that the action is part of a potential pattern 
that would have good consequences, if it were to be realised, that gives reason to 
take that action. If Woodard is correct there may be sufficient moral reason to 
justify a demand to make efforts to establish a collective that can prevent 
structural injustice, even if others are unwilling to form a collective. I will now 
assess the reasons Woodard offers in favour of accepting that ‘pattern based 
reasons’ can apply even when the ‘willingness requirement’ is not met. 
Woodard uses the un-pragmatic intuitions agents have about sticking to a rule 
even when the consequences are likely to be bad (given sensible predictions 
about how others will act) in order to justify rejecting the willingness 
requirement. It is this intuition that leads people to believe that some moral 
principles should be adhered to even when they will not result in a morally 
superior outcome. This is the intuition that leads some to adopt a deontological or 
rule consequentialist approach to moral questions. These intuitions no doubt 
exist. However, it is not clear that what explains them is pattern based reasons.  
Woodard suggests that when bad consequences are likely to result because 
others are likely to fail to do their part in a pattern there is an intuition which 
supports doing one’s part in the pattern regardless. Similarly, he suggests that 
where bad consequences are threatened because others are unlikely to fulfil a 
moral norm there is an intuition that supports still taking the action that would be 
best if they were to fulfil their obligation (Woodard, 2008, p. 99). Thus Woodard’s 
theory suggests that moral norms are in some ways like a pattern of action. 
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Woodard distinguishes between when a pattern of action is likely to fail because 
others do not fulfil their moral obligations from other reasons which could make a 
pattern fail. Thus he separates dilemmas of acquiescence in which an agent makes 
a second best choice because others act impermissibly from dilemmas of 
necessity in which agents are barred from their first preference by natural 
forces.105 He argues that in dilemmas of acquiescence our intuitions suggest that 
there is still reason to perform our part in the best possible pattern of action, 
even if we have good reason to believe that others will not do so. He describes 
this as an anti-pragmatic intuition (Woodard, 2008, pp. 31-40). He argues that 
what we our obliged to do should be sensitive to changes in natural facts. 
However, he suggests that there is an intuition that supports the idea that they 
should not necessarily be sensitive to the threat of impermissible actions by 
others.  
To support his analysis Woodard considers an example from the work of Bernard 
Williams in which an individual is threatened (Williams & Smart, 1973, pp. 108-
118). In the example Jim is approached by Pedro who is planning on shooting 20 
people as an act of intimidation in order to prevent protest. Pedro states that if 
Jim shoots one person he will forgo killing anyone else.106 Woodard suggests that 
there is a strong intuition that there is a moral reason for Jim not to shoot the one 
even if, on balance, it is the right thing to do. Woodard suggests that pattern 
based reasons explain the intuition that Jim has a reason not to shoot; reasons 
ultimately over-ruled by the moral reasons he has to shoot. Woodard explains 
that the best possible pattern of action is one in which neither Jim nor Pedro 
shoots anyone. Thus, it is the fact that not shooting is part of an optimal pattern 
that explains why there is some moral reason not to shoot. The reason not to 
shoot is a pattern based reason (Woodard, 1999). Woodard insists that this 
reason still applies even though Jim knows Pedro will not fulfil his part in this 
pattern. Woodard suggests that despite the fact Jim knows that Pedro is unwilling 
to be part of this best pattern he still has some moral reason to perform his part 
in it. 
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However, Woodard’s explanation is not the only way that our intuitions about the 
case can be explained. It could be that individuals have some reason to do their 
part to uphold sound moral rules (that if universally adhered to would produce a 
fair world) regardless of what others do. However, sound moral rules could be 
understood as a sort of pattern of action involving all people justified on the basis 
of its likely consequences.107 Thus this explanation could be understood as a form 
of Woodard’s explanation.  
Alternatively the intuition could be explained by the fact that what an individual 
themselves does is more morally significant in assessing their conduct than what 
they fail to prevent others doing. This could rely on a conception of moral 
responsibility in which the division of labour for achieving good outcomes is 
divided between people. Thus, each individual must ensure they fulfil their 
responsibilities and not worry about what others are doing. However, this 
responsibility conception can be understood as a pattern. Each person’s 
responsibility can be understood as their part of a pattern. They have reason to 
ensure they do not shoot anyone because it is part of a pattern of action which if 
carried out will result in no one being shot. Thus this explanation is also reliant on 
pattern based reasons. All of the alternative explanations explored here can be 
understood as reliant on pattern based reasons. Thus, in this case Woodard’s way 
of understanding the moral reasons against shooting that apply in the case looks 
plausible. 
Woodard also discusses a version of Williams’ case of George the chemist 
(Woodard, 2003, p. 221). In this example, George is offered a job making chemical 
weapons. In Williams’s example George is opposed to the development of 
chemical weapons. Under Woodard’s description of the problem developing 
chemical weapons is assumed to be morally problematic. If George does not 
accept the job, someone else (who is enthusiastic about their production and 
more likely to develop the technology at a faster pace) will take it. Woodard 
suggests that George has some moral reason not to take the job but also some 
moral reason to take it. He explains that George has some moral reason not to 
take the job (even if this will speed the development of chemical weapons) 
because not taking the job is part of a pattern of action in which there is a 
moratorium on this sort of work. Thus George has reason to refuse the job 
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because it is part of this pattern even if he has reason to believe others will not 
play their part in creating the pattern.  
Again Woodard’s explanation of the reasons that apply in this case is plausible. 
The alternative explanations for the intuition that there is some moral reason not 
to take the job are the same as in Jim’s case. It could be that there is a 
deontological moral norm that prohibits agents working on chemical weapons no 
matter what the circumstances. However, this prohibition could be justified on 
the basis that it is a pattern which is best all things considered. This pattern offers 
George a reason not to take the job even though he knows others will not follow 
the pattern. The other explanation for why he has some reason not to take the 
job is that he is responsible not for what happens but for what he directly does. As 
discussed above, a system that divides up responsibility could be understood as a 
pattern that requires one to play one’s part in the pattern.108 
In this case, Williams suggests that it is integrity that gives George a reason not to 
take the job. Williams explains that integrity is about making one’s actions 
consistent with one’s deepest convictions. Williams suggests that George has a 
reason not to take the job because it violates his values. However, in doing so 
Williams is offering an ethical reason against taking the job. This is a reason that 
George himself may weigh in determining what to do. However, it is not a moral 
reason (which is part of Williams’s point).  
In the case under examination – where chemical weapons’ development is 
assumed to be morally wrong – there is an intuition that there is something 
immoral and not just unethical about taking the job. However, integrity cannot 
count as a moral reason that speaks against the justifiability of taking the job. It 
cannot be argued morally that George should not take the job because it violates 
his deepest commitments. The moral problem with developing the weapons is not 
that it is problem for George (because of his convictions), but that the 
development of the weapons is a problem for all; in that sense, George owes it to 
others not to take the job. 
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Thus, Williams’s account of the problem with George taking the job does not 
explain the intuition that there is something morally problematic about George 
taking the job. Whereas the explanation offered by Woodard does. Thus an 
investigation of the case of George the chemist adds support to the pattern based 
reasons Woodard identifies. 
In the case under discussion in this thesis, the agent has reason to make efforts to 
form a collective and prevent structural injustice because it is part of a possible 
pattern whereby structural injustice is prevented. According to Woodard’s 
account, the fact that this pattern is unlikely to be followed through by other 
actors reduces the strength of the demand, but does not entirely neutralise it.  
It is often asked “are you part of the problem or are you part of the solution?”. 
This slogan suggests that there is an obligation to be part of a problem-solving 
pattern of action even if it is unlikely enough others will join in. It also suggests 
that if you do not do your part in a pattern that solves the problem you will be 
playing a part in the pattern that is problematic. This implies that there is an 
obligation not to be part of a group that prevents the pattern from being realised. 
In the case of the scientist offered a job making chemical weapons he can be part 
of a potential solution or part of a potential problem. If George takes the job he 
will be part of an organisation that manufactures chemical weapons. 
Furthermore, he will be part of an aggregate that prevents a moratorium on 
accepting such work from succeeding. In contrast, if he refuses the job he will 
have done his part in upholding a moratorium that would result in preventing the 
development of dangerous technologies if universally practiced.  
The existence of pattern-based reasons is also supported by the conviction that 
people have some moral reason to ‘be the change they want to see’:109 that they 
must play their part in a way of living or a set of norms that is not currently in 
operation, but which would produce a better world if universally practiced. 
Consider a case in which a small group of individuals boycott a state because of its 
appalling human rights record. There may be reason to join such a boycott even if 
it is unlikely to succeed in changing the policies of the state. In cases where 
individuals commit to playing their part in a pattern they know is unlikely to be 
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realised they demonstrate to others their willingness to be part of a better way 
forward. They thus influence future action and can provoke widespread change. 
Thus, there are consequence based reasons to be part of a boycott even if it is 
likely to be ineffective. According to Woodard’s account, the fact that joining such 
a boycott is part of a pattern of action that would put significant pressure on the 
state if others were willing to join the boycott also provides a reason to take part 
in such a boycott. He claims that this is true even if one knows that others are 
unlikely to join in. 
It could be argued that by participating in a boycott that they have reason to 
believe others will not join individuals absolve themselves of responsibility for the 
failure of the boycott because they have done their part in the pattern. They can 
claim that it is those who have not done their part who are responsible for 
causing the failure. It could be that they are only responsible for performing their 
part of the pattern and that they should do this regardless of whether it is likely 
others will do their part. This is because being responsible only for ensuring you 
avoid directly harming others could be part of a pattern of action which produces 
the best consequences. 
If an agent chooses to take part in a boycott, it could be because they believe that 
it is important to be part of such a pattern even if they do not think sufficient 
numbers will join in to make it successful. Often this is because of the symbolic 
value of such a stance; it is to do with what their action expresses and the 
example they set to others. They hope in part that others will be inspired by their 
action and change will eventually come. However, sometimes they also believe 
that it is important to take this action because it is part of a solution that would 
work if enough people cooperated. This belief is perfectly articulated by Woodard. 
Acting on a pattern based reason in the absence of a group willing to perform the 
pattern involves acting on the basis of what others should do rather than on 
predictions of what they are likely to do. It is a way of refusing to treat others as a 
natural background against which one acts. It is to treat them instead as agents 
with moral obligations; as collaborators in morality who can alter their behaviour 
to fulfil better patterns. If we were all to respond to pattern based reasons 
regardless of whether we have reason to believe others will do the same then all 
these patterns would succeed.  
229 
 
The analysis above suggests that the idea that agents can have some reason to 
take an action because it is part of a pattern that would have certain effects even 
if it is unlikely to be realised is intuitively plausible. It is also intuitively plausible 
that without a willing group this reason is relatively weak. However, Woodard 
does not offer anything other than these intuitions and the usefulness of this way 
of thinking to justify the fact that we should accept and act upon these reasons. 
However, Woodard’s analysis does not justify why we should accept pattern 
based reasons. It merely shows that our intuitions about our obligations can be 
explained by pattern based reasons. 
In the case of global poverty, the agent has reason to make efforts to form a 
collective and prevent structural injustice because it is part of a possible plan 
whereby structural injustice is prevented. According to Woodard’s account, the 
fact that this plan is unlikely to be followed through by other actors reduces the 
strength of the reason for the demand but does not entirely neutralise it.  
Responsibility 
As noted above, in cases where the success of a pattern depends on the 
cooperation of many different actors it could be argued that each individual is 
responsible for performing their part in the pattern of action. Thus, if that pattern 
fails, this can be blamed on those who did not fulfil their part in the pattern. This 
way of conceiving of an agent’s obligations suggests that moral rules should be 
based on what can be reasonably demanded assuming full compliance, rather 
than what can be demanded given likely levels of compliance. 
The aggregate of individuals who make no efforts to form a collective to prevent 
structural injustice thwart the efforts of those who try to form a collective to 
achieve that goal. Thus those who do not make efforts are responsible for the 
failure. They – as an aggregate – are guilty of an omission.  
This analysis relies on the idea that there is an obligation to be part of a collective 
working to prevent structural injustice and an obligation not to be part of an 
aggregate that prevents that action from working. Thus it begs the question 
against the apathy objection. However, if this account is plausible there is reason 
to embrace it rather than an account which claims that only the likely 
consequences of the individual in question fulfilling a particular demand can 
justify that demand.  
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No individual members of the aggregate who do not make efforts (to form a 
collective and prevent structural injustice) prevent the collective action from 
working. A solution to structural injustice does not need every contributor to 
structural injustice to contribute to a collective solution and thus the efforts of 
others could succeed without any particular individual. However, if a large 
number of contributors do not join the collective they do prevent the solution 
from working. As a group they make a difference even though as individuals they 
do not. 
If collective action is likely to fail whether or not a particular individual 
participates the reason for the failure will be the fact that insufficient individuals 
participate in the collective action. If an individual does not make efforts to 
prevent structural injustice they will be part of this set; they will be part of a group 
whose inaction prevented the change from taking place. Although their own 
refusal to act did not make the difference between the action working and the 
action failing, they are part of a group whose inaction prevented the solution from 
working.  
The problem is such that if a group of people of a particular size are committed to 
not taking action, then collective action will fail. It is difficult to determine the size 
of this group. There are multiple combinations of people who could be part of this 
group. For any individual who does not make efforts to form a collective and 
prevent structural injustice it is not true that their refusal to take such action 
makes a difference. In a situation where apathy is prevalent no particular member 
of the apathetic group is required to prevent collective action from succeeding. 
However, all individuals who do not take part in collective action could be part of 
a group that if they changed their mind and joined collective action would make 
the difference between failure and success.  
Any individual that is a difference making part of a group that could make a 
difference can be fairly accused of being part of the problem. They can be 
identified as part of the aggregate of individuals who can be held responsible for 
the fact that the action fails. An agent is part of the aggregate who culpably omit if 
they are part of any set of agents who fulfil the following criteria. Each member of 
the set has an obligation to make efforts to lessen the chance of contributing to 
structural injustice. Each must be such that the individual in question could have 
been a difference-making part of a group of individuals of whom it is true that had 
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they acted then the structural injustice would have been avoided. By a difference-
making part of such a group what is meant is that if the group minus them had 
made the same efforts they would not have succeeded in preventing structural 
injustice. Thus a set of agents can be isolated who could have contributed to 
avoiding structural injustice, but do not. This set can be held responsible for the 
failure of efforts to prevent structural injustice. Individuals have an obligation to 
avoid being part of such a set. Thus they must make efforts to form a collective 
and prevent structural injustice even if it is likely that this action will fail in its goal 
because of the impermissible omissions of others.110 
Is the Apathy Objection Unreasonable? 
This way of thinking draws attention to something suspicious about using apathy 
to justify not taking part in collective efforts to prevent structural injustice. Above 
it was suggested that those who do not take part in efforts to form a collective 
and prevent structural injustice are part of an aggregate of agents who prevent 
such solutions from working.  
There is something problematic about utilising the social fact that not enough 
individuals are willing to make efforts to form a collective and prevent structural 
injustice as a justification for joining the aggregate that is unwilling to make such 
efforts.  There is an element of hypocrisy in utilising an unfortunate social fact to 
justify contributing to that very same fact. For example, it may be true that the 
social fact of widespread apathy means that making efforts to establish a 
collective and take action will not succeed. However, this does not necessarily 
mean that this fact can provide a reasonable excuse for being apathetic. Using this 
excuse is in some sense unreasonable. 
This unreasonableness is something to which G. A. Cohen draws attention in his 
discussion of Rawls’ argument for offering incentive payments to those with rare 
and useful skills. Cohen argues that the argument for such incentives payments 
cannot pass what he calls the ‘interpersonal test’. This means that those who 
demand such incentive payments cannot justify their need for those payments to 
others. It may be a fact that if the public offers such incentive payments they will 
make the least advantaged as well off as possible. However, Cohen argues that it 
cannot be the case that individuals with rare marketable talents can use the fact 
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that they will only work effectively and productively if such payments are offered 
to justify the need for these payments. This is because they should not refuse to 
work effectively and productively without these payments (Cohen, 2008, pp.27-
87). 
Rejecting the obligation to make efforts to establish a collective and prevent 
structural injustice on the basis that such acts will fail because not enough people 
will participate fails the interpersonal test for similar reasons. Those who are 
apathetic and do not take part in efforts to form a collective and prevent 
structural injustice cannot justify their apathy to the victims of structural injustice 
on the basis that any efforts they make will fail because people are generally 
apathetic and will not make efforts to establish a collective and prevent structural 
injustice. An agent cannot reasonably use an unfortunate social fact to which they 
themselves contribute to justify contributing to it. This is true even if the social 
fact does offers an objective reason to believe that the plan of action will fail. 
Furthermore, there are pragmatic reasons not to accept rejections of obligations 
that rely on facts to which failing to fulfil the obligation contributes. This is 
because generally accepting such excuses will mean that we cannot demand an 
end to some morally problematic social practices. It means that no one can be 
obliged to break the vicious cycle and start a trend that may end the problematic 
social fact. Overcoming problematic social facts requires some people to change 
their behaviours. If the existence of the social fact is accepted as a reason to 
refuse to stop contributing to the fact then the social fact will be allowed to 
continue ad infinitum. Thus, no individual will be obliged to end a social practice 
that is morally problematic. However, ending such a fact would be morally 
desirable. Doing so will require moral pioneers even if these moral pioneers may 
not directly cause any improvements. However, if more and more people join 
them in changing their action eventually the social fact will be reversed and much 
good will have been done. Accepting that an agent is permitted to continue 
contributing to a social fact because of the existence of that social fact would 
involve conceding that no one is obliged to be such a pioneer. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter some reasons to take part in collective action schemes that are 
likely to fail because insufficient numbers of people will join the scheme have 
been explored. It has been suggested that long term taking part in political action 
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can alter a climate of apathy and bring about a public that discusses political 
issues and takes action. Thus it has been argued that there is moral reason to take 
part in political action that fails in its goal as it can alter the social and political 
climate long term in positive ways. Thus efforts to establish global coordination to 
tackle structural injustice that fail can have a positive effect on the chances of 
success of movements to establish such institutions in the future. This offers some 
moral reason to make efforts to form a collective and take action aimed at trying 
to prevent structural injustice. However, it may not be sufficient to outweigh the 
unfair disadvantage that individuals who take up such action will suffer as a result 
of taking part when others do not. 
Next it was suggested that there may in general be moral reason to take part in 
patterns of action with morally desirable consequences even if others will not play 
their parts in such patterns and as a result they are not likely to be realised. The 
analysis of Woodard’s account of pattern based reasons showed that they are a 
plausible explanation of intuitions about certain examples. It was also found that 
these reasons can explain the conviction that agents must ‘be the change they 
want to see’. 
After this it was considered whether agents have a responsibility not to be part of 
a pattern of action that prevents collective effort to prevent structural injustice 
from succeeding. It was proposed that agents who have a prima facie obligation 
to make efforts to form a collective and prevent structural injustice have moral 
reason not to be part of a pattern of action that prevents such efforts from 
working. Thus it was suggested that agents must be part of a collective working to 
prevent structural injustice in order to avoid being part of an aggregate that 
prevent such a solution from working. 
In the final section of this chapter it was argued that there is something 
hypocritical about using generalised apathy as an excuse to be apathetic. It was 
argued that an agent cannot reasonably reject an obligation to make efforts to 
form a collective and prevent structural injustice on the basis that such efforts will 
fail because of apathy. This is because they are trying to use a morally problematic 
social fact to which they contribute to justify their contribution to it. It was 
suggested that such an excuse is unreasonable and that there are additional 
pragmatic reasons that speak in favour of refusing to accept it. 
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This analysis suggests that an obligation to make efforts to form a collective and 
prevent structural injustice cannot be reasonably rejected on the basis that such 
efforts will not work due to the prevalence of apathy. Although there are reasons 
of fairness that speak against demanding such action, these reasons are 
outweighed by the moral reasons in support of such action. This is because our 
moral intuitions suggest that there are moral reasons to take part in patterns of 
actions that are morally required even where others will not play their part in the 
pattern. It is also because there is moral reason not to be part of an aggregate 
that prevents a collective action solution from working. Finally, it is because such 
an excuse is unreasonable because it involves using an unfortunate social fact to 
justify contributing to that fact.  
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Chapter 8: Inconsequentialism 
This chapter will tackle what I consider to be one of the most challenging 
objections to the theory thus far proposed. This is the challenge of 
inconsequentialism. The challenge states that there cannot be a legitimate moral 
demand to do, or refrain from doing, something if it will not make any morally 
significant difference to states of affairs. This criticism can be mounted against 
various moral demands including the obligation to vote in elections, to refrain 
from eating meat, or to refuse to accept well paid employment working on a 
harmful project. In all these cases it can be argued that taking the action 
demanded will not make any difference to the level of suffering and injustice in 
the world and that as a result there cannot be a moral demand to act or refrain 
from acting in the way outlined.  
To see how this objection works, consider the case of elections. In elections it is 
usually the case that no individual vote makes any difference to the outcome. This 
is because the winning candidate almost always wins by more than one vote. Thus 
it seems that the obligation to vote cannot be justified by the likely effects of 
voting. In a similar way an inconsequentialism objection can be made against the 
idea that there is a moral obligation to avoid eating a ham sandwich. In the case 
of a vegetarian contemplating eating a ham sandwich at a buffet, whether or not 
they eat that sandwich will have no effect on the number of animals killed. Thus 
the inconsequentialist can insist there can be no moral reason to refrain from 
eating the sandwich. In the case of a chemist who is offered a job making 
chemical weapons, whether or not they take the job will have no effect on the 
number of chemical weapons developed. This is because if they refuse to take the 
job, another scientist will take their place.  
In all these cases the inconsequentialist objection states that because the action 
prescribed or proscribed has no effect on the level of suffering or injustice there 
can be no justification of the prescription or proscription. Inconsequentialism 
insists that individuals cannot be obliged to refrain from taking actions which do 
not effectively make things worse. This means that in a lot of market based cases 
there is no obligation to refrain from performing a particular action. This is 
because if one refrains it is likely someone else will take one’s place such that the 
bad outcome will occur anyway (Woodard, 2003, p. 222). For example, where an 
individual refrains from buying goods made in sweatshop conditions, or from 
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working for a pay day loans company, it is likely that the goods will be bought by 
someone else and the job will be taken by someone else. Thus, according to the 
inconsequentialist objection there cannot be a legitimate moral demand to refrain 
from doing either. 
The objection from inconsequentialism also suggests that there can never be an 
obligation to participate in a beneficial collective project when one’s participation 
will not increase the effectiveness of the project. It also suggests that there can be 
no obligation to refrain from participating in a harmful project when one’s 
contribution will not make the project any worse. The claims of 
inconsequentialism threaten the idea that there can be obligations to work with 
extremely large groups of others to achieve particular outcomes. This is because 
any individual joining a collective and working within it in pursuit of a particular 
outcome is extremely unlikely to make any difference to whether that action fails 
or succeeds. If the group succeeds in its goal, it is likely that the tasks performed 
by this individual could have been spread throughout the group in the absence of 
their participation. If the group fails in its goal, the individual joining the group will 
have made no difference by joining the group. Thus there can be no obligation to 
take part in large scale collective action.  
Thus the inconsequentialist objection is a threat to any moral demand that 
requires large numbers of individuals to work together to achieve a particular 
goal. It is a particularly effective objection to cases in which there is a set goal 
which will either be achieved or not depending on whether the numbers exceed a 
particular threshold. In cases where every additional contribution will improve 
outcomes the inconsequentialist objection is less effective. 
Inconsequentialism grounds two serious criticisms of the theory of poverty and 
obligations proposed in this thesis. The first criticism questions whether or not 
any individuals can be identified as contributors to a structural injustice (or any 
form of essentially aggregative harm) given that no individual’s contribution 
makes a significant difference to the vulnerability to deprivation and domination 
the victims of structural injustice face. Identifying agents as obligated to take 
precautions to avoid contributing to structural injustice relies on the idea that 
they can be identified as at least partially causally responsible for the structural 
injustice if it occurs. However, if any particular agent’s contribution does not make 
the injustice worse, then it is controversial to claim they are contributors to the 
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injustice. The inconsequentialist objection states that if an individual’s action has 
no effect on the likelihood or level of structural injustice, then they cannot be 
considered a potential contributor. If they are not a potential contributor they 
cannot have an obligation to take action to prevent the injustice as a precaution 
to avoid contributing to the injustice. 
The second objection argues that there cannot be an obligation to make efforts to 
establish a collective to prevent future structural injustice because whether or not 
individuals make such efforts will have no effect on whether the project succeeds 
and structural injustice is avoided. This suggests that we cannot claim that the 
agent has a moral reason to take the action recommended and thus there can be 
no such obligation.  
I will deal with each of these objections in turn. Drawing on the work of Derek 
Parfit in ‘Five Mistakes in Moral Mathematics’, I will argue that the existence of 
aggregative harm grounds the need to go beyond the likely consequences of an 
act in assessing its permissibility. I will argue that agents must also consider the 
effects of aggregations of acts of which their act is part. This means that agents 
can be considered contributors to harm even if their action does not make the 
problem worse and thus that agents can be required to take action to avoid 
consequences which they do not make worse. I will set out an account of how 
individuals can be identified as part of such an aggregate. 
Inconsequentialism and Contributing to Structural Injustice 
I will begin by considering the first inconsequentialist objection. This objection 
states that no individuals can fairly be identified as contributors to structural 
injustice because no individual makes structural injustice worse. This objection 
states that agents cannot be considered contributors to structural injustice when 
their actions do not make the problem any worse. As a result, in many cases 
where the account advanced in this thesis suggests individuals’ negative duties 
require they make efforts to form a collective and prevent structural injustice, 
they have no such obligation. This is because in the absence of collective action 
they will not make structural injustice worse and thus they should not be 
considered contributors. 
How can an individual be said to contribute to a problem when their action is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for the problem and their actions do not make the 
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problem worse? My account suggests that individuals can be identified as 
contributors to structural injustice even when their actions do not make the 
problem worse. This is because in many cases of essentially aggregative harm 
outcomes are over-determined. This means that a given individual’s actions do 
not make the difference between justice and injustice. Thus they do not make the 
problem worse. Restricting the category of contributors to those that make the 
problem worse would mean in many cases considering no individual a 
contributor.  
In cases of essentially aggregative harm no individual act is a necessary or 
sufficient cause of the harm. Furthermore, in many cases of essentially 
aggregative harm no individual act makes the structural injustice more acute. This 
is because once the number of actions reaches a threshold additional actions do 
not make the problem worse. It follows from this fact that in these cases 
removing any particular contribution cannot alleviate or lessen the injustice. 
However, if a large proportion of the acts were to stop, then the structural 
injustice would be avoided. In the case of structural injustice, the injustice is the 
result of the aggregation of a range of practices, institutions, past actions and 
trends. None of the acts that contribute to these factors worsens the vulnerability 
to deprivation and domination of the victims of structural injustice. If any of these 
acts were not performed, there would be no effect on the level of structural 
injustice. However, if some of these practices institutions or trends were to 
change, then structural injustice could be lessened or even avoided. Thus most of 
these acts do not worsen structural injustice and yet together they cause it. 
The solution proposed here is that in order to be identified as causal contributors 
it is not necessary that individuals make a problem worse. The plausibility of this 
suggestion can be seen by considering other cases of harm that are over-
determined. Consider the case of a firing squad carrying out an execution. Each 
member of the firing squad simultaneously fires a bullet into the condemned 
person. Who is causally responsible for causing the death? For any member of the 
firing squad it is true that whether or not they fired made no difference to the 
outcome. The condemned would still be dead whether or not that particular 
member of the squad fired his rifle. Thus no single member of the firing squad 
makes things worse; the condemned would die regardless of whether or not they 
pulled the trigger. However, intuitively it cannot be the case that none of these 
individuals is even partially causally responsible for the death. This suggests that 
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for an individual to be partially causally responsible for an outcome it need not be 
the case that they make the outcome worse. 
Considering how we should think about such a case may help us deal with cases 
where outcomes are over-determined. It seems plausible to say that the firing 
squad as a group made a difference between whether the condemned person 
lived or died. Without their actions the condemned would be alive. After their 
actions the condemned died. Their combined actions made the difference 
between life and death.111  
However blaming a group for a consequence on the basis of the difference their 
combined action made is difficult. Some account is needed of who can be 
included in the group so as to avoid random individuals being added to the group. 
In the case of the firing squad a random individual – for example, Betty – could be 
added to the group. Say Betty brushed her teeth that morning. It is true that if the 
five members of the firing squad had not fired their guns and Betty had not 
cleaned her teeth then the condemned would have lived. A theory that demands 
individuals consider the consequences of sets of acts of which their act is part 
needs a way of distinguishing when an act should be considered part of a relevant 
set. Without such an account the act could be added to other actions to form a 
random amalgamation. This would mean agents would have to consider 
consequences of unrelated acts. Thus we need a way of restricting who can be 
included in a set in order to avoid Betty’s brushing her teeth being included 
amongst the set of actions that results in the death of the condemned. Some 
criterion for restricting membership to the causally responsible group is required.  
In the firing squad example there are many possible ways to differentiate 
members of the group who together cause the death. Each member of the firing 
squad intentionally took part in a collective act with a planned result. 
Furthermore, they each performed an action that was sufficient to cause the 
                                                          
111
 In the case of the firing squad there are ways of explain why each member of the firing 
squad act is wrong without appealing to what the group cause. In the case of the firing 
squad each member fires a shot into the condemned. Any such act is sufficient to cause 
death. This is true regardless of whether in the circumstances the shot made a difference 
to whether the condemned lived.  
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outcome. These factors could be used to identify them as part of the group that 
should be considered responsible for the death.112  
However, in other cases where actions come together to cause outcomes that are 
over determined there are no intentions to be part of a group that create an 
outcome. Furthermore, in some cases the individual acts that contribute to a 
problem are not themselves problematic when considered in isolation. In order to 
determine when an individual’s action is causally relevant to these cases some 
criteria are required. What is needed is a way of determining which acts to 
identify as causal contributions to the problematic outcome.  
I will now consider a case in which ten factories release excess water into a river. 
The river overflows and a town is flooded. It is the case that for any particular 
factory manager, whether or not they release water into the river makes no 
difference to whether there is a flood. This is because the other factories’ 
contributions are sufficient to cause the flood in the absence of a contribution 
from any particular factory. Thus any factory manager can claim that their act of 
releasing waste water into the river does not cause the flood. They can also 
plausibly claim that their actions do not make the situation worse because 
flooding would still have occurred whether or not they released water into the 
river. 
In this case no factory manager intends to take part in a collective plan and the 
factories are not part of a collective organisation. Moreover, (assume) it is not the 
case that any of the individual contributions is wrong in itself. However, it seems 
plausible to say the combination of all ten factories flushing their waste water into 
the river caused the flood. Furthermore, it seems fair to say that each act of 
flushing waste water into the river contributed to the flood. In this next section I 
will develop an account that can identify aggregates as causally responsible for 
outcomes whilst denying that random agglomerations of actors can also be 
identified as causally responsible for outcomes. A strategy is proposed that can 
show why all ten factory managers113 can be identified as causally contributing to 
                                                          
112
 Tracy Isaacs has developed a plausible account of accountability, liability and causal 
responsibility for group actions of this kind (Isaacs, 2011). 
113
 In the example each factory is controlled by a single owner-manager. The manager 
takes the action of turning a switch which releases the waste water in to the river. Issues 
of moral responsibility for the acts of corporations are not explored here. The example is 
about how to identify causal responsibility in cases where many factors come together to 
cause negative outcomes. 
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the flood but the actions of random individuals like Betty cannot be considered 
causal contributions to the flood. 
Derek Parfit has developed a theory for dealing with cases in which a harm or 
benefit appears to be caused by a collection of actions none of which is necessary 
for causing the outcome. His account aims to establish whether an agent has 
moral reason to act or refrain from acting. He suggests that a group can be 
identified as causing harm (or benefit) when it is the smallest group of which it is 
true that, if they had all acted differently, the harm or benefit would not have 
occurred (Parfit, 1986, p. 71).114 
Parfit plausibly argues that, when considering how an agent is obliged to act in a 
particular scenario, it is not simply the likely consequences of potential actions 
that matter but also the consequences of sets of actions of which the action in 
question is part (Parfit, 1986, p. 70). Going beyond the consequences and 
significance of a particular action and judging an action also on the consequences 
and significance of a set of actions of which it can be identified as part is a 
significant move.  
If we apply Parfit’s method to the flooding example it will identify the smallest 
group of factories which could prevent the flood by refraining from releasing 
water into the river as harming the town by causing the flood. In cases where 
each factory releases the same amount of water into the river, this group is 
indeterminate. There are multiple smallest groups. In such a scenario it is 
plausible to consider all individuals that are members of one of the smallest 
groups as causally contributors to the flood. All of these managers’ actions are all 
causally relevant because they all stand in the same relation to the problem. None 
of them could have prevented the problem simply by refraining from action. 
However, for each of them it is true that they could have prevented the problem 
by being part of a group – in fact, multiple cross cutting groups – which refrained 
from flushing waste water in to the river. 
Parfit’s account offers a way of identifying aggregates as causally responsible for 
outcomes. His method offers a means of identifying causal contributors in cases in 
                                                          
114
 Parfit is concerned with when a group harms or benefits. I am concerned with when an 
aggregate can be regarded as causally responsible for an outcome. These are different 
problems. However, they both require a means of separating relevant parties from non-
relevant parties. In this section I utilise the criteria he outlines to solve the objection to my 
account. 
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where there is no causally responsible organisation or collective taking part in 
coordinated action. Parfit’s method suggests that aggregates can be identified as 
causally responsible on the basis of the consequences of their actions considered 
as a set. This practice is vital if we are to hold people causally responsible for 
aggregative harms. If serious essentially aggregative harm is to be avoided, 
aggregates must be identified as causally responsibility for the effects of the 
aggregation of their actions.  
To recap, Parfit suggests that groups who harm or benefit can be identified by 
considering who belongs to the smallest group of agents who could together 
avoid the problem by altering their actions. In this way Parfit isolates a particular 
group of individuals who can be held prima facie responsible for a particular harm 
or benefit (Parfit, 1986, pp. 71-72). By insisting that only the smallest group that 
could together prevent a harm or benefit are causally responsible for it Parfit 
avoids including random individuals like Betty. Any group that contains 
superfluous individuals with no connection to the outcome will be larger than the 
group without these random individuals and thus it will not be the smallest 
possible group.  
However there is a significant flaw with Parfit’s method. By insisting that only the 
smallest group that could together avoid the outcome are to be credited with 
causing the harm or benefit he excludes many causally relevant parties. To see the 
deficiency with Parfit’s method, consider a variation on the flooding example in 
which the factories all put different amounts of water into the river. Assume that 
if the three biggest factories stopped putting excess water in to the river the flood 
would be avoided. Thus these factories are part of the smallest possible group 
that could have prevented the problem by refraining from dumping excess water 
in the river. In the absence of these three actions the flood would have been 
avoided. In such a scenario, Parfit’s way of identifying who harms absolves the 
other factories from responsibility for the harm. However, four of the smaller 
factories could also have prevented the flood by not dumping water into the river. 
Parfit’s method precludes the assessment that this group, too, harms. This is 
because these four factories are not members of the smallest group that could 
prevent the problem by refraining from acting. The group of four factories is 
larger than the group of three factories and thus these four factories are excluded 
from causal responsibility just as the group of three factories and Betty is 
excluded. Yet these four factories could together take action to prevent the flood 
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and have a real causal connection to the problem. Using Parfit’s method to 
establish which aggregate is causally responsible for the flood is problematic 
because it excludes from the aggregate of causal contributors factory managers 
that put water into the river and are part of a group of agents who could have 
prevented the flood if they had refrained from so doing.115 Although we may want 
to say that each of the three larger factories have a greater share of causal 
responsibility it is implausible to say that the four smaller factories have no causal 
responsibility. This flaw in Parfit’s method suggests that a different way of 
identifying causally relevant parties is required. 
The strength of Parfit’s method is to exclude identifying as contributors those who 
have no causal connection to the outcome. However, the weakness of his 
approach is that it also excludes causally relevant parties who make small but 
significant contributions to the outcome. In this next section I will develop criteria 
for determining membership of the aggregate of causal contributors by which 
random individuals can be excluded but those who make small contributions are 
not. 
What matters for ascribing causal responsibility is whether any particular agent’s 
actions are a difference-making part of a group of actions that if not taken would 
avoid the outcome in question. The term difference-making aims to distinguish 
cases where an agent’s actions are irrelevant from cases where they make a 
difference to the success of the group in avoiding the outcome. The way to rule 
out adding random individuals to a group who together make the difference 
between the outcome occurring and not occurring is to consider whether the 
same group minus the individual under consideration would still make the 
difference between the outcome occurring and not occurring.. If the exact same 
group minus any particular member could avoid the outcome without them, then 
they are not a difference-making member of the group. 
Thus an agent should be considered causally relevant to an outcome if and only if 
the following conditions are met. Firstly, the agent is a member of some group of 
                                                          
115
 Parfit’s aim in ‘Five Mistakes in Moral Mathematics’ is not to establish causal 
responsibility. Instead he is concerned with obligations to refrain from harming. However, 
it does seem odd only to consider the three largest factories as ‘harming’ the village. It 
might be pragmatic as a means to avoiding aggregative harms to only hold members of 
the smallest group to be harmers. This limits obligations. However in non-ideal conditions 
of partial non-compliance this may be a risky strategy. When reasoning about what a 
factory manager is obliged to do it also seems implausible to say that the managers of the 
smaller factories are not obliged to refrain from putting water into the river.  
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agents of whom it is true that if they together refrained from acting in a particular 
way the outcome would be avoided. Secondly, it must be the case that this group 
of agents could not avoid the outcome by refraining to act if the agent in question 
was removed from the group and not replaced.116 Thus Betty cleaning her teeth 
cannot be considered a contributor to the flood. Betty is part of several groups of 
agents who if they refrained from acting could prevent the flood (one example of 
such a group is the three biggest factories and Betty). However, the same group 
could still prevent this outcome in the absence of Betty even if she was not 
replaced. Thus Betty cannot be considered a difference-making part of this group. 
There is no group of agents that include Betty of which it is true that with Betty 
they could avoid the outcome but without her they could not. Thus Betty cannot 
be identified as a causal contributor to the flood.  
However, each of the four small factories is a difference-making part of a group of 
agents who could together prevent the flood by refraining from acting. Together 
the four factories can prevent the flood by not flushing water into the river. 
However, if any of the four factories were removed from the group (so continued 
to add water to the river), and not replaced, the flood would still occur. This is 
because three small factories refraining from adding water to the river would not 
be sufficient to prevent the flood. This means that each of the four factories is a 
difference making part of a group that could prevent the flood by not acting. Thus 
they should all be considered contributors to the flood. In fact for each factory 
that dumps water in the river there are likely to be multiple groups that could 
prevent the flood with their contribution but not without it. 
This account of identifying causal contributors can isolate causally relevant actions 
from random actions. It identifies only those actions that could be a significant 
part of an aggregation of actions that would together make the difference 
between one outcome and another. It is all those individuals who are a 
difference-making part of a group of individuals who could together prevent 
structural injustice by refraining from acting who should be considered 
contributors to structural injustice.  
This method shows why an individual can be identified as a contributor even 
though their particular contribution does not make the harm worse. This is 
                                                          
116
 The same method was used in chapter 7 to identify those responsible for preventing 
collective action to prevent structural injustice from working. 
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because their action is a difference-making part of a set of actions that if avoided 
would prevent the consequence. In the case of essentially aggregative harms – 
such as global structural injustice – there will usually be multiple groups of this 
kind. The fact that any individual is a difference-making part of a group whose 
actions are sufficient for the harm to take place demonstrates that the individual 
in question is a contributor to the essentially aggregative harm in question.  
This solution to the inconsequentialism objection challenges it head on. It states 
that it does not matter that an individual’s actions do not make a problem worse. 
It instead insists that it is a mistake to think it is only the consequences of an 
action that matter. This response suggests that a sophisticated understanding 
should consider the effects of sets of acts in addition to the effects of individual 
acts. Where an action is a significant part of a set of actions that together make a 
difference to the consequences then this is morally significant. In these 
circumstances the agent may have an obligation to avoid the actions in question, 
take precautions to prevent the harm, or take on the costs the harm causes. In the 
case of structural injustice, agents are obliged to take precautions to reduce the 
risk of harm being caused by the aggregation of their actions with those of others. 
According to my account, any individual who has reason to believe that their 
future actions are likely to contribute to essentially aggregative harm (according 
to the criteria just stated) has a precautionary obligation to work with others to 
prevent the essentially aggregative harm from taking place. It is the likely effects 
of the set of actions (of which the individual’s action is a significant part) that 
grounds this demand rather than the likely effects of the individual’s actions. In 
this way the individual can be identified as a contributor even though their actions 
are neither necessary nor sufficient for the problem in question and their actions 
do not make the problem worse. This account holds all those who share a causal 
connection to an aggregative harm responsible for taking precautions to avoid it. 
This solution calls on individuals to take responsibility for aggregative harm. It asks 
them to consider the likely results of the aggregation of their and others’ actions 
rather than just considering the difference their actions make. This demand is 
justifiable because the costs likely to result from taking into account aggregative 
harms and working with others to avoid these problems are not as serious as the 
suffering and frustration that is likely to result from failing to address aggregative 
harm. Thus it is reasonable to call on agents to consider the effects of the 
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aggregation of their actions with those of others rather than just the effects of 
their actions.  
In the absence of considering the effects of aggregation of acts much suffering will 
take place. In the case of essentially aggregative harms no individual’s actions are 
harmful when considered in isolation, yet the net result of all these actions is 
significant suffering. The fact that a set of actions can be harmful, when the 
individual actions that make up that set are not, means that consequences of sets 
of acts must be considered in moral judgements over the acts which are part of 
these sets.  
Inconsequentialism and Obligations to take part in Collective Action 
The aim of this section is to examine the second inconsequentialist objection. This 
objection states that there cannot be an obligation to make efforts to form a 
collective and establish institutions to prevent future structural injustices because 
whether or not any individual makes such efforts is likely to have no effect at all 
on the success of those efforts. For the efforts to work a large number of 
individuals must join the collective and seek to address the injustice. When it 
comes to global structural injustice the numbers needed will be very large and the 
number of individuals in the set of those who could work together will be 
enormous. This means that for any given individual it is extremely unlikely that 
their joining the global justice movement (a movement that aims to build a 
collective to prevent global structural injustice117) will have an effect on whether 
or not it succeeds in its aims. The inconsequentialist objection states that since 
the obligation is justified by the aim of preventing structural injustice, if the action 
is unlikely to have any influence on the success of this aim, there can be no 
obligation to take such action. In these cases it seems odd that any individual is 
obliged to make any effort, especially as a precaution to avoid contributing to 
structural injustice. If these efforts do not actually prevent structural injustice, it is 
difficult to see why they should be considered a precaution at all. In these 
circumstances it would be more reasonable to demand that individuals make 
efforts to assist the victims of structural injustice. In this way they do more to 
relieve suffering because they take action that is actually effective. 
                                                          
117
 This movement also aims to tackle injustices imposed by global institutions, 
organisations, transnational corporations and powerful states. 
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Dealing with this objection thoroughly requires extensive analysis. I will proceed 
as follows. First, I make a serious case against applying the inconsequentialist 
objection to the duty to make efforts to establish a collective and lessen structural 
injustice in order to promote justice and prevent future contribution to structural 
injustice. I then proceed to make a case against the plausibility of 
inconsequentialist objections in general. 
It is useful to make explicit the assumptions on which the objection relies. After 
doing this, I will question each of these assumptions in turn. The result is several 
distinct problems with the objection. Some concern the application of the 
objection to the particular case, some to do with the way it functions generally. 
From this analysis I will conclude that the inconsequentialist objection does not 
defeat the obligation offered in this thesis.  
I begin by arguing that an individual’s efforts to form a collective and prevent 
structural injustice are more likely to make a difference than the objection 
supposes. Then I discuss whether there can be moral reason to reject the 
inconsequentialist objection even if it is true that any individual’s efforts are 
unlikely to make a difference to outcomes. I use the first part of this discussion to 
demonstrate that the inconsequentialist objection does not offer reasonable 
justification for rejecting the obligation to make efforts to form a collective and 
prevent structural injustice. Some of the later parts of this discussion are less 
developed and more speculative. Their role here is to explore the way of thinking 
on which the inconsequentialism objection relies.  
Assumptions of the Inconsequentialist Objection 
I will begin by deconstructing the inconsequentialist objection and revealing the 
assumptions on which it relies. The objection outlined above assumes that there 
is one single identifiable goal of the required action (preventing future structural 
injustice) and that if the power of the collective working to prevent structural 
injustice surpasses some threshold this goal will be met. This is the first 
assumption I will show to be false. 
The objection rests in part on the claims that the amount of effort required to 
pass the threshold and achieve the goal is large and that the pool of potential 
contributors is even larger. These facts come together to produce a situation in 
which any individual’s contributions are unlikely to make the difference between 
failure and success. Indeed, it is almost certain that no individual contribution will 
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have a defining effect on the outcome. In making these claims, the objection 
assumes that the consequence of an individual making efforts to form a collective 
and prevent structural injustice is the equivalent of adding one extra person to 
the number of people working together to prevent structural injustice. This is the 
second assumption I will show to be false. 
The objection states that it is unreasonable to demand an action that is unlikely to 
make any morally significant difference to consequences. In the case under 
examination, it is claimed that the importance of avoiding structural injustice 
cannot justify the demand to make efforts to establish a collective capable of 
establishing and maintaining institutions for avoiding structural injustice because 
these efforts are unlikely to have any effect on whether or not structural injustice 
is eradicated. Thus the objection assumes that there cannot be a moral reason to 
take actions that have very little chance of making a difference. This is the third 
assumption I will show to be false. 
More generally, the objection assumes that when a contribution does not make 
the difference between failure and success there is no reason to contribute. Thus 
it assumes that there is no reason to contribute to efforts that will succeed 
without your assistance and that there is no reason to contribute to efforts that 
will fail. In the final section of this chapter I will offer reasons to doubt these 
assumptions. 
Multiple Tipping Points 
The first assumption the objection, then, is that there is a single identifiable goal 
of the efforts demanded and that there is a single tipping point at which efforts 
will become sufficient to achieve this goal. The objection states that the aim of 
making efforts to establish a collective is to establish institutions capable of 
preventing structural injustice and that there is a single point at which efforts will 
become intense enough to achieve this outcome. However, the actual situation is 
much more complex than this. It is not the case that structural injustice will be 
prevented or will continue. It could be that the collective fails to eradicate 
structural injustice fully and yet manages to remove many structural injustices 
and to lessen others. Furthermore, a global social movement may successfully 
achieve global coordination on some of the issues that undermine state’s abilities 
to regulate social structures but not others. In such circumstances it is not the 
case that the efforts made have not made any morally significant difference. The 
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aim of the efforts is not simply to prevent structural injustice, but also to lessen 
structural injustice. This goal can be achieved to a lesser or greater extent. If 
efforts succeed in reducing future structural injustice they will have promoted 
justice and reduced the harm caused by social structures even if structural 
injustice is not completely eliminated.  
Thus, there is not just one single goal that action either fails to achieve or 
succeeds in and there is not just one single threshold that makes the difference 
between current levels of structural injustice continuing and structural injustice 
being eradicated. Instead there is relative success or failure as more or less 
structural injustice is tackled and more global coordination is achieved. I will now 
examine what difference these facts make to the likelihood of an individual’s 
efforts making a significant difference.  
Collective action of the kind defended in this thesis often works by pressurising 
existing regulatory institutions to address structural injustice. Political action of 
this kind can alter the decisions made and lead to a reduction in structural 
injustice even if it does not manage to eradicate it completely. Political action 
feeds into a political climate that constrains and enables decision makers who rely 
on public support; the climate effects what decisions are made. Thus collective 
political action can alter the decisions power holders make. As argued in chapter 
7, political action works by using collective power to incentivise certain actions 
and make others impossible. 
Every additional protester or petition signer has a small effect on the political 
climate which in turn has an effect on power holders. Decision makers can bring in 
laws, policies or initiatives that can lessen structural injustice. The political climate 
has an effect on the decisions they make. In many campaigns that do not succeed 
in their ultimate aim of removing a particular structural injustice there can be 
minor successes that significantly lessen structural injustice. The numbers who 
take part in political action have an effect on whether these minor successes are 
achieved or not. Any individual choosing whether to take part in political action 
cannot be sure that their joining will not make the difference between reaching 
one of these thresholds or not.  
There are many ways in which decision makers can reduce structural injustice and 
many issues on which they can coordinate globally in order to overcome 
structural injustice. Instead of one tipping point there are multiple points at which 
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a reduction in structural injustice will take place. This fact increases the chance 
that any individual’s efforts will make a difference to the extent of future 
structural injustice. This fact threatens the conclusion of the inconsequentialist 
objection because it increases the chances that an agent’s efforts will make a 
difference. In the case of efforts to build a collective capable of preventing 
structural injustice, it is more likely that an agent’s efforts will make a difference 
than the objection’s analysis suggested.118 
Spiral Effects 
The inconsequentialist objection states that each individual only has a very small 
chance of making the difference between failure and success. It assumes that 
each individual just adds to the chance of success by expending their efforts in 
support of the shared goal. This second assumption is also open to question. It is 
unlikely that adding one additional person to the collective’s political action will 
make a difference to the success of a collective project. However, each individual 
can make more of a difference than the addition of their own efforts.  
Individuals may, through setting an example and influencing the behaviour of 
others, affect widespread societal change (Hourdequin, 2011, pp. 452-454).119 
Research has shown that the actions and attitudes of individuals can affect the 
actions of others to create spirals which over time alter social facts. So called 
‘spiral effects’ mean that the behaviour and attitudes of some individuals can 
have a dramatic effect on others who have an effect on still more people 
(Hourdequin, 2010) (Pachucki, et al., 2011). This is because the more individuals 
alter their behaviour, the easier it is for others to change as the idea of normal 
changes to incorporate the new practice. Thus one individual joining collective 
efforts may encourage, and make it easier for, many others to join. Thus, they 
may more significantly increase the chance of success than initially thought. 
Any individual joining a collective may cause other members to join by lowering 
the costs of joining, setting an example, or influencing the decisions of others. In 
                                                          
118
 Shelly Kagan makes a similar case in discussing the utilitarian rationale behind 
vegetarianism. He argues that an individual buying food at the supermarket cannot know 
whether their potential meat purchase will trigger additional orders. However, the 
number of additional chickens ordered will be related to the likelihood of the triggering an 
order such that the expected number of chicken murders you will cause by buying a 
chicken will be one. This is because the supermarket are likely to order x chickens if they 
order every time x chickens are sold. Thus there can be reason to refrain from purchasing 
a chicken even if it is unlikely to trigger an order (Kagan, 2011). 
119
 The norm she discussed is a demand to put efforts in to persuading others to engage in 
individual action to lower contributions to humanly accelerated climate change.  
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this way they may increase the chance of success rather more dramatically than 
originally thought. This chain of consequences can result in significant change. 
When a large enough number of members of a social group start taking some sort 
of action it becomes easier to do it than not. This is because remaining part of the 
social group requires sharing in activities and spending time together.  
The fact that the activity of forming a collective capable of preventing structural 
injustice is recruiting additional members means that in this particular case spiral 
effects will be even more significant. Part of political activity is encouraging others 
to join the collective. For any individual who joins in such action, they will 
encourage several others to join. If those others in turn persuade others to join, 
who persuade others, and so on, there will be exponential growth in the size of 
the movement. This means that the effect of that first individual making efforts to 
establish a collective capable of preventing structural injustice will be hundreds of 
additional members joining the collective. This means that it is much more likely 
that an individual making efforts to establish a collective will make the difference 
between the action succeeding in its primary goal of establishing a collective and 
preventing structural injustice.  
Provisional Conclusion 
I have argued that in the case of efforts to establish a collective and prevent 
structural injustice there are multiple tipping points which if reached will result in 
significant gains. This suggests that the chance of an agent’s efforts making a 
difference is significantly higher than the objection assumes. I have also argued 
that each individual’s effort is not best thought of in terms of a mere addition of 
one extra member to the collective. Rather they will recruit new members who in 
turn will recruit new members and thus their efforts will result in a significant 
increase in the efforts committed to alleviating structural injustice. This also 
increases the chances that their making efforts to establish a collective to prevent 
structural injustice will make a difference. Thus the likelihood of any agent’s 
efforts to form a collective and prevent structural injustice making a difference to 
the level of global coordination and structural injustice is larger than the objection 
assumes. As a result, contra the objection, there may be some moral reason to 
take such action. 
252 
 
Small Chances Can Matter 
Having argued that in this particular case there is more chance of making a 
difference than the inconsequentialist objection assumes I will now proceed to 
question some of the assumptions on which all inconsequentialist objections rely. 
Thus, the following criticisms reveal some fundamental problems with the 
objection. I will argue that even if there is only a very small chance of an action 
making a difference there can still be moral reason to take that action. 
As noted above, the inconsequentialist objection rests on the idea that there 
cannot be an obligation to take action that has very little chance of making a 
difference. However, there are cases where agents are obliged to perform actions 
that have very little chance of making any difference. These are cases in which the 
difference that they make, if they do make a difference, is large and significant. 
Where there is a very small chance of making a very big difference individuals can 
have an obligation to act. This is because the expected benefits of the action can 
still turn out to be high. As Derek Parfit notes, a very small chance of making a 
very big difference is worth taking (Parfit, 1986, pp. 73-75) 
In the case under discussion, there is a small chance that an individual’s 
contribution will make the difference between succeeding and failing to eliminate 
structural injustice and a larger (but still small) chance that an individual’s 
contribution will make a difference to the extent of structural injustice. Although 
this chance is small for any individual, no individual can know that their 
contribution will not be the one that makes a difference. Thus there is a small 
chance that an agent will make a difference. However, despite the fact that the 
chances of making a difference are small the benefits of success are significant 
enough to justify the demand to take action. Thus, this small chance of making a 
very big difference can be legitimate grounds on which to demand action.120 
Non-Consequentialist Moral Reasons to take Action 
Inconsequentialist objections assume that there cannot be any moral reason to 
perform actions that are unlikely to make any difference to morally significant 
facts. However, there may be good reason to doubt this. In the closing sections of 
this chapter I will consider various proposals for moral reasons that do not appeal 
                                                          
120
 As discussed above, in the particular case of efforts to form a collective as a precaution 
against structural injustice, the chance of making a difference is not incredibly small. This 
is because there are multiple tipping points at which structural injustice will be reduced 
and because joining a social movement involves recruiting new members and thus one’s 
efforts are likely to produce additional efforts by others. 
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to the consequences of a particular action to justify recommending it. I will 
consider whether any of these account offer reason to take action in cases where 
the expected moral benefits of such action are low.  
Expressing Respect 
Even if the chance of making a difference to consequences is low, there may still 
be good reason to make efforts to form a collective to tackle structural injustice. 
In fact, even in the absence of such consequences it may still be reasonable to 
demand agents take such action. It could be argued that there is moral reason to 
make efforts to establish a collective and prevent structural injustice even when 
such efforts will not make a difference because taking such action expresses 
respect for those suffering from structural injustice as well as concern for their 
plight. This is based on the idea that agents are morally obliged to act in ways that 
honour others and express respect. 
Of course, concern and respect for victims could also be expressed in other ways. 
Assisting the victims directly is also a means through which this concern and 
respect can be expressed. Since such efforts will make a difference to their lives it 
does not look like the need to express respect is a decisive reason in favour of 
making efforts to establish a collective and prevent structural injustice when these 
efforts are unlikely to make any significant difference. There is no reason why 
what individuals who contribute to structural injustice must do is make efforts 
towards a purported solution that will make no significant difference rather than 
take some other action that will have positive consequences (such as aiding the 
victims of structural injustice). It seems odd that agents cannot reject an 
obligation to perform an action which they have good reason to believe will make 
no significant difference to the state of the world. Thus expressing respect cannot 
count as a decisive reason in favour of working with others to prevent structural 
injustice. 
Pattern Based Reasons 
In chapter 7 it was argued that there can be a moral reason to take an action 
because of the fact that it is part of a pattern of action with certain properties or 
likely consequences even in cases where the other parts of that plan are unlikely 
to be carried out. If such pattern based reasons exist they offer a reason to take 
part in collective action even when your contribution is unlikely to make a 
difference. This is because your action is part of a pattern of actions with morally 
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significant consequences. Making efforts to form a collective and prevent 
structural injustice is part of a pattern of action in which many people make such 
efforts and as a result global institutions are established and structural injustice 
effectively regulated. It is the consequences of such a pattern that justify the 
demand to take action. Thus, if the proposed actions may be considered part of 
this pattern, then pattern based reasons offer a justification for the demand. 
The obligation to make efforts to establish a collective and prevent structural 
injustice is an obligation calling on individuals to perform their part in a pattern of 
action that if fulfilled will prevent the continuance of structural injustice. It is the 
importance of preventing structural injustice that justifies the demand. Thus it is 
the consequences of the pattern, of which the efforts are part, which justifies the 
demand to take the action in question rather than the immediate consequences 
of the act itself. Those who make such efforts enact part of such a pattern. This 
action can be demanded because it fulfils part of a pattern we have moral reason 
to bring about. 
Pragmatic Reasons to Embrace Pattern Based Reasons 
Accepting pattern based reasoning involves rejecting the premises on which the 
inconsequentialist objection relies.  It involves suggesting that it is not merely the 
likely consequences of an action that can justify the obligation to take it.  There 
may be pragmatic reasons that speak in favour of embracing pattern based 
reasons and rejecting inconsequentialism as an excuse for inaction. 
If we are determining what excuses should be generally accepted for failing to 
take part in collective action, then it is a bad idea to accept the excuse that such 
efforts are unlikely to make a significant difference to consequences. This is 
because generally accepting this excuse would mean that contributing to 
collective projects with significant moral outcomes could never be morally 
required. Thus, there would be no obligation to tackle serious moral and political 
challenges that require the cooperation of many individual in order to be 
addressed. This would be disastrous. As argued in the introduction to this thesis, 
in the modern world humanity faces many challenges that cannot be overcome 
without global coordination. Rejecting pattern-based moral reasons that require 
that individuals play their part in patterns that if fulfilled will prevent these 
problems would thus be disastrous. 
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In cases where multiple individuals can take part in collective action accepting 
that any individuals contribution is unlikely to have an effect on the consequence 
as an excuse for inaction would mean that no individual is obliged to act. This 
would mean that no large scale collective actions could be morally demanded. 
The fact that such actions are required to prevent serious structural injustice 
offers a reason not to accept this excuse. Intuitively the potential benefits of these 
collective efforts can justify the demand to play your part in them even if your 
own contribution is unlikely to make a difference to outcomes.  
Reasons of Fairness and Obligations to Contribute 
The inconsequentialist objection states that it is very unlikely that an individual’s 
contribution will make the difference between structural injustice being alleviated 
or not. This is because there are two far more likely scenarios in both of which the 
individual’s efforts will be wasted: either the individual will make superfluous 
contributions to a collective action that would have succeeded in any case or they 
will waste their efforts contributing to collective action that fails to achieve its 
goal. Chapter 7 discussed why there can be reason to make contributions to 
collective efforts to alleviate structural injustice that are likely to fail. It suggested 
that pattern based reasons offer a justification of the obligation because these 
reasons apply even when an insufficient number of others are willing to 
contribute to the pattern. This section will suggest that there can be good reason 
to contribute to efforts to form a collective and prevent structural injustice even if 
collective action to avoid structural injustice will succeed without your 
contributions.  It will be argued that there is some moral reason to participate in 
these collective efforts out of a commitment to fairness. 121 
The strongest case for reasons of fairness can be made in situations where one 
can relieve the burdens of others taking part in collective efforts by joining them. 
If an agent’s contribution to forming a collective and preventing structural 
injustice can lessen the burden of others also taking such action, then they may 
have moral reason to do so. It is not fair to allow others to bear a greater amount 
of the costs of taking precautions because you are not contributing to 
                                                          
121
 There has been widespread debate as to when and why obligations to avoid free riding 
occur. This case is particularly interesting because it concerns a case in which an agent 
free-rides on the precautionary efforts of others. It is a case in which an agent avoids 
causing harm because of the efforts of others. In the more usually discussed cases it is 
considered whether an individual has an obligation not to benefit as a result of a mutual 
benefit scheme to which they do not contribute (Nozick, 1974) (Barry, 1991). 
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precautionary efforts. It is important that each agent who contributes to social 
structural injustice takes on a share of the costs of preventing injustice in those 
social structures. This can mean that an agent is required to make efforts to form 
a collective and prevent structural injustice even when the collective efforts 
would fully succeed in the absence of their contribution. This is because in the 
absence of their contribution other agents will take on a larger share of the costs. 
To see this, consider the following analogous example. In a small town many local 
people set off fireworks on a traditional holiday. This practice is fairly dangerous 
and often people are injured and property is damaged. Thus there is an obligation 
on those who set off fireworks to take precautions to reduce the risk of injury. 
Suppose that a group of residents work together to protect property and establish 
a fire safety team to put out any fires promptly and thereby avoid damage. 
Consider the obligations of a resident who puts on an annual firework display but 
is not part of this collective effort. The analysis here suggests that such an agent 
has an obligation to join the collective who fire-proof the town and help organise 
the fire safety team: they must contribute time and money to this collective 
effort. This is because not to do so would be to free ride on the precautions of 
others. This is the case even if their fireworks will not cause any harm regardless 
of whether or not they contribute, because the fire proofing and fire-safety team 
will prevent this harm. 
Unlike in cases of free-riding on mutual benefit schemes, in this case an agent 
cannot simply claim that they do not want the benefit of the other agents efforts 
and thus they would rather no such scheme was established. This is because they 
have an obligation to make efforts to establish such a scheme where there is no 
such scheme. This is because the schemes aim is to avoid harm rather than to 
provide benefits. 
Similarly, it would be wrong for those who contribute to social structures to free 
ride on the efforts of others to prevent structural injustice. Thus, agents have an 
obligation to make efforts to prevent structural injustice in their social structures 
even when sufficient others are already engaged in such collective action. This 
means that the inconsequentialist is wrong to suggest that there is no obligation 
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to take such action in cases where sufficient others are already partaking in such 
action.122 
The fact that agents do not voluntarily choose to pose a threat to others does not 
affect this analysis. To see this consider a case in which the residents of a slum 
without sewerage organise a scheme whereby effluent is cleansed from the street 
on a daily basis. Those slum dwellers who do not contribute to such a scheme 
non-voluntarily contribute to a hazard that threatens the health of all occupants. 
They have an obligation to contribute to the cleansing scheme even if the scheme 
would succeed without their efforts. This is because they have an obligation to 
avoid free-riding on the precautionary efforts of others. It would be unfair of them 
not to contribute. This is true even though they cannot avoid contributing to the 
problem that requires the cleansing. 
To see the strength of reasons of fairness, consider a case in which it is clear that 
efforts to prevent structural injustice will succeed with or without an agents 
contribution.123 Consider a scenario in which a society is regulated by just 
institutions and in which there is an established civic public who participate in 
political discussion and action aimed at maintaining the justice of the established 
political institutions (by holding them to account) and ensuring they deal with any 
structural injustice. In such a scenario the loose collective of active citizens take 
on various costs (dedicating time to discussion of political issues, organising 
meetings, taking political action) in order to play their role effectively. They are 
likely to distribute essential organising tasks between members who commit lots 
of time and rely on a larger membership to flag up emerging issues to organisers, 
attend demonstrations, and sign petitions. In such a scenario, does a politically 
inactive citizen have an obligation to follow public events, consider them 
thoroughly and work with others to prevent structural injustice? 
First consider whether they have an obligation to join structural justice promoting 
demonstrations and sign relevant petitions. Such action will not lessen structural 
                                                          
122
 The argument above suggests that there is an obligation to take part in such efforts in 
order to alleviate the costs to others already taking part in such action. However, it could 
be argued that even where joining in such efforts does not alleviate the costs on others, 
the moral demand to avoid free riding may require that individuals contribute. It could be 
argued that fairness can demand such action even where it will neither prevent more 
harm nor relieve the burdens of others. This is a controversial moral claim.  
123
 In contrast, in the inconsequentialism case it is likely that agents will either contribute 
to efforts that will succeed anyway or contribute to efforts that fail.  However, it is unclear 
which will be the case. 
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injustice (as the example is described the agent knows that structural injustice will 
be avoided anyway thanks to the politically active citizens). Nor is it likely that 
such action will relieve the burden on those who currently take similar action; it is 
likely that these individuals will still spend as much time staying informed, 
attending demonstrations and signing petitions. In such a case the demand to 
take such action cannot be supported by its effect in terms of relieving the 
burdens on others. However, it may still be a required as a strict requirement of 
fairness. It may be demanded because there is a general obligation not to free 
ride on the efforts of others. However, this is a controversial moral claim. 
In contrast, consider the case of a citizen who is considering helping to organise 
meetings, petitions and political events. It is likely that if they take on an 
organisational role or assist in these ways they will be relieving the burdens of 
others. It is likely that if they volunteer for such duties at meetings, other 
politically active citizens will have the burdens of maintaining structural justice 
alleviated. They will be able to spend more time on leisure activities or valuable 
projects, safe in the knowledge that structural injustice will still be avoided. Thus, 
there is an obligation to take on these organisational tasks even if taking them on 
will have no effect on the level of structural injustice experienced. This is because 
taking on these tasks will alleviate the burdens of other active citizens. In this way 
the costs of maintaining structural justice will be more fairly shared and the 
previously inactive citizen will no longer be free-riding on the precautions of 
others. 
The analysis in this section suggests that there can be moral reason to contribute 
to efforts to prevent structural injustice when those efforts will succeed with or 
without your contribution.  The section before suggested that pattern based 
reasons offer grounds for justifying an obligation to make efforts to form a 
collective and prevent structural injustice even when such efforts are likely to fail.  
These two sections come together to suggest that there can be reason to 
contribute to collective efforts to prevent structural injustice even when it is 
unlikely that your efforts will make a difference to whether structural injustice is 
lessened or not. This is because they offer reasons to support taking such action 
when it does not make a difference to the level of structural injustice (either 
because injustice will be alleviated anyway thanks to the efforts of others or 
because it will continue at current levels due to the apathy of others). 
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Conclusion: Rejecting the Inconsequentialist objection 
The first part of this chapter developed an account of how contributors to 
structural injustice can be identified. It argued that contributors can be identified 
by the fact that they could be a difference-making part of a group that could 
prevent structural injustice by refraining from contributing. I defined an agent as 
difference making when the same group could not prevent structural injustice 
without them (assuming that they were not replaced).  This account offers a way 
to identify all genuine contributors while excluding random individuals.  Thus it 
enables an aggregate of contributors to be identified who can be charged with 
duties to work together to avoid causing structural injustice. 
In the second part of this chapter several different problems with the 
inconsequentialist objection to the obligation to make efforts to form a collective 
and prevent structural injustice were discussed.  It was first noted that if collective 
efforts succeed in lessening structural injustice this is morally significant and that 
there are many tipping points which make a difference to the level of structural 
injustice. It was thus argued that an individual’s chance of lessening structural 
injustice by joining such efforts is higher than their chance of making a difference 
to whether or not there is any structural injustice. Next it was argued that the fact 
that the obligation is in part an obligation to evangelise and recruit new members 
to the movement also increases the chance that an agent’s efforts will make a 
difference. This is because they will attract new members, who will attract new 
members. In this way one agent making efforts to form a collective and prevent 
structural injustice could result in hundreds of new members.  
Next it was argued that the fact that lessening structural injustice through political 
institutions will make a huge difference to many lives for the foreseeable future 
combined with the fact that there is a significant chance that an agent’s action will 
lessen structural injustice mean that the expected moral benefit of such efforts is 
high and thus there can be a consequentialist reason to support making efforts to 
form a collective and prevent structural injustice.  
In the final section of this chapter the notion that there is no reason to make non 
difference-making contributions to political movements was questioned. It was 
argued that it could be argued that agents have moral reason to take part in 
political action because their action is part of a set of actions which, if others 
contributed, would result in morally significant consequences. It was suggested 
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that there can be moral reasons to perform acts or refrain from taking actions on 
the basis that they are part of a set of actions that achieve or undermine certain 
goals. Pragmatic reasons for accepting such an account were offered. Finally, it 
was suggested that there can be reasons of fairness that demand an agent join in 
such action even when it will succeed without them.  This in combination with the 
reasons that support contributing to efforts that are likely to fail due to apathy 
(outlined in chapter 7) undermine the inconsequentialist objection.  They offer 
reasons to take action aimed at forming a collective and preventing structural 
injustice when those efforts will not make a difference to structural injustice.  
Thus they suggest that there can be moral reason to make non-difference-making 
contributions. 
This final section proposed certain ways of thinking that may be helpful and 
intuitively plausible. It proposed that pattern based reasons and demands of 
fairness could justify making efforts where they are unlikely to be difference-
making.  However, no definitive argument for embracing these ways of thinking 
was offered. Such an account would involve extensive consideration and may be 
an interesting project to pursue elsewhere. However, such an account is not 
required in order to address the inconsequentialist objection as this objection can 
be defeated by the reasoning set out in the preceding sections. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis proposes that there are both positive and negative duties which 
require that people around the world take political action that aims to regulate 
social structures to prevent poverty and avoid extreme inequality.  In this 
conclusion I will outline the arguments made in this thesis, situate the ideas set 
out here in the existing literature, and discuss what my account adds to that 
literature.  Finally I will discuss possible future directions for this research project. 
Review of the Argument 
This thesis proposes that poverty and inequality are socially caused. It outlines an 
account of poverty in which it is understood as the necessary result of a social 
structure that systematically and avoidably places whole sections of the global 
population in inferior social positions.  These are social positions in which they are 
vulnerable to severe deprivation and domination.  Thus it establishes that poverty 
can be understood as a form of social structural injustice.   
The analysis here suggests that there are positive duties to promote structural 
justice.  It also outlines the case for the existence of negative duties in relation to 
social structural injustice. It explains that these are ex-ante duties to prevent 
social structural injustice as a precaution to avoid contributing to structural 
injustice (which is understood as a form of essentially aggregative harm).   
This account states that structural injustice can effectively be avoided only by a 
range of actors coordinating their action and behaviour.  It has been suggested 
that by working together people can lessen structural injustice in a number of 
different ways.  They can coordinate their action so as directly to avoid the 
injustice, establish institutions to regulate behaviour to alleviate structural 
injustice, or pressurise current power holders to alter policies and/or to 
coordinate with others to prevent structural injustice.  All of these solutions 
require that a significant number of people to work together. 
Trying to establish a collective to prevent the continuance of structural injustice is 
both a positive action and a means through which agents can avoid contributing 
to structural injustice.  Such action fulfils positive duties to establish structural 
justice and negative duties to take precautions to avoid contributing to structural 
injustice.  Thus, this thesis defends the claim that there are positive and negative 
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duties to address poverty by taking explicitly political action.  Such action 
promotes justice (which there is a positive duty to do) and is a precaution that can 
lessen the chance of an individual contributing to structural injustice.  Thus this 
analysis suggests that people must take political action in response to poverty.   
Given that the action and practices of agents in one state alter the environment 
and social and economic situation of agents in other states, agents’ obligations to 
avoid contributing to structural injustice require that they consider the social 
positions of agents in other states.  This is true even in the absence of a shared 
global state. 
This thesis has argued that in order to tackle poverty and inequality it is vital that 
there is global coordination.  It has explained that such coordination is required in 
order to allow national or local governments and communities to regulate social 
structures locally so that they fulfil principles of social justice.  Tackling structural 
injustice in many states is impossible because governments are constrained in 
what they can do by global competition and international pressures.  Often a 
state’s ability to redistribute wealth, promote development, ensure decent 
working conditions, ensure fair wages and provide essential services, is 
undermined by global competition as well as by global pressures, norms, and 
institutions.  Thus, social structural injustice offers a reason to establish global 
institutions.   
Traditionally international institutions have been thought to be a threat to 
national sovereignty and as having the potential to undermine state’s self-
determination.  However, the discussion in chapter 4 suggested that global 
institutions can in many circumstances actually increase sovereignty and secure 
self-determination.  This was argued on the basis that global coordination can 
prevent states from being constrained by global competition.  In this way, global 
coordination can allow states a greater range of effective policy choices and a 
higher degree of independence.  Thus such global coordinating systems instead of 
enforcing a single conception of social justice could allow for states to impose a 
locally agreed conception of social justice in their jurisdiction. 
In the final sections of this thesis it was demonstrated that concerns with apathy 
and inconsequentialism do not offer sufficient reason to reject an obligation to 
take political action aimed at lessening structural injustice.  In relation to apathy, 
it was argued that there is something unreasonable about using the social fact of 
263 
 
apathy to justify being apathetic.  In relation to inconsequentialism it was argued 
that the chance of making a difference is larger than this objection assumed and 
that a small chance of making a very big difference can justify a demand to take 
action.  It was also proposed that the action recommended by the negative duty is 
justified on the basis of the pattern of which it is part and not simply on its own 
merits.  Thus it is not the likely consequences of the action itself that matter but 
the likely consequence of a pattern of which it is part.  If true, this means that the 
fact that the action itself is unlikely to have positive consequences does not show 
that there is no moral reason to take the action in question. 
Contribution to the Literature 
In part one of this thesis existing accounts of poverty and obligation were 
discussed.  I explained that Simon Caney has offered an account of positive duties 
to bring about global justice (Caney, 2005) and Thomas Pogge has offered an 
account of negative duties to avoid making uncompensated contributions to the 
imposition of unjust global institutions (Pogge, 2008).  It was argued that there 
may be additional obligations that have yet to have been identified.  This thesis 
adds to the literature on poverty and obligation by suggesting that even in the 
absence of coercively imposed institutions there can be negative duties in relation 
to global injustice.  Furthermore, it introduces the idea that there are ex-ante 
precautionary duties to prevent poverty rather than compensate for contributions 
to it.  My account suggests that these duties can only be fulfilled by taking political 
action. 
Negative Duties in Relation to Structural Injustice 
The thesis introduces the idea that there can be negative obligations to take 
political action even in scenarios where there is no shared state or coercively 
imposed institutions of any kind.  It explains that all that is required is for there to 
be people who have an effect on shared environmental, economic or social 
conditions.  Whenever this occurs there are shared social structures.  These social 
structures will place agents in social positions.  Wherever there are social 
structures there is a threat of social structural injustice.  In these conditions 
agents have a negative duty to try to form a collective and take action to prevent 
structural injustice.  This is required as a precaution to limit the chance of 
contributing to structural injustice. 
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Ex-ante Precautionary Duties 
My account is original in its use of precautionary duties to justify obligations to 
take action to avoid contributing to social structural injustice.  Precautionary 
duties require agents to take positive action ex-ante rather than compensatory 
action ex-post.  Understanding duties to prevent structural injustice as 
precautions brings to the fore both the humanly caused nature of structural 
injustice and the need to take aversive action to avoid such injustice. 
Many accounts of poverty and global injustice consider obligations to assist or pay 
reparations to the victims of injustice or cover the costs of injustice (Miller, 2007) 
(Pasternak, 2011) (Jubb, 2012).  Instead my account focusses on what can be done 
to avoid future social injustice and who can be obliged to take such action.  As 
discussed in Chapter One it is important to consider ex-ante action because in 
many circumstances acting ex-ante and thus avoiding a problem is preferable to 
allowing it to occur and then attempting to aid or compensate.  This is in part 
because in many cases ex-ante action is less costly than ex-post compensation.  It 
is also because it is often better for the victim to avoid harm in the first place than 
to have that harm occur to them and then compensate them. 
Duties to take Political Action 
The account of duties in relation to poverty established in this thesis aims to 
emphasize the importance of taking political action.  Political action is required of 
all agents so as to protect others from structural injustice and to avoid 
contributing to such injustice.  The analysis here suggests that it is not enough to 
assist the unfortunate and avoid directly harming others.  In an interconnected 
world responsible agents must take action to establish and maintain institutions 
that prevent the serious aggregative harm that is structural injustice. 
This thesis suggests that private charitable giving cannot offset contributions to 
structural injustice.  This is because such action does nothing to secure a social 
structure in which no group is systematically and seriously disadvantaged in terms 
of the vulnerability to deprivation and domination characteristic of poverty.  Only 
joining with others to alter social structures can act as a precaution to lessen the 
chance of contributing to serious structural injustice. This does not mean that 
efforts to assist the victims of misfortune and injustice are not required.  
265 
 
However, it does mean that this action cannot replace political action which is 
demanded by positive and negative duties alike. 
Assisting the victims of poverty cannot substitute for political action.  This is 
because charitable assistance can alleviate suffering, but cannot address injustice.  
Injustice can only be addressed by altering social structures in such a way as to 
ensure that no agents are placed in a social position where they are vulnerable to 
deprivation and domination.  When individuals in poverty are aided their 
wellbeing is improved.  However, this does not prevent them from being 
vulnerable to deprivation and domination.  This is because their access to income 
cannot be secured in this way.  They cannot be certain that the aid will continue 
and are vulnerable to being dominated by those who provide aid. 
In contrast to assistance, political solutions (that involve coordinated action) offer 
a means through which the causes of poverty can be addressed and permanent 
solutions established.  Thus they provide a means through which poverty can be 
prevented rather than alleviated.  They offer the opportunity for agents to secure 
access to essential resources.  Thus, they offer a means through which injustice 
can be ended as well as suffering alleviated.   
Furthermore, political action also offers a way in which more can be achieved by 
less effort on the part of contributors in comparison to uncoordinated efforts to 
assist the victims of injustice.  This is because governing institutions can 
coordinate efforts and thus do more with less.  Furthermore, in many cases it is 
less costly to prevent the problem than to tackle the effects of the problem.  A 
further advantage is that governing institutions can fairly share the burden of 
preventing structural injustice so that no individual has an unfair share of the 
work.   
Political action also offers a means to preventing poverty that the poor can 
themselves engage in.  Concentrating on aiding the poor through donations 
excludes many from participation.  This is because they lack the resources needed 
to make a significant difference through aid.  By taking political action with others, 
individuals without access to resources can make efforts to end poverty that have 
a significant effect.  Unless an individual has great wealth or income, they can 
make more of a difference through changing governing institutions than through 
private action to alleviate poverty.  This is because the majority of wealth is 
controlled by a very small sector of global society.  Even those on comfortable 
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incomes could do more to prevent poverty by working with others to alter 
governing institutions than by donation because the distribution of wealth is so 
top heavy.  In Singer’s discussion of how charitable giving could end poverty he 
shows how a transfer of wealth from the richest 10% of affluent societies like the 
USA could end global poverty.  The distribution of income within affluent states is 
heavily concentrated at the top.  This suggests that those who live in affluent 
states but are not part of this 10% can best tackle global poverty by campaigning 
for political change that ends this unfair division of income (Singer, 2009, pp. 164-
171).124  Those who live in non-affluent states and are not part of the elite should 
also concentrate their efforts on political action. 
Future Projects 
The thesis also lays the ground for future research projects.  Below, I look at some 
of the uses that the reasoning developed here could be put to, as well as 
remaining questions and aspects of global justice that the account does not 
include. 
Civic Engagement 
The demand to make efforts to avoid structural injustice requires agents to work 
together to establish and maintain just and legitimate institutions for avoiding 
structural injustice. The account outlined here suggests that even after political 
institutions are established people still have an obligation to work with others to 
secure structural justice.  They can fulfil this obligation by monitoring social 
structures, institutions and policy proposals and taking political action to pressure 
decision makers to ensure they prevent structural injustice.  Thus the obligation 
outlined here justifies a norm of civic engagement.  The obligations established in 
this thesis support a moral demand to participate actively in politics; to pay 
attention to social structures and institutions; and to take action with others to 
hold institutions to account.  This account could be developed so as to provide an 
argument for a form of civic republicanism.   
The account of duties to establish and maintain just and legitimate institutions to 
regulate social structures developed here could also have interesting 
connotations for questions of legitimate authority and political obligation.  This 
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 Demands to take action have first concentrated on duties of aid because the authors 
and have been considering the specific question of what duties the affluent have. 
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account suggests that agents have an obligation to establish regulatory 
institutions and it suggests that those who live under such institutions are obliged 
to maintain these institutions.  Maintaining these institutions requires that agents 
do not undermine them.  This could mean that they are obliged in general to obey 
their dictates and support their authority.  However the obligation to hold these 
institutions to account and ensure they tackle structural injustice will require 
agents to engage in political action aimed at pressurising decision makers in to 
tackling structural injustice and avoiding coercively imposing injustice.  This could 
in some cases require civil disobedience.  Thus the obligation outlined here could 
support both a duty to obey and to disobey the law.  
Essentially Aggregative Harm and Obligations to take part in Collective 
Action 
This thesis offers a general account of the obligations agents have in relation to 
essentially aggregative harms.  It suggests alongside positive obligations to 
prevent essentially aggregative harm there are negative obligations that give 
moral reasons to prevent it.  The nature of essentially aggregative harm means 
that preventing it requires contributors to work together.  The duties to prevent it 
require agents to make efforts to form a collective and prevent the problem.  This 
account could be used to highlight the obligations agents have in relation to a 
number of significant collective action problems and essentially aggregative harms 
that threaten modern societies.125  In the introduction to this thesis some of the 
essentially aggregative harms that represent a significant threat to humanity were 
outlined.  It would be interesting to develop the line of argument presented here 
to deal with these cases. 
Furthermore, the analysis of obligations in relation to essentially aggregative harm 
developed here could be usefully applied to problems of injustice in informal 
institutions.  Norms that are harmful are often perpetuated by those they harm as 
well as by those who benefit from them.  They often function like a collective 
action problem.  Those who practice them are often trapped in practicing them 
because of other people continuing to conform to them.  These damaging norms 
could be understood as essentially aggregative harms.  The account of obligations 
in relation to essentially aggregative harms developed in Chapter 6 could be 
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 The article attached as appendix 2 outlines how the account of precautionary duties 
offered here can be utilised to identify obligations in a ‘tragedy of the commons’ scenario 
(Kahn, Forthcoming). 
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applied to these cases to identify obligations to work together to oppose these 
injustice.  In the future I hope to develop such an analysis. 
Chapter 7 offers additional reason to support the moral significance of pattern 
based reasons.  However, it does not give conclusive proof of their existence.  
Such pattern based reason could offer a defence of obligations to take part in 
collective action schemes.  Thus the question of whether or not they exist is 
significant for moral reasoning.  These reasons could offer a way to justify taking 
part in collective efforts that could help to solve many of the problems of mass 
society identified in the introduction of this thesis.  Thus these reasons could be 
significant for reforming morality to deal with the modern problems of mass 
society. 
The closing chapters contain several arguments that may be usefully applied to 
other debates.  Chapter 8 identifies a new method for identifying contributors to 
essentially aggregative harm.  It proposes that those who contribute to structural 
injustice can be identified on the basis that they are a difference-making part of a 
set of agents whose actions together are sufficient to cause structural injustice.  
This analysis could be usefully applied to other scenarios.  The account of 
hypocrisy as grounds for declaring a rejection as unreasonably outlined in Chapter 
7 may also be usefully applied elsewhere.   
Showing why arguments from apathy and inconsequentialism cannot defeat 
obligations to take part in political action is important because it could potentially 
provide a defence for demanding agents take part in such action in a range of 
cases. Obligations to take political action are often objected to on the basis that 
they are unlikely to succeed or that one additional person will make no difference 
to their likelihood of success.  The arguments offered here suggest that such 
objections are unfounded.  
Future Directions for Global Justice Theory 
The account of obligations in relation to structural injustice developed here could 
be supplemented by considering whether there are obligations of solidarity that 
require taking action to alleviate structural injustice.  Whether being part of a 
group that benefits from on-going structural injustice can ground additional duties 
to oppose structural injustice could be another interesting question to explore. 
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In the future this thesis could be developed to consider whether the aggregate of 
contributors to social structures should be considered an ‘agent of justice’.  If so, 
whether they have primary responsibility for ensuring justice is an interesting 
question.  This account suggests that this could be the case because it states that 
members of this aggregate are obliged to make efforts to form a collective and 
prevent structural injustice. 
An account of the best strategies that a collective attempting to avoid structural 
injustice can pursue could also be an interesting useful future project.  Such an 
exercise would require considering whether they should attempt to pressurise 
public figures and reform existing institutions or instead establish new institutions 
or coordinate directly.  Such a project could include an account of the sorts of 
institutions that the global public could use to establish global structural justice.  
Such an account would have to consider how global tyranny can be avoided and 
how global institutions can avoid being used to impose the interests of values of a 
minority.   
Considering what demands of legitimacy fall upon political movements that aim to 
bring about structural injustice could be part of such a valuable future project.  As 
could determining what methods such a movement may use.  Developing a 
thorough account of the norms governing the use of force in the pursuit of 
structural justice could also be a valuable and interesting exercise. 
Closing Comments 
The analysis developed in this thesis can contribute productively to the literature 
concerning poverty, global justice and moral obligation.  The account outlined 
aims to establish that poverty should be understood as a humanly caused 
problem and that people must acknowledge an obligation to take part in politics 
as a means to preventing contribution to serious structural injustices like extreme 
poverty and inequality. 
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Appendix 1: Global Economic Justice: A Structural 
Approach 
Public Reason 4 (1-2): 48-67 © 2012 by Public Reason 
Abstract 
This paper aims to make a contribution to the debate concerning the moral 
obligations which follow from the facts of the pervasiveness of acute poverty and 
the extent of global wealth and income inequality. I suggest that in order to make 
progress in this debate we need to move beyond two dominant ways of thinking 
about when the demands of distributive justice apply. The first approach focuses 
solely on the global distribution of resources, regardless of background social 
relations and institutions. This approach, exemplified by Simon Caney, identifies 
positive ‘humanity based’ obligations to promote or support institutions that fulfil 
the socio-economic rights of other humans. The second approach concentrates on 
the justice of the coercively enforced institutional arrangements governing access 
to resources. This approach, shared by theorists like Thomas Pogge, focuses on 
negative obligations not to harm other humans by imposing upon them resource 
regimes which avoidably fail to secure socio-economic human rights. I use Iris 
Young’s concept of structural injustice to suggest that vulnerability to deprivation 
can be understood as a social structural position which results from the 
cumulative effect of a variety of global and national actions, norms and 
institutions. 
I draw on the concepts of social responsibility and civic duty to outline an account 
of social obligation. This obligation requires that individuals critically assess their 
social structures for any systematic injustice, and make efforts to work with 
others to establish and maintain legitimate means for avoiding or mitigating any 
structural injustice. I use this analysis to suggest that individuals who contribute to 
global social structures must make efforts to work with others who are similarly 
connected to global poverty towards preventing the continuation of extreme 
poverty and growing inequality. 
Key words: global justice, social responsibility, civic duties, cosmopolitanism, 
structural injustice, Iris Young, Thomas Pogge, Simon Caney. 
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I. Global Economic Justice: A Structural Approach126 
Cosmopolitan political theorists Thomas Pogge and Simon Caney, argue that the 
current global situation concerning the production and consumption of resources 
is grossly unjust. Some people have great wealth and enjoy access to a host of 
resources for enhancing their comfort and advancing their plans, whilst others 
face difficulties in securing shelter, sufficient nutrition and the basic goods needed 
to maintain a healthy existence. Some people spend the vast majority of their 
time working for subsistence wages to produce goods which are predominantly 
consumed by those who enjoy a high standard of living and opportunities for 
advancement, respect, achievement and power. Some people have wealth and 
incomes that allow them to determine production, whilst others have very little 
bargaining power and lack the ability to determine where they live, the work they 
do and the food they eat. 50% of the world’s population share just 3% of global 
household income. In 2008 2.47 billion people living in countries classified as 
'developing' by the World Bank lived on less than could be bought with $2 in the 
USA in 2005. That equates to 37% of the global population at the time.127 This 
consumption figure includes all foods or services they provide for themselves 
through their own efforts as well as what they purchase from others.2 
Meanwhile, the richest 10% of the world share 71.1% of global household income 
(Pogge, 2010, p 5) (Chen and Ravallion, 2012).  
Political philosophers working on global poverty are united in their condemnation 
of the continuance of a situation in which a significant sector of the world’s 
population lack secure access to the basic resources required to maintain 
minimally decent lives. Cosmopolitan social justice theorists argue that at least 
some of the demands of social justice concerning control and consumption of 
resources should apply globally.128 This paper aims to make a contribution to the 
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 I deliberately avoid using the term distributive justice because I agree with Iris Young 
that there are significant shortcomings with understanding social justice purely in the 
terms of a distribution of goods (Young, 1990) (Forst, 2007). 
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debate concerning whether justice makes demands in relation to the global 
distribution of access to resources and opportunities. I suggest that in order to 
make progress in this debate we need to move beyond two dominant ways of 
thinking about when demands of distributive justice apply and about the moral 
obligations we have to promote distributive justice. The first approach focuses 
solely on the global distribution of resources, regardless of background social 
relations and institutions. This approach, exemplified by Simon Caney, identifies 
positive ‘humanity based’ obligations to promote or support the fulfilment of the 
socio-economic rights of other human beings (Caney 2005). The second approach 
concentrates on the justice of coercively enforced institutional arrangements 
governing access to resources. This approach, shared by theorists like Thomas 
Pogge, focuses on negative obligations not to harm other humans by imposing 
resource regimes which promote avoidable socioeconomic human rights deficits 
(Pogge 2010). 
I endorse an alternative approach to identifying global economic injustice and 
obligations to oppose such injustice. I use Iris Young’s concept of structural 
injustice to suggest that a sort of injustice can emerge from the combined effect 
of a variety of actions and institutions (Young, 2011). I argue that when portions 
of the global population are predictably and avoidably placed in positions of 
disadvantage where they lack the means to secure access to sufficient resources 
to fulfil their capacities they suffer from a form of injustice. This is true even when 
the structures that place them in such positions are not the result of an 
identifiable regime of coercively imposed institutions but rather the result of 
multiple actions, laws, policies, trends and practices. I argue that in many cases 
some of these actions originate far away, many of the trends cross borders, and 
some of the institutions involved are global. This means that the social structure 
that places agents in vulnerable positions is contributed to by agents throughout 
the world both directly and indirectly through participation in norms, institutions 
or practices. Hence these structures are in an important sense global. 
I argue that one obligation to bring about the just regulation of social life emerges 
from the fact that agents collectively have a pervasive impact on each other’s life 
chances and relative bargaining positions. I seek to establish that agents who live 
in social contexts (and thereby contribute to social structures) have corresponding 
social responsibilities. These social responsibilities require that they critically 
evaluate social structures and actively establish and maintain just solutions for 
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avoiding and mitigating structural injustice. I will argue that those who contribute 
to social structures have such a social responsibility which currently requires they 
work towards the just and legitimate alteration of global practices, institutions 
and trends so as to lessen structural injustice. More specifically, I propose that 
obligations to bring about a just global structure of production and consumption 
emerge from the fact that agents from around the world participate and 
contribute to a global structure and that this structure systematically places some 
agents in positions of serious disadvantage which cannot be justified. As a result 
of this disadvantage, even otherwise permissible interactions between agents can 
be unfair.  
The structure of my paper is as follows. I first discuss in turn the two 
aforementioned approaches to social justice and detail the problems associated 
with each. I then suggest that there may be additional forms of global economic 
injustice and obligations of resource justice. Next, I introduce Iris Young’s concept 
of structural injustice. I explain why the combined effects of human action and 
institutions may be considered unjust rather than simply unfortunate. I proceed 
to argue that there is a general obligation requiring agents to monitor their social 
structures for injustice and work towards the lessening of any structural injustice. 
This is followed by a brief explanation of what this proposed obligation requires 
when it comes to global economic justice. I conclude by explaining how this 
approach and obligation relate to other proposals in the global justice literature. 
II. Humanity Based Cosmopolitanism 
The first of the aforementioned approaches focuses solely on the global 
distribution of resources, regardless of background social relations and 
institutions. This approach suggests that certain distributions of resources 
between persons are unjust regardless of whether or not people share a common 
institutional background, coercive regime or substantive social community. This 
approach is characterised by cosmopolitans like Simon Caney who claim that 
individuals have rights in virtue of having moral personality. These rights include 
rights to access a certain level of resources. Caney proposes that demands of 
distributive justice follow from the fact that persons have moral personality. Thus, 
any plausible domestic case for distributive justice also applies globally. Arbitrary 
factors, such as nationality or state of residence, do not affect this moral 
personality based claim. Caney proposes four principles for global distributive 
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justice. They include a right to a basic level of subsistence, a right to equal 
opportunities, a right to equal pay for equal work and a proviso that says that 
benefiting people is more important the worse off they are. For the sake of this 
paper I am not concerned with the nature of demands of social justice. I am 
simply concerned with when certain demands of social justice apply and what 
obligations agents have in relation to these demands. Caney suggests that 
individuals have an obligation to support the institutional arrangements which 
best promote global distributive justice.  
This is a positive ‘humanity centred’ obligation to support distributive justice. It is 
important to note that Caney insists that establishing distributive justice requires 
establishing ‘institutional arrangements’ which effectively secure justice rather 
than through individual transactions that aim to bring about a more just 
distribution of resources (Caney, 2005, p. 109, pp. 121-23) (Caney, 2011). One key 
difference between Caney’s approach and other humanity based accounts of 
obligations to the global poor is that Caney argues that everyone has a right to an 
institutional set up that guarantees one does not live in poverty. Caney’s account 
recognises the need to establish a global order which secures peoples freedom 
from poverty and fulfils demands of distributive justice. He believes that our 
humanity based obligations demand that we support those institutions that 
effectively secure these rights. However, by identifying a humanity based positive 
duty to support just institutions Caney still treats distributive injustice as one 
species of misfortune. 
III. Critiques of Humanity Based Cosmopolitanism 
Humanity based approaches to cosmopolitanism can be criticised for failing to 
draw a distinction between injustice and misfortune. Caney’s theory states that 
demands of distributive justice apply between all people no matter what their 
relationship. This means that if two isolated groups of people enjoy different 
levels of opportunity or different levels of pay for the same work, this is an 
injustice. However, according to a rival understanding of injustice, this difference 
in conditions cannot be identified as a case of injustice. This rival understanding of 
justice claims that whilst it is unfortunate that some people live in poverty, it is 
unjust when a government passes and enforces laws that condemn some people 
to live in poverty. Injustice is distinguished from misfortune because it is a species 
of negative circumstance for which someone or some group is responsible. Where 
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differences in wealth exist between independent societies it is difficult to see why 
this should be considered a case of injustice. As parents tell their children: ‘Life 
isn’t fair!” However, children can and do demand that their parents and other 
authorities act fairly. This political account of distributive justice suggests that we 
cannot demand that the world be just, but we can demand that we are treated 
justly by those with power over us. 
The easiest cases of injustice to identify are ones in which laws discriminate 
between people in a way that cannot justified. For example a law which 
prevented members of a certain ethnic group from owning property would be a 
prime example of injustice rather than misfortune. However, sometimes a 
combination of laws leads to a situation of injustice. Thus, a more sophisticated 
approach explains that states enforce a set of rules determining use and control 
of resources and that it is the regime of law enforced by an authority (or coercive 
body) which should be judged as just or unjust. Hence, distributive justice applies 
when such a body enforces a property rights regime. This view suggests, contra-
Caney, that there can only be distributive justice or injustice within a coercively 
enforced property regime. 
Many political theorists share the view that critiques of distributive justice should 
only be applied to coercively-enforced institutional orders. They argue that 
egalitarian demands of distributive justice only apply in specific circumstances. 
Some reject the idea that there is global distributive injustice because there is no 
global authority claiming a monopoly of legitimate violence. Thomas Nagel argues 
that strong demands of distributive justice apply within a state because co-
citizens share a coercively enforced property regime. He argues that demands of 
social justice only apply in a very specific set of circumstances. He quotes Dworkin 
to explain that when there is an effective leviathan making a plausible claim to 
legitimate authority, this leviathan must treat its subjects as equals. Nagel 
explains that demands of justice only apply in circumstances where agents share 
such a political authority. He follows Rawls in asserting that demands of justice 
are norms for the basic structure of a nation state and should be distinguished 
from the appropriate normative demands for international relations or individual 
conduct (Nagel 2005, pp. 121-23). 
Where there is no such leviathan, Nagel explains, demands of distributive justice 
imply do not apply. Further, Nagel suggests, in such a situation there is no 
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obligation to enter in to the political relation of sharing an authority (Nagel 2005, 
121). He supports what he calls the ‘political’ conception of distributive justice 
whereby authorities are not a means by which to discharge pre-existing duties of 
social justice. Rather, to live under a shared authority is to have a special 
relationship with others. Entering in to such a relationship, where no such relation 
currently exists, is by no means compulsory. However, when agents do share a 
government which makes a plausible claim to a monopoly of legitimate violence, 
that government may only enforce a regime of access to property which treats 
people as equals and this requires fulfilling norms of distributive justice. Simon 
Caney argues that although these coercive accounts may successfully establish 
that claims of distributive justice do apply within a coercively enforced regime 
they do not establish that demands of distributive justice only apply within 
coercive regimes.129 It is possible that there is both a duty not to impose an unjust 
regime on others and an additional duty to support the establishment of a just 
and secure property regime. Whether in both cases the same demands of justice 
apply is a further question, which I will leave aside for the sake of this paper. 
Those committed to a “coercive imposition” account (as I will refer to it) deny that 
justice demands the establishment of just shared institutions where none exist. 
They insist that duties to support the establishment of just regimes or to create a 
more egalitarian distribution where there are no regimes are humanitarian duties. 
They believe that requirements of justice only emerge within a coercively 
enforced regime (Nagel 2005, 121). 
IV. Institutional Cosmopolitanism and Negative Duties 
In response to the objection that cosmopolitans identify only obligations of 
humanity based aid rather than justice many cosmopolitan theorists have sought 
to identify features of the global situation that could justify making demands of 
global distributive justice. Various ‘institutional’ cosmopolitan approaches have 
been developed which cite features of global interaction and organisation and 
argue that these features make it appropriate to apply demands of social justice 
to the global order (Caney, 2005, p.106). Thomas Pogge suggests that the current 
global economic institutional order is coercively imposed by the affluent states 
(Pogge 2010, p.21). Pogge claims that this global institutional order is unjust 
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because it knowingly and avoidably perpetuates human rights deficits (Pogge 
2005).130 
Pogge explains that there is a global institutional order to which demands of social 
justice should be applied. He defines an institution as a social practice governed 
by publicly known rules which stipulate roles and responsibilities. The central 
social practices of a society, which have a pervasive impact on people’s life 
prospects, make up the basic structure or institutional order of that society 
(Pogge, 1989). Pogge argues that the global institutional order is imposed by the 
governments of powerful and affluent states in the interests of their business and 
finance elites (Pogge, 2010, pp.16-25). 
Pogge suggests that there is a moral obligation to refrain from coercively imposing 
(or making uncompensated contributions to the coercive imposition of) an 
institutional order which is deeply unjust. This, Pogge argues, is a negative 
institutional duty and part of the duty to refrain from harming others. Pogge does 
not claim that we have a negative duty to refrain from making uncompensated 
contributions to the imposition of an institutional order which falls short of 
maximal justice. What he does argue is that our negative duty only requires we 
refrain from imposing any order that knowingly and avoidably perpetuate human 
rights deficits (Pogge, 2010, p. 29). 
Pogge’s account faces a number of criticisms. At present there is no global agency 
or centralised power that effectively enforces the current regime through a claim 
to the monopoly of legitimate violence. The current global economic order is 
based on negotiations and agreements. In these negotiations economic and 
militarily dominant states dictate terms because they have a better bargaining 
position. However, no individual government or cohesive bargaining block 
unilaterally determines policy. This fact means that the global institutional order 
does not perfectly fit the leviathan model on which the political approach to 
distributive justice is based. Many global economic rules and norms have emerged 
through bargaining and tradition rather than being imposed by a unified power 
centre. However, Pogge’s account avoids this critique by giving a broad definition 
of what constitutes “coercive imposition” and “institutional order” so that his 
account can apply to the global economic institutions which are shaped by the 
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larger global economies and major TNCs and from which smaller states cannot 
effectively opt out. 
Pogge’s account of global injustice and obligation is based on persons having a 
negative duty not to make uncompensated contributions to the imposition of the 
unjust global institutional order. However, there are substantial difficulties with 
identifying citizens of affluent states as culpable for contributing to the coercive 
imposition of the current global institutional order and therefore liable to moral 
censure. It is not clear that the relationship between citizens and affluent states is 
such that they may be held responsible for the actions of their states. The fact 
that citizens help to maintain the power of their governments through obeying 
the law and paying taxes is not sufficient grounds for claiming they are culpable 
accomplices in the actions of their governments. The relationship between 
citizens of affluent liberal democracies and the actions of their governments is a 
complicated one. The citizenry of a state cannot be considered members of an 
organised collective with makes decisions and takes action. Individuals often lack 
an intention to be part of such a collective. More needs to be said in order to 
show why citizens of a state may be understood as morally responsible for a 
state’s actions.131 Even if it can be established that the people as a collective are 
responsible, what this means in terms of individual culpability is a further 
question. 
Furthermore, under an orthodox understanding of harm, negative duties are only 
violated by those who are morally responsible for contributing to harm. If the 
connection between citizens and the actions of their states is too weak to 
establish culpability, further explanation is required in order to explain why 
compensatory behaviour is owed (Kahn, 2011).132 
In standard understandings of the negative duty to refrain from harming others, 
harm cannot simply be offset by compensatory actions. Pogge insists that it is only 
uncompensated contributions to the imposition of injustice which violate our 
negative duties. His claim is that we do not violate the negative duty if we 
compensate for any contributions we make by campaigning for institutional 
change or making donations to poverty charities. Compare this to a circumstance 
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in which an individual intentionally violates a negative duty not to harm others. 
We wouldn’t say that only uncompensated contributions to an assault violate 
negative duties. Imagine if one member of a gang who physically assaults a 
woman compensates by paying for some of the woman’s medical treatment. In 
such a case we would not say that the gang member had not violated the negative 
duty to refrain from harming others. It is unusual to assert that only 
uncompensated contributions to harm violate the negative duty. Which is what 
Pogge claims is the case when it comes to contributions to the imposition of 
injustice.133 A more plausible account might insist that individuals become liable 
to provide compensation when they make contributions to harm and they cannot 
reasonably be expected to avoid making contributions. Such an account may be 
based on strict liability rather than culpable violation of a negative duty.134 
A further objection to Pogge’s approach is levelled by David Miller. Miller argues 
that the global institutional order cannot be identified as the cause of human 
rights deficits because national institutions also have an effect on whether human 
rights are secured. Miller explains that national institutions and cultural factors 
significantly affect the levels of poverty within any state. He demonstrates that 
these factors have an effect by comparing different development outcomes 
within the same global economic system (D. Miller 2007, 236-41). Miller is right 
that the global economic institutional order is not the only factor which affects 
the extent and acuteness of poverty. The difficulty with Pogge’s position is that 
the global institutional order is significantly different to the idealised notion of 
basic structure within a closed society described by Rawls (Rawls, 1971). In 
Realizing Rawls Pogge develops Rawls’ conception of a ‘Basic Structure’ (Pogge, 
1989). He explains how the central social and economic institutions have a 
pervasive impact on people’s opportunities and outcomes. He explains that it is 
this institutional order which is the subject of accounts of justice. When we 
consider central global economic institutions, it is only in conjunction with local 
norms, laws and institutions that they determine people’s opportunities and 
outcomes.135 Since the central global economic legal institutions do not effectively 
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determine the entitlements of individuals we may not be able to hold them 
responsible for these entitlements. 
One way to avoid the debate as to whether national or global institutions are 
primarily responsible for poverty is to adopt an account of poverty and obligation 
that holds when poverty results from the combination of a range of human 
factors. 
Multiple forms of injustice and multiple duties of justice 
The two approaches to global distributive injustice so far discussed identify a form 
of injustice and describe a moral obligation. Caney states that any situation where 
some persons lack secure fulfilment of their socio-economic human rights is 
unjust. He suggests that there is a positive moral obligation to support 
institutional arrangements which secure the human rights of others and fulfil 
other principles of distributive justice (Caney 2005, 121). Thomas Pogge suggests 
that the current global institutional order is unjust because it foreseeably and 
avoidably gives rise to human rights deficits. He argues that there is a negative 
duty that prohibits agents from making uncompensated contributions to the 
imposition of any institutional order which foreseeably and avoidably gives rise to 
human rights deficits (Pogge 2010, 29). 
There are difficulties with both these approaches. However, I do not wish to argue 
that either approach is wrong. Pogge notes that in addition to the negative duties 
he outlines there may be positive duties to secure the human rights of others 
(Pogge 2010, p. 28) (Pogge 2005, p. 102). Simon Caney acknowledges that in 
addition to the positive obligations he describes there may be the sorts of 
negative obligations identified by Pogge (Caney 2011, p. 513). I think that Caney 
and Pogge are right to suggest that there may be a range of obligations relevant 
to the question of obligations to the global poor. I wish to suggest that in addition 
to positive obligations to promote the situation of others and negative obligations 
to refrain from imposing unjust conditions upon them there is a third sort of 
obligation which is relevant to global poverty. 
What I propose is that there are demands of social justice that apply whenever 
individuals indirectly affect the position of others in terms of the resources 
available to them and their relative bargaining position. I wish to suggest that 
there are moral obligations that require people who contribute to the social 
281 
 
position of others to work towards the secure fulfilment of demands of social 
justice. 
V. Structural Injustice 
I will now set out an account of global economic injustice and a corresponding 
duty to alleviate that injustice. I begin by outlining Iris Young’s account of 
structural injustice. I then explain why this may be a useful way to understand 
global economic injustice. I then set out a corresponding account of social 
structural obligations. This account will suggest that individuals have a general 
obligation to critically assess the social structures to which they contribute and to 
work towards the lessening of any structural injustice they identify. 
In Responsibility for Justice Iris Young develops an account of structural injustice. 
Young describes how various human institutions and social rules, along with past 
actions that have permanently altered the physical environment, serve to create a 
social structure which places agents in various positions. This social structure is 
experienced as an objective fact that determines the options available to an agent 
and the outcomes attached to different choices. Part of the effect of such a 
structure is to determine individuals’ access to opportunities to acquire resources. 
This structure is experienced as both a physical constraint on what an agent can 
achieve and an enabling channel allowing them to achieve certain things. When 
the differences in options provided by a social structure are unfair there is social 
injustice (Young, 2011, p. 52-64). Young specifies that structural injustice can 
be identified when social structural processes place a group of agents in a position 
where they are vulnerable to domination or deprivation in comparison to 
others.136 
To illustrate this idea Young introduces the example of Sandy, a woman seeking 
accommodation for herself and her young children. In the story, Sandy works as a 
sales assistant in an out of town shopping centre. Sandy has to move because the 
owner of the apartment building in which she rents wishes to convert the building 
into a condominium. There is no cheap accommodation near Sandy’s work. Sandy 
judges the cheap accommodation in town not to be sufficiently safe or decent for 
her family. She cannot find any housing which allows her access to affordable 
                                                          
136
 For the sake of this paper I will bracket the issue as to how we determine the justice or 
injustice 
of social structures. 
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transport to work, so she realises she must get a car. She looks into subsidised 
housing but the waiting list is two years long. She finds a tiny place forty-five 
minutes from work but lacks sufficient funds for the deposit because she has 
spent all her savings on a down payment for a car. Sandy faces the prospect of 
homelessness (Young 2011, p. 43-45). 
Young alleges that Sandy is suffering from structural injustice. The options 
available to Sandy place her in a position where her access to housing is insecure 
(relative to other people). However, Sandy’s situation is not the result of an unjust 
law or immoral act (Young 2011, p.47). Sandy’s situation is one she shares with a 
significant section of her society. The causes of her problem are multiple, large 
scale and relatively long term. She is in a situation where she is vulnerable to 
being deprived of housing. She is part of a group which face a ‘systematic wrong’ 
whereby they are put in a position of relative and significant deprivation in terms 
of opportunities to develop and exercise their capacities compared to their peers 
(Young 2011, p. 72). 
VI. Background Justice 
One way to capture the idea of structural injustice is to consider one aspect of the 
Rawlsian concept of background justice.137 In “The Basic Structure as Subject” 
Rawls argues against Robert Nozick’s conception of social justice. He suggests that 
a series of transactions between individuals which involve no rights violations can 
nevertheless undermine the background conditions required for transactions to 
be fair. 
“The accumulated results of many separate and ostensibly fair agreements, 
together with social trends and historical contingencies, are likely in the course of 
time to alter citizens’ relationships and opportunities so that the conditions for 
free and fair agreements no longer hold.” (Rawls 1977, 159-60) 
The idea expressed here is that over time the background justice required for 
deals to be free and fair is likely to be undermined. The reason why Rawls is 
concerned with the cumulative effects of actions and transactions is because they 
can undermine the conditions in which deals between individuals are fair. They 
lead to circumstances in which some agents can dominate and exploit others 
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 I am indebted to Miriam Ronzoni for the suggestion that there may be a similarity 
between structural injustice and the erosion of background justice. 
283 
 
because their relative bargaining positions means that their agreements are not 
really free and fair. Rawls expands his account further by explaining that the 
distribution of wealth that follows from individual market transactions is only fair 
when the starting distribution is fair and the structure of the market system is fair. 
He explains that this fairness in the starting distribution includes that all 
individuals have fair opportunity to earn income and gain wanted skills. Rawls’ 
discussion suggests that the prevalence or absence of such opportunities is 
properly considered part of the background in which individuals act and social 
practices take place. Rawls finds that background justice is absent when certain 
opportunities are denied to some (Rawls, 1977, p. 160). This account suggests that 
injustice can emerge whenever agents interact and not just in circumstances 
where agents share governing institutions or a cooperative scheme. 
Rawls’ account of the erosion of background justice conflates two separate issues. 
Namely whether background conditions are fair and whether the combined effect 
of many permissible individual actions can produce injustice. Rawls suggests that 
background conditions are just to begin with and become eroded by transactions 
over time. 
It is not clear that in the real world background conditions begin just or that only 
transactions and human actions affect background conditions. However, it is 
difficult to separate the socially caused from background conditions. This is 
another way of saying it is difficult determine the baseline from which a social 
structure is to be judged. 
Young is concerned with the cumulative effects of actions, institutions and norms 
because these can place certain groups in positions of significant disadvantage 
(Young, 2011, pp. 41). The problematic disadvantages which Young highlights 
include positions where those disadvantaged are especially vulnerable to being 
deprived in terms of abilities to fulfil their capacities and live full lives. Young also 
highlights positions where groups of individuals are especially vulnerable to being 
dominated by others. Agents are vulnerable to domination when their bargaining 
position is comparatively weak, they lack options, they lack resources sufficient to 
defend themselves from violence or they lack sufficient resources to secure 
independence (Young, 2011, pp. 34-64). 
Young’s account of structural injustice identifies structural problems which should 
be of concern to those who are socially connected to a structure. Rawls’ account 
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identifies that over time transactions which are just when considered in isolation 
can lead to circumstances in which deals cannot be just even if both parties agree 
to them and in which individuals are disadvantaged in terms of opportunities. 
They are both accounts of how the cumulative effects of human action and policy 
can lead to unjust states of affairs. Rawls’ suggests that a well regulated basic 
structure is needed in order to maintain background justice to ensure 
circumstances which make deals and distributions of goods just. Young demands 
that we work to prevent the establishment of structures which make certain 
groups vulnerable to deprivation and domination relative to others. Both set of 
demands can be interpreted more or less stringently. 
What is important for the sake of this paper is that both accounts open up the 
idea that the background or social structure which is the cumulative result of 
human actions and practices should be normatively assessed and can be a site of 
injustice. They suggest that in addition to states of affairs and coercively imposed 
institutional orders the social structure which is the cumulative effect of human 
actions can be unjust. 
Miriam Ronzoni has developed Rawls’ idea of background justice to suggest that a 
global problem of background justice may emerge (Ronzoni, 2009). She argues 
that if certain empirical conditions obtain then there may be problems of 
background justice at the global level. She suggests that if this is the case we may 
have a duty to establish supranational agencies with effective regulatory powers 
to end this injustice.138 
Structural injustice or misfortune 
At this stage it is worth discussing whether what Young describes as structural 
injustice is nothing more than a species of misfortune. Structural injustice is a 
concept that identifies groups of people who find themselves vulnerable to 
domination and deprivation which cannot be causally linked to a specific 
perpetrator and is not imposed by any identifiable actor or agency. If experiencing 
structural injustice cannot be distinguished from merely being in a difficult state 
of affairs, the only duty that applies is a humanitarian the only duties that apply 
are humanity based obligations to support institutions which can bring about just 
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 Ronzoni’s account predominantly concentrates on justice between states rather than 
between individuals living in different states (Ronzoni, 2009). 
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states of affairs. If this is the case, then the concept of structural injustice adds 
nothing to Simon Caney’s understanding of injustice.  
Crucially, Young suggests that injustice implies that there is something wrong with 
current social and political arrangements. The cases Young describes constitute 
injustice rather than misfortune because they are the result of a combination of 
actions, policies and social practices performed by people. This makes them social 
and political problems. The fact that the problem is in some sense a social or 
political one means that it appropriately attracts feelings of anger, 
disappointment, regret and responsibility which are not present in identifying 
misfortune or natural disaster. We see injustices as arising from a social set up. 
Injustices are things for which we hold society responsible. Hence, we believe 
them to press more urgently on the attentions of members of the society than 
outsiders. We feel that society could and should have been set up in such a way 
that the problem was avoided. The power of Young’s account is to make us 
consider social structures as a human responsibility rather than as natural and 
inevitable. The power of understanding an injustice as the result of the 
combination of human action, institutions and social processes is that it makes us 
implicitly recognize an obligation to try to change social processes (Young 2011, 
pp. 33-34). The point is that recognising a disadvantage as the result   of human 
factors gives us an additional reason to do something about it. Any account of a 
structural injustice must give plausible grounds for considering a systematic 
disadvantage to be the result of human action, institutions and practices. 
Structural injustice and social obligation 
Structural injustice is defined as injustice which is produced by the combination of 
various factors: trends, social institutions and past actions. This usually means 
that no one individual, agency or collective agent can be found causally 
responsible for a structural injustice. In the case of Sandy and her housing 
difficulties one might claim that her government is to blame for coercively 
enforcing a regime in which working class single mothers are vulnerable to being 
deprived of housing relative to other citizens. One might additionally suggest that 
people have a humanitarian duty to promote and support arrangements in which 
working class single mothers no longer face these difficulties. I wish to suggest 
that social obligations exist in addition to the two obligations identified so far. 
286 
 
Such obligations require individuals to critically asses the social structures they 
contribute to and to work with others to lessen any structural injustice.139 
Individuals often cannot be held morally responsible for social structural injustice 
on the basis of their contribution to the social structures which contain these 
injustices. The connection in question is insufficient grounds for attributing blame 
or responsibility (Kahn, 2011).140 However, such individuals should not be 
considered as innocent bystanders, with no relationship to the injustice in 
question. This means that those who contribute to a social structure which 
contains structural injustice cannot reasonably reject an additional demand to 
work towards the alleviation of the injustice, or so I will suggest. 
Social structural injustices are systematic and widespread. This fact suggests that 
they require co-ordination between actors. It is unlikely that all such injustices can 
be avoided by following a publicly agreed set of norms for interactions. As Rawls’ 
explains, background justice is eroded despite no one acting unfairly. Rawls insists 
that it is unlikely that there is a set of rules that can be applied to individual 
behaviour which can prevent the erosion of background justice and that if there is 
they would be excessively burdensome (Rawls, 1977, p. 160). Rawls suggests that 
in order to secure background justice we need regulating bodies charged with 
securing background justice. These bodies need to do more than enforce norms 
governing interactions. They need to monitor structures for any systematic 
disadvantages and intervene to prevent them. 
The fact that background justice cannot be secured through respecting the rights 
of others means that in addition to norms appraising how we directly treat each 
other we need norms appraising the social structures that result from the 
aggregate of these interactions. Young’s theory suggests that justice and morality 
serve different functions. Norms of justice apply to social structures, whereas 
moral norms apply to the behaviour of agents (Young, 2011, p. 65). Young’s 
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Young suggests that there is a forward looking shared responsibility which requires 
individuals who are socially connected to structural injustice to work together to lessen 
structural injustice (Young, 2011). There are problems with this way of conceiving of the 
obligation (Kahn, 2011). My account of social obligation is similar to Young’s. I do not 
detail the differences here. Rather I seek to provide additional arguments for social 
obligation which is distinct from obligations of non-harm and duties of aid. 
140
 However, a case could be made for attributing liability to those who causally contribute 
to a 
social structural injustice. Pasternak and Jubb set out how such an account could function 
and discuss liability for cumulative harm in their paper from the ECPR conference in 
Reykjavik (Pasternak & Jubb, 2011). 
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understanding of the relationship between moral obligations and demands of 
justice is thus opposed to that proposed by Nagel. Instead of justice naming a set 
of norms for the basic structure of a state, justice names a set of norms that bear 
on the social structures that emerge from human action and interaction. In 
agreeing with Young that there can be structural injustice I am not denying that 
there may be additional norms that restrict what governments, for example, may 
do. However, I am insisting that there are norms of justice that can be used to 
appraise social structures even in the absence of a government with effective 
control of those structures. In the account  I support there can be unjust laws, 
institutional orders and social structures. It is possible that the norms for these 
three different sites could be different. 
Returning to the question of structural injustice, we must consider how to 
connect structural injustice to obligations. If norms assessing social structures are 
to have any use to people we need to link them to obligations or responsibilities 
that fall on agents. If we do not do this then talk of structural injustice has no 
connection to actions or obligations and no hope of provoking agents into 
eradicating that injustice. 
My discussion above suggests that if individuals are to ensure the results of their 
interactions are fair they need to do more than obey a simple set of moral norms 
governing their interactions with others. They need to do more than avoid lying, 
cheating and violating agreements. They additionally need to work to establish 
and maintain agencies that secure structural justice. If we are to live amongst 
each other in a fair and just manner we need to be living in conditions of 
background justice. If we wish to ensure that we treat others fairly we must live 
within conditions of structural justice. This is because if there are no institutions 
monitoring and regulating social structures then over time structural injustices 
can develop and background justice can be undermined. Young’s and Rawls’ ideas 
are significantly different in some respects. However, they share a common 
feature which is the idea that just refraining from harming others, respecting 
rights, and giving aid is insufficient, we also need to be concerned with the 
cumulative effect of actions and interactions. 
However, it is not reasonable to require any individual to (try to) ensure social 
structural justice. This is beyond what an individual can guarantee. Instead we can 
posit that each individual has an obligation to make reasonable efforts to work 
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with others in order to establish and maintain a just and legitimate system of 
regulation which prevents social structural injustice in those structures to which 
she contributes. My suggestion is that, just as one must ensure one’s behaviour 
does not directly harm or disrespect others, one has an obligation to do what can 
be reasonably expected to prevent one’s actions from indirectly contributing to an 
unjust social structure.  
The distinctive feature of my account is the claim that an agent A contributing to 
social structure X which features social structural injustice Y in its treatment of B, 
is grounds on which B can reasonably demand more of A in terms of preventing 
the continuance of Y. There may be a positive obligation for A to work towards 
the alleviation of injustice Y as an act of humanity fulfilling the general duty to 
promote the wellbeing of others when they suffer from deprivation and one can 
help without significantly worsening one’s life (R. W. Miller, 2010, p. 9-31). 
However, the fact that B’s problem is an injustice in social structure Y to which A 
contributes provides grounds for B to legitimately demand more from A.141 Notice 
that if B also contributes to the social structure that places her in a position of 
structural injustice she too has an obligation to work towards the reform of that 
structure. 
This proposed duty captures the popular ideal of ‘social responsibility,’ which 
suggests that individuals should take an interest in the justice of the social 
relations they help to reproduce. Social responsibility suggests that members of a 
society must take responsibility for the justice of their society and work towards 
lessening any injustice. The reason usually given for this demand is that one’s 
society is in some sense one’s business. My account gives a more fully worked out 
account of why we have social obligations. A commitment to social justice could 
help prevent the risk of great social injustice emerging from behaviour and action 
which is morally permissible when considered in isolation.142 This fact gives some 
reason in favour of establishing such a norm, because it is in the interests of 
mankind, as a means to ensuring conditions in which people can flourish. 
                                                          
141
 This account is similarly to one that is sometimes suggested in Thomas Pogge’s work. It 
may be 
that participating in the global economy constitutes contributing to the imposition of an 
unjust institutional order. If this is the case, then such participation violates a negative 
duty to refrain from harm unless individuals compensate by working towards reform of 
the global economic institutional order. I would not support such an account of the 
obligation for the reasons stated above in the discussion of Pogge’s view. 
142
 There would still be a humanitarian obligation to lessen structural injustice. However, I 
think this additional obligation also applies. 
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The demand to work towards the establishment of morally-permissible ways to 
avoid structural injustice will probably require the establishment of administrating 
agencies of some kind where such agencies do not exist or lack the power or 
inclination to fulfil this role. Such agencies can coordinate human action by 
regulating behaviour and directly intervene to prevent injustice emerging. If such 
agencies are to be morally-permissible they must be legitimate and the 
institutional order they impose must be just. Establishing such agencies will 
require collective action and mobilising such collective action will require 
cooperating with others and campaigning to get more individuals to support and 
work towards establishing institutions or regulatory agencies. 
The obligation I have outlined is unusual because it is an obligation to work 
towards the achievement of a collective project. It demands individuals pursue 
outcomes which they cannot individually guarantee. Moral analysis usually 
considers what an individual should do out of the options available given 
background assumptions about what others are doing. Instead this moral demand 
obliges individuals to take actions to interact with others in an attempt to alter 
what they do: it asks individuals to take action with others in an attempt to alter 
the society that is the aggregate result of their actions and those of others.  
Considering the possibility of taking action together allows us to imagine 
possibilities which are not available whilst we only consider what can be achieved 
through unilateral action. There has recently been a wealth of work concerning 
backward looking collective moral responsibility. This literature predominantly 
considers moral blame for collective acts (Isaacs, 2011) (Kutz, 2000) (May, 1992). 
What I am proposing is a moral obligation to try to join with others and perform 
collective acts. Contemplating collective action allows us to consider new 
solutions to problems that result from the aggregation of multiple actions and 
institutions. 
VII. Global Poverty and Obligations to Alleviate Structural 
Injustice 
Having sketched an understanding of injustice and obligations I will now conclude 
by briefly outlining how this approach can help us make progress in the global 
debate concerning obligations to alleviate global injustice in general and global 
poverty in particular. 
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Thomas Pogge in World Poverty and Human Rights outlines in detail the plight of 
people living in difficult conditions: these people lack secure access to adequate 
nutrition, housing, health care and education (Pogge, 2005). Pogge aims to explain 
this situation as unjust rather than simply unfortunate. The power of this change 
in perspective is to convince people to stop considering famine as a misfortune 
requiring aid and to start think of it as an injustice requiring social and political 
change. Young’s theory offers an alternative way to understand the plight of these 
people. These individuals are systematically placed in a position where they are 
vulnerable to deprivation and domination relative to others. These positions are 
part of a social structure which is the cumulative result of various human actions 
and institutions. 
In the modern world many people are placed in positions of vulnerability to 
deprivation as a result of a range of sources which include global factors. There 
are global formal legal, political and economic institutions like the United Nations, 
International Criminal Court, World Bank and International Monetary Fund. 
Voluntary associations like the World Trade Organisation have been established 
(Pogge 2010, p. 14). These associations provide norms for trade and attach 
significant advantages to members and disadvantages to non-members. National 
economies and financial markets have become increasingly interdependent. 
Trends, laws and acts of government in one state can have a pervasive impact on 
conditions abroad. The latest evidence of this can be seen by the effects of the 
latest global financial crisis which have reverberated across the world. In the 
modern world there are transnational corporations that operate in multiple 
territories and link the fates of people in distant communities. These companies’ 
policies have a huge impact on the lives of their employees and the economies in 
which they choose to operate. Consumer habits, worker’s rights and tax regimes 
in one state can have an impact on the life prospects of agents in other states. 
More informally, global communications technology has allowed global trends 
and fashions to develop. One result of these changes is that trends, patterns and 
laws in one state can contribute to instances of structural injustice in another 
state. The integration and interdependence created by these factors means that 
individuals living in one state can contribute to social structural positions in other 
states. From this it follows that there can be obligations to lessen vulnerability to 
deprivation and domination in country A which fall on agents in country B. This 
means that we cannot treat states as if they contain discrete social structures and 
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we cannot assume that individuals only need be concerned with local social 
structures. 
In order to show how a social structural account can help us understand distant 
poverty and obligations it may be helpful to consider one example of structural 
vulnerability to poverty and consider who has social obligation to alleviate that 
injustice by regulating or otherwise altering the social structure in question. In 
Responsibility for Justice Young describes the circumstances faced by workers in 
the global apparel industry (Young, 2011, pp.125-35). Considering the position 
these workers find themselves in can help show how an understanding of 
structural injustice can assist the global justice debate. The social position 
inhabited by those working in factories to produce garments for the global 
apparel industry is one of extreme vulnerability to deprivation and domination 
(both relatively speaking and in absolute terms). These people (predominantly 
young women) lack other reputable employment options. This means they are 
wise to continue in their factory work no matter what conditions are imposed. 
They are unlikely to be protected by their government because bringing in 
regulations to improve pay and conditions is likely to result in the work being 
relocated to other states. Global competition for manufacturing contracts drives 
down wages and conditions. In this industry violence and intimidation is regularly 
used against those who seek to collectively bargain or form unions. These 
conditions are consistent across much of the global south, where many countries 
rely on external investment to provide jobs. The position such countries find 
themselves in means that they often cannot take unilateral action to improve 
conditions for their apparel workers without radically increasing unemployment 
and poverty (Young 2011, pp. 126-34). 
Young’s analysis suggests that we understand the plight of these garment workers 
as a form of structural injustice. The structure in question is made up of national, 
global and transnational factors (or social structural processes as she calls them). 
This means that we cannot isolate particular global formal institutions or national 
governments as causally responsible for the position workers find themselves in. 
However, we can still identify the poverty of these workers as an injustice which 
should be alleviated. Many of the relevant factors are contributed to by 
individuals around the world. According to the theory I have proposed here, these 
individuals have an obligation to work with others to alter the social structure so 
as to remove the injustice by trying to establish effective and legitimate ways to 
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regulate global social structures.143 Individuals could discharge this obligation in a 
number of ways. 
One way to do this may be to campaign for global regulation or international 
collective agreements that can enable state governments to effectively regulate 
internal social structures. Individuals could also work with others to build 
collective action networks and attempt to directly alter social structures through 
changing norms. Arguably this is what organisations that promote fair-trade or 
boycotts of particularly exploitative companies are attempting to do. Trade unions 
could also play a significant role in forcing better pay and conditions for those 
who work in the apparel industry. 
Possible routes an individual trying to discharge their obligation could take 
include: campaigning for global minimum labour standards, lobbying politicians 
for legal changes and joining or showing solidarity with trade unions fighting for 
global reform. Individuals could also support alternative clothing networks which 
provide decently paid labour in good conditions as a means to demonstrating the 
effectiveness of different ways of organising the global economy. They could also 
draw attention to the problem and try to directly improve conditions by 
campaigning outside shops that use sweat shop labour. 
The conception of injustice and corresponding moral obligation I have outlined 
oblige people to monitor their social structures and work towards the alleviation 
of any structural injustice within them. I am not suggesting that structural 
injustice is the only form of global injustice. Nor am I proposing that the 
obligations to assess one’s social structures and work with others to lessen 
structural injustice is the only obligation people have in relation to global 
economic justice. I have argued that structural injustice is one sort of injustice 
that individuals can experience. I have stated that the obligation I propose can fit 
alongside positive humanity based obligations to promote justice and negative 
obligations to refrain from imposing sufficiently unjust institutional orders on 
others. I have not had room to address the various possible objections to the 
account I have proposed or to clarify the details of that account. If such an 
account is to be plausible more must be said to justify the reasonableness of the 
proposed obligation. In addition, more needs to be done to show that it is 
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 They also have an obligation to inform themselves on the justice of their social 
structures and consider any claims of structural injustice made by others. 
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intuitively plausible that contribution to a problem can ground an additional 
obligation to work towards overcoming it. My aim in this paper has been to show 
how a structural approach to global economic injustice and obligation can help us 
to understand the obligations the affluent have in relation to global poverty. 
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Appendix 2: The Tragedy of the Commons as an 
Essentially Aggregative Harm144 
This paper has been accepted by the Journal of Applied 
Philosophy  on the condition that minor revisions are made.  
Abstract 
This paper concerns what individuals in a ‘tragedy of the commons’ scenario owe 
to one another. Baylor Johnson has argued that the general obligation to promote 
the common good requires that agents make efforts to establish a collective 
agreement to avert a potential tragedy of the commons. I agree with Johnson’s 
analysis but argue that there are negative duties which give commons users 
additional moral reason to take the action he recommends. These duties link 
commons users to resolving this particular problem and provide grounds to 
demand commons users make greater efforts to prevent the destruction of the 
commons. 
First, the ‘tragedy of the commons’ is identified as an essentially aggregative 
harm. Then, it is suggested that being a responsible actor requires taking 
reasonable precautions to avoid contributing to the suffering of others and that 
these precautions can include helping to establish and maintain collective 
solutions that prevent essentially aggregative harm.  
This analysis suggests that fulfilling negative duties can require establishing 
collective institutions with the power to regulate human action and interaction. It 
is hoped that this analysis can be applied to a range of social problems which 
result from the aggregation of actions and practices.  
Word Count: 8406 
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 I would like to thank Matt Matravers, Thomas Pogge and Uwe Steinhoff for helpful 
comments on previous drafts of this paper. 
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Introduction 
In the much discussed philosophical example of ‘The Tragedy of The Commons’ 
multiple agents graze animals on a piece of common land. The cumulative effect 
of so many animals grazing on the land is that it is destroyed (Hardin, 1968, pp. 
1243-1248). Instead of considering what it is rational or mutually beneficial, this 
paper concerns what individuals in such a scenario owe to one another.  
Garett Hardin, in his classic paper discussing the problem, states that what is 
required is mutual coercion mutually agreed to (Hardin, 1968, p. 1247). More 
recently, Baylor Johnson has suggested that the general obligation to promote the 
common good requires agents work to establish and effectively enforce a 
collective agreement that prevents the destruction of the commons (Johnson, 
2003, p. 283). This paper does not dispute Johnson’s position. It observes that the 
tragedy of the commons involves the threat of essentially aggregative harm and 
that avoiding the tragedy also prevents commons users from making contribution 
to harm.  It suggests that being a responsible actor requires taking reasonable 
precautions to avoid contributing to the suffering of others. It is proposed that in 
a commons scenario these precautions include efforts to establish and maintain a 
collective solution that can prevent the essentially aggregative harm from 
occurring.  
The proposed duty links commons users to resolving this particular problem 
rather than promoting the common good in general. It also provides moral reason 
to demand more from commons users than can be demanded from mere 
bystanders. Understanding duties to prevent significant collective action problems 
as duties to avoid contributing to harm strengthens the case for making these 
issues a priority and highlights the connection between the actions of individuals 
and essentially aggregative problems. There are those who accept the demands of 
negative duties but either reject a general positive obligation to promote the 
common good or claim that this is a humanitarian duty that is not a demand of 
justice. My account offers a moral reason that these more minimal accounts of 
obligations can accept.145 
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 Thomas Pogge has developed an account of how taking certain actions can allow 
agents to fulfil negative duties.  See Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: 
Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms (Cambridge: Polity, 2008). Pogge’s account is 
based on the idea that agents who contribute to collective harm can compensate for these 
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By analysing the obligations which apply in this specific example I aim to draw 
more general conclusions about moral demands in situations where an 
individual’s actions have indirect effects on the prospects of others. I hope that 
this analysis can be applied to a range of real life political and social problems that 
result from the aggregation of a range of actions and practices.146 
This paper assumes that there is a set of norms which should be adhered to by all 
out of consideration for other persons and that the precise nature of these norms 
can be determined through reasoned deliberation. Moral reasons are 
distinguished from prudential and ethical reasons. A prudential reason is a reason 
based on the good of the agent themselves and an ethical reason is a reason 
based on a particular account of the good life, whereas a moral reason is a reason 
grounded in a shared set of public norms dictating the extent to which the 
community can justifiably demand agents must consider other persons in their 
choices.  My argument begins from the assumption that there is a general moral 
obligation to avoid harming others.147 
The paper begins by introducing a specific example of ‘the tragedy of the 
commons’ and outlining Johnson’s account of the moral obligations in such 
scenarios. I suggest that we should consider whether there are any negative 
duties relevant in this scenario in addition to the positive duties Johnson 
identifies. The second section explores this possibility. I discuss holding individuals 
responsible for threatening the viability of the resource and holding the group 
collectively responsible for the threat. I propose that the case discussed involves 
an essentially aggregative harm. In the third section, the obligation to take 
                                                                                                                                                   
contributions by taking other actions to shield the victims or promote an end to the harm 
such that overall they cannot be said to contribute to harming the victims.  My account 
differs from Pogge’s because I understand the duty to be one of taking precautions to 
prevent future harm rather than a duty to take compensatory action to avoid harming.  
Unfortunately I do not have space to discuss the significance of this difference or the 
relative merits of the two approaches here.  
146
 My analysis here suggests that fulfilling negative duties can require establishing 
collective institutions with the power to regulate human action and interaction. This 
suggests that negative duties alone may be enough to ground a demand to establish and 
support political institutions.  It is my hope that these findings could be used within the 
global justice debate to support the need for global regulation. 
147
 The obligation to avoid harming others is not without qualification.  There may be 
circumstances in which harming others is not immoral.  In these cases the causing of 
suffering or dis-benefit can be justified using moral reasons.  Possible cases where harm is 
not proscribed may include cases where the harmful action is justified because it is either 
unavoidable, consented to, required to neutralise an innocent threat or a form of 
justifiable punishment. 
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reasonable precautions to prevent contribution to essentially aggregative harm is 
introduced. The idea that commons users are obliged to make efforts to establish 
a collective agreement as a precaution to prevent contribution to the destruction 
of the resource is discussed. This suggestion is compared to an alternative 
proposal of how agents can best fulfil the proposed obligation. The penultimate 
section briefly discusses several objections to my proposals and in the final 
section I conclude by considering possible applications of this analysis.  
The Tragedy of the Commons and Harm 
Consider a situation in which a group of people graze sheep on a piece of common 
land. The situation is such that if too many animals are grazed on the land it will 
be destroyed and all will suffer as a result. However, for each person their 
interests will be maximised by having as many animals on the commons as can be 
accommodated without risking the utility of those sheep she currently grazes. 
Those grazing sheep on the commons rely on this practice as the sole source of 
securing resources. If the commons is permanently damaged those who rely on it 
will suffer deprivation and be left vulnerable to exploitation by others.  Whilst the 
use of the commons remains unregulated, commons users are vulnerable to being 
deprived of the common resource as a result of over-grazing. 
Tracy Isaacs has discussed how considering collective action can allow us to 
identify possibilities which otherwise remain invisible (Isaacs, 2011, p. 36). 
Collectives can produce effects and perform actions which go beyond what a 
group of uncoordinated individuals can achieve. In the case of the commons, 
collective action offers commons users a way to avoid the destruction of their 
shared resource. Commons users could work together to regulate the use of the 
commons so as to prevent it from being destroyed: they could establish and 
maintain a system of regulation.  Under such a scheme, commons users would 
have reasonable assurance that their efforts will not be wasted and the tragedy 
will be avoided. Furthermore, by acting together they can fairly share the burden 
of protecting the resource. 
Those who wish to continue grazing animals on the common have a prudential 
reason to engage in such collective action. Baylor Johnson argues that potential 
contributors also have moral reason to work with others to establish such a 
scheme (Johnson, 2003, p. 283). He suggests that is part of an imperfect general 
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obligation to promote the common good.  The obligation to promote the common 
good is a positive duty. 
However, seeing the problem only in terms of positive duties may be misleading. 
The threat to the commons is the result of human action rather than natural 
forces: the fact that so many animals have been put to graze on the common is 
what threatens the viability of the resource.  Perhaps the tragedy of the commons 
should therefore be considered harm rather than misfortune because the 
problem is the net result of human action. If an agreement is made and the 
common is saved, it will not be a case in which collective action has prevented an 
external threat but a case where coordination has allowed the users to avoid 
causing a problem. In cases where a potential problem is humanly caused there 
are often negative duties to avoid the problem in addition to positive duties to 
avert the problem.148 In order to determine whether there are negative duties in a 
tragedy of the commons it will now be considered who is responsible for causing 
the damage if the commons is destroyed. 
When there is one human factor that contributes to a state of affairs amongst a 
host of natural and predictable background factors and events we usually identify 
the human action as the cause. When there are multiple human factors which 
contribute to a problem sometimes we can determine the morally responsible 
party by isolating those who intend to cause a particular result. However, no 
commons user intends to destroy the commons. Another way that a morally 
responsible party can be identified is by identifying those contributing actors who 
do something unusual or violate an established norm. In these cases the other 
contributing factors can be considered as natural background. In the commons 
                                                          
148
 As mentioned in note 3, there are cases in which harm is not morally problematic 
because it can be justified.  The exact parameters of these cases are controversial.  It could 
be argued that by grazing too many animals on the common they tacitly consent to its 
destruction or that the suffering each user faces is balanced out by the suffering their 
contribution to the problem causes such that no party is harmed overall. In the first case I 
would argue that tacit consent seems insufficient to ground permission to harm. However 
the intuitive pull of this justification comes from the idea that those who themselves 
contribute to a problem cannot object to others doing so too. They cannot condemn 
others for doing something they too participate in. By using the commons themselves 
they surrender the ability to claim that others doing so unjustly harms their future 
interests.  The harm that may be done to commons users is therefore justifiable and not in 
violation of a moral duty.  However, I am not convinced the fact that the agents who will 
be harmed use the common themselves rules out the possibility that something is owed 
to these agents because one contributes to a potential harm.  In the course of my 
discussion I will consider whether the claims I make can be justified in the circumstances 
described. 
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case it is impossible to isolate any commons user who acts unusually or violates 
an established norm. Hence, there is no clear basis for isolating a responsible 
party. 
Perhaps instead we should consider whether the group as a whole is morally 
responsible for risking the destruction of the commons. In her work on collective 
moral responsibility Tracy Isaacs agrees that collectives can be responsible for 
what they cause in certain circumstances. She defines two sorts of collective that 
can be held responsible for their actions. The first is an organisation. Individuals 
knowingly join organisations and act to further the organisation’s goals. These 
organisations have decision making mechanisms which determine the goals and 
strategies of the organisation. The other example of a morally responsible 
collective which Isaacs highlights is a ‘goal orientated collective’. A goal orientated 
collective is a group of individuals with a collective goal. All those who share in 
this goal are part of the collective. The goal is essentially collective because the 
individuals intend to do something with others; usually something they cannot 
achieve alone. Goal orientated collectives need not have a formal decision making 
procedure or extensive organisation. All that is required is that they have a shared 
collective intention and that they alter their individual actions to be responsive to 
the actions of others (Isaacs, 2011, pp. 23-25). 
One problem with utilising this approach is that the users of the commons do not 
intend to take part in any collective project or organisation. The group in question 
do not share a collective goal the pursuit of which causes harm. Each is consumed 
with an individual project: grazing their animals on this land. The destruction of 
the commons is not a collective enterprise or the foreseeable result of some 
collective enterprise. The group who graze animals on the commons have no 
shared goal and no organisational structure. Hence they cannot be identified as 
either a goal orientated collective or organization (Held, 1970, pp. 471-481). 
Without some form of organisation or shared collective goal commons users are 
just a set of individuals. The concept of collective causal responsibility is 
inappropriate for considering the situation of individuals unilaterally contributing 
to a collective action problem. Each commons user unilaterally and marginally 
contributes to the destruction of the commons. In the context of others using the 
commons they make a small contribution to an aggregate of actions which 
together threaten the shared resource.  
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Essentially Aggregative Harm 
The group of individuals that contribute to the harm are in no sense a collective 
which can be held morally responsible. These individuals can be identified as a set 
only because they all contribute to a potential problem. This makes them an 
aggregate rather than an organisation or a group of individuals engaged in a 
shared project.  The tragedy is an essentially aggregative problem because it is the 
result of the aggregation of a number of independent actions. Harm can be 
classified as essentially aggregative when it only results from the combined efforts 
of various uncoordinated acts and is not instantiated (even in a minimal form) by 
any of its sources. An essentially aggregative harm is suffering that is caused by a 
number of individual acts but that would not result from any one of those acts if it 
were performed in circumstances where the other contributing acts did not 
occur.149 
Essentially aggregative harms are interesting for several reasons. Unlike regular 
harms no agent (either a collective agent or individual person) is morally 
responsible for the harm caused. Essentially aggregative harms can occur even 
when every actor’s actions are impeccable when considered in isolation150. Yet, it 
would be wrong to treat an essentially aggregative harm as simply a misfortune. 
The tragedy of the commons will not occur unless a set of people act in a 
particular way. If the commons is destroyed the aggregate causes the destruction 
even if there is no collective actor who can be held morally responsible. This 
makes it difficult to assess these scenarios normatively. It is an important question 
in moral philosophy how to deal with cases like these. 
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 For an instance of harm to be classified as essentially aggregative it need not be the 
case that the acts in question do not make a significant difference to the amount of harm 
done.  However if it is the case that harm is significantly increased by the number of actors 
involved there may be stricter moral obligations not to contribute. 
150
 Lichtenberg distinguishes essentially aggregative harms from aggregative harms which 
are made up of individual acts that are wrong in themselves.  However, it is possible that 
several actions which are wrong in themselves contribute to a different harm which is 
more than the sum of its parts.    For example hunting an animal to extinction is an 
aggregative harm.  Suppose that each act of hunting is wrong in itself.  This fact would not 
change the fact that causing extinction is an essentially aggregative harm.  This is because 
causing an animal to become extinct is distinct from the wrong that is hunting.  Hence, 
even if hunting is wrong in itself, hunting to extinction can be considered an essentially 
aggregative harm. However, the interesting forms of essentially aggregative harms are 
ones in which the actions are not wrong in themselves because these cases pose a 
dilemma as to whether contributing actions should be avoided. 
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The idea that individuals who are potential contributors to an essentially 
aggregative harm have an additional moral reason to try to prevent its occurrence 
is intuitively appealing. Judith Lichtenberg argues that it is prima facie plausible 
that a causal connection to a problem gives an additional moral reason to be 
concerned with resolving it (Lichtenberg, 2010).  In the following section I will 
explore possible explanations for why a causal connection to a problem can 
ground an additional moral reason to address that problem. 
Avoiding Contribution 
Derek Parfit has proposed that, in certain circumstances, individuals have an 
obligation to avoid contributing to sets of acts which together cause harm to 
others (Parfit, 1986, pp. 71-83). He suggests that when the act we are proposing 
to take is likely to be part of a set of acts which cause harm, we are obliged to 
avoid taking the action in question.151 This is a very demanding theory; it requires 
individuals to refrain from taking action whenever they have reason to believe it 
will contribute to an essentially aggregative harm.  
There are many reasons to doubt that there is a general prohibition on 
contributions to aggregative harm. In modern society it is likely that many of an 
agent’s actions make small contributions to aggregative harm. In these conditions 
a prohibition of this kind could have a paralysing affect. Worse still, often agents 
have moral reasons to keep taking actions which risk coming together with others 
to cause harm. In these conditions contributions to essentially aggregative harms 
may be justifiable.  Furthermore, the moral reasons in favour of such a prohibition 
are relatively weak because the connection between contributors and harm is 
weak. Often, refraining from making a contribution to a potential essentially 
aggregative harm will not prevent the harm from taking place and will make no 
significant difference to the seriousness of the problem. The fact that those who 
will suffer as a result of the destruction of the common also contribute to this 
destruction also speaks against a prohibition on use of the common.  This is 
                                                          
151
 One problem with applying Parfit’s theory to the tragedy is that it is not clear which 
agents must alter their actions in order to avoid the tragedy.  Parfit specifies that the 
smallest group of individuals who could have avoided a problem by acting differently are 
at fault.  In this example there are multiple groups to choose from and it is difficult to 
identify who exactly is in the group.  When the group is indeterminate Parfit suggests that 
whether an individual has an obligation to alter their behaviour depends on whether or 
not they have reason to believe that enough individuals have changed their behaviour 
such that the problem can be avoided (Parfit, 1986, pp. 71-83). 
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because an agents right to object to contributions by others to threats to the 
livelihood of themselves and others is somewhat undermined if they also 
contribute to the problem themselves.  All of which suggest that it is 
unreasonable to demand that agents always avoid making contributions to 
essentially aggregative harms, especially when these contributions are required to 
maintain their livelihood or to fulfil their other obligations.  
The connection between an action and harm prima facie suggests that the action 
should be avoided.  However, where avoiding the action is extremely costly, the 
victims participate in the problem themselves and the action is unlikely to make a 
significant difference the prima facie demand is outweighed by these other 
important considerations.  The right to be free from obligation coupled with the 
right to take actions necessary to fulfil one’s obligations and pursue one’s 
conception of the good outweighs the reasons that speak in favour of prohibiting 
the act.  However, where avoiding contributions is not excessively costly and the 
harm is significantly serious there is a case for suggesting that agents have an 
obligation to avoid contributing. Freedom from excessively demanding obligation 
must be balanced against freedom from essentially aggregative harms. These 
considerations suggest not that there is no obligation to avoid actions that 
contribute to an essentially aggregative threat.  Instead they suggest that any 
such obligation must be limited by what can reasonably be demanded.  It could be 
that the obligation to avoid contributing to essentially aggregative harm only 
demands that agents make reasonable efforts to avoid such contributions. 
 In the tragedy of the commons case described, the only way commons users can 
ensure they do not contribute to the destruction of the commons is to remove all 
their animals from the pasture.152 Removing one’s sheep from the commons is 
incredibly costly and will not significantly decrease the risk of the commons being 
destroyed. In fact any individual withdrawal may make no difference at all 
because the space left is likely to be taken up by users who do not exercise 
restraint (Johnson, 2003, p. 274). In this case the action demanded: avoid grazing 
is as costly as the outcome of the essentially aggregative harm: agents cannot 
graze their livestock. Hence, the demand that agents refrain from grazing animals 
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 It could be argued that it is only those who use more than their fair share of the 
commons who should be identified as contributors to the problem.  This possibility is fully 
explored below. 
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on the commons is unreasonable because the cost of complying is too high to 
justify the action. 
Preventing the destruction of the commons through collective agreement is a way 
in which commons users could avoid contributing to the essentially aggregative 
harm without sacrificing their own access to the commons. This means that it 
represents a strategy for preventing the destruction of the commons (and thereby 
avoiding contributions to its destruction) which is not overly demanding and 
which promotes the common good. I will now explore whether making efforts to 
establish such a collective agreement can be required by the duty to make 
reasonable efforts to avoid contributing to essentially aggregative harm. 
Taking Precautions 
Obligations to avoid harming others sometimes require that individuals take 
action prior to or during engagement in a risky activity in order to reduce the risk 
of the activity causing harm to others. For example, those wishing to conduct 
firework displays are required to take certain precautions in order to avoid 
causing harm to others. Being responsible requires that agents take these 
precautions in order to avoid causing harm to others. This example shows that the 
obligation to avoid harming others sometimes requires ex-ante precautionary 
action.  In the commons case perhaps agents have an obligation to take such 
precautionary action to prevent contributing to essentially aggregative harm. 
Although it may be unreasonable to ask commons users not to graze any animals 
on the commons, it is not unreasonable to ask that they make efforts to establish 
a collective agreement that prevents the destruction of the common resource. My 
proposal is that one has an obligation to do what can be reasonably demanded to 
prevent one’s action contributing to an essentially aggregative harm.  
In cases like the tragedy of the commons where ending contributions directly is 
unreasonably demanding, potential contributors to aggregative harm should 
make efforts to form a collective and prevent the harm that may otherwise result 
from the aggregation of their actions. By working together agents could agree on 
a scheme and adopt an enforcement mechanism that provides reasonable 
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assurance. Taking action of this kind will reduce to an acceptable level the risk of 
the commons being destroyed.153  
Taking a precaution is never guaranteed to prevent one’s actions causing harm. In 
the case of a fireworks display there remains a risk of injury. The precautions 
taken aim to reduce the risk of injury to an acceptable level. In the case of 
essentially aggregative harm, individual action aimed at trying to establish a 
collective agreement may not be successful. However, such efforts increase the 
likelihood that an agreement will be forged. If an agreement is forged then it 
becomes incredibly unlikely that the commons will be destroyed. Hence, making 
efforts to establish a collective agreement (in circumstances where such efforts 
increase the likelihood of an agreement being forged) reduces the likelihood that 
the commons will be destroyed. This means that efforts to establish such an 
agreement can be considered a precaution which decreases the likelihood that an 
agent will contribute to essentially aggregative harm. 
Unilaterally Cutting Down 
Marion Hourdequin argues that individuals who contribute to a tragedy of the 
commons have an obligation to cut down their own contributions to the problem 
(Hourdequin, 2011).154 She argues that in a tragedy of the commons each 
individual is obliged to restrict their own use of the commons to a sustainable 
level.  There may be an obligation to unilaterally cut down ones use of a common 
resource when it is threatened by overuse.  However, the existence of such an 
obligation does not preclude the existence of an obligation to take reasonable 
precautions to avoid contributing to essentially aggregative harm.  Nor does 
cutting down the number of animals a user grazes on the common fulfil this 
obligation.  Those who cut back their use of the commons still causally contribute 
to the threat to the commons, because they still use the resource.  Hence, they 
still have an obligation to take precautions to avoid contributing to a tragedy of 
the commons. 
                                                          
153
 Outsiders may assist, but there may be legitimacy problems with allowing them to help 
design and enforce such a system. 
154
 In his monist account of justice and morality Liam Murphy also suggests that individuals 
can make individual contributions to just outcomes aswell as acting through governing 
institutions (Murphy, 1999). 
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At a stretch, taking action to reduce the number of animals you graze could be 
seen as a form of precautionary action aimed at preventing the destruction of the 
resource.  Such a precaution could be substituted for efforts to establish a 
collective solution. However, cutting back could only prevent an agent from 
contributing to the tragedy if enough other agents cut back such that the tragedy 
is avoided. In the absence of a general norm governing restraint, an essentially 
aggregative harm is still likely to emerge from the combination of the agent’s 
actions with the actions of others. An individual choosing to cut back is unlikely to 
manage to avoid the destruction of the commons and thereby avoid contributing 
to the destruction of the commons. Hence, it does not seem the most effective 
precaution to take.  
When individuals act unilaterally, in the hope that others will follow suit, they risk 
their efforts being wasted.  Worse still, agents who cut down the number of sheep 
they have grazing reduce their access to meat and wool. If others fail to alter their 
behaviour, this sacrifice will have had no positive results. By independently 
changing their action individuals risk disadvantaging themselves relative to others 
who do not play their part.  This means that unilaterally cutting back is even more 
demanding because it puts agents at a relative disadvantage.155  It also offers a 
prudential reason to favour a collective solution.  
Even if individual restraint helps to establish a norm of restraint it will remain 
unclear how much any individual must cut down their contributions. Users may 
disagree about what constitutes their fair share of restraint and which factors 
dictate the size of their share of use. Without an explicit agreement, there is no 
guarantee the commons will be protected even if all commons users seek to cut 
back to some extent. Only if a collective strategy is agreed can an individual know 
how much they need to cut down to ensure the tragedy is avoided. The only 
reliable way to avoid these problems would be to establish a norm governing fair 
use of the commons and adopt a mechanism capable of offering assurance that 
each individual will stick to the norm. In certain circumstances such a norm could 
emerge through reciprocal restraint, trust and casual discussion. In such 
circumstances this option is likely to be effective. However in such circumstances 
this solution becomes a species of the sort of action I have been recommending. 
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 The strategy I recommend of making efforts to establish a collective agreement also 
risks wasted efforts if others do not support this action.  Hence, I deal with this objection 
to my own account below.   
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This is not to say that there is no moral reason for individuals in a potential 
tragedy of the commons to practice restraint. It is only to say that restraint is not 
the best precaution to take in order to prevent contribution to essentially 
aggregative harm, unless it is part of establishing a social norm which can prevent 
the destruction of the resource. 
One could object that it is only unsustainable use of the commons which 
contributes to its destruction.  One could say that it is those who use more than 
their fair share of the use the common can sustainably support who as an 
aggregate cause the destruction of the commons.  Thus those who only use the 
commons sustainably avoid contributing to the destruction.  In contrast my 
account suggests that those who use only their fair share of what the commons 
can support still graze animals and therefore still are part of the aggregate who 
cause the destruction of the commons because their animals still contribute to 
the over-grazing.   
The rival understanding of the problem assumes that there is a fair share of 
sustainable use that applies even in the absence of any collective agreement.  It 
advises commons users to stay within the limits of that fair share.  This is 
controversial as there are reasons to think that limits on resource use only apply 
in circumstances where there is an effective practice of restraint.  As Brian Barry 
argues it is only when there is an existing practice of restraint that those who do 
not participate free ride on the efforts of others (Barry, 1991, pp. 160-165). 
Furthermore, staying within the limits of one’s fair share may be difficult because 
commons users may not know what their fair share is. It could be assumed that 
each grazer is entitled to an equal number of animals.  However this approach 
could be problematic.  It could be that those grazers with larger families are 
entitled to more animals whilst those without children or other relatives to 
support are entitled to less.  There may be some commons users whose skill set 
and level of ability is such that they can only rely on the common whereas others 
have skill and abilities which mean they can secure the same standard of living 
whilst grazing less animals (for example some grazers may lack the use of their 
legs and therefore not be able to grow crops).  It could be that any individual 
person lacks the objectivity to successfully determine what constitutes their fair-
share in isolation.  Even if the deliberations that individuals take alone can come 
up with a right idea of what moral criteria determines a fair share determining 
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how many animals they may graze will require substantial information about 
commons and substantial knowledge of other commons user’s needs and 
situation.  This will require a thorough investigation into or discussion of other 
commons users needs and abilities.  In these circumstances, it may be easier for 
commons users to establish common institutions to determine each user’s fair 
share of use together. 
Despite these problems a commons user may know roughly what their fair share 
of use is and stay well within it.  If my account of contribution is rejected in favour 
of the account that states that only those that use more than their fair share of 
grazing contribute to the tragedy there may still be moral reasons for a commons 
user to choose campaigning for a collective agreement over unilaterally cutting 
back to a level of use which would preserve the common if universally practiced.  
Unilaterally cutting back may be more costly than campaigning for a collective 
agreement.  This is because unilaterally cutting back puts a commons user at a 
disadvantage in market transactions and social life relative to others.  There are 
also independent moral reasons for them to prefer campaigning for a collective 
solution.  Establishing a collective agreement is more likely to promote the 
common good than unilaterally cutting back the use of the commons.  Baylor 
Johnson’s argument holds that the common good is best promoted by preventing 
the destruction of the commons and that agents can best achieve this through 
establishing a collective agreement.  Establishing a collective agreement prevents 
contribution to harm and promotes the common good.  Whereas unilaterally 
cutting back commons use to a sustainable level only prevents contribution to 
harm (if the alternative conception of contribution to the tragedy is accepted). 
However, if it is true that only unsustainable use of the common contributes to 
the problem, in circumstances where a collective agreement may fail to be 
established the commons users negative duty to avoid contributing to essentially 
aggregative harm will require that they cut back their use of the common to a 
sustainable level.  That way they can guarantee they do not contribute to harm.  
However, their reason to promote the common good may require them to also 
work towards a collective agreement. 
Objections 
Some of the objections to unilateral restraint as a precaution also give reason to 
oppose an obligation to try to establish a collective agreement.  The efforts 
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required to maintain and enforce a collective agreement can be divided up 
between commons users. Establishing an initial collective agreement and 
institutions capable of sharing out duties will require effort. Persuading enough 
commons users to support a collective agreement will require dedicating a fairly 
substantial amount of time and effort to the project. An agent’s time and effort 
could otherwise be spent at her own discretion; working to pursue her plans and 
living as she wishes. Fulfilling the demand outlined will thus substantially reduce 
the time, energy and resources agents have to pursue what is valuable to them 
and develop the relationships that are important to them. Thus it could be that 
the obligation proposed could be rejected on the basis that it is overly demanding.  
A sphere of activity in which individuals are free from the demands of others is 
essential to a decent life. However, the importance of such a sphere is unlikely to 
provide good reason to reject the demand that agents spend a reasonable 
amount of time and energy preventing the destruction of the commons.  It is 
unlikely that other commons users should accept the excuse given that the 
destruction of the common land will leave them in a situation where their ability 
to pursue their life plans and live how they choose will be severely reduced.  
One case in which the demandingness of the proposed duty becomes especially 
significant is when fulfilling an obligation may require neglecting other significant 
obligations. Sometimes the ability to fulfil special obligations can be undermined 
by the demandingness of a general obligation. For example, a parent has an 
obligation to provide for the needs of their young children.  Each commons user 
will be in a unique situation in terms of ability to help. Some will have other 
obligations, some will be in a position where contribution will be more costly and 
others may have to dedicate the majority of their time to maintaining their 
existence. The obligation to make reasonable efforts will require different 
amounts of time and commitment from different individuals based on the precise 
circumstances of their case. 
In some commons examples the negative effects of the loss of a resource is too 
small to justify the limitation to liberty a collective agreement to prevent that 
destruction would require. In these cases it may not be right to establish such an 
agreement. Similarly there may be situations where the costs of participating in 
collective action and political organisation may be such that a demand to take 
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part in it can be justifiably refused. These costs must be balanced against the 
benefits of succeeding in the endeavour. 
There is a limit to the precautions it is reasonable to demand an agent takes. 
Where the precaution is costly and its ability to limit harm marginal we do not 
demand that agents take precautions. The freedom of those who wish to take 
part in potentially harmful activities is balanced against the risk of causing harm 
and the seriousness of that harm. Similarly, the obligation outlined only requires 
that agents take reasonable precautions to avoid contributing to essentially 
aggregative harm. The demandingness of a precaution must be balanced against 
the seriousness and likelihood of the threat in question.  
There are points at which the burdens attached to fulfilling a proposed obligation 
are sufficient to give good reason to reject it. These points occur where the 
burdens approach the seriousness of the burden the obligation seeks to address. 
The burden an agent faces in promoting collective action must be weighed against 
the suffering the tragedy of the commons will cause to the people most adversely 
affected. 
Agents may also reject the demand to take collective action on the basis that the 
threat to the resource is too low to justify the demand for action. If the threat is 
unlikely to be realised fulfilling the demand could be rejected on the basis that it 
is an acceptable risk. If the commons can cope easily with the current level of 
grazing and an increase is unlikely then commons users are not required to 
establish an agreement to protect the commons. 
Again a balance must be established between the burdens imposed by a duty and 
the problem it attempts to avoid. This time it is not the seriousness of the 
problem which must outweigh the inconvenience of the obligation. Instead it is 
the likelihood of the bad consequence emerging which needs to be sufficient to 
justify the efforts demanded. The seriousness of the potential consequence in 
combination with its likelihood should be weighed against the difficulty and 
sacrifice involved in discharging the proposed duty and the likelihood that the 
efforts demanded will succeed. 156 
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 It is likely that this weighing up is not simply a utilitarian cost benefit analysis where the 
advantages and disadvantages to a number of individuals are added together.  It is 
probably necessary that the position of each individual is considered and the burdens they 
are asked to shoulder by the solution proposed considered. This is because there are 
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An individual could argue that it is unfair to demand they make efforts to establish 
a collective agreement because even if they make reasonable efforts others are 
unlikely to join in collective action and as a result the destruction of the commons 
won’t be avoided. If other commons users are apathetic and unlikely to 
participate in establishing a collective solution it may be unreasonable to demand 
that any particular individual makes efforts to establish a collective solution.157  If 
a collective agreement is not secured, efforts expended on trying to establish such 
an agreement will have done nothing to lessen the aggregative harm. Worse still, 
agents who have made efforts to establish such a solution will be at a 
disadvantage compared to their fellow commons users. This is because they will 
have devoted time and effort to trying and failing to secure a collective solution 
rather than sheering sheep or any of the other things they could have been doing 
with their time.  
Alternatively, an agent could object that whether or not they contribute to 
establishing a collective solution will have no significant effect on whether the 
tragedy occurs. This problem is sometimes known as ‘inconsequentialism’. The 
accusation is that for any individual agent, that agent making efforts to establish a 
collective solution cannot make any significant difference to the outcome. This 
suggests that we cannot claim that the agent has a moral reason to take the 
action recommended.  
Both the outlined objections suggest that efforts to establish collective 
institutions have no effect on future contributions to essentially aggregative 
harm. These objections are particularly effective on an obligation that requires 
agents take precautions in order to prevent contributing to harm. This is because 
in circumstances where an individual’s efforts are unlikely to be successful they 
will not avoid contributing to harm. Furthermore, if their efforts fail then agents 
do not even lessen their contributions to aggregative harm. It is difficult to see 
                                                                                                                                                   
probably cases where burdening a large number of individuals is preferable to allowing 
one individual to undergo serious suffering (Scanlon, 2000). 
157
 The failure of others to acknowledge the obligation means there are less people to 
promote a collective solution so the burden on those who do take up the demand will 
increase if they are to be successful.    This is not just a case of sharing the same work 
among fewer people.  This problem means that there are more people to persuade and 
pressure to join in a collective solution and therefore more work to do.  It may be 
unreasonable to pursue a collective solution to the destruction of the commons in such 
circumstances. 
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why such efforts should be seen as necessary precautions if they are unlikely to 
have any effect on future contributions to the destruction of the resource. 
In the commons case discussed a collective solution is not necessarily doomed to 
failure, nor is it the case that an individual’s efforts to establish a collective 
solution will necessarily be insignificant.  It is likely that commons users will 
cooperate since a collective solution allows them to fulfil their obligations and 
promote their own interests.  Most commons users will be open to accepting a 
collective solution.  Furthermore, if there are only a relatively small number of 
commons users supporting or proposing a collective solution can make a 
significant to difference to its likelihood of success. 
However, in circumstances where there are large numbers of commons users who 
are fairly uncooperative these objections may pose a serious problem to a 
collective action solution.  However, even in circumstances of widespread apathy 
and numbers larger enough to make individual choices insignificant there may be 
moral reasons to pursue precautionary action even if its chances of success are 
slim.  Recent work on patterned principles of action from Christopher Woodard 
offers a possible way out of this dilemma (Woodard, 2008).  Woodard’s account 
suggests there can be moral reasons to play ones part in a  pattern of action even 
when it is unlikely that others will play their part in that pattern.  Shelly Kagan has 
recently produced work offering reasons to take action in circumstances where 
we are uncertain whether our action will make a significant difference (Kagan, 
2011).  These accounts could be utilised to overcome the objections noted above.  
However in a paper of this length I do not have the space to properly deal with 
these complex and interesting issues.  Hence, I will have to leave these problems 
unresolved here.   
Conclusions 
It has been suggested that the destruction of a common resource through over 
use as a form of essentially aggregative harm. Others have suggested that agents 
have positive obligations to try to prevent the destruction of a common resource 
through a collective agreement. I have argued that commons users must take 
such action as a part of an obligation to take reasonable precautions to avoid 
contributing to essentially aggregative harm. I have very briefly considered 
possible objections and replies to the proposed norm and the demand to make 
efforts to prevent the destruction of commons land. Some of these objections 
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offer reasons to limit the cases in which the obligation applies and the amount of 
effort the obligation can demand. I have discussed considerations that should 
guide judgement on this matter.  I have suggested several routes that could be 
employed to defend the idea that commons users must contribute to establishing 
a collective agreement to avoid the destruction of the commons against the 
objection that such efforts are unlikely to work and that any contribution to such 
efforts will not make a significant difference to outcomes.  
Some of these routes may also offer reason to support an obligation to cut down 
one’s use of the commons unilaterally. This means that commons users may be 
obligations to practice restraint. However, as a solution to the destruction of the 
commons this option remains suboptimal compared to my proposed solution. 
This is because making the collective action solution work so as to prevent 
contribution to essentially aggregative harm only requires a critical mass to 
establish an agreement and an assurance mechanism, whereas a strategy of 
unilaterally cutting down (in the absence of an assurance mechanism) requires 
universal compliance in order to be effective in preventing contribution to the 
destruction of the commons.  Furthermore, the strategy of trying to establish a 
collective agreement is more realistic in its demands: it does not ask individuals to 
reduce their use of the commons in conditions where this sacrifice is unlikely to 
prevent the destruction of the resource and they are likely to be disadvantaged 
relative to others.  
Often a morally significant bad situation is the result of on-going social practices, 
trends in human action, and the concrete results of past action. There are a 
diverse range of cases that mirror the commons example in that no individual 
factor or action can be identified as their cause. In many of these cases collective 
action represents the most effective route through which harm can be avoided. 
Possible examples range from environmental problems, such as human-
accelerated climate change to economic problems such as the prevalence of 
poverty wages in manufacturing worldwide, to social problems such as the 
unreasonable grooming standards expected of women. As in the commons 
scenario, those who contribute to these social problems often do not intend to 
make contributions to these outcomes. Furthermore, contributors are unable to 
prevent their contribution without substantial personal cost. In some cases 
unilateral change is impossible. This is the case when the harm is caused by the 
amalgamation of a set of complex practices engaging many disparate individuals 
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and participation in these practices is the only available way to access essential 
resources. A final similarity is that those who contribute often regard avoiding 
such contributions as not necessary because such a change in behaviour would 
have no significant effect on the social problem in question.  
In the modern world a number of serious global social problems have become 
apparent. Often these problems are the cumulative result of the contributions of 
billions of people residing in a variety of states and different regions of the world. 
There are various global environmental problems that in some ways resemble the 
‘tragedy of the commons’. There are also significant problems within the global 
economy and with access to that economy which are partly caused by 
competition between states. One example of which is the exploitative working 
conditions (low wages, long hours, no collective bargaining) of export processing 
zones and the lack of economic opportunities that lead people to accept these 
conditions.158  My analysis here suggests that those who contribute to these 
problems have obligations to work with others to establish collective solutions to 
these problems: they must establish a collective system of regulation and 
adjustment that allows them to prevent the essentially aggregative harm from 
emerging. These obligations apply even if it cannot be reasonably demanded that 
agents refrain from making contributions to these problems. I have argued that 
negative duties to make reasonable efforts to avoid contributing to essentially 
aggregative harm require such action in addition to obligations to promote the 
common good and the rational demands of prudence. 
The obligation I have proposed offers an update of conventional morality to deal 
with mass society and a globalised world in which collective action offers the only 
means through which these forces can be tamed. I hope that understanding 
obligations to engage in action to establish collective solutions as required by a 
negative duty to avoid contribution to aggregative harm can emphasize the 
connection between individuals and large scale social problems. I also hope that 
the possibility of working with others can help individuals overcome feelings of 
powerlessness in the face of global forces.  Participating in collective action can be 
difficult and progress can be slow. Worse still, collective action can be a 
                                                          
158
 For just one example of pay and hours witnessed during a government sanctioned visit 
to an export processing zone in Bangladesh see ‘Are export processing zones the new 
sweatshops, or drivers of development?’ Guardian Poverty Matters Blog at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2012/apr/30/export-
processing-zones-sweatshops-development April 2012 accessed 04/03/2013. 
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dangerous force if not pursued through legitimate and fair practices. However, 
collective efforts have the potential to make structural and permanent change 
which can benefit millions of lives. 
There are many difficulties standing in the way of the establishment of just and 
legitimate solutions to collective action problems. Coordination across continents 
is difficult and the majority of the world’s population are too consumed with the 
daily struggles of poverty to devote much time to these problems. Furthermore, 
many individuals in affluent countries like those of Western Europe have the 
necessary time, resources and political environment to make progress on these 
issues possible but are uncooperative and averse to taking political action. In spite 
of these difficulties it is my hope that the analysis here can be helpfully applied to 
some of these problems. It is my belief that the seriousness of these problems 
should be sufficient to give reason to justify an obligation to work towards finding 
just and legitimate solutions to them. 
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